In the Matter of the Welfare of M. S.-R.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1468

In the Matter of the Welfare of M. S.-R.

Filed April 20, 2020
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-18-4191

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Senior Assistant
County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Worke , Judge; and Larkin ,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant-juvenile challenges the district court’s order requiring him to pay
$1,400.47 in restitution, arguing that the district court failed to adequately co nsider his
restitution challenge. We affirm.

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FACTS
In September 2018, the state filed a juvenile-delinquency petition alleging that 15-
year-old appellant M.S.- R. engaged in disorderly conduct (brawling or fighting ).1 The
petition stemmed from a May 2018 incident at M.S.-R.’s high school in which M.S.-R. and
three other individuals engaged in a series of physical altercations with N.B. and L.B. The
entire incident lasted about six minutes and occurred at three locations in the high school.
Parts of the incident were captured on security cameras. N.B. and L.B. sustained injuries
and received medical treatment. N.B. was treated for a broken nose, a facial laceration that
required stitches, and a head injury that required a CT scan, which was later determined to
be a concussion. N.B. had to have surgery to correct his nose.
The state agreed to send M.S.- R.’s case to a diversion program and to dismiss the
charge upon his completion of the program. M.S.- R. agreed to pay one-half of the total
amount of any restitution. M.S.-R. notified the district court and the state of his intent to
challenge the amount of restitution, and the district court ordered a restitution study . In
March 2019, the district court ordered M.S.-R. to pay $3,354.29 in restitution “on a Joint
and Several basis.” M.S.- R. completed diversion programming and filed a formal
objection to the requested restitution.
In July 2019, the district court held a contested restitution hearing. The district court
received 11 exhibits, including a surveillance video depicting parts of the incident. The
district court heard testimony from N.B., the probation officer who prepared the restitution

1 Our statement of the facts is based on the district court’s order and memorandum of law
regarding M.S.-R.’s restitution challenge.
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study, and M.S.- R.’s mother. N.B. testified about th e incident, M.S.- R.’s role in the
incident, his injuries, and the medical expenses he incurred as a result of the incident. The
probation officer testified that she determined the loss to N.B. to be $3,111.44. She also
testified that M.S.- R. could pay fo r restitution through probation’s sentence -to-service
program, which provides opportunities for juveniles to work on weekends for
compensation that is paid toward their restitution obligations.
M.S.-R.’s mother testified regarding his ability to pay restitution and explained that
although M.S.-R. had a part-time job, he used his earnings to support his family, and his
family needed those earnings to pay necessary expenses. M.S.-R. argued that he should
not have to pay restitution because he did not dire ctly cause N.B.’s or L.B.’s losses and
because it would create a financial hardship for his family.
After the hearing, the district court issued a 23-page order and memorandum of law
granting in part and denying in part M.S.- R.’s motion contesting restitution. The district
court rejected M.S.-R.’s argument that he should not have to pay restitution and determined
that N.B. was entitled to restitution of $2, 800.94. In doing so, t he district court rejected
N.B.’s claim for $310.50 in lost wages and limited the restitution award to N.B.’s medical
expenses. Based on M.S.-R.’s diversion agreement to pay one-half of the amount of total
restitution, the district court ordered M.S.-R. to pay $1,400.47 in restitution either through
the paid sentence -to-service program or cash payments before the expiration of his
continuance for dismissal.
M.S.-R. appeals.
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D E C I S I O N
“[I]f [a] child is found to have violated a state or local law or ordinance which has
resulted in damage to the person or property of another,” a district court may impose
restitution if it is “necessary to the rehabilitation” of the child. Minn. Stat § 260B.198,
subd. 1(a)(5) (Supp. 2019).2 “In juvenile-delinquency matters, restitution is governed by
both the restitution provision of the juvenile -delinquency statute . . . and the general
restitution statute . . . .” In re Welfare of I.N.A., 902 N.W.2d 635, 640 (Minn. App. 2017),
review denied (Minn. Nov. 28, 2017); see Minn. Stat. § 611A.04 (2018) (general restitution
statute); Minn. St at. § 260B.198, subd. 1 (a)(5) (allowing for restitution i n juvenile -
delinquency cases).
“The primary purpose of the [restitution] statute is to restore crime victims to the
same financial position t hey were in before the crime.” State v. Palubicki , 727 N.W.2d
662, 666 (Minn. 2007). A district court has broad discretion to award restitution, and its
decision “will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Andersen, 871
N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. 2015). “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings
of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or rendering a decision
that is against logic and the facts on [the] record.” I.N.A., 902 N.W.2d at 642.
“The record must provide the [district] court with a factual basis to award
restitution.” State v. Johnson , 851 N.W.2d 60, 65 ( Minn. 2014). And “[t]he burden of
demonstrating the amount of loss sustained by a victim . . . is on the prosecution.” Minn.

2 The legislature renumbered Minn. Stat § 260B.198, subd. 1, in 2019. 2019 Minn. Laws
ch. 50, art. 1, § 85.
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Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(a) (2018). If a district court orders restitution as part of a
disposition in a juvenile-delinquency case, its order must contain sufficient findings of fact
to support the disposition ordered. See Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 1(b) (Supp. 2019)
(providing that any order for a disposition in a juvenile -delinquency case must contain
findings to support the disposition ordered); Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 2(A)
(providing that “the dispositional order made by the court shall contain written findings of
fact to support the disposition ordered”). Written findings are required “to show that the
district court considered vital standards and to enable the parties to understand the court’s
decision.” In re Welfare of N.T.K., 619 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Minn. App. 2000).
“[I]nadequate written findings in a juvenile disposition order constitute reversible error.”
I.N.A., 902 N.W.2d at 642.
M.S.-R. contends that the district court failed to adequately consider his restitution
challenge, arguing that the district court erred in its determinations regarding his role in the
incident, his ability to pay restitution, and whether resti tution aids in rehabilitation. We
address each argument in turn.
M.S.-R.’s Role in the Incident
M.S.-R. argues that “despite the district court’s findings,” “his level of participation
was not the same as that of the other defendants” and he therefore should not have been
compelled to pay restitution.
“[A] district court may order restitution only for losses that are directly caused by,
or follow naturally as a consequence of, the defendant’s crime.” State v. Boettcher , 931
N.W.2d 376, 381 ( Minn. 2019). “It may not order restitution fo r conduct that is only
6
tangentially related to the criminal act that caused the loss.” State v. Miller , 842 N.W.2d
474, 477 (Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 2014). When the injuries
caused by a defendant are indistinguishable from the inj uries and losses that his
codefendant inflicted on their victim, a district court may hold defendants joint ly and
severally liable for restitution. See id. at 478 (concluding that district court acted within its
discretion in ordering joint-and-several restitution liability where two defendants were
involved in an assault but it was unclear who caused victim’s specific injuries).
The district court considered whether M.S.-R. directly caused the injuries to N.B.,
and the other victim, L.B. It determined that M.S.-R. was responsible only for N.B.’s
injuries and that he was responsible both directly and as an aider and abettor. That
determination was based on evidence at the restitution hearing, including N.B.’s testimony
that M.S.-R. grabbed him, punched him in the face, put him in a headlock, and then threw
him headfirst into a wall and ultimately onto the floor. The surveillance video showed
M.S.-R. punching N.B. and corroborated N.B.’s testimony. The record supports the district
court’s determination that “the injuries [M.S.- R.] inflicted on the victim are
indistinguishable from the injuries and losses that the other three males in his group
inflicted upon N.B.” (Footnote omitted.)
M.S.-R.’s Ability to Pay
M.S.-R. argues that the district court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay
restitution because “no findings showed [that he] had an ability to pay.”
In determining whether to award restitution, the district court must consider “(1) the
amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense; [and] (2) the
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income, resources, and obligations of the defendant.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a)
(2018). “In a juvenile -delinquency case, re stitution must be reasonable.” I.N.A., 902
N.W.2d at 643 (quotation omitted); see Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 1(a)(5) (providing
that the district court may order a child to “make reasonable restitution”). Because the
statute does not indicate how courts should consider those factors, dist rict courts have
“wide flexibility to structure restitution orders that take into account a defendant’s ability
to pay.” State v. Maidi , 537 N.W.2d 280, 285- 86 (Minn. 1995). There is no strict
requirement regarding how the district court should address a defendant’s ability to pay,
State v. Alexander, 855 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2014), but courts must be specific
in defining the terms of restitution, State v. Hanninen , 533 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Minn. App.
1995), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 1995).
In determining M.S.-R.’s ability to pay, the district court acknowledged M.S. -R.’s
mother’s testimony that M.S.-R.’s restitution obligation would create a financial hardship
for the family because earnings from his part-time job are needed to help support their four-
person family and noted that “it is clear that [M.S.-R.] has limited income and financial
resources.” However, the district court also considered the probation officer’s testimony
that M.S.-R. could work sentence-to-serve shifts each weekend for $10 per hour and that
the money would go directly toward his restitution obligation. The district court considered
M.S.-R.’s school obligations, and part -time employment, and concluded that despite the
family’s financial circumstances, M.S.-R. had “the resource of time to engage in paid work
to pay the restitution” and could satisfy his $ 1,400.47 restitution obligation through the
sentence-to-service program, without cutting into the money he earned at his job for his
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family. The district court’s thorough memorandum shows that it adequately considered
whether M.S.-R. had the ability to pay restitution.
M.S.-R. also argues that “just as in I.N.A., [here] the district court failed to specify”
the amount M.S.- R. is to pay monthly and over what period and whether the remaining
balance will be docketed for civil judgment, and “failed to assess [his] ability to pay those
specific amounts given his income, resources, and obligations.”
M.S.-R.’s argument focuses on our remand instructions in I.N.A., which were based
on the circumstances of that case. In I.N.A., the district court ordered 14 -year-old I.N.A.
to pay approximately $12,500 in restitution and supported the order with a general
statement that I.N.A. “had the ability to pay the restitution in smaller monthly
installments.” 902 N.W.2d at 638, 643. I.N.A. appealed, and this court reasoned that
“because the order [was] unclear as to how much the district court expect[ed] I.N.A. to
actually pay per month, and over what period of time ,” we could not determine whether
the restitution award was reasonable. Id. at 643-44. As a result, our remand instructions
were precise: (1) specify the amount the child was expected to pay monthly and over what
time period, (2) determine whether a remaining balance would be docketed and, if so, in
what amount, and (3) assess the child’s ability to pay those specific amounts given his
income, resources, and obligations. Id. at 644.
This case is unlike I.N.A. First, the amount of restitution here is significantly less
than in I.N.A. Second, the district court’s reasoning in this case is clear. Third, the district
court here thoroughly considered M.S.-R.’s ability to pay. And fourth, contrary to M.S.-
R.’s argument, the district court’s order provides that if M.S.- R. “fails to pay the ordered
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restitution amount of $1,400.47 by . . . the expiration date of the continuance for dismissal,
the balance of $1,400.47 may be docketed as a civil judgment.”
Lastly, M.S.-R. argues that the “proper legal standard demands that the district court
provide an accounting of how much a juvenile must pay at what intervals and how that
amount of time and money will affect the juvenile’s ability to pay his other expenses and
help out his family .” Again, this argument is based on our remand instructions in I.N.A .
See id. In giving those instructions, this court did n ot say, as a matter of law, that it was
establishing a requirement for all cases. In fact, in I.N.A. this court recognized that “[t]here
is no strict requirement regarding how the district court should ad dress the ability-to-pay
issue” and noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court has determined that the legislature
intended to give courts “wide flexibility to structure restitution orders that take into account
a defendant’s ability to pay.” Id. at 643 (quotations omitted). The district court adequately
considered M.S.-R.’s ability to pay and its order is within the wide flexibility given to the
district court.
Whether Restitution Aids M.S.-R.’s Rehabilitation
M.S.-R. argues that “[t]he [district court’s] findings did not show paying restitution
aids rehabilitation.”
A district court must consider whether restitution is “necessary to the rehabilitation
of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 1(a)(5). “[T]he whole purpose of the Juvenile
Court Act is to rehabilitate a young person . . . .” In re Welfare of J.E.C., 225 N.W.2d 245,
254 (Minn. 1975).
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The district court’s order explains, at length, why restitution will further
rehabilitation. The district court reasoned that paying restitution serves to rehabilitate
M.S.-R. “by demonstrating the nature and extent of the physical injuries [M.S.-R.] and his
fellow associates inflicted on the victim, as well as the cost of the resulting medical care.”
It further explained that although “it may be inconvenient for [M.S.-R.] to either work
additional hours at his private employment or to spend some of his free time working in
the paid sentence -to-service program ,” those additional hours “will contribute to [his]
rehabilitation in that he will be reminded that his actions in this incident resulted in specific
monetary and time consequences for him.” The district court’s reasoning is sound, and its
findings show that it adequately considered whether paying restitution was necessary for
M.S.-R.’s rehabilitation.
In sum, as we said in I.N.A., “[w]ritten findings are required in juvenile-delinquency
cases to show that the district court cons idered vital standards and to enable the parties to
understand the court’s decision.” 902 N.W.2d at 642 (quotation omitted). That standard
is satisfied here. The district court’s order is 23 pages long and includes 6 pages of findings
of fact and approximately 13 pages of legal conclusions. The district court’s findings and
conclusions are supported by the testimony and exhibits introduced at the restitution
hearing. Moreover, the district court’s order sets forth the relevant substantive law with
citations and applies that law to its detailed factual findings. Lastly, the district court
thoroughly addressed the restitution issues that must be considered in a juvenile -
delinquency case. It is apparent from the district court’s order that M.S.- R. received
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thorough consideration of his restitution challenge and that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in establishing M.S.-R.’s restitution obligation.
Affirmed.