State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1477

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Abram Valdez,
Appellant.

Filed August 31, 2020
Reversed and remanded
Cochran, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19WS-CR-18-15725

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Alina Schwartz, Campbell Knutson, Eagan, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, Colin Colby, Certified Student Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and
Bryan, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction, appellant seeks to withdraw
his guilty plea to domestic assault. Because we conclude that appellant’s plea is inaccurate,
we reverse and remand to allow appellant to withdraw his guilty plea.

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FACTS
The state filed a complaint against appella nt Abram Valdez that charged him with
five offenses, including one count of gross- misdemeanor domestic assault—fear against
his stepsister and one count of gross-misd emeanor domestic assault—fear against his
stepfather. According to the complaint, the stepsister reported that she found Valdez in her
bedroom taking some of her personal property. She confronted Valdez. Valdez yelled at
her and grabbed her by the throat. The stepsister did not believe that Valdez was trying to
choke her, but she did believe that Valdez was going to hit her with a flashlight.
The argument woke Valdez’s stepfather. The stepfather hear d Valdez tell the
stepsister to get out of their house and saw Valdez holding a flashlight as if he intended to
hit someone with it. The stepfa ther told Valdez to leave the house. In response, Valdez
threw furniture around the living room. Vald ez’s mother attempte d to intervene, and
Valdez unintentionally hit her. The stepfather called 911. He reported to police that he
feared for the safety of himself and his fa mily. Valdez left the house before the police
arrived. When police later apprehended Valdez, he indicated that he was the one who had
been assaulted, and that his family members had hit him multiple times.
Valdez entered into a plea agreement with the state. He pleaded guilty only to the
charge of domestic assault against his stepfather. He did not plead guilty to the charge of
domestic assault against his stepsister or any of the other charges. At the plea hearing,

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Valdez and his attorney attempted to establish a factual basis for his plea with the following
colloquy:
Q: Mr. Valdez, is it true that on November 10th, 2018, in
the city of South St. Paul, County of Dakota, State of
Minnesota, you were in the city of South St. Paul,
correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And on that day, you got into a verbal argument with
your sister, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And you’d agree with me that during that verbal
argument, through your words or actions, you intended
to cause fear of bodily harm?

A: Yes.
Valdez also submitted a plea petition that read, in relevant part, “I got into a verbal
argument with the victim and through my words or actions I intended to cause fear of
bodily harm.”
The district court accepted Valdez’s guilty plea to domestic assault against his
stepfather and sentenced him on a later date. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the other four
charges were dismissed. Valdez appeals, seeking to withdraw his plea.
D E C I S I O N
Valdez argues that he must be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because it is
inaccurate, and therefore invalid. In his initial brief to this court, Valdez argued that his
guilty plea was inaccurate because the record did not demonstrate that he intended to cause
his stepsister fear of immediat e bodily harm. In its brief, th e state argued that the record

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established that Valdez did intend to cause hi s stepsister to fear immediate bodily harm.
Because Valdez pleaded guilty to, and stands convicted of, domestic assault against his
stepfather, not his stepsister, we asked the parties for supplemental briefing on whether
Valdez’s guilty plea to domestic assault agains t his stepfather—not his stepsister—was
accurate. In their supplemental briefs, the parties disagree over whether the record supports
a finding that Valdez assaulted his stepfather.
“To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accura te, voluntary, and
intelligent.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (M inn. 2010). “If a guilty plea fails to
meet any of these three requirements, the plea is invalid.” State v. Johnson ,
867 N.W.2d 210, 214 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2015). Whether
a plea is valid is a question of law that we review de novo. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94.
Valdez challenges only the accuracy of his plea. “The accuracy requirement
protects a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than that for which he
could be convicted if he insisted on his right to trial. To be accurate, a plea must be
established on a proper factual basis.” Id. (citations omitted). “The factual basis must
establish sufficient facts on th e record to support a conclu sion that defendant’s conduct
falls within the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” Munger v. State ,
749 N.W.2d 335, 338 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
Typically, the factual basis for the plea is established when the defendant describes
the crime in his own words. Lussier v. State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 589 (Minn. 2012). But “a
defendant may not withdraw his plea simply because the court failed to elicit proper
responses if the record contains sufficien t evidence to support the conviction.”

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Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. Thus, a plea colloquy may be supplemented by other parts of
the district court record, including—under appropriate circumstan ces—the complaint.
Lussier, 821 N.W.2d at 589 (citing State v. Trott , 338 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. 1983)
(permitting the use of the whole record, incl uding the complaint a nd photographs, to
establish the factual basis for a guilty plea)).1
Valdez was convicted of domestic assau lt—fear, under Minn. Stat. § 609.2242,
subd. 2 (2018). A person is gu ilty of domestic assault—fear if he commits an act with
intent to cause his family or household member to fear immediate bodily harm or death.
Id., subd. 1 (2018). Valdez argues that the record does not support a finding that he
committed an act with the intent to cause his stepfather to fear immediate bodily harm or
death. See Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1) (2018) (defining domestic assault—fear).
The state maintains that the record does support such a finding.
Intent is generally proved with circumst antial evidence, “by drawing inferences
from the defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances.”
State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997). In assessing the accuracy of a guilty
plea, we may consider circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s intent. See
Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 860 (Minn. 2016 ). A fact-finder may “infer that a

1 While Minnesota precedent allows some in formation from the complaint to supplement
the plea-hearing record, the extent to which allegations in the complaint, not acknowledged
or admitted at the plea hearing, may f ill gaps in an otherwise inaccurate, non-
Alford/Goulette plea is an open question of law. We need not answer that question here
because we conclude that even considering the allegations in the complaint, the record does
not demonstrate that Valdez intended to cause his stepfather to fear immediate bodily harm
or death.

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person intends the natural and probabl e consequences of her actions.” State v. Janecek ,
903 N.W.2d 426, 431 (Minn. Ap p. 2017) (quotation omitted). That a victim actually did
fear bodily harm—though not dispositive of the defendant’s intent—is circumstantial
evidence of a defendant’s in tent to cause fear of immediate bodily harm. Cf.
State v. Schweppe, 237 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1975 ) (concluding that “the victim’s
reaction to the threat was circ umstantial evidence relevant to the element of intent of the
defendant in making the threat” in a terroristic threats case). And, a defendant may intend
a single act to cause multiple vi ctims to fear immediate bodily harm or death, therefore
constituting multiple assaults. See State v. Hough , 585 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1998)
(“When an assailant fires numerous shots fr om a semiautomatic w eapon into a home, it
may be inferred that the assailant intends to cause fear of immediate bodily harm or death
to those within the home.”).
Here, the plea colloquy alone is plainly insufficient to esta blish that Valdez
committed an act with the intent to cause his stepfather to fear immediate bodily harm or
death. During the plea colloquy, Valdez admitted that he got into a verbal argument with
his stepsister and testified that he intended to cause fear of bodily harm through his words
or actions. But Valdez did not mention his stepfather. Thus, Valdez did not admit that he
intended to cause his stepfather to fear immediate bodily harm or death at the plea hearing.
Valdez’s plea petition also does not support an inference that he intended to cause
his stepfather to fear immediate bodily harm . While Valdez indicated in his plea petition
that he “got into a verbal argument with the victim and through [his] words or actions [he]
intended to cause fear of bodily harm,” th e plea petition does not identify the victim or

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specify that he intended to cause fear of bodily harm to anyone other than the victim. And,
as noted above, Valdez admitted that he got into a verbal argument with his stepsister, not
his stepfather.
The state asserts that Valdez’s plea is nonetheless accurate because the allegations
in the complaint may be used to supplement the plea colloquy and plea petition. 2 On this
basis, the state maintains that the record is sufficient to es tablish that Valdez’s plea was
accurate with regard to the charge of domestic assault against his stepfather. We are not
persuaded.
The complaint alleges that Valdez got into an argument with his stepsister that woke
his stepfather. When the stepfather went into the living room, he saw Valdez yelling at the
stepsister and holding a flashlight as if he was going to hit someone. The stepsister told
police that she believed that Valdez was going to hit her with the flashlight. She also told
police that earlier in the altercation, Vald ez had grabbed her by the throat. When the
stepfather found the two arguing, he instructed Valdez to leave. At that point, Valdez threw
furniture around the living room, but there is no allegation that Valdez directed the furniture
toward his stepfather. Valdez ’s mother intervened, and Vald ez unintentionally hit her.
Valdez’s stepfather ultimately called police, and later reported that he feared for the safety
of himself and his family.

2 In its supplemental brief, a ppellant contends that an appe llate court may consider only
“the record made when the de fendant entered the plea” to determine whether the factual
basis for the plea is sufficient. As discus sed above, the extent to which a court may
consider allegations in the complaint to supplement the plea record is an open question of
law. But we need not resolve the issue in this case. See supra n.1.

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The state argues that Valdez intended the natural consequences of these actions, and
that one natural consequence is that Valdez’s stepfather would fear immediate bodily harm.
See Janecek, 903 N.W.2d at 431. We are not co nvinced that a natu ral and probable
consequence of the acts described in the comp laint is that a person in the stepfather’s
position would fear immediate bodily harm or death. It is clear that the allegations in the
complaint are sufficient to establish that Valdez intended to cause his stepsister to fear
immediate bodily harm or death—he put his hands on her neck, yelled at her, and held a
flashlight as if he were going to hit her. An d the allegations also clearly demonstrate that
Valdez was disruptive. But the complaint doe s not allege that Valdez took any action
toward his stepfather. Valdez purportedly threw furniture around the living room after his
stepfather told him to leave, but there is no allegation that Valdez threw anything at his
stepfather or threatened him. And though Valdez purportedly hit his mother when she tried
to intervene, Valdez’s mother reported to police that the strike was unintentional. Thus,
while Valdez’s stepfather reported that he feared for his safety, we cannot confidently infer
from the allegations in the comp laint that Valdez intended to ca use his stepfather to fear
immediate bodily harm or deat h. We therefore conclude that Valdez’s guilty plea to
domestic assault against his stepfather was inaccurate, and therefore invalid.
The state argues that we sh ould affirm because the inac curacy in Valdez’s plea
colloquy was harmless. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01 (“An y error that does not affect
substantial rights must be disregarded.”). It maintains that “[t]he confusion arising from
this error did not alter the outcome for appellant or impact appellant’s substantive rights in
any way.” We disagree. The state’s argument amounts to a contention that an inaccurate

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plea is permissible so long as the plea was otherwise knowing and voluntary. But if a guilty
plea is not knowing, voluntary, and accurate, it is invalid. Johnson, 867 N.W.2d at 214.
In support of its argument that the erro r in accepting appellant’s guilty plea was
harmless, the state cites an unpublished opinion that also involved a guilty plea to a count
involving one victim but a plea colloquy that referenced another victim of a different count
that was ultimately dismissed. See Aron v. State, No. A06-0389, 2007 WL 1053195 (Minn.
App. Apr. 10, 2007), review denied (Minn. June 19, 2007). In that unpublished and
non-precedential opinion, we affirmed because the plea colloquy, supplemented by the
allegations in the complaint, made it clear that the defendant also assaulted the victim in
the pleaded-to count. Id. at *3-4. Thus, we concluded that the plea was accurate and stated
that “[n]o manifest injustice resulted from the confusion.” Id. at *4. The unpublished
opinion cited by the state does not support its position because, as discussed above,
Valdez’s plea was inaccurate. Because Vald ez’s guilty plea wa s inaccurate, it is
constitutionally invalid. See Johnson, 867 N.W.2d at 214. We reverse and remand for the
district court to allow Valdez to withdraw his plea.
Reversed and remanded.