1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A19-1554

Court of Appeals Hudson, J.
Concurring, Moore, III, McKeig, JJ.
State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs. Filed: December 29, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts
Carlos Ramone Sargent,

Appellant.

________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Benjamin T. Lindstrom, Cass County Attorney, Walker, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

David M. Robbins, Special Assistant Pu blic Defender, Meyer Njus Tanick, PA,
Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.

________________________
S Y L L A B U S
1. Article I, Section 10 of the Minn esota Constitution requires a law
enforcement officer to have reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to expand
the scope and duration of a traffic stop beyond its initial purpose.
2
2. Because a violation of a pretrial release condition does not constitute criminal
activity, the law enforcement officer’s investigation into appellant’s non-criminal violation
of his pretrial release conditions exceeded the permissible scope and duration of the traffic
stop and therefore was an unreasonable seizure under Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota
Constitution.
Reversed and remanded.
O P I N I O N
HUDSON, Justice.
This case arises from appellant Carlos Ra mone Sargent’s appeal of the district
court’s order denying his motion to suppress ev idence. During a routine traffic stop, law
enforcement officers questioned Sargent, a pa ssenger in the stopped vehicle, about the
conditions of his pretrial release. Sargent was then arrested for violating a condition of his
pretrial release and a pat-down search revealed ammunition in his pocket.
The State charged Sargent with illegal po ssession of ammunition. Sargent moved
to suppress the State’s evidence, arguing that the officers violated his constitutional right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when they questioned him about the
conditions of his pretrial release during the traffic stop. The district court denied Sargent’s
suppression motion and he was convicted of illegal possession of ammunition. The court
of the appeals affirmed.
We reverse. The Minnesota Constitution requires that a law enforcement officer
have reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to expand the scope and duration
of a traffic stop. We conclude that a pretrial release violation does not constitute criminal
3
activity, which means the inquiry by the officers into the conditions of Sargent’s pretrial
release exceeded the permissible scope of the traffic stop and was an unlawful seizure under
Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution. Therefore, we reverse the decision of
the court of appeals and remand to the distri ct court with directions to vacate Sargent’s
conviction and grant his suppression motion.
FACTS
In May 2017, Sargent was charged with fifth-degree possession of a controlled
substance and driving while impaired. The district court granted him pretrial release with
conditions that included refraining from the use of alcohol and submitting to random drug
tests. Sargent posted bail and was released from custody pending his trial on the two
charges.
Six months later, law enforcement office rs with the Leech Lake Tribal Police
initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by an adult female for failing to properly signal a
turn. Sargent was one of three passengers insi de of the vehicle. One of the officers
recognized Sargent because the officer had recently reviewed Sargent’s criminal history in
connection with an assault inve stigation and knew that he wa s on pretrial release. The
officer did not know whether Sargent’s pret rial release was subject to any specific
conditions.
During the traffic stop, an officer smelled an odor of alcohol coming from inside of
the vehicle. The officer asked the adult fe male driver if she had been drinking; she
responded “no.” The officer then asked the three passengers in the car the same question,
4
and all the passengers, including Sargent, admitted that they had consumed alcohol earlier
that evening. A preliminary breath test confirmed the adult female driver’s sobriety.
The officer began questioning Sargent and asked if he had “a no drink” condition as
part of his pretrial release. Sargent responded in the affirmative. The officer asked Sargent
to submit to a preliminary breath test; he agreed and provided a breath sample that showed
an alcohol concentration of 0.03.
The officer contacted dispatch and receiv ed confirmation that Sargent’s pretrial
release included a condition prohibiting him from consumin g alcohol. The officer
attempted to contact the probation agent supe rvising Sargent’s pretrial release but was
unable to reach him. Another probation agent told the officer that Sargent should be
arrested for violating his pretrial releas e condition. Sargent was placed under arrest,
leading to a pat-down search that revealed ammunition in Sargent’s pocket.
The State charged Sargent with illegal possession of ammunition under Minn. Stat.
§ 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020). Before trial, Sargent move d to suppress the ammunition
evidence found in his pocket during the pat-down se arch, arguing that the officer’s
questions about the conditions of his pretrial release improperly expanded the scope of the
traffic stop. The district court determined that the officer had sufficient reasonable
articulable suspicion that Sargent was violating a condition of his pretrial release to expand
the scope of the traffic stop and denied the su ppression motion. Sargent waived his right
to a jury trial and agreed to a stipulated evidence trial to obtain review of the pretrial ruling.
See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. The district court found Sargent guilty and sentenced
him to the mandatory minimum of five years in prison.
5
Sargent appealed the district court’s denial of his suppression motion and the court
of appeals affirmed. State v. Sargent , 951 N.W.2d 121, 134 (M inn. App. 2020). In a
precedential opinion, the court of appeals determined that th e officer’s expansion of the
traffic stop to investigate the conditions of Sargent’s pretrial release was constitutional and
reasonable under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Sargent, 951 N.W.2d at 131. The court
of appeals acknowledged that the violation of a pretrial release condition is not a crime
under Minnesota law and “does not provide a basis for a traditional Terry stop,” but the
court was “not persuaded that the noncriminal nature of a pretrial-release violation requires
a conclusion that expansion of a warrantless seizure to investigate such a violation is never
constitutionally reasonable.” Id. at 128. Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed.
Sargent asked our court to review the issue of whether law enforcement may expand
the scope of a traffic stop to investigate an individual for a potential violation of the
conditions of their pretrial release.1 We granted Sargent’s request for review.
ANALYSIS
Sargent argues that the district court co mmitted a reversible error by denying his
pretrial suppression motion. When reviewing a pretrial motion to suppress, “we review
the district court’s factual findings for clear e rror and its legal determinations de novo.”
State v. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d 149, 155 (Minn. 2020). Under a de novo standard, “we do

1 Sargent also sought review of whether the random-testing condition of his pretrial
release was unconstitutional. We denied review of that issue. State v. Sargent ,
No. A19-1554, Order at 1 (Minn. filed Dec. 29, 2020).
6
not defer to the analysis of the courts below, but instead we exercise independent review.”
Wheeler v. State, 909 N.W.2d 558, 563 (Minn. 2018).
Sargent contends that the law enforcement officer’s investigation into the conditions
of his pretrial release exceeded the permissi ble scope of the traffic stop and amounted to
an unconstitutional seizure. Thus, we begin our analysis with an overview of the law
governing the scope and duration of traffic stops. We then turn to the facts of this case to
determine whether the officer’s investigation exceeded the permissible scope of the traffic
stop.
I.
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section
10 of the Minnesota Constitution protect the “ri ght of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches a nd seizures.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV; see Minn. Const. art. I, § 10.2 The first step when analyzing an alleged

2 Although identical in their language and structure, we have interpreted Article I,
Section 10 of the Minnes ota Constitution to provide greater pr otection against
unreasonable searches and seizures than th e Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 361–63 (Minn. 2004). But
when analyzing the reasonableness of an officer’s seizure under the Minnesota
Constitution, our analysis is governed by “the principles and framework of Terry” that are
derived from the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 363; see also State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d
239, 266 n.36 (Minn. 2007) (Gildea, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that
the permissible scope of a Terry stop is “a concept that is drawn from the federal
constitution”).
Because we conclude that Sargent’s ri ghts were violated under the Minnesota
Constitution, we need not deci de whether his federal constitu tional rights were violated.
See Flowers, 734 N.W.2d at 258 (“[W]e have conc luded that Flowers’ rights under our
state constitution were violated , and therefore we need not address the issue of whether
Flowers’ rights under the federal constitution were violated.”).
7
violation of Article I, Section 10 is to determine whether the officer’s conduct constituted
a search or seizure. State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Minn. 2007). The conduct at
issue in this case is the officer’s questioning of a passenger during a routine stop for a minor
traffic violation. The parties do not dispute that Sargent was seized when the officer began
questioning him about the conditi ons of his pretrial release. 3 Thus, the first step of the
analysis is complete.
Having concluded that a search or seizure occurred, the next step is to decide
whether it was unreasonable. A search or seizure conducted without a warrant is
considered unreasonable per se. State v. Burbach , 706 N.W.2d 484, 488 (Minn. 2005).
Absent a warrant, the State has the burden to show that a search or seizure falls within one
of the “specifically established and well delineated exceptions” to the warrant requirement.
Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the State relies on the Terry search exception, which comes from the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). We have summarized
the holding from Terry as follows: even w ithout probable cause, “police may stop and
frisk a person when (1) they have a reasonabl e, articulable suspicion that a suspect might
be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might

3 In State v. Fort , we held that a passenger of a car is considered seized “if a
reasonable person, under the circumstances, w ould not feel free to disregard the police
questions or to terminate the encounter.” 6 60 N.W.2d 415, 418 (Min n. 2003). The facts
of this case as relevant to the seizure issue are analogous to the facts of Fort. There is little
doubt that, under the circumstances, an objectively reasonable person in Sargent’s position
would not feel free to disregard the officer’s questions or to end the encounter. Therefore,
we agree with the parties that Sargent was seized when the officer started questioning him
about the conditions of his pretrial release.
8
be armed and dangerous.” State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992), aff’d,
508 U.S. 366 (1993). “T he purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of
crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his inve stigation without fear of violence . . . .”
State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 251 (Minn. 2007) (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 146 (1972)). In Minnesota, we have expressly adopted “the principles and framework
of Terry for evaluating the reasonableness of seiz ures during traffic stops even when a
minor law has been violated.” State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 363 (Minn. 2004).
Applying the Terry framework to a traffic stop invol ves a two-pronged analysis.
See id. at 364. Under the first Terry prong, “we ask whether the traffic stop was justified
at its inception,” id., by a showing of “reasonable articulable suspicion,” State v. Diede ,
795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011). If the officer had reasona ble suspicion to justify the
initial stop, we turn to the second Terry prong and ask whether “the actions of the police
during the stop were reasonably related to and justified by the circumstances that gave rise
to the stop in the first place.” Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 842 (quoting Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d
at 364). Because Sargent conc edes that the initial traffic stop of the vehicle for failing to
signal a turn was lawful, our analysis focuses solely on the second Terry prong.
“The second Terry prong constrains the scope and methods of a search or seizure.”
Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 364. An initially valid stop of a vehicle may “become invalid if
it becomes ‘intolerable’ in its ‘intensity or scope.’ ” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 17−18).
“[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the
seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic viol ation that warranted the stop and attend to
related safety concerns.” Rodriguez v. United States , 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015) (internal
9
citations omitted). An officer seeking to expa nd the duration or scope of the traffic stop
beyond its original justificati on may only do so if “he or she had a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” Diede, 795 N.W.2d
at 843 (quoting State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995)).
“[E]ach incremental intrusion during a stop must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by
the circumstances which rendered [the in itiation of the stop] permissible.’ ” Askerooth,
681 N.W.2d at 364 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19). Put anot her way, each step of an
officer’s investigation must “b e tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the
original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3)
reasonableness, as defined in Terry.” Id. at 365.
Reasonableness, as defined by Terry, is an objective standa rd: “would the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure . . . warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?” Id. at 364 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at
21–22) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have explained that “to be reasonable, any
intrusion in a routine traffic stop must be supp orted by an objective and fair balancing of
the government’s need to search or seize and the individual’s right to personal security free
from arbitrary interference by law officers.” Burbach, 706 N.W.2d at 488 (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our reasonableness inquiry considers the
“totality of the circumstances,” including th e special training, experience, and ability of
law enforcement officers to make inferences and deductions beyond that of the average
person. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d at 251–52. In the en d, the burden is on the State to
10
“demonstrate that the Terry search was sufficiently limited in scope and duration.” Id. at
252.
II.
With these principles in mind , we turn to the issue of first impression before us:
whether a law enforcement officer may expand th e scope of a traffic stop to investigate a
passenger’s potential violation of a condition of their pretrial release.4 “Any expansion of
the scope or duration of a traffic stop must be justified by a reasonable articulable suspicion
of other criminal activity.” State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 419 (Minn. 2003) (emphasis
added).
Sargent argues that, even if the officer had reasonable suspicion that he was actively
violating a condition of his pretrial release, such conduct is not a crime. Because the officer
did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, Sargent contends that the officer’s
expansion of the scope of the traffic stop wa s unconstitutional. The State acknowledged
during oral argument that a pretrial release violation is not a crime under Minnesota law,
but maintains that an officer may expand the scope of a traffic stop to investigate a potential
violation of a pretrial release condition if the officer’s actions are reasonable under Terry.
As a preliminary matter, we agree with Sargent and the court of appeals that under
State v. Jones, 869 N.W.2d 24, 25 (Minn. 2015), a pretrial release violation is not a crime.

4 In this case, the officer’s knowledge that Sargent was on pretrial release combined
with Sargent’s admission that he had been consuming alcohol earlier in the evening provide
the “minimal level of objective justificati on” to reasonably suspect that Sargent was
violating a condition of his pretrial release. See State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393
(Minn. 2008) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
11
In Jones, the issue was whether a probationer could be charged with criminal contempt for
violating a condition of his probation.5 Id. Reading the criminal contempt and probation
statutes together, we found it “telling that the comprehensive pr obation statutes do not
provide, or even hint, that a willful violation of a ‘term’ of probation constitutes criminal
contempt.” Id. at 29. Thus, we concluded that “[a] willful violation of a term of probation
does not itself constitute a violation of a ‘mandate of a court’ under [the criminal contempt
statute].” Id. at 31.
Although Jones was decided in the context of probation violations, we find its
reasoning applies with equal force to the violation of a condition of pretrial release for two
reasons. First, nothing in the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure suggests that a willful
violation of a pretrial release condition constitutes criminal contempt. In fact, the opposite
is true; the comments accompanying Rule 6.03, which governs violations of pretrial release
conditions, plainly state that with one exception not relevant here, “there are no provisions
similar to Rule 6.03 in existing Minnesota statutory law.” See Minn. R. Crim. P. 6 cmt.
Second, it is noteworthy that individuals on pret rial release pending a trial have not been
convicted of a crime and still carry the presumption of innocence. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483–86 (1978). If a probationer’s willful viola tion of a term of probation
does not constitute criminal contempt, then an individual who is merely accused of a crime

5 In Jones, the criminal contempt charge was brought under Minn. Stat. § 588.20,
subd. 2(4) (2014), which provided that every person who willf ully disobeys “the lawful
process or other mandate of a court” is guilty of a misdemeanor. See Jones, 869 N.W.2d
at 25–26. The State does not argue that Jones is distinguishable or offer any alternative
theory to explain why pretrial release violations should be considered criminal activity.
12
(and still presumed innocent) should likewise not be subject to criminal contempt charges
for violating a condition of pretrial release.
Even though the court of appeals recogni zed that Sargent was not engaged in
criminal activity, it was “also not persuaded th at the noncriminal nature of a pretrial-
release violation requires a conclusion that expansion of a warrantless seizure to investigate
such a violation is never constitutionally reasonable.” Sargent, 951 N.W.2d at 128. We
disagree. Indeed, it is precisely the noncrimina l nature of Sargent’s conduct that leads us
to conclude that the officer’s questioning was unreasonable in its scope. Permitting law
enforcement officers to subj ect motorists and their passe ngers to ques tioning about
noncriminal conduct with no nexus to the in itial purpose for the stop, even if done in a
reasonable manner, is incompatib le with “the individual’s right to personal security free
from arbitrary interference by law officers” guaranteed by Article I, Section 10 of the
Minnesota Constitution. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365 (quoting United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).6 Thus, we reaffirm the fundamental principle
that under Article I, Section 10 of the Mi nnesota Constitution, an officer must have

6 This individual right to avoid arbitrary interferences by police has its origins in, and
is necessarily inform ed by, the history of the Four th Amendment an d the Framer’s
experience with arbitrary search and seizur e practices under British colonial rule. See
generally Tracey Maclin, Anthony Amsterdam’s Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment ,
and What it Teaches About the Good and Bad in Rodriquez v. United States, 100 Minn. L.
Rev. 1939, 1984 (2016) (ar guing that arbitrary police que stioning of motorists during
routine traffic stops is “inconsistent with th e central meaning of th e Fourth Amendment,
which . . . was designed to restrain polic e discretion when conducting searches and
seizures”); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Origi nal Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L.
Rev. 547, 724 (1999) (“The Framers aimed the Fourth Amendment precisely at banning
Congress from authorizing use of general warrants; they did not mean to create any broad
reasonableness standard for assessing warrantless searches and arrests.”).
13
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity—that is, conduct that is a crime under
Minnesota law—to expand the scope of a traffic stop.7
The State, however, highlights several pa ssages from prior decisions where we
upheld the expansion of a traffic stop based on reasonable articulable suspicion of “illegal
activity.” See, e.g., State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002) (“Expansion of
the scope of the stop to include investigation of other suspected illegal activity is
permissible under the Fourth Amendment only if the officer has reasonable, articulable
suspicion of such other illegal activity .” (emphasis added)). By implication, the State
suggests that a willful violation of a pretrial release condition, although not a crime, falls
into a broader category of “illegal activity” and can provide a sufficient basis for expanding
the scope of a traffic stop. We disagree. A cl oser review of our case law reveals that the
State’s proposed distinction between “criminal” and “illegal” activity for the purposes of a
Terry stop is a distinction without a difference.8 Whether we have referred to the suspected

7 To be clear, our holding does not mean that officers are categorically prohibited
from investigating any suspected violations of pretrial releas e conditions during a traffic
stop. Indeed, in many instances, an individua l who is violating a condition of pretrial
release will also be committing a separate crime. But that was not the case here. Sargent’s
conduct (i.e., sitting in the passenger seat of a vehicle with an alcohol concentration of less
than half of the legal limit for operating a mo tor vehicle) was entirely legal in any other
context. Put another way, an officer is perm itted to expand the scope of a traffic stop to
investigate a suspected pretrial release cond ition violation if the underlying conduct is
criminal.

8 In cases where we have reviewed th e expansion of a traffic stop using the Terry
framework, the underlying conduct justifying the expansion of each traffic stop was
criminal. Compare State v. Smith , 814 N.W.2d 346, 351–52 (Minn. 2012) (relying on
evasive answers, lack of proof of insurance, and other facts to justify expansion of search
for controlled substances or weapons), and Flowers, 734 N.W.2d at 251–52 (concluding
that failure to comply with directions to pull over and suspicious movements in vehicle
14
conduct as “criminal” or “illegal,” the takeaway in each case is the same: an officer must
have reasonable suspicion that an individual is committing a crime to expand the scope of
a traffic stop beyond its initial purpose.
We are also not persuaded by the two alte rnative grounds offered by the court of
appeals to justify the officer’s expansion of the scope of th e traffic stop to investigate
Sargent’s noncriminal pretrial release condition violation. First, the court of appeals found
it significant that a traffic stop can be lawf ully initiated based on reasonable articulable
suspicion of a traffic violatio n, which is a petty misdemeanor and, by definition, not a
crime. Sargent, 951 N.W.2d at 129; see, e.g. , Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 4a (2020)
(“ ‘Petty misdemeanor’ means a petty offens e which is prohibited by statute, which does
not constitute a crime and for wh ich a sentence of a fine of not more than $300 may be
imposed.”). The court of appeals’ reasoning suggests that if law enforcement officers can
initiate a traffic stop based on suspic ion of noncriminal activity (e.g., a traffic violation),
then officers should be able to expand the scope of a traffic stop based on suspicion of
noncriminal activity (e.g., a pretrial release condition violation). But that logic is contrary
to Terry, which held that “a search which is r easonable at its inception may violate the
Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 18.

supported search for controlled substances or weapons), with Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 843−44
(concluding that defendant’s proximity to person who is suspected of criminal activity does
not justify expansion to search for defend ant’s possession of cont rolled substances),
Burbach, 706 N.W.2d at 488–89 (s tating that odor of alcohol from adult passenger does
not justify expansion to search for open containers and pos session of controlled
substances), and Fort, 660 N.W.2d at 419 (concluding th at a stop for speeding and a
cracked windshield did not justify expansion to search for controlled substances).
15
Similarly, we have explained that “the justification for an initial search or seizure will not
necessarily provide a basis for subsequent e xpansions of the scope of that search or
seizure.” Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 364.
Second, the court of appeals determined that the officer’s warrantless seizure of
Sargent was justified because Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 6.03, subdivision 2,
permits an officer to make a warrantless arre st for a pretrial release condition violation
under certain circumstances. Sargent, 951 N.W.2d at 129 (citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.03,
subd. 2).9 But the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure do not control the analysis when
considering a violation of the Minnesota Constitution. See State v. LeDoux, 770 N.W.2d
504, 512 (Minn. 2009) (“[T ]he rules cannot diminish Constitutional protection.”).
Moreover, we rejected a similar argument in Askerooth, explaining that “only article I,
section 10’s reasonableness requirement explicitly applies to an officer’s actions from the
time the officer initiates an i nvestigative detention and continues to apply throughout the
detention by requiring reasonableness for any in crease in the intrusiveness of the stop.”
Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 363 n.6.
The same rationale applies here. Whether or not law enforcement may expand the
scope of a traffic stop to investigate a noncriminal infraction is, at its core, a constitutional

9 Rule 6.03 allows licensed p eace officers to conduct a warrantless arrest for a pretrial
release condition violation if (1 ) they have probable cause to believe a pretrial release
violation has occurred, (2) it “reasonably appear s” that the individual’s continued release
“will endanger the safety of any person,” and (3 ) it is not “possible” to obtain a warrant.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.03, subd. 2. Absent th ese conditions, the rule instructs officers to
obtain a warrant before making the arrest. See id. (“When possible, a warrant should be
obtained before making an arrest under this rule.”).
16
question—one that cannot be resolved solely based on the rules of criminal procedure.
Instead, we look to the principles and framework of Terry as our guide when determining
if an officer’s actions in a particular case exceeded the permissible scope of a traffic stop.
In sum, we reaffirm the principle that law enforcement o fficers must have
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activ ity to expand the scope of a traffic stop.
We hold that a violati on of a condition of pretrial rel ease does not constitute criminal
activity. Accordingly, we conclude that th e officer’s questioning of Sargent about the
conditions of his pretrial release exceeded the permissible scope of a traffic stop in
violation of Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution.10
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and
remand to the district court w ith directions to vacate Sarg ent’s conviction and grant his
suppression motion.
Reversed and remanded.

10 The court of appeals held “that an officer may expand the scope of a traffic stop to
investigate a suspected pretrial-release violation if the expansion is reasonable as defined
in Terry, that is, if the government interest in public safety outweighs the resulting intrusion
on the suspect’s individual rights.” Sargent, 951 N.W.2d at 133. But as the concurrence
notes, there is no evidence in the record that Sargent’s conduct created a safety risk for the
officers or the public.
C-1
C O N C U R R E N C E
MOORE, III, Justice (concurring).
The conclusions reached by the court in this case are supported by the law. I agree
with the court that a violation of a pretrial release condition is not criminal contempt under
Minn. Stat. § 588.20, subd. 2(4) (2020 ), consistent with the rationale in State v. Jones ,
869 N.W.2d 24, 26–31 (Minn. 2015). And be cause Sargent’s actions did not constitute a
separate criminal offense, and the officer’s contact with Sargent was not based on officer
safety concerns, I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that the officer’s expansion of
the traffic stop and seizure of Sargent was no t supported by Article I, Section 10 of the
Minnesota Constitution as interpreted in State v. Askerooth , 681 N.W.2d 353, 364–70
(Minn. 2004).1

1 Eight states have enacted statutes that make violation of a pretrial release condition
a separate criminal offense. See Alaska Stat. § 11.56.757(a) (2020) (“A person commits
the crime of violation of condition of release if the person . . . violates a condition of release
imposed by a judicial officer . . . .”); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-212(1) (2021) (“A person who
is released on bail bond of whatever kind . . . commits a class 6 felony if he knowingly fails
to appear for trial or other proceedings . . . or if he knowingly violates the conditions of the
bail bond.”); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-222(a) (2 021) (“A person is gu ilty of violation of
conditions of release in the first degree wh en, while charged with the commission of a
felony, such person is released . . . and inte ntionally violates one or more of the imposed
conditions of release.”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 2113(c) (2020) (“ If the defendant . . .
knowingly breaches any condition of release, ea ch such . . . breach shall be a separate
crime . . . .”); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/32-10(a) (2021) (criminalizing a failure to surrender
following a violation of a condition of pretri al release); Me. Stat. tit. 15, § 1092 (2021)
(making it a crime to violate a condition of preconviction release); Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1110
(2021) (“Whoever . . . incurs a forfeiture of the bail or violates such undertaking or
recognizance and willfully fails to surrender himself within five (5) days following the date
of such forfeiture shall . . . be guilty of a felony . . . .”); Wisc. Stat. § 946.49 (2020)
(making it a separate offense to “intentionally fail[] to comply with the terms of his or her”
release). Other jurisdictions make violations of pretrial release conditions punishable as
criminal contempt. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3148(a), (c) (stati ng violations of conditions of
C-2
However, I write separately because the majority’s holding places law enforcement
officers who are attempting to enforce pretrial release conditions set by the district courts
in a difficult position. Under Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.02, subd. 1, a defendant must be released
from custody during the pretri al stage of a criminal pr oceeding on either personal
recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond “unless a court determines that release will
endanger the public safety or will not reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance.” We
have said that Rule 6.02 “by its express te rms, permits public safety concerns to be
considered” by the district c ourt when determining whethe r the imposition of pretrial
release conditions will assure the defendant’s appearance at future court proceedings. State
v. Martin, 743 N.W.2d 261, 266 (Minn. 2008). In doing so, district courts must consider
various factors, including the relative safety of the victim(s), any other person, and the
greater community as well as “the nature and circumstances of the offense charged” on a
case-by-case basis, rather than imposing release conditions as standard or blanket policies.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.02, subd. 2; see Martin, 743 N.W.2d at 267.
My concerns are specifically related to the safety of la w enforcement officers and
the public. The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure allow an officer to “arrest a
released defendant if the officer has probable cause to believe a release condition has been
violated and it reasonably appears continue d release will endanger the safety of any

pretrial release are subject to prosecution fo r contempt of court); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 597:7-a(II) (2021) (“A person w ho has been released pursuant to the provisions of this
chapter and who has violated a condition of his release is subj ect to . . . a prosecution for
contempt of court”). As we have long recogn ized, “[t]he enactment of criminal laws, the
scope of those laws, and the sanctions for their violation, are solely within the legislative
function and province.” State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Minn. 1985).
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person.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 6. 03, subd. 2. Although the cr iminal rules “cannot diminish
Constitutional protection[s],” State v. LeDoux, 770 N.W.2d 504, 512 (Minn. 2009), I am
concerned that if officers are not allowed to investigate potential violations of pretrial
release conditions that implicate public safe ty concerns, then a district court’s order
establishing pretrial release conditions becomes largely meaningless because the
conditions serve no purpose and do not allow officers to act in a preventative capacity to
protect public safety in their communities.
In the context of traffic stops, we have interpreted Article I, Section 10 of the
Minnesota Constitution to prov ide individuals with more protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 362–63.
Under Askerooth, to “search or seize, there must be an individualized, articulable, and
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.” State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 152 (Minn. 2009).
We balance the government’s need to search or seize a vehicle’s occupants against “the
individual’s right to personal security free fr om arbitrary interference by law officers.”
Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U.S. 873,
878 (1975)).
We have emphasized, however, that the analysis “should not be read as limiting in
any way a search conducted pursuant to Terry v. Ohio for purposes of officer safety.” State
v. Fort , 660 N.W.2d 415, 419 n.2 (Minn. 2003). The principles of Terry apply when
evaluating the reasonableness of searches and seizures during traffic stops even when a
minor law has been violated. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 363. Under Terry, a law
enforcement officer may stop and frisk a pers on when the officer has (1) a reasonable,
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articulable suspicion of criminal activity and (2) reasonably believes the suspect might be
armed and dangerous. State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 250 (Minn. 2007).
Like the United States Supreme Court, we have repeatedly emphasized the existence
of officer safety concerns during traffic stops, particularly in the early morning hours when
some officers are working without a partner present. See, e.g., Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at
368. Recognizing the “paramount interest” in officer safety, State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d
886, 891 (Minn. 1998), we have noted that the safety concerns increase when there are
multiple people inside of a st opped vehicle because all the in dividuals may have similar
motivations to conceal evidence of criminal activity, Ortega, 770 N.W.2d at 152. Because
of these heightened concerns, law enforcem ent officers can order passengers out of a
stopped vehicle withou t violating the constitutional requi rement for an individualized
suspicion of criminal activity. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413–15 (1997); Ortega,
770 N.W.2d at 152.
In this case, the State did not present any evidence during the omnibus hearing to
indicate that Sargent’s conduct, including his suspected violation of the pretrial release
condition requiring him to abstain from alcohol use, created an immediate risk to the officer
or the public. But I want to make clear that law enforcement officers are not foreclosed by
this decision from expanding a Terry stop under the appropriate circumstances. See Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, at 30–31 (holding that an officer may conduct a limited protective
weapons frisk of a lawfully stopped person if the officer has an objective articulable basis
for thinking that the person may be armed and dangerous); State v. Payne , 406 N.W.2d
511, 513–14 (Minn. 1987) (concluding that officer’s act of removing passengers from a
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vehicle and searching them for weapons was permissible under Terry). For example, if a
law enforcement officer conducts a traffic stop of a vehicle and knows that a passenger in
the vehicle is on pretrial release for domestic assault and has a pret rial release condition
prohibiting the possession of dangerous weapons, the officer will have, under Terry, a
lawful basis to expand the scope of the traffic stop if the officer has reasonable articulable
suspicion to believe that the passenger is possessing a dangerous weapon. The traffic stop
expansion in this example is necessary and appropriate to address officer and public safety
concerns, and the information ga thered by the officer during the expanded stop may be
used to subsequently allege a violation of the defendant’s pretrial release conditions.

McKEIG, Justice (concurring).
I join in the concurrence of Justice Moore.