State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1467

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Abdullahi Ahmed Ali,
Appellant.

Filed December 7, 2020
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-14-26417

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorn ey, Adam E. Petras , Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Pres iding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Frisch, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal from final judgment, appellant Abdullahi Ahmed Ali challenges
his conviction for being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2012). He argues that (1) his previous offense of first-degree

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burglary is not a qualifying “crime of violen ce” that renders him ineligible to possess a
firearm because the first-degree burglary was a juvenile adjudi cation, (2) the evidence is
insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he constructively possessed a firearm,
and (3) Minn. Stat. § 62 4.713, subd. 1(2), is unconstitutio nally enforced against men of
color, including him. Ali’s first challenge fails because, after Ali filed his appellate brief,
the Minnesota Supreme Court decided that a juvenile adjudication may qualify as a “crime
of violence.” As to Ali’s remaining two challenges, we conclude that circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to sustain Ali’s convi ction for being an ineligible person in
possession of a firearm and that Ali’s constitutional argument is forfeited because he failed
to raise it to the district court. For these reasons, we affirm.
FACTS
The following facts were established at trial. In the early morning hours of April 25,
2014, two Minneapolis police officers stopped a car with a cracked windshield, believing
that the crack may have been caused by a recently reported nearby shooting. Both officers
approached the car—one on each side. There were three men in the car: the driver, a man
in the front passenger seat, and Ali in the re ar on the passenger’s side of the car. Because
the rear driver’s-side window was dirty, the driver’s-side officer asked the driver to lower
the window so he could see inside. When the window was down, the officer could see that
the driver’s seat was reclined 45 degrees.
While talking with the drive r, the driver’s-side officer noticed that Ali was acting
nervous and gesturing towards the driver’s seat. When the officer looked closely to where
Ali was gesturing, he noticed part of a handgun, initially obscured by the reclined driver’s

3
seat, peeking out from under the back of the driver’s seat. The handgun was within Ali’s
reach.
The officers took the three men into custody, took photos of the scene, and collected
the handgun (which was later determined to be operational). Another officer then
transported two of the men, including Ali, to the Hennepin County jail. While en route, Ali
asked the officer why he was being detained. When the officer replied that it was because
of the gun found in the car, Ali said, “Okay,” and seemed “kind of resigned.”
DNA samples were taken from Ali and th e other two men. The Minnesota Bureau
of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) performed DNA testing on the samples and the handgun.
The testing determined that at least five people left DNA on the handgun. It also determined
that, while 88.2% of the general population, including the front-seat passenger, could be
excluded from contributing to the DNA found on the handgun, Ali and the driver could not
be excluded.
The state charged Ali with be ing an ineligible person in possession of a firearm,
predicated on his 2007 juvenile adjudication for first-degree burglary. A jury found him
guilty, and the district court sentenced Ali to 60 months in prison.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Ali raises three issues with his conviction, which we address in turn.
I. Ali’s 2007 juvenile adjudication qu alifies as a “crime of violence.”

Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2), prohi bits ineligible persons from possessing
firearms, and Ali was ineligib le to possess a firearm if he had previously committed a

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“crime of violence” as defined by Minn. Stat . § 624.712, subd. 5 (2012). Ali argues that
his 2007 first-degree burglary did not qualif y as a crime of violence because it was a
juvenile adjudication. But th e Minnesota Supreme Court recently decided that juvenile
delinquency adjudications for felony-level offenses listed in Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5,
“may be deemed ‘felony conv ictions’ and meet the statutor y definition of a crime of
violence.” Roberts v. State, 945 N.W.2d 850, 854 (Minn. 2020). Ali’s juvenile adjudication
was for first-degree burglary—a crime that is id entified as a crime of violence in section
624.712, subdivision 5. Thus, Ali’s juvenile adjudication is a predicate crime of violence
rendering him ineligible to possess a firearm.
II. There is sufficient circum stantial evidence to prove that Ali constructively
possessed the handgun.

Ali next argues the state presented insu fficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he knowingly possessed the handgun.
Because the handgun was not found on Ali’ s person but instead under the driver’s
seat, the state argued that Ali constructivel y possessed the gun. Constructive possession
applies when the state “cannot prove actual or physical possession . . . but where the
inference is strong that the defendant at one time physically possessed the [contraband] and
did not abandon his possessory interest in the [contraband].” State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d
609, 610 (Minn. 1975). There are two ways to prove constructive possession. State v.
Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017). The state may prove that the contraband was
found in a place under the defendant’s exclus ive control to which others did not have
access, or, if it was found in a place to which others had access, that there was “a strong
probability (inferable from other evidence) that at the time the defendant was consciously

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or knowingly exercising dominion and control over it.” Id. The exercise of dominion and
control goes beyond “mere proximity” to the item. Id. An individual can jointly possess an
item with another person. Id.
Because Ali did not have exclusive contro l over the car in which the handgun was
found, the state’s theo ry was that he constructively po ssessed the handgun through his
exercise of dominion and control over it. Th e state relied on circumstantial evidence to
prove it.
“A conviction based on circumstantial evidence . . . warrants heightened scrutiny.”
State v. Al-Naseer , 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010 ). We analyze the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence through a two-step analysis. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594,
598 (Minn. 2013). First, we “identify the circumstances proved.” Id. “In identifying the
circumstances proved, we defer to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances
and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted w ith the circumstances proved by
the State.” Id. at 598-99 (quotations omitted). Because the jury is in the best position to
analyze credibility, “we consider only those circumstances that are consistent with the
verdict.” Id. at 599. Therefore, we assume “that th e jury believed the [s]tate’s witnesses
and disbelieved the defense witnesses.” Id.
Second, we “determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt
and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Here, we give no deference to the jury’s choice between any reasonable inferences. Harris,
895 N.W.2d at 601. If there is any rational hypothesis pointing to innocence, then the
evidence is insufficient and the conviction must be overturned. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at

6
474. To uphold a conviction based on circumst antial evidence, “the circumstances must
form a complete chain which, in light of the ev idence as a whole, lead s so directly to the
guilt of the accused as to excl ude, beyond a reasonable doub t, any reasonable inference
other than that of guilt.” State v. Reed , 737 N.W.2d 572, 581 (M inn. 2007) (quotations
omitted).
The circumstances proved are as follows. In the morning of April 25, 2014, two
officers conducted a traffic stop of a car. The car had three occupants: the driver, a front-
seat passenger, and Ali in the rear passenger-side seat. On approaching the driver’s side of
the car, one of the officers aske d the driver to lower the rear driver’s-side window so he
could see inside. Ali was m oving around and gest uring nervously towards the area
underneath the driver’s seat. In response, the officer shined hi s flashlight in the area and
saw a partially visible handgun underneath the driver’s seat. Ali was in arm’s reach of the
handgun. Following DNA testi ng, the BCA determined that 88.2% of the general
population, including the front-seat passenger, could be excluded from contributing to the
DNA on the handgun, but neither Ali nor the driver could be excluded. Finally, while Ali
was being driven to the Hennep in County jail, and after be ing told that he was being
arrested for the gun, Ali said “okay” and seemed “kind of resigned.”
We now evaluate the inferences from the circumstances proved. Ali does not dispute
that the circumstances yield the reasonable in ference that he possessed the handgun. He
contends, though, that the circumstances are al so consistent with the rational hypothesis
that he did not possess it. He points to the fact that the handgun had DNA from multiple
people and that the handgun wa s close to the driver. Ali also suggests that he might have

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said “okay” and seemed “resi gned” simply because he had learned from the police that a
gun was in the car. Ali contends that the case is markedly similar to Harris and that his
conviction should likewise be reversed. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 592.
We conclude that this case is different from Harris and that the only reasonable
inference from the circumstances is that Ali constructively po ssessed the firearm, either
individually or jointly. In Harris, the defendant had been convicted of illegally possessing
a firearm after police discovered a firearm hidden in the headlining of a car driven by Harris
but owned by someone else. Id. at 596. The supreme court reversed the conviction because
the evidence did not ex clude the reasonable hypothesis th at Harris was unaware that the
firearm was in the car. Id. at 602. Three key facts di fferentiate this case from Harris and
refute a hypothesis of innocence here. First, in Harris, the firearm was hidden within the
lining of the car’s roof, behind the driver. Id. at 597. The handgun in this case was close to
and visible to Ali, as it was sticking out from underneath the back of the driver’s seat.
Second, in Harris, nothing suggested that the defendant knew that there was a firearm in
the car, let alone that the defendant exercised any control over the firearm. Id. at 603. Here,
Ali gestured nervously toward the nearby handg un, leading the office r to look in that
direction and find it. Ali’s behavior demonstr ates the conscious and knowing exercise of
control over the handgun. Florine, 226 N.W.2d at 611. Third, the DNA results in this case
are more conclusive than those in Harris. In Harris, the DNA sample was only able to
exclude 75.7% of the general population. 895 N.W.2d at 602. Here, the DNA sample can
exclude 88.2% of the general population but cannot exclude Ali. In addition, here Ali had
an air of resignation when the officer told him why he was be ing arrested. In sum, unlike

8
in Harris, here, there is no other reasonable inference to be drawn from the circumstances
proved than that A li knowingly exercised dominion and control over the handgun. See
Florine, 226 N.W.2d at 611.
Therefore, the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain Ali’s conviction.
III. Ali’s constitutional argument is forfeited.

Ali raises a final argument in his pro se supplemental brief. 1 He argues that
enforcement of the underlying statute, Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2), disproportionately
affects men of color in violation of their right to equal protection. Issues that were not
raised before the district court are generally forfeited on appeal. Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d
354, 357 (Minn. 1996). This principle applies to constitutional challenges to a statute. State
v. Frazier, 649 N.W.2d 828, 839 (Minn. 2002) (quoting Hampton v. Hampton, 229 N.W.2d
139, 140 (Minn. 1975)). Even liberally construing Ali’s argument as he urges us to do, we
conclude that Ali’s constitutional challenge wa s not raised before or considered by the
district court and it is therefore forfeited.
Affirmed.

1 Ali also asserts explanations for why the evidence is insufficient in this case. We review
the sufficiency of the evidence based only on th e record evidence that is consistent with
the verdict. See Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 598-99. We perfo rmed that review above and
concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support Ali’s conviction.