Whitney Hinrichs-Cady, Appellant,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1561

Whitney Hinrichs-Cady,
Appellant,

vs.

Hennepin County,
Respondent.

Filed April 20, 2020
Reversed and remanded
Rodenberg, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-19-683

Christopher J. Heinze, Kirsten J. Libby, Libby Law Office, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Be verly J. Wolfe, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Pres iding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
A person who claims to ha ve been denied reasonabl e pregnancy accommodations
under Minn. Stat. § 181.9414 (2018) is no t required to meet the 12-month-tenure
requirement in Minn. Stat. § 181.940, subd. 2 (2018), in order to a ssert a claim for the
denial.

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O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Whitney Hinrichs-Cady appeals fro m the district court’s rule 12 dismissal
of her claims alleging violations under the Pregnancy and Parental Leave Act (PPLA) and
the Minnesota Whistleblower Act (MWA). Appe llant argues that the district court erred
by determining that (1) she was not an “empl oyee” as defined by Minn. Stat. § 181.940,
subd. 2, for purposes of the PPLA at the time she requested the pregnancy
accommodations; and (2) her PPLA and MWA cl aims are preempted by the exclusivity
provision of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). We reverse and remand.
FACTS1
Respondent Hennepin County hired appellant as a social worker on September 19,
2016. Appellant was pregnant. Appellant was initially placed with the induction unit, and
she was assigned to a field-team unit in November 2016. Appe llant’s responsibilities
included investigating cases of child abuse and neglect. This sometimes included visiting
children in their homes. Appellant claims that, during some of these home visits, she was
exposed to unhealthy and un safe conditions, including ex posure to cigarette smoke,
marijuana smoke, and other drug use.
During her pregnancy, appella nt developed an iron deficiency which caused her to
faint during an in-home visit in February 2017. Appellant’s doctor subsequently provided
appellant with a list of job restrictions for th e last seven weeks of her pregnancy. These

1 As discussed below, the procedural posture of this case requires that we accept as true all
of the complaint’s allegations. Sipe v. STS Mfg., Inc., 834 N.W.2d 683, 686 (Minn. 2013).

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restrictions included not working for more than one hour without rest, not lifting more than
ten pounds, not driving if she felt dizzy, and not being exposed to environments deemed
unsafe or unhealthy for appellant or her unborn child.
Appellant claims that she met with her di rect supervisor on February 10, 2017, “to
request that [respondent] allow her to work within the restrictions set forth by her doctor.”
Appellant alleges that her direct supervisor to ld her that the superv isor had herself “done
this job pregnant” and that appellant cannot use her “pregnancy as a disability.” Appellant
alleges that her direct supervisor required ap pellant to perform her work as usual until a
decision on the requested accommodations was made.
Appellant further alleges that, after she me t with her direct supervisor, she went to
meet with the director of the department to discuss her accommodations request and to
request a new direct supervisor. Appellan t’s direct supervisor was already in the
department director’s office when appellant arrived.
Appellant claims she received a phon e call from her direct supervisor, the
department director, and respondent’s Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) coordinator
on February 14, 2017. During that phone call, the ADA coordinator told appellant that her
requested accommodations “would prevent her from successfully completing her job and
[respondent] could not provide her with such accommodations.”
Respondent placed appellant on unpaid leave that appella nt did not request. On
June 5, 2017, appellant returned to work after giving birth to her child. That same day,
appellant’s direct supervisor and the department director ga ve appellant a letter notifying
her that her employment was terminated.

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On October 26, 2017, appellant and resp ondent unsuccessfully participated in
mediation. Appellant asked whether respondent would agree to another formal mediation.
On February 26, 2018, respondent declined to enter into formal mediation and instead
made a settlement offer to appellant. Appella nt did not reply to respondent’s settlement
offer.
On January 11, 2019, appellant sued re spondent, asserting (1 ) violation of the
PPLA; (2) an MWA claim; and (3) an MHRA claim.
On January 30, 2019, respondent moved to dismiss appellant’s complaint under
Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). On May 8, 2019, respondent requested th at the district court
convert respondent’s motion to dismiss the MHRA clai m to a motion for summary
judgment. At the close of the motion hearing, the district court allowed the parties to file
post-hearing letter briefs, and both parties made post-hearing submissions.
On July 31, 2019, the district cour t granted respondent’s motion to dismiss
appellant’s PPLA and MWA claims under rule 12.02(e). The district court also granted
respondent’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed appellant’s MHRA claim.
Judgment dismissing all claims was entered on August 1, 2019.
This appeal followed. On appeal, appella nt challenges only the rule 12 dismissals
of her PPLA and MWA claims. Appellant has abandoned her MHRA claim.

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ISSUES
I. Does the PPLA require that appellant have been employed by respondent for
12 months in order to be entitled to its pregnancy protections?
II. Are appellant’s claims under the PPLA and the MWA preempted by the
exclusivity provision of the MHRA?
ANALYSIS
Appellant challenges on appeal the district court’s dismissal of her PPLA and MWA
claims under rule 12.02(e). Appellate courts “r eview de novo the district court’s grant of
a motion to dismiss under Minn . R. Civ. P. 12.02(e).” Sipe, 834 N.W.2d at 686. In this
posture, we “consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as true.”
Id. (quotation omitted). We therefore do not evaluate the merits of appellant’s claims but
only whether appellant’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e).
I. The district court erred by concluding that appellant was not an “employee”
entitled to the protections of the PPLA.

Appellant argues that the district court erred by concluding that she is not entitled
to the protections of the PPLA because she ha d not yet been employed by respondent for
12 months and therefore did not meet the definition of “employee” under Minn. Stat.
§ 181.940, subd. 2, at the time she request ed pregnancy accommodations. Appellant
argues that the definition of “employee” provided in Minn. Stat. § 181.940 (2018), which
contains a requirement of 12 month’s empl oyment, does not apply to her request for
pregnancy accommodations under Minn. Stat. § 181.9414. Respondent disagrees and

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argues that the section 181.940 definition applies to the PPLA. We are therefore presented
with an issue of statutory interpretation.
Appellate courts review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Cocchiarella
v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016). “The first step in statutory interpretation is
to determine whether the statute’s la nguage, on its face, is ambiguous.” State v.
Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn. 2017). “A statute is ambiguous if it is subject
to more than one reasonable interpretation.” State v. Pakhnyuk , 906 N.W.2d 571, 576
(Minn. App. 2018), aff’d, 926 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 2019).
On Mother’s Day in 2014, the Minnesota legislature ma de changes to the laws
concerning the rights of pregnant women by enacting the Women’s Economic Security
Act. 2014 Minn. Laws ch. 239, art. 1. The Women’s Economic Security Act added section
181.9414—the PPLA—to Minnesota’s employm ent laws. 2014 Minn. Laws ch. 239,
art. 3, § 4. It placed the PP LA within a group of statutes that at the time related only to
parenting leave. See Minn. Stat. § 181.940-.944 (2012).
The 2014 PPLA, providing for pregnanc y-accommodations, states that “[a]n
employer must provide reasonable accommodations to an employee for health conditions
related to pregnancy or childbirth if she so requests.” Minn. Stat. § 181.9414, subd. 1. The
statute further requires the employer to “engage in an interactive process with respect to an
employee’s request for a reasonable accommodation.” Id. The statute prohibits retaliation
by an employer against an employee who requests or obtains a pregnancy accommodation.
Id., subd. 3. Finally, the statute provides that an employer “shall not require an employee
to take a leave or accept an accommodation.” Id., subd. 4.

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“Employee” is defined for purposes of the group of statutes pertaining to parenting
leave and accommodations in Minn. Stat. § 181.940, subd. 2. That section provides that
an “employee” is:
a person who performs services for hire for an employer from
whom a leave is requested unde r sections 181.940 to 181.944
for:
(1) at least 12 months preceding the request; and
(2) for an average number of hours per week equal to
one-half the full-time equivalent position in the employees job
classification as defined by th e employer’s personnel policies
or practices or pursuant to the provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement, du ring the 12-month period
immediately preceding the leave.

Minn. Stat. § 181.940, subd. 2.
The definitions section of the parenting leave and accommodation statutes states
that “[f]or the purposes of se ctions 181.940 to 181.944, the terms defined in this section
have the meanings given them.” Minn. Stat. § 181.940, subd. 1. The “pregnancy
accommodations” section is numbered within the range of sections identified in section
181.940, subdivision 1. Su bdivision 2 then defines “employee.” The statute does not
further define the term “leave.” See Minn. Stat. § 181.940.
Respondent argues, and the district cour t concluded, that an “employee” for
purposes of the PPLA must have worked for an employer for 12 months before the PPLA
recognizes the employee as e ligible for protection under it. In its order granting
respondent’s motions to dismiss, the district court applied the section 181.940 definition
of “employee,” and determined that appellant was “not an eligible ‘employee’ covered by
the PPLA” because appellant “had not performed services as an employee for at least 12

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months preceding the alleged request for accommodation.” The district court also
determined that, even if the definition of “employee” were considered to be ambiguous,
“the history of the [PPLA statute’s] modification reflects the Legislature’s intent to provide
that the PPLA provisions cover individuals with 12 months of employment tenure.”
Appellant argues that the definition of “employee” in section 181.940,
subdivision 2, as applied to th e PPLA, which requires pregnancy accommodations, is
ambiguous. We agree with appellant that the legislature, by placing the pregnancy-
accommodations statute where it did, created ambiguity concerning how courts should
apply the definition of “employee” for purposes of the PPLA.
“The primary objective in interpreting a statut e is to give effect to the intention of
the legislature in drafting the statute.” State v. Sopko, 770 N.W.2d 543, 544 (Minn. App.
2009) (quotation omitted). “[W]e assume that the legislature does not . . . intend absurd or
unreasonable results.” State v. Koenig, 666 N.W.2d 366, 372 (Minn. 2003). “[W]e cannot
add words to a statute that th e Legislature intentionally or inadvertently left out.” Great
River Energy v. Swedzinski, 860 N.W.2d 362, 364 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).
The words that the legislatur e used, in the context that they were used, creates
ambiguity here. The definition in section 181.940, subdivis ion 2, concerns persons who
work for “an employer from whom leave is requested.” Minn. Stat. § 181.940, subd. 2.
Before enactment of the PPLA, all of the sec tions to which the defi nition of “employee”
applied provided for some type of leave. The definition is a vestige of that pre-PPLA time.
See Saltonstall v. Birtwell, 164 U.S. 54, 70, 17 S. Ct. 19, 25 (1896) (“[I]t is not unusual, in
a succession of statutes on the same subject- matter, amending or modifying previous

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provisions, that a word or phrase may rema in, although rendered useless or meaningless
. . . . Such words are merely vestigial, and should not be permitted to impair or defeat the
fair meaning of the enactment.”).
The PPLA covers a good deal more than “leave.” It specifically identifies well-
understood pregnancy accommodations includin g the need for “freque nt restroom, food,
and water breaks,” lifting limitations, and seating and positional accommodations. These
sorts of accommodations are not leave. They are the sorts of accommodations that allow
pregnant women to continue working.
The county argues that every reque sted accommodation under Minn. Stat.
§ 181.9414 is a request for leave. The county posits, therefore, that any person requesting
an accommodation must also have worked for an employer for 12 months. This cannot be
right. No common definition of “leave” includes the likes of lifting restrictions or restroom
breaks. And the statute itself recognizes the difference between leave and accommodation
by providing that pregnant employees sh all not be required “to take a leave or accept an
accommodation.” Minn. Stat. § 181.9414, subd. 4 (emphasis added). Moreover, because
section 181.9414, subdivision 1, requires an employer to accommodate at least three things
that are plainly not “leave,” the legislat ure cannot have intended that no PPLA
accommodations need be made before an em ployee has worked fo r the employer for 12
months.
While the legislature might have had a r eason for requiring a person to have worked
for an employer for 12 months before that person is entitled to leave, it surely did not intend
the same for a person requesting non-leave accommodations under the PPLA. Indeed, the

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definition on which the county relies applies only when “leave is requested” from the
employer. By limiting application of the defi nition to situations when an employee
requests leave, and by distinguishing between leaves and accommodations, the legislature
demonstrated its intent to limit the defi nition of “employee” in section 181.940,
subdivision 2, to circumstance s involving an employee who requests leave. And, as
discussed, the PPLA expressly identifies specific sorts of pregnancy accommodations that
will allow pregnant women to continue working instead of taking a leave.
The absence of a statutory definition for non-leave accommodations for pregnant
women does not undermine our conclusi on. “Employee” has a plain-language,
commonsense definition. When a pregnant woman requests non-leave accommodation
under the PPLA, we employ that definition and not the leave-specific definition in section
181.940, subdivision 2. The purpose of the PPLA is to require that employers
accommodate the reasonable pr egnancy-related needs of women. These needs are
common to pregnant employees regardless of how long they have worked for the employer.
Pregnant women may require more restroom breaks or may require positional or lifting
accommodations even though they have not yet worked for 12 months for their employer.
The evident intention of the PPLA is that those accommodations be made. We resolve the
statutory ambiguity consistent with the evident legislative intention in enacting the PPLA:
to require accommodation of th e pregnancy-related needs of women. Employees who
request reasonable non-leave accommodation of their pregnancy-related health conditions
are “employees” for purposes of the PPLA regardless of whether they have worked for the
employer for 12 months.

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We hold that non-leave pregnancy acco mmodations under the PPLA do not require
that the employee requesting accommodation mu st have worked for the employer for 12
months. The district court therefore erred in dismissing appellant’s claims under the PPLA.
II. Appellant’s claims under the PPLA and MWA are not barred by the MHRA’s
exclusivity provision for purposes of respondent’s rule 12 motion.

Appellant argues that the district court e rred when it determined that her claims
under the PPLA and MWA are barred by the exclusivity provision of the MHRA.
Appellant brought three claims against re spondent in district court: (1) a PPLA
claim, (2) an MWA claim, and (3) an MHRA claim. Appellant has abandoned her MHRA
claim and now challenges only the dismissal of her PPLA and MWA claims by the district
court under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e).
The district court concluded that appellant’s PPLA and MWA claims are barred by
the exclusivity provision of th e MHRA. The exclusivity provisi on states that “as to acts
declared unfair by sections 363A.08 to 363A.19, and 363A.28, subdivision 10, the
procedure herein provided shall, while pendi ng, be exclusive.” Minn. Stat § 363A.04
(2018).
In Williams v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., the Minnesota Supreme Court defined the
scope of the MHRA’s exclusivity provision, holding “that the exclusivity provision of the
Human Rights Act operates as a bar to the separate maintenance of [a] claim under the
Whistleblower Act” where the same acts by th e employer were claimed by the plaintiff-
employee to violate both the MHRA and the MWA. 551 N.W.2d 483, 486 (Minn. 1996).

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Among other things, appellant’s PPLA clai m is that responde nt did not make
reasonable accommodations for health conditio ns and complications related to her
pregnancy, that respondent required appellant to take unpaid leave, and that respondent
retaliated against her by terminating her employment when appellant requested
accommodations.
Some of the conduct alleged in appella nt’s PPLA claims could also violate
provisions of the MHRA. If this were true, then the supreme court’s analysis in Williams
might apply. However, appellant asserts in her MWA claim that she was penalized for
having requested accommodations under the PPLA.
Based on the limited record on appeal, and applying the rule 12 standard of whether
appellant’s complaint has stated a claim on wh ich relief can be granted, it cannot now be
determined as a matter of law that appellant ’s PPLA and MWA claims are barred by the
MHRA’s exclusivity provision.
The MHRA protects against employment di scrimination on the basis of a number
of identified statuses. Amon g the persons protected are those with “any condition or
characteristic that renders a person a disabled person.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 12
(2018). Respondent identifies no authority supporting the notion that all pregnant women
are disabled, and we are certainly aware of no such authority. Some pregnant women may
be disabled within the meaning of the MHRA and, we suppose, the MHRA’s exclusivity
provision might then apply to cl aims that fall within both it and the PPLA. But that case
is not now before us . Appellant’s MHRA claim has been dismissed with prejudice and
appellant has abandoned it. She adva nces no argument that her requests for

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accommodations related to pregnancy were accommodations for a “disability” or that she
was a “disabled person.” And appellant’s MWA claims relate to her allegations that she
was discharged for having requested pregnancy accommodations and reporting a suspected
violation of law when she was denied them. She did not allege any status identified in and
protected by the MHRA.
It is true that appellant’s complaint alleges sex discrimination. But it is evident that
the essence of appellant’s complaint is that her pregnancy-based needs were not
accommodated, not that she was discriminated against for the status of being pregnant. We
decline to stretch the supreme court’s analysis in Williams to apply here.2
Appellant’s MWA claim, on its face and for purposes of rule 12, is viable.
Appellant’s MWA claim alleges that responden t penalized appellant by terminating her
employment after she reported suspected vi olations of law by respondent in not
accommodating her pregnancy-related needs under the PPLA. In other words, appellant
claims to have blown the PPLA whistle on re spondent’s conduct. She makes no claim to
have blown the MHRA whistle regarding sex discrimination or disability discrimination.

2 Courts have questioned the scope of the rule of law announced in Williams. See, e.g.,
Pierce v. Rainbow Foods Group, Inc. , 158 F. Supp. 2d 969, 974-75 (D. Minn. 2001)
(wherein Senior United States District J udge Alsop noted the “l ack of a consistent
analytical framework” in Minnesota’s law after Williams, resulting in at least four possible
approaches to the MHRA-preemption issues). We do not by our holding here, or by noting
Judge Alsop’s concern expressed in Pierce, question the viability of the supreme court’s
Williams holding, and we are well aware that supreme court precedent binds us. State v.
Curtis, 921 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2018). Amon g other distinctions between this case
and that one, the PPLA did not exist when Williams was decided. Our holding here is
limited to the question of whether MHRA preemption applies to appellant’s PPLA claims
in the rule 12 posture of this case.

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In a rule 12 analysis, appellant’s MWA cl aim is viable regardless of the MHRA’s
exclusivity provision.
Appellant also raises a constitutional argum ent on appeal which we do not reach.
Because appellant’s PPLA and MWA claims do not fail to state claims on which relief can
be granted, it is unnecessary and would be unwise that we address any constitutional issues.
See Midland Glass Co., v. City of Shakopee , 226 N.W.2d 324, 326 (Minn. 1975) (stating
that “whenever possible, the merits of a case should be decided without a determination of
a statute’s unconstitutionality”); see also Alexander v. Severson , 408 N.W.2d 195, 199
(Minn. App. 1987) (explaining that there is no need to address constitutional claims when
a case is resolved on the merits without reference to constitutional arguments).
D E C I S I O N
We reverse the district court’s rule 12 di smissal of appellant’s PPLA claims based
on the reasoning that appellant is not en titled to PPLA protecti on because she had not
worked for respondent for 12 months when accommodations were requested. We also
reverse the district court’s dismissal of appellant’s MWA claims as barred by the
exclusivity provision of the MHRA. Appellant has stated viable claims for purposes of
rule 12 under both the PPLA and the MWA. We remand to the district for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.