State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1510

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Bridgett Ann Burrell,
Appellant.

Filed November 9, 2020
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-16837

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Krista Barrie, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Charles F. Clippert, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Frisch, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FRISCH, Judge
Following a court trial, the district court found appellant guilty of one count of
racketeering, Minn. Stat. § 609.903, subd. 1(1) (2016), and eight counts of aiding and
abetting theft by swindle over $35,000, Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, subd. 1, .52, subd. 2(a)(4)

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(2016), due to her participation in a complex Medicaid -fraud scheme. Appellant argues
that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions and contests the sentencing
severity level assigned by the district court to her racketeering conviction. We affirm.
FACTS
The state alleges that appellant Bridgett Ann Burrell and her codefendants
fraudulently acquired payments from the Medicaid program, which is administered by the
Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS). Medicaid funds personal care assistant
(PCA) programs in which patients hire agencies to coordinate PCA servi ces, the agencies
contract with individual PCAs to provide services, the PCAs submit timesheets to the
agencies, and the agencies obtain reimbursement from DHS. To enroll in the PCA
programs and become eligible for reimbursement, the agencies must submit enrollment
documents affirming that the agencies do not employ or contract with any providers that
have been excluded from the Medicaid program.
The relevant events begin with the activities of codefendant Lillian Richardson. See
State v. Richardson , No . A19 -1141, 2020 WL 53 61101 (Minn. App. Sept. 8, 2020)
(affirming racketeering and theft -by-swindle convictions) , pet. for review filed (Minn.
Oct. 8, 2020). In July 2012, Richardson pleaded guilty to theft by false representation for
submitting false cla ims for PCA services in order to defraud the Medicaid program.
Richardson was consequently banned from participating in Medicaid, Medicare, and other
federal health-care programs for a minimum of five years beginning July 18, 2013.
Notwithstanding Richardson’s status as an excluded provider, she assisted in the
enrollment, management, control, and billing of numerous PCA agencies, receiving tens

3
of thousands of dollars in compensation for this work. From July 2013 to March 2017,
these agencies regularl y submitted false claims employing the same scheme that led to
Richardson’s 2012 conviction. By the time the state fully uncovered th e scheme, the
agencies had obtained over $7.7 million in reimbursement through the activ ities directed
by Richardson.
Burrell and others facilitated Richardson’s involvement. Knowing that
Richardson’s participation would preclude the agencies from obtaining payments, Burrell
and others concealed Richardson’s participation by submitting documents falsely affirming
that no excluded persons were involved in the agencies, pr oviding Richardson access to
email accounts, and laundering money to compensate Richardson for her assistance. As
agencies came under investigation, Richardson, Burrell, and others coordinated the
movement of employees and recipients to new agencies in order to continue the fraudulent
billing scheme. Nearly half of the purported clients ultimately participated in two or more
of the agencies.
Although Burrell was not the “main driver” of the operation, s he was involved in
five of the agencies and held a leadership role in relation to all other individuals except
Richardson. The district court found that the scheme would not have been as coordinated
and succe ssful without Burrell’s participation. Participants relied on advice from both
Richardson and Burrell to coordinate the concealment of assets, provide false names, and
hide Richardson’s involvement in the scheme during investigative interviews.
On June 10, 2017, Burrell and Richardson discussed whether the state was building
a case against the agencies and gathering letters from the agencies to disguise Richardson’s

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involvement. After learning that an employee of one of the agencies was planning to
consent to an investigative interview, Richardson directed Burrell to persuade the
employee to conceal Richardson’s involvement.
The state charged Burrell with one count of racketeering and eight counts of aiding
and abetting theft by swindle of an amount over $35,000. Following a stipulated-evidence
court trial, the district court found Burrell guilty on all counts.
Because racketeering is not ranked in the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, the
parties each proposed to the district court a sentencing severity level. The district court
issued a memorandum and order ranking the offense at level nine, ultimately imposing an
executed prison sentence of 74 months. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Burrell argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions because
the state failed to establish the requisite structure for a racketeering enterprise and presented
insufficient evidence to prove that she aided and abetted theft by swindle . She further
contends that the district court improperly ranked the racketeering offense at a severity
level of nine. Because the record supports Burrell’s convictions and the district court did
not abuse its discretion in ranking the offense, we affirm.
I. The evidence supports Burrell’s conviction for racketeering.
Burrell first argues that the district court applied an incorrect definition of
“enterprise” when finding her guilty of racketeering and that the state failed to present
evidence to establish an enterprise under the correct definition.

5
When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we “carefully examine the record
to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from” those facts permit
a reasonable conclusion of guilt . State v. Griffin , 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016)
(quotation omitted) . “The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict, and it must be assumed that the fact-finder disbelieved any evidence that conflicted
with the verdict. ” Id. But whether a defendant’s conduct meets the definition of a
particular offense presents a question of statutory interpretation reviewed de novo. State
v. Hayes, 826 N.W.2d 799, 803 (Minn. 2013).
The district court found the existence of an enterprise based on circumstantial
evidence. When reviewing a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, we apply a two-
step analysis. First, we identify the circumstances proved, viewing conflicting evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598-99 (Minn.
2013). We next determine “whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. at 599 (quotation
omitted). In making this determination, we independently examine the reasonableness of
all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved, including inferences
consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt. Id.
Before the district court, Burrell argued that the state did not prove the existence of
an enterprise within the meaning of the racketeering statute because an enterprise cannot
be found where authority is shared between co defendants. The statute defines an
“enterprise” as “a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, trust, or other legal entity”
or an “association, or group of persons, associated in f act although not a legal entity.”

6
Minn. Stat. § 609.902, subd. 3 (2016). An enterprise is characterized by (1) a common
purpose among its m embers; (2) an ongoing and continuing organization, “with its
members functioning under some sort of decision making arrangement or structure ”; and
(3) activities that “extend beyond the commission of the underlying criminal acts either to
coordinate the underlying criminal acts into a pattern of criminal activity or to engage in
other activities.” State v. Huynh, 519 N.W.2d 191, 196 (Minn. 1994).
The district court concluded that “t hough the typical case of racketeering does
involve a clear and authorita rian structure, it does not require a clear and authoritarian
structure. Rather, there may be a loosely affiliated set of agencies carrying out a scheme
with a common purpose.” Burrell disputes this conclusion, arguing that the district court
was require d to find the existence of a hierarchical organization . But the statutory
definition specifically contemplates entities, such as par tnerships, that are nonhierarchical
in nature. See Minn. Stat. § 609.902, subd. 3. And where a group is “associated in fact,”
the structure of the organization may be informal. See Huynh, 519 N.W.2d at 196. For
example, Huynh did not require a strict hierarchy but only “some continuity of structure
and personnel.”1 Id. at 197.
Even so, the district court here found a structure that was hierarchical in nature. The
district court found that participants relied on advice from Richardson and Burrell to

1 Burrell argues that Huynh mentions a “hierarchy,” but this reference only appears in a
footnote discussing the statute’s legislative history. 519 N.W.2d at 195 n.4. Burrell also
cites State v. Longo, in which the enterprise had “a clear organizational structure, with [the
defendant] as the principal” and another individual as his “right-hand man.” 909 N.W.2d
599, 606 (Minn. App. 2018). However, Longo does not establish that such a structure is
the only type of arrangement that may constitute an enterprise.

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coordinate a scheme that “involved several layers, all focused on a goal of pro curing
unjustified payments.” The district court described four layers to this scheme:
The lowest level of this scheme involved allegedly disabled
individuals verifying receipt of personal care services that were
never rendered. The second level required personal care
attendants to verify that p ersonal care services had been
provided regardless of whether or not services had actually
been rendered. The third level involved multiple businesses,
and the owners of these businesses, submitting requests to the
state for payment of these personal care services which were
never rendered. Defendant Bridgett Burrell was a member of
this third group. Finally, at the top of the structure, Defendant
Lillian Richardson directed and coordinated the illegal
activities necessary to keep the scheme in operation.

The record otherwise shows an ongoing, coordinated scheme with a common
purpose and activities extending beyond the commission of the predicate criminal acts in
order to further perpetuate the scheme . See id. at 196. All agency principals uniformly
omitted Richardson’s name from documents that required the agencies to identify their
affiliates. Considering Richardson’s continuous involvement with the agencies and
leadership role, as well as the number of participants involved, it is unreasonable to infer
that the omission was a coincidence rather than a coordinated plan. Further, the agencies
shared not only personnel but also participants and clients, and transferred these various
individuals between agencies to avoid investigation. On this record, the only reasonable
inference is that the agencies operated under a coordinated decisionmaking arrangement.
The district court found that Burrell had a leadership role in this scheme, subordinate to

8
Richardson. Accordingly, we see no error by the district court in its finding that the scheme
contained the requisite structure for a racketeering enterprise.2
II. The evidence supports Burrell’s conviction for aiding and abetting theft by
swindle.
Burrell next argues that her convictions should be reversed because the evidence is
insufficient to support her convictions for aiding and abetting theft by swindle , the
predicate offenses to her racketeering conviction.
The crime of theft by swindle occurs when a person “by swindling, whether by
artifice, trick, device , or any other means, obtains property or services from another
person.” Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(4). Accordingly, the elements of theft by swindle
are: (1) the owner gave up possession of the property due to the swindle, (2) the defendant
intended to obtain possession of the property, and (3) the defendant’s act was a swindle.
State v. Pratt , 813 N.W.2d 868, 873 (Minn. 2012). The elements of aiding and abetting
are “(1) that the defendant knew that h [er] alleged accomplices were going to commit a
crime, and (2) that the defendant intended h [er] presence or actions to further the
commission of that crime.” State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 805 (Minn. 2012) (quotation
omitted).
Burrell first argues that, even if there were swindles, the state did not prove that
DHS paid out money “due to the swindle [s].” We recently rejected the same argument
raised by her codefendant. Richardson, 2020 WL 5361101, at *4. To be sure, the supreme

2 Burrell also argues that the district court “misinstructed itself” on the definition of an
“enterprise.” Although she frames this as an alternative argument, it is premised on the
same contentions that we reject herein.

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court affirmed a theft -by-swindle conviction based on a similarly attenuated chain of
causation in Pratt. There, the defendant prepared fraudulent purchase agreements and loan
applications, and uncontroverted evidence established that mortgage lenders relied on such
documents when deciding whether to extend loans. 813 N.W.2d at 871-72. In standard
practice, once a lender agreed to extend a loan, a title company often facilitated closing and
disbursed funds received from the lender. Id. at 872. The Pratt court held that the false
representations on the purchase agreements and loan applications supported the
defendant’s theft-by-swindle convictions notwithstanding this chain of causation. Id. at
875. Here also, the false enrollment documents may form a basis for theft by swindle even
though the actual transfer of Medicaid funds did not occur until the agencies later submitted
claims for reimbursement.
Burrell further contends that the state failed to prove specific intent to swindle over
$35,000, the amount that increases the maximum allowable penalty for the offense. Minn.
Stat. § 609.52, subd. 3(1) (2016). She does not explain why the evidence was insufficient,
cite any caselaw directly supporting her argument, or provide substantive legal analysis. It
is true that intent to defraud is an element of theft by swindle. State v. Flicek, 657 N.W.2d
592, 598 (Minn. App. 2003). But caselaw shows that the requisite intent concerns the
intent to defraud , not an intent to steal a specific amount. See id. (“Theft by swindle
requires the intent to defraud.”); see also In re Disciplinary Action Against Bonner ,
896 N.W.2d 98, 111 (Minn. 2017) (“[T]heft by swindle requires the specific intent to
defraud another.”). Burrell’s knowledge and intent concern the act o f theft by swindle
rather than the amount swindled.

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Further, the circumstantial evidence supports a finding that Burrell intended to aid
and abet the swindles of amounts greater than $35,000. The evidence shows that Burrell
helped lead a coordinated sch eme that generated over $7 million over the course of four
years. The district court made detailed findings as to the amount swindled for each six -
month period and found that during each such period, the enterprise received hundreds of
thousands of dollar s from DHS based on the misrepresentations o f Burrell and her
associates. Burrell does not present an alternative hypothesis. Given the volume of
participants and claims involved and the amount of money consistently received over each
six-month period, it is not reasonable to infer that she lacked knowledge and intent to
contribute to the transfer of hundreds of thousands of dollars every six months. The
evidence is sufficient to support the necessary intent.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in ranking the racketeer ing
offense.
Burrell challenges the district court’s ranking of the racketeering offense at a
severity level of nine for the purpose of sentencing . When sentencing a defendant on an
unranked offense, a district court must assign the offense a severity level. Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.A.4 (Supp. Nov. 2016). Relevant factors inclu de, but are not limited to:
(1) the gravity of the specific conduct underlying the unranked offense; (2) the severity
level assigned to any ranked offense whose elements are similar to those of the unranked
offense; (3) the conduct of, and severity level assigned to, other offenders for the same
unranked offense; and (4) the severity level assigned to other offenders who engaged in
similar conduct. Id.; State v. Kenard, 606 N.W.2d 440, 443 ( Minn. 2000). We review a

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severity-level determination for an abuse of discretion. State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660,
666 (Minn. 2006). Here, we conclude that the district court properly applied the Kenard
factors when ranking the offense.
The gravity of the specific conduct
First, the record demonstrates the severity of Burrell’s conduct. The district court
found that Burrell played a key role in this scheme, holding a leadership role with respect
to oth er participants except Richardson. The scheme itself was large and complex,
involving over $7 million and numerous co -conspirators. Further, the money targeted by
the enterprise was meant for vulnerable and sick individuals.
The severity level assigned to any ranked offense whose elements are similar to
those of the unranked offense
The district court also considered the severity of ranked offenses with similar
elements. Because her convictions do not involve violence or gang activity, Burrell argues
that she is entitled to a lower severity ranking than the defendant in Huynh, who received
a similar ranking after threatening to k ill the victim and his family. 3 See Huynh, 519
N.W.2d at 198. When affirming that ranking, however, the supreme court noted that the
penalties for racketeering are similar to penalties for first-degree assault and stated that

3 The racketeering offense in Huynh was ranked at level eight, but the ranking there is not
directly analogous to the current ranking grid. Compare Minn. Sent. Guidelines IV (Supp.
1992) (providing a presumptive sentence of 86 months of imprisonment for a level-eight
offense when a person has a criminal -history score of zero), with Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 4.A (Supp. Nov. 2016 ) (providing a presumptive sentence of 86 months of
imprisonment for level-nine offense when a person has a criminal-history score of zero).

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“[t]he legislature clearly intended to punish severely those persons who engage in
racketeering.” Id.
Burrell further argues that her conduct is more analogous to that of other financial
crimes. She cites the crime of financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult, which —like
racketeering—is punishable by up to 2 0 years in prison . Compare Minn. Stat. § 609.52,
subd. 3(1) , with Minn. Stat. § 609.2335, subd. 3 (2016) (providing for penalty un der
section 609.52). When the amount involved is over $35,000, the guidelines assign a
severity level of seven for that offense . Minn. Sent. Guidelines 5.B. And identity the ft
involving over $35,000 is ranked at severity level of eight. Id.
But the district court found the racketeering at issue here to be more severe than the
above-named offenses. Indeed, Burrell helped coordinate such fraud on a large scale,
involving ma ny pa rticipants and requiring a greater degree of sophistication than other
fraud crimes.
The conduct of, and severity level assigned to, other offenders for the same
unranked offense
The district court further reasoned that, according to guidelines commission data,
racketeering is most commonly ranked at level nine. Burrell argues that this factor should
be given little weight because —by their nature—unranked offenses are rarely prosecuted
or cover a wide range of underlying conduct. But Kenard identifies historical ranking of
such offenses as a relevant consideration in establishing the severity level of the instant
offense. 606 N.W.2d at 443. The district court appropriately considered the ranking
assigned to other racketeering convictions.

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The severity level assigned to other offenders who engaged in similar conduct
Referencing this factor, Burrell reiterates the argument that her crime was
nonviolent and observes that level -nine offenses generally involve loss of life or the high
probability of loss of life. Indeed, the district court expressed reluctance to adopt a straight
comparison between violent crimes and th e racketeering involved here. Nonetheless, as
the district court observed, Burrell’s conduct is similar to racketeering cases involving
mortgage fraud and white-collar crimes, which courts have also ranked at level nine. 4
The district court did not abuse its discretion in establishing a severity level of nine
for this unranked offense.
Affirmed.

4 See, e.g. , State v. Rosenlund , No. A09 -358, 2010 WL 7 71773, at *4 -5 (Minn. App.
Mar. 9, 2010) (affirming level-nine ranking for racketeering involving mortgage fraud).