State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1417

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Luke Alexander Dean,
Appellant.

Filed May 18, 2020
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-12-3627

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge;
and Peterson, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Luke Alexander De an challenges the district court’s order revoking his
probation and executing his stayed sentence.1 Dean argues that the district court abused its
discretion by (1) deciding that the need fo r confinement outweighed the policies favoring
continued probation and (2) imposing a ten-year conditional-release term after the district
court imposed a five-year conditional-release term when it first pronounced the sentence
and did not change the term on the record at his probation revocation hearing. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2013, Dean pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal sexual conduct based on sexual
contact he had with his minor half-sister between 2005 and 2008 . The district court
sentenced Dean to 144 months’ imprisonment with five years’ conditional release, stayed
execution of the sentence, and placed him on pr obation for ten years. As part of Dean’s
probation, the district court imposed conditions, including that he spend a year in custody,
participate in sex-offender programming and trea tment, avoid contact with the victim or
other minors, not possess or use pornographic materials, and not access the internet without
probation’s approval. Dean violated his conditions of probation three times. The first two
times, the district court did not revoke probation; the third time, the district court revoked
probation, executed Dean’s sentence, and im posed a ten-year cond itional-release term,
leading to this appeal.

1 The state did not file a brief in this appeal.

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Dean’s first two probation vi olations occurred in 2016, three years after the initial
sentencing. Both violations involved Dean’s contacts with his minor children. As for the
first violation, Dean admitted that he contacted his minor ch ildren, failed to complete his
sex-offender treatment program, and possessed pornographic magazines. The district court
continued Dean’s probation but required him to spend nine months in custody and to restart
and complete sex-offender treatment. As for the second violation, D ean admitted that he
again tried to contact his minor children by sending them birthday cards. For a second time,
the district court cont inued Dean’s probation, this time with the co ndition that he spend
another year in custody and continue sex-offender treatment.
In 2019, the third and final violation aros e out of a relationship Dean began with a
new girlfriend. Dean admitted that he had contact with his girlfriend’s minor child, both at
a store and at the girlfriend’s parents’ home. He explained that he was never alone with the
child but also that he understood the probation condition was to have no contact with minor
children. At a later dispositi on hearing, the district cour t heard from Dean’s probation
officer, who reviewed Dean’s history, including describing some uncharged sexual conduct
involving Dean’s children and the termination of De an’s parental rights. Appellant’s
counsel urged the district court to contin ue probation, along w ith some additional
confinement, arguing that long -term public safety would be best served by appellant’s
rehabilitation through treatment in the community.
The district court orally indicated that it was revoking Dean’s probation and
executing his sentence. The dist rict court thereafter issued an amended sentencing order,
which executed Dean’s 144-month sentence , updated Dean’s time-served credit, and

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imposed a ten-year, rather than five-year, te rm of conditional release after confinement.
The district court also made written findings regarding its probation revocation.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Dean’s probation.
If an offender with a stay of execution admits a probation violation, a district court
may continue the offender on probation or revoke the stay of execution and execute the
sentence. Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 3( 2)(b). To revoke an o ffender’s probation, a
district court “must 1) designate the specific condition or conditions that were violated;
2) find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable; and 3) find that need for
confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.” State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246,
250 (Minn. 1980). “A district court has broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient
evidence to revoke probation and should be reve rsed only if there is a clear abuse of that
discretion.” State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted).
Dean challenges only the third Austin-factor finding, arguing that the need to
confine him does not outweigh the policies fa voring probation. In a ssessing whether the
need for confinement outweighs the policies fa voring probation, a district court should
consider whether (1) “confinement is necessary to protect the public from further criminal
activity,” (2) the offe nder needs “correctional treatment which can most effectively be
provided if he is confined,” or (3) reinstating probation “would unduly depreciate the
seriousness of the violation.” Id. at 607 (quotation omitted). In some cases, “policy

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considerations may require that probation not be revoked even though the facts may allow
it.” Id. at 606 (quotation omitted).
The district court determined that confin ement was necessary to protect the public
from further criminal activity. Sp ecifically, it found that De an was “at an extremely high
risk of reoffending” and that his continued presence in the community posed an “immediate
and pressing danger” to the public. The district court cited the behavior that led to Dean’s
conviction, the earlier probation violations, his lack of rehabilitation, and his unacceptable
sexual behaviors. Specifically, the district court emphasized Dean’s conduct leading to the
third violation, in which Dean was evasive about having contact with his girlfriend’s child
and continued the relationship with his gi rlfriend, despite his treatment group’s
recommendation that he end it.
Dean argues that “[t]his case is the rare case where pol icy considerations required
that the district court not revoke Dean’s probation, even though the facts may have allowed
it.” He contends the facts show that he was on a path of rehabilitation. He claims that he
has come to recognize the impact that his own childhood victimization has had on his
behavior. And Dean states that , while treatment has been di fficult, he has made progress
over the last year and had begun working to support himself.
We conclude that the record supports the district court’s determination and does not
suggest that this is a rare case requiring continued probati on. Dean admitted that he had
contact with the minor child and knew that his probation conditions did not allow that
contact. Furthermore, Dean’s treatment program terminated his treatment when the state
filed the third probation-viola tion report. In terminating Dean ’s treatment, the treatment-

6
program therapist wrote two letters descri bing issues Dean had during treatment,
contradicting Dean’s claim that he was making progress. Indeed, the therapist stated that
Dean was using his increased knowledge from the program to better manipulate others,
rather than to “moderate his risk for sexually acting out.” She also stated that Dean was “at
high risk of reoffending and would likely reoffend if given the opportunity.”
Dean’s argument that he has made progre ss in rehabilitation does not address the
district court’s determination that Dean was likely to reoffend and appeared to be grooming
another potential victim when he violated his probation co nditions. His argument that he
was a victim of abuse as a child, while sympathetic, also does not address the district court’s
determination. The district c ourt did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the need
for confinement outweighed the policy concerns supporting probation.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by correcting Dean’s sentence.
Dean argues that the district court erred by changing his sentence from five to ten
years of conditional release after confinement. The district court “may at any time correct
a sentence not authorized by law.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. Appellate courts afford
the district court “great discretion in the imposition of sentences and reverse sentencing
decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Soto , 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08
(Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). A district c ourt abuses its discretion if it errs in its
application of the law. See State v. Williams , 862 N.W.2d 701, 703 (Minn. 2015)
(discussing review of postconviction court’s denial of motion to correct sentence).
When Dean was originally sentenced, the warrant of commitment indicated a stayed
sentence of 144 months’ imprisonment and a five-year period of conditional release. At the

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disposition hearing on the probation violation, th e district court revo ked Dean’s stay of
execution, stating:
Here’s where I’m at, Luke. I think it’s time to—to shut
this down. I’ve looked at it. I’ ve thought about it. I read the
letter from The Institute two or three times, and that doesn’t
mean the work is done or that anybody’s throwing you away,
but it does mean you do the prison time.
You’ve got 693 days of cr edit against the sentence.
You’ve got that conditional release period. It’s gonna be
continued work. It’s gonna be in a different environment.
(Emphasis added.) The district court ma de no comments about the length of the
conditional-release period, nor did it suggest it was planning to modify Dean’s original
sentence.2 But when the district court amended De an’s sentencing order to execute his
sentence, it changed the number of years of conditional release after confinement from five
to ten.
Dean characterizes these actions as the district court imposing a sentence orally and
then issuing a written order that conflicts with the oral sentence. He contends that the
district court’s statement about “that condi tional release period” amounts to an oral
pronouncement that it was imposing the prev ious five-year conditional-release sentence.
As Dean notes, we have previously concl uded that the district court’s “formal on-the-
record pronouncement of sentence is controlling” over a warrant of commitment, at least

2 At the hearing, the probation officer did me ntion that, “at this point . . . that would
obviously require ten years of conditional release.” But neither the officer nor the district
court elaborated further.

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when determining whether the district court imposed concurrent or consecutive sentences.
State v. Rasinski, 527 N.W.2d 593, 595 (Minn. App. 1995).
But even if the district court’s imposition of ten years of conditional release departed
from its oral pronouncement at the dispositi on hearing or from the original sentencing
order, the district court did not abuse its discretion. In im posing ten years of conditional
release, the district court was correcting D ean’s sentence in accordance with law. Under
Minnesota law, a district court must place o ffenders convicted of fi rst-degree criminal
sexual conduct on conditional release for a ma ndatory period of te n years following the
offender’s release from prison. Minn. Stat . § 609.3455, subd. 6 (2 008). These mandatory
terms may not be waived in a plea agreement. State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn.
2000). Appellate courts may not enforce thro ugh specific performance an agreement that
does not have these mandatory terms. State v. Garcia , 582 N.W.2d 879, 881-82 (Minn.
1998).
The district court convicted Dean base d on his admission to committing multiple
acts of sexual abuse between January 1, 2005 , and December 31, 2008, so his admission
establishes that his criminal sexual conduct occurred after the August 1, 2005 effective date
of the mandatory ten-year period. See 2005 Minn. Laws ch. 136, ar t. 2, § 21, subd. 6, at
931 (adding the mandatory te n-year period of conditional release after confinement); see
also Rickert v. State, 795 N.W.2d 236, 242-43 (Minn. 2011) (holding that a guilty plea to
criminal sexual conduct “[o]n or about 2003 through 2006” established that the criminal
conduct occurred in 2006, so the ten-year conditional release applied). Dean was therefore
subject to the mandatory ten-year requirement, and the district court had the authority to

9
correct the sentence at any time. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. Dean is not entitled
to the specific performance of th e district court’s oral sentence because such a sentence,
with only five years of conditional releas e after confinement, would be unlawful. See
Garcia, 582 N.W.2d at 881-82.
Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by correcting Dean’s sentence to
include ten years of conditional release after confinement.
Affirmed.