In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Charles Jeremy Epperson.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1497

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Charles Jeremy Epperson.

Filed April 20, 2020
Reversed; motion denied
Segal, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-PR-19-509

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Scott H. Ikeda, Brandon Boese, Assistant Attorneys
General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant Commissioner of Human Services)

Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney, Rockwell J. Wells, Assistant County
Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Conrad C. Kragness, Gammello -Pearson, PLLC, Baxter, Minnesota (for respondent
Charles Epperson)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Segal,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SEGAL, Judge
Appellant Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services
(commissioner) challenges the district court’s denial of her motion for misjoinder or to
dismiss her as a party for failure to state a claim. Appellant argues that the district court
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erred by sua sponte joining her as a n indispensable party in this civil -commitment
proceeding. We reverse.
FACTS
On February 5, 2019, respondent Charles Jeremy Epperson was civilly committed
as a chemically dependent person. The district court committed Epperson to appellant
commissioner for placement at an appropriate treatment facility. Epperson was transported
to the Clay County Detox Center pending placement. On April 3, 2019, respondent Crow
Wing County filed a 60- to 90-day commitment report. The report indicated that Epperson
remained at the detox center and had not “completed any of the treatment that had been
recommended for him ” because the commissioner had failed to secure an appropriate
placement for him in a treatm ent facility. As of a second review hearing held on May 1,
the situation had not changed and Epperson was still housed at the detox center with no
treatment and no placement.
On May 2, 2019, noting that Epperson had been confined for 91 days in the det ox
facility without treatment or even a plan to secure a placement for him in a treatment
facility, the district court i ssued an order sua sponte joining the commissioner as an
indispensable party to the civil -commitment proceedings. The district court de termined
that, without the commissioner being added as a party, “complete relief cannot be accorded
among those already parties” and that Epperson was “likely to continue to have his legal
right to treatment under Minnesota law violated.” The commissioner was served with the
order joining her as a party through the Minnesota Office of the Attorney General the
following day.
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On May 10 , the commissioner filed a change of status report indicating that
Epperson had been provisionally discharged to a treatmen t facility in Rochester, with
responsibility for his care transferred to the county. The c ommissioner then moved the
district court for misjoinder or to dismiss her as a party for failure to state a claim. Neither
Epperson nor the Crow Wing County Attorney opposed the motion. Before the d istrict
court ruled on the motion , Epperson’s commitment expired as of August 6, 2019.
Approximately t wo weeks later, the district court issued an order denying the
commissioner’s motion for misjoinder or to dismiss. The commissioner appeals.1
D E C I S I O N
The commissioner argues that the district court erred by sua sponte joining her as
an indispensable party to this civil-commitment proceeding. We recognize that the district
court was understandably frustrated by the fact that Epperson was committed for the
purposes of treatment for his chemical dependency and was confined for 91 days in a
facility with no treatment and no plan for securing him placement in an appropriate
treatment facility, and joined the commissioner as a party to the proceeding to compel the
commissioner to provide treatment. The district court, however, lacked authority to join

1 After briefing of this appeal was complete, the commissioner moved to strike the county’s
brief and addendum, arguing that it raised issues that were not raised below and considered
by the district court. But the county expressly did not take a position on the commissioner’s
motion to dismiss, either before the district court or on appeal, and did not raise any legal
issues in its brief . In the same motion, the commissioner moved to supplement her
addendum to include documents from a prior civil -commitment proceeding. The
documents are publicly available and we may take notice and consider them if doing so is
critical to understanding the questions presented in this case. See Rigwald v. Rigwald, 423
N.W.2d 701, 704 n.5 (Minn. App. 1988). We therefore deny the motion as unnecessary.
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the commissioner under the statutory rubric of the civil-commitment statute. We therefore
reverse the denial of the commissioner’s motion for misjoinder and/or dismissal as a party.
We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to joinder orders. Hoyt Props.,
Inc. v. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. , 716 N.W.2d 366, 377 (Minn. App. 2006), aff’d, 736
N.W.2d 313 (Min n. 2007). The improper application of a rule of civil procedure is an
abuse of discretion. Whitaker v. 3M Co. , 764 N.W.2d 631, 636, 640 (Minn. App. 2009) ,
review denied (Minn. July 22, 2009).
The commissioner argues that the district court erred by finding that she was an
indispensable party subject to joinder under Minn. R. Civ. P. 19.01, which provides:
A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as
a party in the action if (a) in the person’s absence complete
relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or
(b) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the
person’s absence may (1) as a practical matter impair or
impede the person’s ability to protect that interest or (2) leave
any one already a party subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by
reason of the person’s claimed interest.

In this case, the district court relied on clause (a) of rule 19.01, and joined the commissioner
as an indispensable party after determining that without joinder, “complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties.” We disagree.
This case involves a civil commitment pursuant to the Minnesota Commitment and
Treatment Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.01-.24 ( 2018). The act creates a comprehensive
statutory scheme governing civil -commitment proceedings that neither contemplates nor
requires the participation of the commissioner as a party. A civil-commitment proceeding
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is initiated by the filing of a petition by an “interested person” as provided in Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.07, subd. 2(a). In this case, the petitioner was the Becker County2 Department of
Human Services.3 After the filing of the petition, notice and an opportunity to present and
rebut evidence is provided to the county attorney and the respondent, in this case the Crow
Wing County Attorney and Epperson, in accordance with Minn. Stat. § 253B.08, subd. 5a.
There is no provision for the commissioner to be added as a party under the statutory
scheme for civil commitments. Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.001-.24.
This court has previously held that the c ommissioner is not a proper party to civil-
commitment proceedings. In re Bowers, 456 N.W.2d 734, 736-37 (Minn. App. 1990). In
that case, we held that , because “the Commissioner did not receive n otice of the hearings
or the claim for costs, and she did not participate,” the commissioner was not a party to the
civil-commitment proceedings. Id. at 736. The district court’s order requiring the
commissioner to pay costs was thus held to be void. Id. at 737-38.
The district court in this case, however, joined the commissioner as an indispensable
party under Minn. R. Civ. P. 19.01. While not directly addressed in our decision in Bowers,
we conclude that the joinder did not cure the underlying def ect identified in that opinion .
The basic fact remains that the relief contemplated by the district court was outside the
court’s authority under the commitment statute.

2 Venue was later transferred to Crow Wing County.

3 The petitioner is a department of the county, separate and distinct from the Minnesota
Department of Human Services, which is a department of the state.
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The purpose of adding the commissioner was to require the commissioner to provide
the ordered relief —an appropriate treatment placement. But t he mere fact that the
commissioner had a statutory duty to place Epperson in an appropriate treatment facility is
not, without more, sufficient to establish that the district court can exercise jur isdiction
over her. See Seaway Port Auth. v. Midland Ins. Co. , 430 N.W.2d 242, 250 n.2 (Minn.
App. 1988) (stating that while a nonparty insurance company may have been obligated by
state law to pay amounts owed to a party, the district court does not have personal
jurisdiction over a nonparty insurance company to order such payment by the nonparty).
This court’s decision in the case of In re Wicks is instructive. 364 N.W.2d 844
(Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn. May 31, 1985). In Wicks, an indivi dual was
civilly committed after the district court determined that he was incapable of caring for
himself. Id. at 845 -46. The district court committed Wicks to the state hospital , but
determined that the least-restrictive ultimate placement for Wicks is a community facility
and ordered the county to file a treatment plan which emphasized “progress made toward
community placement.” Id. at 846. The district court further ordered that “if no such
placement is available within a reasonable time after [Wi cks] is capable of accepting the
placement, [the county] is able and obligated to initiate proce dures to create an available
placement.” Id. On appeal, this court reversed the district court’s order that the county
was obligated to create an appropriate community placement. We stated that, “[a]lthough
we sympathize with the [district] court’s frustration at the lack of resources for Wicks,” the
treatment of patients is not properly before the committing court. Id. at 847. We further
acknowledged that “[t]here is no statutory authority for ordering [the county] to create a
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community placement when all community placements are currently full, or will not accept
Wicks.” Id. at 848.
Similarly in this case, the failure to provide treatment was based on th e lack of
placements available in an appropriate facility. The county initially attempted to secure a
placement for Epperson, but was unable to do so because the facilities refused to accept
him because he had “burned a lot of bridges with a lot of treatm ent facilities throughout
the state” and was on a “no take” list for a number of detox facilities. The commissioner
explained that it was unable to secure a placement for Epperson because there are a limited
number of placements available in state -funded programs, and those on the waitlist are
assigned a priority based on federal regulations. The commissioner was therefore unabl e
to place him based on his low -priority ranking. Under our holding in Wicks, it was not
proper for the district court to join the commissioner for the purpose of ordering her to, in
essence, create or force a placement.
The district court also determined that it was necessary to join the commissioner as
an indispensable party because without joinder Epperson “is likely to continue to have his
legal right to treatment” violated. But we have previously recognized that “the
commitment process is not the proper avenue for asserting a right -to-treatment argument”
and that “a committed person has adequate avenues outside the commitmen t process for
asserting a right-to-treatment issue.” In re Civil Commitment of Navratil, 799 N.W.2d 643,
651 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2011). Because the district court
lacks the authority to order the commissioner to create a plac ement and a committed
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individual can assert a right -to-treatment claim outside of the commitment process, the
commissioner does not qualify as an indispensable party under Minn. R. Civ. P. 19.01.
As in Wicks, we sympathize with the district court’s frust ration with committing
individuals, who lack the ability to care for themselves, for the purpose of providing
treatment only to face lengthy delays and a lack of available placements. But, nevertheless,
we conclude that the proper path for resolving this issue is not through joinder of the
commissioner in a proceeding under the civil-commitment statute and that the district court
lacked authority to join the commissioner as an indispensable party.4
The commissioner is not a proper pa rty under chapter 253 B to civil -commitment
proceedings for the purpose of requiring the commissioner to provide a treatment
placement. The district court therefore erred in denying the commissioner’s motion for
misjoinder or to dismiss.
Reversed; motion denied.

4 Because the determination that the commissioner is not an indispensable party is
dispositive, we decline to rule on the commissioner’s argument that the district court erred
by denying her motion on the grounds of failure to state a claim.