State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1537

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Rafael Buenfil,
Appellant.

Filed August 10, 2020
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-CR-19-825

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, E lisabeth Mary Kirchner, Assistant County
Attorney, Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Frisch, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for fleeing a peace officer in a
motor vehicle, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied
his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.
FACTS
In March 2019, according to the state’s complaint, a police officer attempted to stop
a car that was being driven without license plates. When the officer turned on his flashing
lights to stop the car, the car fled through a red light. The car continued to flee at speeds
up to 80 miles per hour until it ultimately slid into a snowbank. The driver and passenger
exited the car and fled on foot. The officer dispatched his police dog, who apprehended
the driver. The driver was identified as appellant Rafael Buenfil.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Buen fil with fleeing a peace officer in a
motor vehicle under Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 3 (2018), and three other crimes. Buenfil
agreed to plead guilty to fleeing a peace officer in a mo tor vehicle in ex change for the
state’s dismissal of the remaining charges.
At the plea hearing, Buenfil entered a pl ea of guilty and answ ered a series of
questions from the state’s attorney. In response to questioning, Buenfil acknowledged that
he understood the rights he was waiving by pl eading guilty. Buenfil also confirmed that

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he did not make any claim that he was innocent. He then engaged in the following colloquy
with the state’s attorney:
Q: Okay, let’s go back to Ma rch 1st of this year, at
approximately 2:23 in the morni ng, were you in the area of
8th Street and 30th Avenue South, here in Moorhead,
Minnesota?

A: Yes.

Q: And you were in Clay County, Minnesota, is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And shortly after that time, did an officer try to make
contact with you?

A: Yes.

Q: What happened?

A: Vehicle—officer—displayed their lights—it was a speed
chase all the way up to 20th Avenue. Basically, I fled, fled on
foot out of the vehicle. A K- 9 was ordered to, to detain—and
brought to the county jail.

Q: Okay, so were you a driver in a vehicle that fled from one
of the officers here in Moorhead?

A: Yeah. When I—when I jumped out of the vehicle.

Q: And you had been driving th at vehicle before you jumped
out, is that correct?

A: Yeah. I jumped—yep.

Q: And where did you drive before you got out of the vehicle?

A: Down—I’m, I’m not sure—it was 18th Street.

Q: Okay. And you knew that th at officer was following you,
is that correct?

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A: Yeah. This officer—the officer’s lights were going through
the whole—through the whole chase.

. . . .

Q: And then you stopped the vehicle and you ran from him. Is
that correct?

A: Yes, I jumped out of the vehicle and ran.

Q: And then he deployed his K-9?

A: Yes.

After the state completed its questions, Buenfil’s attorney asked Buenfil if he
understood that he could go to prison for the crime. Buenfil responded that he understood.
The district court then asked Buenfil, “w hen you first started answering questions,
you seemed a little hesitant and, and you’ve answered all the questions, I just want to make
sure that you are comfortable proceeding in this fashion?” Buenfil responded, “I am, Your
Honor.” Buenfil also had signed and subm itted a plea petition, which indicated that he
understood the rights he was waiving. After considering Buenfil’s testimony and the plea
petition, the district court found that Buenfil knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently gave
up his rights and provided a factual basis for his guilty plea. The district court then ordered
a presentence investigation report and deferred acceptance of the plea until sentencing.
Four days after pleading guilty—and before the sentencing hearing—Buenfil sent a
letter to the court requesting that the court allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. In support
of his request, Buenfil claimed that another individual was driving the car when it fled the

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police. He further alleged that the individual had sent him a letter in which the individual
stated that he, not Buenfil, was the driver of the car.
After receiving Buenfil’s request, the distri ct court held a hearing and the parties
agreed to brief the issue. Buenfil argued that the district court should allow him to
withdraw his plea because it was “fair and just” to do so. He maintained that “it would not
be just to allow a defendant to enter a plea to a particular charge if another individual has
asserted that he committed the crime.” Buenfil did not file the letter which he claimed he
had received from the individual taking responsibility for the crime or any other supporting
documentation with his brief.
The state opposed the withdrawal. The state argued that the plea was valid and that
the letter was of questionable evidentiary value. In support of its argument, the state filed
the letter, which Buenfil claimed was written by the other individual, as well as a letter that
Buenfil himself had written. The state argued that the handwriting on the letter that Buenfil
claimed he received from the individual was “identical” to Buenfil’s own handwriting. In
response, Buenfil argued that (1) he should be allowed to withdraw his plea because
another person had claimed responsibility for the cr ime, (2) the state would not be
prejudiced by the withdrawal of his plea, and (3) the credibility of th e letter is a question
of fact for the jury to decide after the case proceeds to tria l. Buenfil again provided no
further evidence—such as an affidavit—to support his claim of innocence.
The district court denied Buenfil’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In its order,
the district court found that Buenfil’s plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The
district court also determined that Buenfil provided an adeq uate factual basis at the plea

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hearing when he “acknowledged that he was the driver of a motor vehicle and that he fled
in that motor vehicle when he saw the officer’s lights.” The district court concluded that
the plea was made with deliberation and that Buenfil failed to show that his plea was invalid
or that it would be fair and just to allow him to withdraw it.
The district court accepted Buenfil’s plea and sentenced him to 17 months’
imprisonment, stayed for four years.
Buenfil appeals.
D E C I S I O N
“A defendant has no absolute right to wi thdraw a guilty plea after entering it.”
State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). A plea withdrawal under Minn. R.
Crim. P. 15.05 may occur “if one of two standards is met.” State v. Lopez, 794 N.W.2d 379,
382 (Minn. App. 2011). First, a district court “must allow” a defendant to withdraw a plea
at any time if it is necessary to correct a “m anifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05,
subd. 1. Second, a district court “may allow” a defendant to withdraw a plea before
sentencing “if it is fair and just to do so.” Id., subd. 2. The fair-and-just standard is less
demanding than the manifest-injustice sta ndard, but does not permit withdrawal “for
simply any reason.” State v. Townsend, 872 N.W.2d 758, 764 (Minn. App. 2015) (quoting
State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007)).
Before the district court, Buenfil did not argue under the manifest-injustice standard.
Instead, Buenfil argued that it would have been “fair and just” to allow him to withdraw
his guilty plea before sentenci ng because another in dividual had taken responsibility for
the crime. Under the “fair and just” standa rd, the district court must consider two

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factors: “(1) the reasons a defendant advanc es to support withdrawal and (2) prejudice
granting the motion would cause the St ate given reliance on the plea.” Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d at 97. In addition, the district court may consider “the entire context in which
[the defendant’s] plea of guilty occurred , as demonstrated by the record.”
State v. Abdisalan, 661 N.W.2d 691, 695 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn.
Aug. 19, 2003). The defendan t bears the burden to provide reasons for withdrawal, and
the burden is on the state to demonstrate that withdrawal would cause prejudice. Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d at 97. We review a district court’s decision to deny a plea-withdrawal motion
for an abuse of discretion, reversing only in the “rare case.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Buenfil argues that the district court abus ed its discretion because it would have
been fair and just to allow him to withdraw his plea when another individual had taken
responsibility for the crime. We first review the district court’s assessment of the reasons
Buenfil gave to support withdrawal of his plea. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97. Here, Buenfil
did not provide any evidentiary support for the reasons he advanced—such as the letter or
an affidavit from the individual. Buenfil bear s the burden of advancing the fair and just
reasons to support withdrawal. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97. Be cause Buenfil failed to
produce any evidence to support his assertion that someone else had taken responsibility
for the crime, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
determined that Buenfil failed to demonstrate a “fair and just” reason to withdraw his plea.
Moreover, when deciding whether to grant a plea withdrawal motion, a district court
may consider “the entire context in which [t he defendant’s] plea of guilty occurred, as
demonstrated by the record.” Abdisalan, 661 N.W.2d at 695. As the state points out, the

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record clearly demonstrates that Buenfil acknowledged his guilt at the plea hearing. See
State v. Tuttle , 504 N.W.2d 252, 256-57 (Minn. A pp. 1993) (affirming a denial of a
plea-withdrawal motion where a victim recanted their statement due, in part, because the
defendant acknowledged his guilt and showed remorse). At no point during the plea
hearing did Buenfil indicate that he was in nocent of the charge. Instead, Buenfil
established his own guilt by admitting that he drove the car to fl ee from the police. See
Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 3 (defining fleei ng a peace officer in a motor vehicle as one
who by means of a motor vehicle flees “a peace officer who is acting in the lawful discharge
of an official duty, and the perpetrator knows or should reasonably know the same to be a
peace officer”). The district court carefully ev aluated the validity of the plea, noting that
Buenfil was represented by counsel, questioned about giving up his right to a trial, and
confirmed that he made no claim that he was innocent.
The district court must also consider the prejudice to the state if the defendant is
allowed to withdraw his plea. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97. Buenfil argues that the district
court did not find prejudice to the state and th at the district court therefore should have
allowed him to withdraw his plea. But the district court does not need to find prejudice to
deny a plea-withdrawal motion when the defe ndant fails to provide any “substantiated
reasons for withdrawal of his plea.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 98; see also State v. Cubas,
838 N.W.2d 220, 224 (Minn. App. 2013) (“Even when there is no prejudice to the state, a
district court may deny plea withdrawal under rule 15.05, subdivision 2, if the defendant
fails to advance valid reasons why withdrawal is fair and just.”), review denied (Minn.
Dec. 31, 2013).

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In sum, Buenfil did not meet his burden of presenting a fair and just reason to
withdraw his plea. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that
Buenfil did not show that it would have been fair and just to allow him to withdraw his
guilty plea. See Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97 (holding that a district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying plea withdrawal under the fair-and-just standard when the defendant
“failed to provide any valid reason why withdrawal would be ‘fair and just’”).
Affirmed.