State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1465

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Daniel John Wyatt,
Appellant.

Filed July 20, 2020
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19AV-CR-18-17076

Keith Ellison, Minnesota Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota; and

Christine J. Cassellius, Ryan J. Bies, Dougherty, Mol enda, Solfest, Hills & Bauer, P A,
Apple Valley, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly , Presiding J udge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Florey, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Defendant appeals his conviction of domestic assault and disorderly conduct, raising
several procedural challenges as well as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
against him. We affirm.
FACTS
On October 30, 2018, S.H. called the police from her parked vehicle to report what
she perceived to be a hostile interaction between appellant Daniel Wyatt and M.S. She
later reported that she initially heard shouting and saw that it was coming from Wyatt and
M.S. She watched Wyatt and M.S. as they shouted and walked to a grassy area a short
distance away. S.H. later testified that she stayed in the area in part because she has a
sensitivity to domestic abuse, and she noticed that M.S. was “very small,” appeared to be
scared, and at one point seemed to be sobbing. S.H. further testified that, before police
arrived, she saw Wyatt, still screaming at M.S., “pin [her] down” and strike her with his
open hand, in response to which M.S. “cowered” and curled into the fetal position. By the
time the responding police officer arrived on scene, there was no physical altercation
ongoing between Wyatt an d M.S. After talking to M.S. and Wyatt, the officer arrested
Wyatt, and the state charged him w ith misdemeanor disorderly conduct and fifth -degree
domestic assault—fear.
The next day, Wyatt appeared for a bail hearing and was released without bail. On
November 29, 2018, Wyatt failed to appear for the pretrial hearing in his case , and a
warrant was issued for his arrest. Wyatt was later arrested and appeared for a second bail

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hearing on December 7. At the second bail hearing, the court was made aware that M.S.
was present in the courtroom and sought to have an unrelated domestic abuse no -contact
order (DANCO) against Wyatt lifted. The court stated that the DANCO matter would be
addressed at the next court date because there were no prosecutors present. After again
deciding to release Wyatt without bail and scheduling arraignment for January 2, 2019, the
court spontaneously stated, “I still want this on a speedy even though he’s being released,
so the DANCO can be addressed and all these other issues.”
Wyatt failed to appear for the January 2, 2019 arraignment, and the matter was
continued until Febr uary 13. Again, Wyatt failed to appear for the February 13
arraignment, so the district court issued a warrant for his arrest and set the next court
appearance for April 29. Wyatt did appear for the April 29 bail hearing, where he waived
his right to a s peedy trial. However, having appeared for another arraignment on May 8,
Wyatt asserted his right to a speedy trial. The district court set a trial date of June 24.
On June 20, 2019, Wyatt’s attorney learned that Wyatt was in custody in a different
county jail on unrelated charges. Because he was incarcerated in another county, Wyatt
did not appear for his June 24 trial, and his attorney (who was standing in for the attorney
of record) indicated the defense’s intent to seek a continuance. On July 15, Wya tt was
brought from the county jail for another pretrial hearing. At the July 15 hearing, Wyatt
requested that either his trial commence within that same week or his case be dismissed as
having violated his right to a speedy trial. The district court den ied Wyatt’s requests and,
Wyatt having earlier waived his right to a jury trial, set a new date for the bench trial —
August 6, 2019.

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The state’s witnesses at trial were S.H. and the officer who responded to the
incident. At the conclusion of the case, the court found Wyatt guilty of both charges. Wyatt
appealed, challenging several aspects of his conviction.
D E C I S I O N
First, Wyatt argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated and that his conviction
must therefore be reversed.
Because a defendant’s right to a speedy trial is granted by both the Minnesota and
United States Constitutions, this court reviews de novo whether that right was violated.
State v. Osorio , 891 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Minn. 2017). To assess whether a defendant’s
constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, we apply a four -factor analysis that
balances “the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant.” Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 530 (1972); Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 628 (referring to and applying the analysis
set out by the United States Supreme Court in Barker). The factors to be considered—the
“Barker factors”—are (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether
the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced
the defendant. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 627. These factors are only related —none are
inherently necessary or sufficient to determine the result—so we must engage in a “difficult
and sensitive balancing process” with them—in tandem with any “other circumstances that
may be relevant.” Id. at 628.
The length of the delay
The parties agree that the first factor—the length of the delay—should be the initial
inquiry, as it has a “triggering” effect which informs the remainder of the analysis.

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Specifically, if the delay in any given case meets or exceeds a certain threshold, it raises “a
presumption that a violation has occurred” and the court is required to apply the remaining
factors and continue the analysis. Such further analysis is not required where the applicable
threshold is not met. State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. 1999). The Minnesota
Rules of Criminal Procedure set that threshold at 60 days. Id. at 315-16 (citing Minn. R.
Crim. P. 11.10).
Here, the state does not dispute that the 60-day threshold was exceeded. Between
Wyatt’s May 8, 2019 demand for a speedy trial and the trial that actually took place on
August 6, 90 days had elapsed. We therefore conclude that the 60 -day threshold was
exceeded and accordingly begin with the presumption that Wyatt’s right to a speedy trial
was violated.
The reason for the delay
The inquiry as to the reason for the delay asks whether the government or the
defendant is more at fault for its occurrence. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 628. Different actions
which caused the delay, as well as the motivations underlying those actions, will weigh
differently, and malice on the part of the responsible party weighs heavily against their
position. See State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 19-20 (Minn. 2015).
Wyatt’s argument on this point is that fault cannot be attributed to him for the delay
caused by his non -appearance at his first (June 24) trial because he was in custody
elsewhere on separate charges. While he does not argue that either the state or the cou rt
was at fault for the delay , he argues that this factor weighs in his favor giv en that (1) he
was not at fault and (2) neither the state nor the court noted any “exceptional

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circumstances” for court congestion that would amount to good cause for the del ay. He
cites State v. Griffin for the “exceptional circumstances” language; however, Griffin did
not hold that the state must demonstrate “exceptional circumstances” lest this factor be to
the benefit of the defendant. 760 N.W.2d 336, 340 (Minn. App. 2009) (noting that calendar
congestion does not constitute good cause for delays caused by the state or court absent
“exceptional circumstances”). Likewise, Wyatt did not establish that the mere absence of
fault on the part of the defendant benefits him in t his analysis. Moreover, the state is not
arguing that it or the court may have caused the delay but had good cause for doing so.
There is no indication that the state or court is responsible for the delay.
It is true that “the right to a speedy trial is not suspended by confinement as
punishment for a different offense.” State v. Borough, 178 N.W.2d 897, 898 (Minn. 1970).
However, the state argues that while Wyatt may not personally be responsible for missing
the June 24 trial; he is to blame, by extens ion, given his attorney’s failure to file a writ in
a timely fashion and have Wyatt transported for trial. However, Wyatt’s attorney learned
of Wyatt’s incarceration four days prior to trial, and even if defense counsel’s conduct did
fall below some stand ard, the state does not cite any authority for the necessary premise
that an attorney’s blameworthiness is attributable to his or her client for purposes of the
second Barker factor. We need not answer the question as applied here, however, because
we conclude that even if neither party is at fault for the delay, there was still no speedy -
trial violation.

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Whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial
If the defendant has asserted his or her right to a speedy trial, the “circumstances
surrounding the frequency and intensity” of those demands are relevant considerations for
the third factor. Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 318. Wyatt argues that this factor weighs in his
favor because he asserted the speedy -trial right “multiple times” and mov ed to dismiss
when his right to a speedy trial was ostensibly denied.
The state responds that Wyatt did not in fact assert the right “multiple” times, and
we agree. The state points out that when Wyatt describes his first supposed demand for a
speedy tri al, he uses the language, “[t]he district court first recorded the speedy trial
demand on December 7” because Wyatt did not in fact assert the right there. Rather,
without any prompting and for unclear reasons, the judge sitting for the second bail hearing
said, “I still want this on a speedy even though he’s being released. So, the DANCO can
get addressed and all of these other issues.” 1 Whatever the district court judge’s reasons
for this statement, the only reference in the record to a speedy trial be fore December 7
comes from the bail hearing on October 31, 2018. There, the district court judge asked for
confirmation that Wyatt was not going to request a speedy trial.2 Wyatt’s argument that a
district court’s unprompted reference to “a speedy” has t he same legal effect of a
defendant’s unequivocal demand for a speedy trial lacks support. The caselaw on this

1 The court was referring to the news, provided by Wyatt and his attorney earlier in the
hearing, that the alleged victim was present in the courtroom and wanted the DANCO
lifted. The court responded that there were no prosecutors present to weigh in on the
DANCO issue and that it therefore would be addressed at the next court date.
2 Moreover, while it is not entirely clear, the court may have been referring to a different
matter entirely.

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factor consistently refers only the defendant’s assertion of his or her own constitutional
right, and we are unwilling to conflate that with a d istrict court judge’s offhand and
ambiguous remark.3
Appellant also argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated on July 15, 2019,
when, after “finally” making it to a hearing, he requested that the court either (1) hold the
trial later that day o r within the week or (2) dismiss the matter as having violated his
speedy-trial rights. This argument also lacks authority. There is simply no support for the
contention that a court’s refusal to hold a trial on the same day or week that the defendant
appears for the first time following a failure to appear at the original promptly scheduled
trial violates the defendant’s speedy-trial right.
In sum, Wyatt demanded a speedy trial once—on May 8—and this demand followed
three separate failures to appear for which the defendant was undeniably at fault (which
resulted in warrants for his arrest), and his waiver of his speedy -trial right. While a
defendant does have the right to re-assert his right to a speedy trial after waiving it, in these
circumstances, we cannot conclude that the “frequency and intensity” of a defendant’s
demands for a speedy trial weigh heavily in his favor.
Whether the delay prejudiced the defendant
On the fourth factor, Wyatt argues not that he was prejudiced by any delays, but that
a showing of prejudice is not strictly necessary to establish a speedy -trial violation. We

3 We note also that we are less inclined to interpret the district court’s remark as a demand
for a speedy trial where, as here, the defendant missed the following two court dates and
only appeared after he was arrested on a warrant.

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agree with Wyatt’s explicit argument that such a showing is not required, as well as his
implicit concession that, in this case, he was not prejudiced.
In consider ing the factors together, while we begin with the presumption that
Wyatt’s right to a speedy trial was violated, we conclude that a defendant’s right to a speedy
trial is not violated where, as here, (1) the trial only exceeded the speedy -trial window by
30 days; (2) the defendant’s single demand for a speedy trial followed the defendant
causing a total delay of more than 180 days between charging and the first-scheduled trial;
(3) neither the state nor court were to blame for the delay; (4) the defendant had previously
waived his right to a speedy trial; and (5) the defendant suffered no prejudice as a result.
Wyatt next argues that the state’s evidence against him was insufficient to establish
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The parties agree that fifth-degree domestic assault—fear, is a specific-intent crime
and that the state presented only circumstantial evidence. However, “[i] ntent may be
inferred from events occurring before and after the crime and may be proved by
circumstantial evidence.” State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 840 (Minn. 2003). When we
review the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, we perform a two -step analysis. State
v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn. 2010). First, we consider the circumstances
proved; second, we analyze the reasonableness of inferences which could be drawn from
the proven circumstances. Id. We defer to the fact finder’s conclusions as to the first
inquiry, but “we give no deference to the fact finder’s choice between reasonable
inferences.” Id. at 329-30 (quotation omitted).

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Wyatt was convicted of domestic assault —fear, which is where one “commits an
act with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.2242, subd. 1(1) (2018). Because this was a specific-intent crime, the state bore the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Wyatt acted in such a way as to intend
to cause M.S. to fear immediate bodily harm or death. See State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303,
308 (Minn. 2012).
In this case, the relevant circumstances proved were those recounted by S.H.: that
Wyatt (1) yelled and screamed at; (2) behaved loudly, aggressively, and threatening
towards; and (3) “pinned down,” “lunged at,” and struck M.S. S.H. also testified that M.S.
appeared scared at this time and to “cower” away from Wyatt, sob, and assume the fetal
position. The district court specifically found S.H.’s testimony credible and provided a
thorough explanation of its rationale for that finding, to which we defer. Wyatt argues that
the state was required to provide corroborating evidence and cites State v. Foreman. 680
N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn . 2004). However, Foreman explicitly states that the nee d for
corroborating evidence arises where (1) there are additional reasons to question the
witness’s credibility and (2) the witness is the victim —neither of which are true here. Id.
at 539.
As for the second inquiry, we conclude that the only reasonable inference is that
Wyatt acted in such a way as to cause M.S. to be in fear of bodily injury. Wyatt does not
argue that this inference is unreasonable, only that it is technically possible to draw other
inferences with respect to his specific intent. Howe ver, “[t]he State does not have the
burden of removing all doubt, but of removing all reasonable doubt,” and we will affirm a

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conviction where the circumstances proved are “consistent with guilt and inconsistent with
any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 330. Moreover,
while Wyatt argues that the circumstances proved could be consistent with an innocence
hypothesis, he does not explain how one could rationalize those circumstances as not
evidencing his intent to cause M.S. fear. Rather, he simply asserts that it would be possible
for all of those circumstances to be true while he lacked the requisite mental state. Wyatt’s
injection of metaphysical doubt does not present a rational hypothesis with which these
proven circumstances could be consistent, which leaves the only rational hypothesis to be
that of guilt.
Finally, Wyatt argues that the court applied the wrong burden of proof. His
argument refers to the court’s statement that “[t]he court . . . must determine whethe r the
elements of the offense have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. If the elements of
the offense have not been proved, a judgement of acquittal must be entered,” and the court’s
citation to Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.02, subd. 7(c). Wyatt points out that subdivision 7(c) of
rule 20 concerns cases in which a defense of mental impairment is raised and that no such
defense was raised here. He argues that the rule’s reference to disproving the “elements”
of the crime for acquittal is more stringent than the defendant’s normal burden of creating
a reasonable doubt as to a single element of the crime alleged.
The district court clearly made only a citation error. There is no substantive
indication that the district court applied anything other than the normal criminal burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It explicitly concluded that the state proved beyond a

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reasonable doubt every element of the crimes with which Wyatt was charged. We therefore
conclude that the district court did not apply an improper burden of proof.
Affirmed.