Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State v. Waiters 929 N.W.2d 895
- State v. Moore 481 N.W.2d 355
- State v. Porte 832 N.W.2d 303
- State v. Ortega 813 N.W.2d 86
- State v. Al-Naseer 788 N.W.2d 469
Opinion text
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1534
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Andrew Patrick Olson,
Appellant.
Filed July 20, 2020
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge
Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CR-17-1449
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Kathleen A. Heaney, Sherburne County Attorney, George R. Kennedy, Assistant County
Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, Melissa Sheridan, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
In this direct appeal from his theft conv iction, appellant Andrew Olson argues that
the circumstantial evidence tending to prove that he committed the theft is insufficient to
eliminate all rational inferences inconsistent with his guilt. We disagree and affirm.
2
FACTS
On April 20, 2017, a 14-foot V-nose RC tr ailer belonging to D.Z. was stolen from
the lot behind his business in Elk River. Surv eillance footage shows that the trailer was
stolen by one person driving a light-colored, four-door pi ckup truck with black door
handles, black wheel arches, black rims, running boards, five cab lights, and a silver mark
behind the driver’s-side front wheel well. The footage shows only one person getting out
of the pickup truck, hitching the trailer to the truck, and driving away. Only D.Z. and his
son had permission to use the trailer.
On April 21, 2017, D.Z. discovered that hi s trailer was missing and contacted police.
Two days later, D.Z. found his trailer listed for sale on Craigslist in Eau Claire,
Minneapolis, and Rochester. The listings were posted on April 22 a nd 23, 2017. Police
determined that the photograp hs posted on Craigslist were taken in a Shopko parking lot
in Rochester. An officer contacted the seller, who was identified as “Drew Olson.” After
initially responding to the officer, the seller later ceased contact and deleted the listings.
At trial, T.B. testified that he was sho pping for a trailer in April 2017, and found a
14-foot V-nose RC trailer listed for sale on Craigslist. T.B. agreed to meet the seller of the
trailer in a Walmart parking lo t in Rochester. When T.B. a rrived at the parking lot, the
seller, later identified as appellant, was alrea dy there. Appellant was alone, and had the
trailer hitched to a silver Dodge Ram 2500 di esel pickup truck. Similar to the vehicle
depicted in the surveillance footage when the trailer was stolen, the Dodge Ram pickup
truck had five cab lights, black door handles, black wheel arches, black rims, and running
3
boards. T.B. bought the trailer for $2,900 on April 25 or 26. The trailer was later identified
as the trailer stolen from D.Z.
On April 30, 2017, Rosemont police stoppe d a silver Dodge Ram 2500 diesel pickup
truck for failing to display license plates. The truck had five cab lights, black door handles,
black wheel arches, black rims, running boards, and a silver mark behind the driver’s-side
front wheel well. The truck, which was driven by appellant, was pulling a stolen trailer.
Appellant provided police with false information about his identity. Police arrested him.
A search of appellant’s truck revealed duplicate vehicle identification number (VIN)
stickers for the stolen trailer that appellant had sold to T.B. Police also found an
advertisement for D.Z.’s trailer on appellant’s cell phone. In September 2017, D.Z.’s trailer
was recovered from T.B., who had been an unwitting buyer of it.
The state charged appellant with theft of movable property in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1) ( 2016), based on the state’s a llegation that appellant stole
D.Z.’s trailer from the parking lot in Elk River. Appellant pleaded not guilty and the case
was tried to the court. At trial, the dist rict court admitted evidence that appellant had
previously been convicted of possessing stol en trailers in 2013 and 2017, because the
evidence tended to prove identity and common scheme or plan.
The district court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to an executed prison
term of 21 months.
This appeal followed.
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D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that his “conviction must be reversed becaus e the state did not
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he stole a trailer from [D.Z.]” because, he argues, the
state’s circumstantial evidence that he is the person who stole D.Z.’s trailer is insufficient.
When evaluating a claim concerning the su fficiency of circumstantial evidence, “we
carefully examine the record to determine whether the fa cts and the legitimate inferences
drawn from them would permit the factfinder to reasonably conclude that the defendant
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v.
Waiters, 929 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. 2019) (quo tation omitted). We view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the fact-finder believed the state’s
witnesses and disbelieved any contrary evidence. State v. Moore, 481 N.W.2d 355, 360
(Minn. 1992). “A convictio n based on circumstantial evidence receives heightened
scrutiny on appellate review.” State v. Porte , 832 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. App. 2013)
(quotation omitted).
“A conviction supported by circumstantial evidence requires us to apply a two-step
[analysis] . . . .” State v. Ortega , 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012). “First, we must
identify the circumstances proved, giving deference to the [fact-finder]’s acceptance of the
proof of these circumstances and rejection of ev idence in the record that conflicted with
the circumstances prov ed by the State.” Id. (quotation omitted). Second, we must
“independently examine the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the
circumstances proved, including inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.”
Id. (quotation omitted). “Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view
5
of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the de fendant as to exclude
beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Al-Naseer,
788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).
The charged offense required the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
appellant intentionally and without claim of ri ght took, used, transfe rred, concealed, or
retained possession of D.Z.’s property withou t D.Z.’s consent and with the intent to
permanently deprive D.Z. of the property, and that his act occurred in Sherburne County.
Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1). Appellant does not argue that D.Z.’s trailer was not
stolen, but maintains that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he is the person who
stole the trailer. The evidence of identity is circumstantial, because the surveillance footage
is not sufficiently clear to identify the person who took the trailer.
Applying the circumstantial-ev idence review standard to the evidence of appellant’s
having been the thief, the circumstances proved are that, on April 20, 2017, a light colored,
four-door pickup truck with black door hand les, black wheel arches, black rims, running
boards, five cab lights, and a silver mark behind the driver’s-side front wheel well was used
to steal D.Z.’s trailer. There was one person in the pickup truck when the trailer was stolen.
Two or three days after the theft, the trailer was listed for sale on Craigslist in Eau Claire,
Minneapolis, and Rochester. The same pictur es of the trailer, taken at a Shopko in
Rochester, were used in all three listings. The Craigslist seller identified himself as “Drew
Olson.” On April 25 or 26 , 2017, appellant met with T. B.—who knew nothing of the
theft—to sell the trailer to T.B. Appellant was alone when he met with T.B. and was
driving a silver Dodge Ram 2500 diesel four-d oor pickup truck with black door handles,
6
black wheel arches, black rims, running boards, five cab lights, and a silver design reading
“Ram 2500” behind the driver’s-side front wh eel well. On April 30, 2017, a Rosemont
police officer stopped appellant, who was driving the silver Dodge Ram 2500 diesel four-
door pickup truck with black door handles, black wheel arches, black rims, running boards,
five cab lights, and “Ram 2500” written in silver lettering be hind the driver’s-side front
wheel well. When officers searched appellant ’s pickup truck, they discovered duplicate
VIN stickers for D.Z.’s stolen trailer. On January 30, 2017, appellant received a stolen
trailer in Hennepin County, knowing that it was stolen. On March 13, 2013, appellant was
stopped in Pine County while towing a stolen trailer that had the serial number removed.
Having identified the facts consistent w ith guilt, we next “i ndependently examine
the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved.”
Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100 (quota tion omitted). The inferences to be drawn from the
circumstances proved are consistent with appellant’s guilt, and appellant makes no contrary
argument.
Appellant argues, however, that the circ umstances proved are consistent with an
alternative theory of innocence: that appellant possessed the stolen trailer, but was not the
person who stole it.
The state argues that the truck used to take D.Z.’s trailer is identical to the truck
appellant used to meet T.B. to sell him the stolen trailer and is identical to the truck he was
driving when Rosemont police stopped him and discovered documents concerning the
stolen trailer in that truck. And he was twi ce convicted in the past of being in possession
of stolen trailers. The district court determined that the only reasonable inference from the
7
evidence is that the same pic kup truck was involved in each of these incidents, and that
appellant was the person who stole the trailer.
The only rational inference from the circum stances proved is indeed that appellant
was the individual who stole the trailer on April 20, 2017. In the days following the theft,
appellant drove a pickup truck identical to the one used in the traile r theft, both when he
sold the trailer to T.B. and when he was stopped by Rosemont police. The record on appeal
includes no evidence that anyone other than appellant drove that pickup truck. Police also
found an advertisement for the trailer on a cell phone seized from appellant, and the truck
appellant was driving when he was arrested contained documents pertaining to the stolen
trailer. This evidence, although circumstantial, leads unerringly to only one conclusion—
that appellant is the person who stole the trailer.
Appellant’s proposed alternative conclusion, that someone else stole the trailer, is
neither reasonable nor rational on these fact s. The only reasonabl e conclusion from the
circumstances proved is that appellant stole D.Z.’s trailer on April 20, 2017. We therefore
affirm his conviction.
Affirmed.