State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1527

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Deandre Lamond Jones,
Appellant.

Filed May 2, 2022
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-17-7569

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney , Michael J. Lieberg, Chief Deputy County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Pres iding Judge; Connolly , Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgme nt of conviction for the promotion of
prostitution, and following a remand for postconviction proceedings, appellant argues that
(1) Minnesota lacked jurisdiction to prosecute the offense fo r which he was charged, and
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(2) he received ineffective assistance of co unsel. Because jurisdiction was proper and
appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm.
FACTS
In August 2017, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Deandre Lamond
Jones with one count of aiding and abetting the promotion of prostitution of a person under
the age of 18. The complaint against him alle ged that in July 2017, Jones and two other
adults transported 17-year-old Child A from Stearns County, Minnesota, to Fargo, North
Dakota, to engage in prostitu tion. The complaint also a lleged that, after Child A was
dropped off at a “call,” Jones picked her up and received a portion of the money she made.
Jones moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The district court held a contested
omnibus hearing on Jones’s motion to dismiss and denied it. The district court determined
that it had jurisdiction over Jones because the alleged act of aiding and abetting the
promotion of prostituti on began in Stearns County, Minne sota, and the charged offense
included transportation of the minor to aid in prostitution.
Jones and the state reached a plea agreemen t. Under that agreement, after Jones
pleaded guilty, he would be granted conditiona l release pending sentencing. If Jones did
not violate any conditions of re lease, then he would receive a sentence of 60 months in
prison, a downward durational departure. But if he violated a condition of release, he
would be sentenced to 128 m onths, a guideline sentence. Fo llowing his guilty plea, the
district court found that Jones “made a knowing and intelligent waiver of [his] rights” and
“provided an adequate fact basis to support [his] plea” and entered a conviction.
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Shortly after his release, the state alleged that Jones violated multiple conditions of
his release. Jones admitted the violations. The district court held a bail hearing during
which Jones told the district court that he was “being misrepresented” by his counsel and
that he wanted to take back his plea. But the district court told Jones that he needed to have
a legal basis to withdraw his plea.
At the sentencing hearing, the state asked the district court to follow the plea
agreement and commit Jones to prison for 128 months because he violated his conditional
release. Jones, through his attorney, asked th e district court to sentence him to the lower
sentence of 60 months, arguing that Jones made mistakes but accepted responsibility and
that receiving 68 more months for a minor violation would be unjust. The district court
imposed a sentence of 128 months. In doing so, the district court stated: “[U]nfortunately,
Mr. Jones, I don’t think I have a choice. I reviewed the plea agreement, and [your attorney]
made it really clear because you wanted to get out pending sentencing . . . if you mess[ed]
up you [don’t] qualify for the durational departure and you agreed to that. So I don’t have
a choice.” Jones asked if he co uld withdraw his original guilty plea, but the district court
stated there was no way to withdraw it at this point in the legal proceedings.
Jones filed a direct appeal to this court. This court stayed the appeal while Jones
petitioned for postconviction relief. In his postconviction petition, Jones argued that his
guilty plea was invalid and that his sentence mu st be vacated. Firs t, he contended that
Minnesota lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him for a crime committed in North Dakota.
Second, he asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney
failed to honor his request to withdraw his guilty plea and misadvise d him that he could
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still receive a 60-month sentence despite violating the conditions of his release. The district
court held an evidentiary heari ng on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. Both
Jones and his trial attorney testified. Jones testified that after he violated the conditions of
his release, he told his attorn ey he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea because he did not
want to receive 128 months and because he felt like he did not get all the information and
evidence necessary before making the plea. His attorney te stified that she advised him
against withdrawing his plea because she did not think that he had a legal basis and because
she could still argue for the 60-month sentence at sentencing.
The district court denied Jones’s postconviction petition. The district court held that
the state had jurisdiction because Jones traveled from Stearns County to go to North Dakota
to commit the crime. The district court al so determined that Jones had not received
ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel’s representation did not fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The State of Minnesota had jurisdiction to prosecute Jones.
Jones first argues that Minnesota lacked jurisdiction1 over him because the offense
was committed in North Dakot a. Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions
provide that a criminal defendant has a right to trial in the st ate, county, or district where

1 Jones argues that the district court lacked “territorial jurisdiction.” Because Jones is
arguing that the operative elem ents of the charged crime o ccurred outside of Minnesota,
we analyze his argument as one of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See State v. Simion,
745 N.W.2d 830, 839 (M inn. 2008) (holding that the dist rict court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over the prosecution because no operative element of the crime occurred in
Minnesota).
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the crime was committed. U.S. Const. amend VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. Consistent with
these constitutional principles, “some part of the crime charged must be ‘committed’ within
the jurisdiction.” State v. Smith, 421 N.W.2d 315, 319 (Minn. 1988). Jurisdiction is the
court’s “power to hear and decide disputes.” Id. at 318. We review issues of jurisdiction
de novo. Simion, 745 N.W.2d at 837.
Minnesota has jurisdiction over a person when the individual:
(1) commits an offense in whole or in part within this state;
or
(2) being without the state, causes, aids or abets another to
commit a crime within the state; or
(3) being without the state, intentionally causes a result
within the state prohibited by the criminal laws of this
state.

Minn. Stat. § 609.025 (2016). Jones argues that jurisdiction did not exist on any of these
three statutory grounds. He argues that his actions in the charged offense of promoting
prostitution occurred solely within North Dakota.
Courts look to the elements of the charged offense when determining whether all or
part of the offense was committed in Minnesota. Simion, 745 N.W.2d at 837. The relevant
statute reads: “Whoever, while acting other than as a prostitute or patron, intentionally does
any of the following may be se ntenced to imprisonment . . . (2) promotes the prostitution
of an individual under the age of 18 years.” Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1(a)(2) (2016).
“Promotion of prostitution” incl udes when a person knowingl y “transports an individual
from one point within this state to another point either within or without this state, or brings
an individual into this state to aid the prostitution of the individual.” Minn. Stat. § 609.321,
subd. 7(6) (2016).
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The district court found that it had power to exercise jurisdiction over Jones because
Jones helped transport Child A from Stearns County in Minnesota to North Dakota to
engage in prostitution. Thus , a relevant portion of the offense occurred within the
boundaries of this state. The district court came to this conclusion based on Minn. Stat.
§ 609.321, subd. 7(6), and Minn. R. Crim. P. 24.02, subd. 1: “when an offense occurs
within the state on a co nveyance, and doubt exists as to where the offense occurred, the
case may be prosecuted in any county through which the conveyance traveled in the course
of the trip during which the offense was committed.”
We agree that the district court had the power to exercise jurisdiction over Jones
because Jones committed part of the offense in Minnesota. At the plea hearing, Jones
admitted that he knew the purpose of the trip from St. Cloud to Fargo was to have one of
the female passengers engage in prostitution in North Dakota. While Jones testified that
he did not know that Child A was a minor, the lack of knowle dge of age is not a relevant
defense. Jones knowingly transported Ch ild A from one point within the State of
Minnesota to another point outsi de the state to aid in the pr ostitution of Child A. This
action supports the finding that the district c ourt had jurisdiction to convict Jones of the
crime charged.2 Thus, the district court did not err in finding it had jurisdiction to prosecute
Jones for the charged crime.

2 We note that the district court erred in deciding it had jurisd iction over Jones under
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.02 because that rule establishes venue and not
jurisdiction. See Smith, 421 N.W.2d at 320 (“Jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry that must
be established before the question of venue is reached.”). That said, this error is harmless
and is not grounds for reversal. Kallio v. Ford Motor Co. , 407 N.W.2d 92, 98 (Minn.
1987).
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II. Jones received effective assistance of counsel.
Jones next argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. A defendant has
a right to the effective assistan ce of counsel in all criminal prosecutions. U.S. Const.
amend. VI; Minn. Const. art I, § 6; Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016).
We examine ineffective-assi stance-of-counsel claims unde r the two-prong test set
forth in Strickland v. Washington . 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Ellis-Strong , 899
N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. App. 2017). Under the Strickland test, a defendant “must
demonstrate that (1) his counsel’s perform ance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have
been different but for counsel’s errors.” Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013).
“If a claim fails to satisfy one of the Strickland requirements, [this court] need not consider
the other requirement.” State v. Mosley , 895 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. 2017) (citation
omitted). “Application of the Strickland test involves a mixed question of law and fact,
which we review de novo.” State v. Mouelle, 922 N.W.2d 706, 715 (Minn. 2019).
The objective standard of reasonableness for an attorney in Minnesota is defined as
“representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills a nd diligence that a
reasonably competent attorney would pe rform under similar circumstances.” State v.
Gassler, 505 N.W.2d 62, 70 (Minn. 1993). There is a strong presumption that an attorney’s
“performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” State v.
Miller, 754 N.W.2d 686, 709 (Minn. 2008).
Jones contends that his counsel’s performan ce fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness for two reasons: (1) counsel offered inaccurate advice on sentencing
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consequences, and (2) counsel fa iled to adequately advise Jones on how to withdraw his
guilty plea. The district court determined that Jones did not meet his burden of proof to
show that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
We agree. As to Jones’s first argument—that he receiv ed inaccurate advice—Jones
testified at the plea hearing that he understood that if he violated the conditions of release,
he could serve 128 months. And in the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Jones testified
that his attorney told him th at a sentence of 128 months was possible if he violated
conditional release but that she would still argue for 60 months. He al so stated that she
repeated that advice after the violation occurred.
Jones’s attorney also testified at the evidentiary hearing and the district court found
her to be credible. The attorney testified that she told Jones she would try to work with the
prosecution to see if they wo uld still honor the original 60-month agreement or, at the
sentencing hearing, she would ask the judge to sentence him to 60 months instead of 128
months despite the violation. She testified that she told Jones the judge may be willing to
agree with her argument because it was a “min or violation,” but th at she would “never
guarantee that.” She also testif ied that she made it clear to Jo nes that he would likely be
sentenced to 128 months in pris on. At the sentencing heari ng, Jones’s attorney tried to
negotiate the lower sentence on his behalf. Thus, there is no evidence that Jones’s counsel
offered inaccurate advice as to sentencing consequences.
Nor is there any evidence that Jones’s attorney failed to advise or provided
inaccurate advice about Jones’s desire to withdraw his guilty plea. When Jones’s attorney
received a letter from him stating he was cons idering withdrawing his plea, she informed
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him that he needed to have a sufficient basis to withdraw his plea, such as proof of coercion.
She also told Jones that he could not just withdraw a guilty plea simply because he wanted
to. The attorney testified that when they spoke further about a plea withdrawal, Jones did
not offer any basis that would allow her to submit a motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
Instead, she testified that the only basis he provided her for withdrawal was because he
now thought the plea was a bad deal.
The attorney advocated for Jones’s interests in reachi ng a plea agreement with the
state for a downward departure of 60 months , if Jones complied with the terms of his
conditional release pending sentencing. And Jones testified that he understood what would
happen if he violated the conditions of release under the plea agreement. Yet Jones violated
those conditions of release. Only after th e violation did Jones e xpress his desire to
withdraw his guilty plea. But, as his attorney testified, J ones did not provide a sufficient
basis to withdraw the plea. Thus, his attorney advised him of his remaining option—to try
to advocate for the lesser sentence despite his violation of his conditional release. Because
there is no evidence that Jones’ s attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness, Jones cannot meet the first prong of the Strickland test. And because
Jones’s claim fails to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, we need not analyze the
prejudice to Jones, if any. For these reas ons, Jones failed to prove that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.