In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Barry L. Blomquist, Jr., a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 12090X

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STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A19-1461
Original Jurisdiction Per Curiam
Took no part, Chutich, J.

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against
Barry L. Blomquist, Jr., a Minnesota Attorney,
Registration No. 12090X

Filed: May 5, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts

________________________

Susan M. Humiston, Director, Binh T. Tuong, Managing Attorney , Office of Lawyers
Professional Responsibility, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for petitioner.

Barry L. Blomquist, Jr., Paynesville, Minnesota, pro se.
________________________

S Y L L A B U S
Disbarment is the appropriate discipline for an attorney who misappropriated and
converted trust assets for his personal use in violation of his fiduciary duties as trustee,
refused to comply with court orders, and failed to cooperate with the Director’s
investigation.

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O P I N I O N
PER CURIAM.
The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility filed a petition
for disciplinary action against respondent Barry L. Blomquist, Jr. The petition alleged
Blomquist misappropriated trust assets by investing in five start-up companies he owned,
in breach of his fiduciary duty as trustee; refused to comply with court orders from three
different judges; and failed to cooperate with the Director’s investigation into his
misconduct. After an evidentiary hearing, a referee found the Director had proven
Blomquist committed the alleged misconduct and recommended Blomquist be disbarred.
Based on Blomquist’s misconduct , we agree with the referee and , therefore, we disbar
Blomquist from the practice of law.
FACTS
Blomquist was admitted to practice law in Minnesota on October 24, 1980. His
only history of prior discipline is an admonition in 2012 for falsely notarizing a mortgage
deed conveying property from a seller to an entity he co- owned, in violation of Minn. R.
Prof. Conduct 8.4(c)–(d). Blomquist has also been administratively suspended for failing
to pay his annual registration dues since 2009. See Rule 14(A), Sup. Ct. R. Lawyer
Registration; see also In re Knutson , 405 N.W.2d 234, 236 (Minn. 1987) (explaining that
a lawyer’s “[f]ailure to pay attorney registration fees results in automatic suspension”).
The present proceeding arises from Blomquist’s actions as trustee of a trust created
by a then-client with whom he had developed a close personal relationship, R.N. In May
2003, R.N. executed a will creating a trust for the benefit of his daughter, D.H., and his two
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sons. R.N. insisted on naming Blomquist in the will as personal representative of R.N.’s
estate and trustee, despite Blomquist’s personal objection to serving in these roles.1
In October 2003, R.N. passed away. Blomquist accordingly became the personal
representative of the estate and trustee of the corresponding trust. After R.N.’s estate was
settled, the estate was valued at approximately $2,000,000 which was divided into three
trusts; one for each of his children.
Under the provisions of the will and trust, D.H. was entitled to receive portions of
the trust at pre -determined intervals. She was to receive one- third of the principal in her
trust in 2006, one-half in 2010, and the remainder in 2013.
In 2006, Blomquist, in his role as trustee, gave D.H. only $100,000, which was less
than one-third of the principal in the trust to which she was entitled by the express language
of the trust document. D.H. requested the remainder of her 2006 disbursement. Her request
went unanswered and Blomquist never provided the additional money to which she was
entitled.
In 2007, D.H. received an estate summary, which included a description of the
remaining trust assets, her share of those assets, and how the assets were to be distributed.
After this, Blomquist did not provide D.H. with any information or accounting related to
the trust until 2011.

1 R.N. named Blomquist the trustee of both a testamentary trust and a life insurance
trust, and D.H. was a beneficiary of both trusts. The two trusts were eventually merged,
so we will refer to them as a single trust.
4
In 2010, D.H. was entitled to another distribution from the trust. She did not receive
that distribution, however, until March 2011, and she believed the amount she received
was less than the amount to which she was entitled.
In 2011, D.H. received “a Trustee Summary Report” from Blomquist. This report
indicated Blomquist had invested significant sums of money from the trust principal in five
recently created, start-up, green-energy companies, which were all partially owned by
Blomquist. Throughout 2009 and 2010, unbeknownst to D.H., Blomquist signed seven
promissory notes on behalf of these companies to obtain loans from R.N.’s trust totaling
$799,000.00. In these notes, he held himself out as the “chief manager,” “Chief Executive
Officer,” and “trustee” of the companies. The companies made no payments to the trust
on any of the promissory notes and Blomquist failed to provide any information about these
companies to D.H. despite his personal interest in them. Further, these companies were
neither in existence when R.N. created his trust nor were they active at the date of his death.
In February 2011, D.H. filed a petition in Hennepin County Probate Court seeking
an accounting of the trust assets and court supervision of the trustee. In May of the same
year, the district court ordered Blomquist to appear at a June hearing. Blomquist
knowingly failed to appear. The probate court subsequently ordered Blomquist to appear
at a hearing in July 2011 to show cause as to why he failed to appear at the June hearing
and to explain why he had not provided required trust documentation. The show cause
order also required Blomquist to appear at the July hearing with documents related to the
trust and the five companies in which he had invested trust assets.
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Blomquist appeared in court as directed, but failed to bring all the court-ordered
documents and information. The probate court subsequently removed Blomquist a s
trustee, finding Blomquist failed to act as a prudent investor 2 and violated Minnesota’s
prohibition against trustee self-dealing.3 The court found “especially troubling”
Blomquist’s “cavalier attitude . . . about the obvious self -dealing he engaged in by using
trust assets to fund his own businesses.” The court observed that “[Blomquist] believes
that since he sees his business ventures as promising significant returns upon (what he
believes is) their inevitable success, he has satisfied his fiduciary duties to the Trust and to
[D.H.]. Unfortunately, nothing could be further from the truth in the eyes of the law.”
D.H. later filed a motion to enter judgment against Blomquist for trust money owed
to her in both his personal capacity and in his role as trustee. The probate court granted
summary judgment for D.H. in March 2012, finding Blomquist had breached his fiduciary
duties and engaged in self -dealing by investing a substantial amount of trust assets in the
five start-up companies. The court further determined D.H. would have been entitled to
receive $400,000 under the trust if Blomquist had not breached his fiduciary duties. It
ordered Blomquist to pay $400,000 directly to D.H. and produce documents about what
was done with the trust assets. Blomquist did not move for amended findings of fact or
appeal this ruling.

2 Minn. Stat. § 501C.0901 (2020) (previously codified as Minn. Stat. § 501B.151
(2010)).

3 Minn. Stat. § 501C.0802(a) (2020) (previously codified as Minn. Stat. § 501B.14,
subd. 1(2) (2010)).
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D.H. docketed the judgment. She sought information about the trust’s assets from
Blomquist through post-judgment discovery. Blomquist still did not produce the necessary
documentation. This forced D.H. to pursue additional judicial enforcement actions. In
November 2012, the probate court ordered Blomquist to appear at a hearing later that
month to answer questions concerning his personal property and transactions related to the
trust property. Blomquist, however, engaged in a series of delay tactics including a claimed
illness, which resulted in repeated continuation motions and a general lack of
responsiveness. In June 2013, after over 6 months of delays, D.H. filed a motion for an
order to show cause why Blomquist should not be held in contempt.
In July 2013, the probate court held a hearing on the show cause motion. Blomquist
appeared at the hearing and provided inconsistent testimony regarding how much of the
trust was invested into his five companies. Based on this proceeding and Blomquist’s
failure to produce documentation, the probate court issued an order taking under
advisement whether Blomquist was in civil contempt of court and requiring Blomquist to
surrender his passport or else he would be deemed to have committed constructive civil
contempt. A week later, the probate court issued a subsequent order requiring Blomquist
to produce numerous documents within 30 days , most of which he had been previously
ordered to produce. The court also scheduled a review hearing in August 2013, after the
deadline. If Blomquist failed to produce the documents by that date, he would be held in
contempt.
Blomquist did not appear at the August review hearing. Blomquist never produced
his passport to the probate court and he falsely represented to D.H.’s attorney he had done
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so at the July hearing. Blomquist also provided D.H.’s counsel a photocopy of his alleged
passport that misspelled his last name as “Blom guist.” The court accordingly found
Blomquist in civil contempt and issued a bench warrant for his arrest. At the hearing before
the referee, Blomquist insisted he did not know about these probate court hearings, but the
referee found this claim to be without merit and unsupported by the evidence.
In October 2013, to avoid arrest, Blomquist submitted his actual passport and
presented a box of documents to the probate court. These documents were also incomplete.
In the end, D.H. was unable to trace the assets Blomquist took from the trust and invested
in his companies. Blomquist was unable to account for trust assets he supposedly invested
in various companies through the promissory notes.
Every company Blomquist allegedly invested trust assets in has since dissolved.
None of the companies generated any income or revenue. They made no payments on the
promissory notes granted in favor of the trust.
By the time the trust dissolved, the balance was only $20,000. Blomquist only paid
approximately $100,000 of the $400,000 judgment that D.H. obtained against him . But
that payment was not voluntary and D.H. only received this money because her attorney
located various properties Blomquist owned and sold them off at auction.
Blomquist’s actions caused D.H. monetary and emotional harm. She spent many
hours and substantial funds to get Blomquist to simply account for the trust assets. As the
referee summarized, Blomquist misappropriated trust assets for his personal use and acted
in bad faith, in violation of his fiduciary duty as trustee by “investing” trust assets in five
risky and speculative companies in which he had a personal interest.
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On March 8, 2018, D.H. filed a complaint with the Director. Two weeks later, the
Director issued a not ice of investigation directing Blomquist to respond to D.H.’s
complaint. Over the next year, Blomquist failed to fully respond to the Director’s requests
for information and provided evasive, non-responsive answers to the Director’s
outstanding questions.
In February and March 2019, the Director tried to schedule a meeting with
Blomquist, but he did not respond to two telephone calls and a letter from the Director. In
March 2019, the Director wrote a second letter to Blomquist about the meeting and asked
him to send the Director a list of available meeting dates within 10 days.
Two days after the requested response date, Blomquist told the Director that the
documents requested were no longer available. Blomquist did not send the Director a list
of meeting dates as was requested; instead, he told the Director that any questions she had
should be submitted in writing.
In early April 2019, the Director told Blomquist via letter that she still wanted to
meet, and set a meeting date for two weeks later. Blomquist failed to appear at the meeting.
He wrote a letter to the Director on the same day and offered again to answer only questions
posed in writing.
On June 24, 2019, the Director served charges of unprofessional conduct on
Blomquist. He did not provide an answer to the charges or otherwise communicate with
the Director about the charges.
In September 2019, the Director filed an amended petition for disciplinary action
against Blomquist. We appointed a referee. Following an evidentiary hearing, the referee
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made factual findings consistent with the facts we just described. The referee found that
Blomquist’s disciplinary history, failure to accept responsibility , denial that his actions
were wrong, selfish motives, and failure to meaningfully make D.H. whole were
aggravating factors. He found testimony from Blomquist about his desire to pay D.H. back
in full to be “a minimal mitigating factor.”
The referee also made the following conclusions. First, the referee concluded
Blomquist violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c) and 8.4(d) by “willingly and knowingly”
failing to comply with three different court orders, “leading to an order finding [Blomquist]
in contempt of court.”4 Second, the referee concluded Blomquist misappropriated or used
the trust assets in bad faith, which constituted a breach of his fiduciary duties as trustee, in
violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d). Third, the referee concluded Blomquist
violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c) by engaging in dishonest conduct through his
conversion of “trust assets for his personal use and failing to account for those assets.” 5
Fourth, the referee concluded Blomquist “failed to fully cooperate with the Director’s
investigation and respond to the charges” in violation of Minn. R. Prof Conduct 8.1(b) and

4 A lawyer is prohibited from “knowingly disobey[ing] an obligation under the rules
of a tribunal.” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c). A lawyer may not “engage in conduct that
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d).

5 A lawyer may not “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c).

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Rule 25, Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR). 6 The referee
recommended that Blomquist be disbarred.
ANALYSIS
We begin with two preliminary procedural issues raised by Blomquist. Blomquist
first claims this disciplinary proceeding is moot because he wishes to voluntarily
disassociate from the bar. Second, Blomquist challenges the factual record in this case and
alleges the Director was obligated to order a transcript of the evidentiary hearing. We
address these issues in turn. And then we turn to the question of the proper discipline.
I.
Blomquist argues this proceeding is moot because he wants to voluntarily
disassociate from the bar. Lawyers may resign from the bar. See Rule 11, RLPR. We,
however, “do [] not allow a lawyer to resign with charges pending.” In re Perez,
688 N.W.2d 562, 567 (Minn. 2004). We do not allow resignation when allegations of
serious misconduct are pending because to do so “would not serve the ends of justice nor
deter others from legal misconduct.” In re McCoy, 447 N.W.2d 887, 891 (Minn. 1989).
Blomquist fails to present any reason to depart from our general prohibition on resignation
when charges of serious misconduct are pending and we decline to do so.
II.
Blomquist also attempts to challenge the referee’s factual findings notwithstanding
his failure to order a transcript of the proceeding. The applicable rule provides: “Unless

6 A lawyer “shall not . . . fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from
a[] . . . disciplinary authority.” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.1(b); see Rule 25(a), RLPR.
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the respondent or Director, within ten days, orders a transcript and so notifies this Court,
the [referee’s] findings of fact and conclusions shall be conclusive.” Rule 14(e), RLPR.
When no transcript has been ordered, we view “a referee’s factual findings as conclusive”
because reviewing factual findings is impossible “without a transcript.” In re Montez,
812 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Minn. 2012). We “similarly accept as conclusive the conclusions that
the referee draws from the facts, such as whether the attorney’s conduct violated the Rules
of Professional Conduct, when no transcript has been ordered.” Id.7
Neither party ordered a transcript in this case. Blomquist, however, alleges the facts
in this case required the Director to order a transcript of the proceedings before the referee.
We disagree.
Under the plain language of Rule 14(e), RLPR, both the Director and the attorney
facing discipline are permitted to order a transcript of the referee’s evidentiary hearing.
There is, however, no language in the rule obligating the Director to order a transcript in

7 Although we are bound by the referee’s findings regarding misappropriation and
conversion, we note the Director’s concession at oral argument that the record supporting
the referee’s findings that Blomquist engaged in misrepresentation and conduct involving
dishonesty lack specificity regarding the amount of trust assets involved in that behavior.
The referee’s findings are primarily based on the probate court orders in the R.N. trust case,
but those orders do not definitively find that Blomquist acted dishonestly, fraudulently,
deceitfully, or engaged in misrepresentation with regard to a particular amount of trust
assets. Rather, the court found that Blomquist breached his fiduciary duties as trustee based
on Blomquist’s conversion and investment of an uncertain amount of the trust assets into
businesses owned by Blomquist. We agree with the Director that the referee’s ultimate
conclusions that Blomquist’s conduct was both prejudicial to the administration of justice
in violation of Rule 8.4(d) and involved dishonesty in violation of Rule 8.4(c) are supported
by the district court’s determination that Blomquist breached his duty of loyalty as a trustee
by engaging in self-dealing with trust assets. This conclusion is bolstered by Blomquist’s
concession to the entry of a $400,000 judgment against him.
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any given case. Nor has Blomquist cited to a single case where we have placed such a duty
upon the Director. Instead, we have repeatedly said that when neither party orders a
transcript, the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions drawn from those facts are
“conclusive.” See , e.g., In re Fru, 829 N.W.2d 379, 387 (Minn. 2013); Montez,
812 N.W.2d at 66; In re Dedefo, 781 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 2010); In re Moore, 692 N.W.2d
446, 449 (Minn. 2005). Based on the plain language of Rule 14(e) and our precedent, we
decline to place an obligation on the Director to order a transcript of the referee’s
evidentiary hearing. Therefore, the referee’s factual findings and conclusions that
Blomquist violated various rules of professional conduct are deemed to be conclusive.
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8 In particular, Blomquist argued to the referee that the “unusual terms” in R.N.’s trust
instrument pertaining to the power of the trustee eliminated application of the prudent
investor rule and the rule against self -dealing, and granted him immunity against the
Director’s claims regarding his actions as trustee. The referee rejected Blomquist’s defense
and determined that the facts established by clear and convincing evidence that Blomquist
converted trust assets, misappropriated trust assets, and acted in bad faith in contravention
of the language of the trust. Although Blomquist is not permitted on appeal to contest these
findings, having not ordered a transcript, we agree with and reiterate the ultimate
conclusion reached by the referee that “[d]espite any language in the trust instrument, the
trustee is still a fiduciary and owes some level of care, loyalty, and reasonableness in the
administration of trust assets for the benefit of the beneficiary.” See Thomas. B. Olson &
Assocs., P.A. v. Leffert, Jay & Polglaze, P.A. , 756 N.W.2d 907, 914 (Minn. App. 2008)
(“A trustee-beneficiary relationship necessarily gives rise to a fiduciary duty in the trustee
toward the beneficiary. ”), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 20, 2009). We have repeatedly
emphasized that “no rule is more fully settled than ‘that which forbids a trustee’s dealing
with himself in respect to trust property ; that no fraud, in fact, need be shown by the
beneficiaries, and no excuse can be offered by the trustee to justify such transactions. The
fact established, the result inevitably follows.” St. Paul Tr. Co. v. Strong, 88 N.W. 256,
257 (Minn. 1901) (quoting Baldwin v. Allison, 4 Minn. 25 (4 Gil. 11) (1860)).
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III.
The only remaining issue in this case is what discipline is appropriate for
Blomquist’s misconduct. The referee recommended Blomquist be disbarred, and the
Director agrees, arguing that disbarment is the only appropriate level of discipline.
Blomquist does not address whether disbarment is appropriate; rather, he argues that he
should not be subject to discipline at all.
We alone are the ultimate arbiter of the appropriate discipline for any attorney, but
we give the referee’s recommendation “great weight.” In re Nelson, 733 N.W.2d 458, 463
(Minn. 2007). In determining the appropriate discipline, we consider four factors: “(1) the
nature of the misconduct; (2) the cumulative weight of the disciplinary violations; (3) the
harm to the public; and (4) the harm to the legal profession.” Id. We also consider any
aggravating and mitigating factors and look to “similar cases for guidance.” Id. at 463–64.
A.
The nature of Blomquist’s misconduct is divisible into three categories: (1)
misconduct as trustee; (2) non-compliance with court orders; and (3) failure to cooperate
with the Director’s investigation. All three are serious misconduct.
We begin with Blomquist’s misconduct as trustee. Blomquist misappropriated trust
assets in breach of his fiduciary duty as trustee, acted in bad faith, converted trust assets
for his personal use by investing trust assets in five speculative start-up companies in which
he had an ownership interest, and failed to account for those assets to a trust beneficiary .
“Misappropriation of trust funds is serious misconduct . . . that has resulted in the
disbarment of attorneys who breached the fiduciary duty owed to a non-client beneficiary
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of a trust.” In re O’Brien, 894 N.W.2d 162, 166 (Minn. 2017). In determining the
appropriate sanction for an attorney who has misappropriated funds, “the amount of
misappropriation is an appropriate consideration.” In re Grzybek, 567 N.W.2d 259, 264
n.1 (Minn. 1997).
We have repeatedly disbarred attorneys who misappropriated trust assets, in breach
of their fiduciary duty to a trust beneficiary. O’Brien, 894 N.W.2d at 168 (disbarring an
attorney who misappropriated $300,000 of trust assets and failed to cooperate with attorney
disciplinary proceedings); In re Moe, 851 N.W.2d 868, 873 (Minn. 2014) (disbarring an
attorney who misappropriated trust funds set up for a disabled adult); In re Amundson,
643 N.W.2d 280, 281 (Minn. 2002) (disbarring an attorney who misappropriated slightly
over $400,000 in trust assets). The misappropriation of trust assets is “sufficiently serious
to warrant severe discipline” even without the aggravating factors present in this case.
O’Brien, 894 N.W.2d at 166; In re Stroble, 487 N.W.2d 869, 870 (Minn. 1992) (noting
“disbarment is often ordered in misappropriation cases”).
We now turn to Blomquist’s repeated failure to comply with various court orders.
Over the course of D.H.’s litigation to reclaim trust assets to which she was entitled ,
Blomquist failed to appear for multiple court hearings, repeatedly failed to produce
required documents, lied to opposing counsel about forfeiting his passport to the court,
produced a fake passport, was found in civil contempt, and had a bench warrant issued for
his arrest as a result. “[F]ailure to comply with court orders is a ‘serious violation’ and . . .
‘repeated failure to comply with court orders’ is itself a ground for disbarment.” In re
Lundeen, 811 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Minn. 2012) (quoting Grzybek, 567 N.W.2d at 264–65).
15
Blomquist’s misconduct, however, does not end there. After misappropriating
D.H.’s trust assets and willfully ignoring court orders, Blomquist failed to cooperate with
the Director in her investigation. He provided non-responsive answers to questions, did
not provide requested documentation, failed to appear for a required meeting, insisted the
Director could only submit written questions to him, and failed to respond to the charges
of unprofessional conduct.
“[N]oncooperation with the disciplinary process, by itself, may warrant indefinite
suspension and, when it exists in connection with other misconduct, noncooperation
increases the severity of the disciplinary sanction.” Nelson, 733 N.W.2d at 464. We have
“long recognized that it is imperative that an attorney cooperate with disciplinary
authorities in their investigation and resolution of complaints against the lawyer.” In re
Engel, 538 N.W.2d 906, 907 (Minn. 1995). Blomquist’s noncooperation combined with
other misconduct supports more severe discipline under our precedent.
B.
We now turn to the cumulative weight of Blomquist’s actions. When determining
the severity of an attorney’s misconduct, we distinguish between a “brief lapse in
judgment” and “multiple instances of mis[conduct] occurring over a substantial amount of
time.” In re Fairbairn, 802 N.W.2d 734, 743 (Minn. 2011) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). When an attorney commits multiple instances of misconduct
rather than one single incident of misconduct, more serious discipline is called for. Id.; see
In re Oberhauser, 679 N.W.2d 153, 160 (Minn. 2004) (“[T]he cumulative weight and
16
severity of multiple disciplinary rule violations may compel severe discipline even when a
single act standing alone would not have warranted such discipline.”).
Blomquist committed multiple instances of misconduct over a period of many years.
He repeatedly misappropriated trust assets by investing those assets in five different risky,
start-up companies in which he had a personal interest and then repeatedly failed to account
for those assets. He repeatedly and knowingly disobeyed court orders by three different
district court judges. Additionally, he was consistently non-cooperative with the Director
in her investigation. This factor weighs heavily in favor of more serious discipline.
C.
We also find Blomquist’s misconduct caused serious harm to the public. “In
assessing the harm to the public caused by misconduct,” we look at the number of people
harmed and the extent of their injuries. In re Stoneburner, 882 N.W.2d 200, 206 (Minn.
2016). Additionally, “conduct that is detrimental to the administration of justice harms the
public, because it increases the public costs of administering justice.” Id. (citation omitted)
(internal quotations marks omitted).
Blomquist’s misconduct has primarily injured D.H. He depleted her trust through
his breach of fiduciary duties and refused to pay her back. D.H. incurred serious emotional
harm and monetary injury totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars. See O’Brien,
894 N.W.2d at 167 (referring to the harm to a trust beneficiary when an attorney
misappropriated trust assets as “obvious and significant”). Blomquist has, however, also
harmed the public by refusing to cooperate with various court orders and with the
17
disciplinary proceedings. Stoneburner, 882 N.W.2d at 206. We find Blomquist’s harm to
the public to be significant and to weigh in favor of severe discipline.
D.
Fourth, we find Blomquist’s actions to be detrimental to the legal profession. “[T]he
misuse of funds entrusted to an attorney . . . is a breach of trust that reflects poorly on the
entire legal profession and erodes the public’s confidence in lawyers.” In re Harrigan,
841 N.W.2d 624, 630 (Minn. 2014) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Blomquist’s failure to comply with court orders has wasted both the time and resources of
the court system and undermined the “public confidence in the legal profession.” Lundeen,
811 N.W.2d at 609. And “[f]ailure to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation also
harm[s] the legal profession by undermining the integrity of the attorney disciplinary
system.” In re Ulanowski, 834 N.W.2d 697, 703 (Minn. 2013); see also In re Brooks ,
696 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Minn. 2005) (noting our concern with an attorney’s failure “to respond
to the Director’s requests for more than one year” and that “failure to cooperate with the
disciplinary process hurts . . . the legal profession as a whole”). We find Blomquist’s
actions reflect poorly on our profession and that this factor weighs in favor of more heavy
discipline.
E.
Before coming to our final disciplinary conclusion, we are required to evaluate the
aggravating factors, mitigating factors, and the punishment imposed in similar disciplinary
cases.
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The first aggravating factor in this case is Blomquist’s previous admonition for
falsely notarizing a mortgage deed. “Attorneys with a disciplinary history are ‘expected to
show a renewed commitment to ethical behavior.’ ” In re Kurzman, 871 N.W.2d 753, 758
(Minn. 2015) (quoting In re Coleman, 793 N.W.2d 296, 308 (Minn. 2011)). We look
“closely at prior misconduct” and have consistently held that prior misconduct is an
aggravating factor. In re Milloy, 571 N.W.2d 39, 46 (Minn. 1997).
The second aggravating factor is Blomquist’s failure to accept responsibility for his
actions or to acknowledge that his actions were wrong.9 “Because one purpose of attorney
discipline is to protect the public, an attorney’s remorse or lack of it is an important factor.”
In re Nora, 450 N.W.2d 328, 330 (Minn. 1990) (citation omitted). We are concerned about
attorneys who do not acknowledge committing any misconduct because they “might
engage in similar conduct in the future unless” they are “appropriately sanctioned.” In re
Westby, 639 N.W.2d 358, 371 (Minn. 2002); In re Ray, 610 N.W.2d 342, 347 (Minn.
2000).
The third aggravating factor is that Blomquist’s abuse of the trust was self -serving
and selfish.
10 “An attorney’s selfish motive may be an aggravating factor.” In re Severson,

9 At oral argument, Blomquist was asked specifically if he acknowledged any
wrongdoing in this case. His response: “None whatsoever.”

10 The referee found Blomquist’s failure to meaningfully make D.H. whole was an
aggravating factor. Lack of restitution to D.H., however, is not an aggravating factor
because we have already considered the harm Blomquist caused D.H. when evaluating the
harm to the public. See In re Udeani, 945 N.W.2d 389, 399 (Minn. 2020) (“Our case law
does not support an aggravating factor based on [an attorney’s] indifference toward
restitution because we have already considered his failure to make restitution to clients
when analyzing the harm caused to his clients.”).
19
860 N.W.2d 658, 671 (Minn. 2015); see also Fairbairn, 802 N.W.2d at 747. Here,
Blomquist invested trust assets in five companies that he owned and lost all of it. And a
district court found he engaged in self-serving actions. This is an aggravating factor under
our case law.
The referee found one minimal mitigating factor—Blomquist testified he wants to
pay D.H. in full as soon as possible. Because a transcript has not been ordered, we accept
this mitigating factor and agree that it is minimal. See In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 153, 162
(Minn. 2010) (concluding referee did not clearly err in finding attorney entitled to
mitigation, based in part, on her statement that she wanted to pay restitution as soon as she
could).
Finally, we examine “similar cases to impose consistent discipline.” In re Albrecht,
779 N.W.2d 530, 540 (Minn. 2010) . There are few cases identical to Blomquist’s. The
most similar are cases involving lawyers who misappropriated a substantial amount of
assets from a trust, in breach of a fiduciary duty to a trust beneficiary. We disbarred these
lawyers. O’Brien, 894 N.W.2d at 168; Moe, 851 N.W.2d at 873; In re Amundson,
643 N.W.2d at 281 (Minn. 2002); see also Mayne, 783 N.W.2d at 164 (disbarring attorney
who misappropriated assets while acting as an attorney in fact for a vulnerable adult). And
in misappropriation cases involving substantial sums of money, we impose discipline less
than disbarment only when there were substantial mitigating factors. Compare Fairbairn,
802 N.W.2d at 744–48 (suspending an attorney for 18 months who misappropriated
$144,000 in client assets, but with five mitigating factors and no aggravating factors), with
Mayne, 783 N.W.2d at 163–64 (disbarring attorney for misappropriating assets while
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acting as an attorney in fact for a vulnerable adult when “the mitigating factors proven . . .
fall short of what is required for us to deviate from the sanctions we generally impose for
similar misconduct”).
Blomquist misappropriated and converted trust assets for his personal use, in
violation of his fiduciary duty as trustee, by investing thousands of dollars in five risky and
speculative start-up companies in which he had a personal interest. None of these
companies generated any revenue, or made any payment to the trust on the promissory
notes that Blomquist signed. Blomquist repeatedly failed to comply with court orders and
failed to cooperate with the Director’s investigation. His behavior was selfish, he
acknowledges no wrongdoing, and he was previously disciplined for dishonest conduct.
Based on this behavior and our precedent, we conclude that the appropriate discipline is
disbarment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, respondent Barry L. Blomquist, Jr. is disbarred from the
practice of law in the State of Minnesota, effective on the date of this opinion. Respondent
shall comply with Rule 26, RLPR (notice of disbarment to clients, opposing counsel, and
tribunals), and shall pay $900 in costs pursuant to Rule 24(a), RLPR.
Disbarred.

CHUTICH, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.