In re the Marriage of:

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1562

In re the Marriage of:

Lisa Marie Kent, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Brenton Jackson Kent,
Respondent.

Filed October 12, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Jesson, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-FA-16-9954

Greg A. Engel, Engel Law Offices, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for appellant)

Timothy R. Reuter, Kelm & Reuter, P.A., Sauk Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decide d by Larkin, Presiding J udge; Reilly, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
In this marital dissolution proceeding , appellant Lisa Marie Kent raises
16 challenges to the district court’s reso lution of property and financial issues
stemming from the couple’s divorce. After c onsolidating related issues, we address the

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following allegations that th e district court: (1) erroneous ly determined that certain
business interests were gifted to husband and therefore his nonmarital property; (2) should
have ruled that husband dissipated certain marital property; (3) misvalued marital and
nonmarital business interests; (4) incorrectly allocated marital debt to husband; (6) should
have awarded wife more spous al maintenance; (7) should ha ve awarded wife need-based
attorney fees; (8) should have ordered an upward deviation from the child-support
guidelines; and (9) should have secured wife’s property award. We affirm the district court
on all issues, except for the issues of spousal maintenance, need-based attorneys fees, and
a $211,531 withdrawal by husban d from J.K. Self Storage in 20 17. With regard to these
items, we reverse and remand for additional findings.
FACTS
Appellant Lisa Marie Kent (wife) and respondent Brenton Jackson Kent (husband)
were married in 1998. They have three children together, the oldest of whom was 18 years
old at the time of the dissolution trial but had not yet graduated from high school.
Wife filed a petition to dissolve the marri age in October 2016. Husband and wife
entered into a partial-marital-termination agreement which they filed with the district court
in October 2018. The district court approved the partial agreement and issued a judgment
and decree dissolving the marriage in December 2018. The district court’s December 2018
judgment and decree resolved issues of custody and parenting time, and reserved resolution
of a number of outstanding financial issues until trial. The decree also established
September 30, 2017, as the valuation date for husband and wife’s assets.

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Following a court trial, the district cour t issued supplemental findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and order for judgment in May 2019. The district court ordered
husband to pay wife $950 per month in spousal maintenance, $783 per month in net child
support, and a property-equalizer payment of $168,832, which husband could pay in
monthly installments of $2,000 per month plus interest. The district court denied wife’s
requests for need-based and conduct-based attorneys fees.
In the course of equalizing the property settlement, the district court resolved
husband and wife’s respective interests in four business entities: Motors-N-More, Inc.
(“Motors-N-More”); J.K. Real Estate Services, LLC (“J.K. Real Estate”); J.K. Self Storage,
LLC (“J.K. Self Storage”); and Benton Development LLC (“Benton Development”). The
district court found that husband’s interests in Motors-N-More and J.K. Self Storage were
marital assets. But the district court determined that husband’s interests in J.K. Real Estate
and Benton Development were gifts from his mother, and therefore nonmarital.
Wife moved the district court for amende d findings and a new trial. With the
exception of one typographical correction, the district court denied wife’s motions in their
entirety. Wife appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Wife raises 16 challenges to the district court’s resolution of the outstanding
property and financial issues stemming from the couple’s divorce. Where possible, we
have condensed related claims to avoid redundancies in our analysis.

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Nonmarital property – J.K. Real Estate and Benton Development
Wife asserts that the district court inco rrectly classified husband’s 50% ownership
interest in J.K. Real Estate and 25% owne rship interest in Benton Development as
nonmarital gifts from his mother. Whether prop erty is marital or nonmarital presents a
legal question, but we must defer to the di strict court’s underlying findings of fact.
Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1997). “However, if [the reviewing court is]
left with the definite and firm conviction th at a mistake has been made, [it] may find the
[district] court’s decision to be clearly erroneous.” Id. (quotation omitted).
We presume that all property obtained by either spouse du ring the marriage,
regardless of the form of ownership, is marital property. Id. In order to overcome this
presumption, husband must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the
property is nonmarital. Id. Nonmarital property includes property acquired as a gift to one
spouse only from a third party. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b(a) (2018).
We first consider the status of J.K. R eal Estate. In concluding that husband’s
interest in this entity was a gift, the district court relied on the testimony of the attorney
who incorporated the company, J.K. Real Estate’s accountant, husband, and husband’s
mother. The district court found that all four people “testified credibly and unequivocally
that [husband’s] interest in J.K. Real Estate was a gift.” Appellate courts defer to a district
court’s credibility determinations. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).
Regarding husband’s interest in Benton Development, th e district court similarly
found that the same four individuals provided “credible testimony” that husband received
his interest in the entity as a gift from his mother. In light of these credibility

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determinations made by the district court, the district court did not err by classifying
husband’s interests in J.K. Real Estate a nd Benton Development as nonmarital gifts from
his mother.
Notwithstanding the district court’s cred ibility determinations, wife asserts that
husband could not have been gifted his ownership interests in J.K. Real Estate and Benton
Development because when th e companies were incorpor ated, both husb and and his
mother were initially identified as owners.
But that one piece of evid ence does not, by itself, outweigh testimony from the
accountant, husband, and husban d’s mother that neither hus band nor wife invested any
money in J.K. Real Estate. Furthermore, the district court found that the accountant
consistently testified that “he transferred 25% capital [from Husband’s mother to husband]
in the initial year of the gift, and 5% of cap ital in subsequent years—and these [transfers]
are reflected on the tax returns and in the capital accounts.”
Regarding husband’s interest in Benton De velopment, the district court found that
while husband signed the purchase agreement for the land owned by Benton Development,
“[t]he land was purchase[d] with a loan taken out by [the attorney] and [husband’s mother]
from Farmers and Merchants State Bank.” The accountant testified that the attorney and
husband’s mother “contributed assets [to Bent on Development], then [husband’s mother]
contributed 25% of her ownershi p interest to [husband].” The accountant, husband, and
husband’s mother all “testified that neither [husband nor wife] ever invested any money
into Benton Development.”

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These findings adequately support the district court’s determination that husband’s
interests in J.K. Real Estate and Benton development are nonmarital.
Increase in Value of Benton Development
Even if husband’s ownership in Benton Development was nonmarital, wife argues
that the increase in value of husband’s interest in Benton Development during the course
of their marriage was marital. As a result, she should be entitled to half of that increased
value. Wife’s argument is grounded in the le gal principle that the increase in value of
nonmarital property which is attributable to the efforts of a spouse is itself marital property,
but the increase in value of nonmarital property which is attributable to market forces or
inflation remains nonmarital. Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 192 (Minn. 1987).
Here, the district court found that any in crease in value was not attributable to
husband’s efforts. Rather, the district cour t determined that “the evidence shows that
[husband’s] actual work for the entity is limited to performing repairs and maintenance of
rental units, performing yard care and snow removal, in addition to nominal work in
accounting and operations . . . . [T]he increase is attributable to factors unrelated to
[husband’s] efforts.” Wife does not assert that these findings are clearly erroneous.
Therefore, because husband’s efforts during the course of the marriage constituted nominal
physical upkeep, the district court did not err by finding that the increased value of Benton
Development during the course of marriage was not attributable to husband’s efforts, and
thus, a nonmarital asset.

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Dissipated Assets and Entity Distributions
Wife similarly argues that this court s hould remand her unaddressed requests for an
equitable accounting of dissipated assets and to apportion her share of husband’s income
and distributions received from the entities during the dissolution proceedings. In essence,
wife asserts that the district court failed to account for certain items of marital property, of
which she is entitled to her fair share. “[O]n appeal error is never presumed. It must be
made to appear affirmatively before there can be reversal.” Loth v. Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542,
546 (Minn. 1949) (quotation omitted), see also Palladium Holdings, LLC v. Zuni Mortg.
Loan Trust 2006-OA1, 775 N.W.2d 168, 177-78 (Minn. App. 2009) (citing Loth to support
the proposition that “silence on a motion is . . . treated as an implicit denial of the motion”),
review denied (Minn. Jan. 27, 2010). Thus, we treat the district court’s silence on wife’s
requests for an equitable accounting and an apportionment of husband’s income and
distributions as an implicit denial of those re quests, and address each of wife’s specific
concerns below.
 Properties sold by J.K. Real Estate and J.K. Self Storage
Wife identifies four real-estate transacti ons entered into by J.K. Real Estate, and one
by J.K. Self Storage, that she asserts constitu te an unaccounted-for dissipation of marital
assets. See, e.g., Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297, 303 (Minn. 2018) (“[T]he proceeds from a
sale of marital property that occurs during dissolution proceedings are marital property
subject to the court’s equitable division.”). None of the properties sold were marital assets,
but instead pertained to husband’s marital inte rests in J.K. Real Estate and J.K. Self
Storage.

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Here, the district court determined that hu sband’s interest in J.K. Real Estate was
nonmarital, and allocated wife $0 in increased value due to the unprofitability of J.K. Real
Estate as demonstrated by the limited evidence presented at trial. And the district court
determined that husband’s interest in J.K. Se lf Storage was marital and allocated to wife
half of the value of husband’s ownership interest based on an appraisal conducted by Miller
Welle Heiser. Therefore, any marital interest wife had in the sales of property by the
companies would be subsumed in her over all marital share of husband’s ownership
interests in the companies, not in the parcels of land themselves.1
 Entity Distributions / Income
Similarly, wife argues that the district court erred by implicitly denying her request
to apportion the income and distributions husband received from the entities between
January 1 and September 30, 2017. Wife a sserts that husband conceded in a post-trial
submission that the distributions he recei ved from Benton Development and J.K. Real
Estate were marital, but the document cited by wife does not contain any such admission.
Furthermore, wife does not point to any eviden ce presented at trial which establishes the
amount of distributions husband allegedly received as income that were unaccounted for

1 Wife further appears to incorrectly assert that husband bore the burden of proof at trial to
connect the sales of the proper ties to the companies’ ultimate valuations. Wife relies on
Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1a (2018) for th e proposition that spouses owe one another a
fiduciary duty over the profits derived from a transaction involving a marital asset.
However, that section goes on to state that the burden of proof under the subdivision “is on
the party claiming that the other party transferred, encumbered, concealed, or disposed of
marital assets . . . during th e pendency of the current di ssolution . . . and that the
transfer . . . or disposal was not in the usua l course of business.” Minn. Stat. § 518.518,
subd. 1a.

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by the district court in its findings. Finally , the district court apportioned the spouses’
interests in their bank accounts, which pres umably accounts for their unspent cash
holdings.
However, in its discussion of husband’s ability to pay maintenance, the district court
did make a finding that husband withdrew $211,531 from J.K. Self Storage in 2017. The
district court did not provide any reasoning for not awarding wife any share of these funds.
Remand is therefore warranted so the district court can address whether any of those funds
were marital and if so, to address their division.
 Purchase of Automobiles
Next, wife argues that the district court erred by finding that cars purchased after
the valuation date, or in one instance ow ned by husband’s mother, were nonmarital. See
Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b (2018) (sta ting that the marital-property presumption
applies to property acquired pr ior to the valuation date). Wife asserts that husband used
“marital funds, loans and trade-ins to pay more than $200,000 for a variety of vehicles for
the parties’ sons, himself and work.”2 Wife does not support this assertion with a citation
to any evidence in the record that traces the purchases to marital funds. Absent more, she
has not shown the district court’s findings that husband traced the cars to a nonmarital
source are not clearly erroneous. 3 See State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus. V. Wintz Parcel

2 Wife does not connect this assertion to th e $211,531 husband withdrew from J.K. Self
Storage in 2017.
3 Similarly, while wife asserts that she should be allocated her share of husband’s attorney
fees which he paid with marita l assets, she fails to support th is argument with evidence.
However, the evidence presented at trial did not establish how much of husband’s fees
were paid by J.K. Self Storage, nor did it establish whether the payment occurred before or

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Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (no ting that appellate courts decline to
reach issues that are inadequately briefed); see also Bradksy v. Bradsky, 733 N.W.2d 741,
479 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying Wintz in a family-law appeal); Loth, 35 N.W.2d at 546
(stating that “on appeal error is never presumed . It must be made to appear affirmatively
before there can be reversal . . . [and] the burden of showing error rests upon the one who
relies upon it” (quoting Waters v. Fiebelkorn , 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (1944));
Luthen v. Luthen, 596 N.W.2d 278, 283 (Minn. App. 1999) (applying this aspect of Loth).
In sum, with the sole exce ption of the $211,531 husban d withdrew from J.K. Self
Storage in 2017, wife is not entitled to an equitable accounting because she has not
identified an unaccounted for marital interest in any of the identified items. We remand
the issue of the $211,531 so the district court can make the necessary findings as to whether
there is a marital interest in the withdrawal, and, if so, ho w it should be divided between
the parties.
Valuation of Assets
Wife argues that the district court made incorrect findings regarding the increased
value of J.K. Real Estate, the value of Bent on Development, and the value of J.K. Self
Storage. A district court’s valuation of an item of property is a finding of fact, and it will
not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous on the record as a whole. Maurer v. Maurer,
623 N.W.2d 604, 606 (Minn. 20 01). “That the record might support findings other than

after the valuation date. Due to this lack of evidence, the district did not err by implicitly
denying wife’s request for an apportionment of husband’s attorney fees paid by J.K. Self
Storage.

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those made by the [district] court does not show that the court’s findings are defective.”
Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 474 (Minn. App. 2000). In order to successfully
challenge a district court’s findings of fact, “the party challenging the findings must show
that despite viewing that evid ence in the light most favorable to the [district] court’s
findings . . . , the record still requires the defi nite and firm conviction that a mistake was
made.” Id. With this standard of review in mind, we turn to each challenged valuation.
 J.K. Real Estate
Unlike its conclusion regarding the increa sed value of Benton Development, the
district court concluded that wife was entitled to one half of the increased value of J.K.
Real Estate attributable to husband’s efforts during the course of the marriage. And, noting
that neither party submitted an appraisal of the value of J.K. Real Estate, the district court
turned to the company’s Sept ember 30, 2017 balance shee t—the agreed upon valuation
date—to determine the increased value of the company.4
According to the balance sh eet, J.K. Real Estate’s liabilities exceeded its
assets by more than a million dollars, an d the value of husband’s capital account
was -$206,811. Given this nega tive value, the district court valued J.K. Real Estate at
$0.00. As a result, the court did not apporti on wife any increased value attributable to
husband’s efforts during the course of the marriage. Since wife does not point to any other
evidence presented at trial which established th e total value of J.K. Real Estate as of

4 The district court acknowledged that book value was not th e optimal method of valuing
the company, but relied upon it given the limited valuation evidence presented at trial.

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September 30, 2017, the district court did no t clearly err by relying on the balance sheet
when establishing the (lack of) increased value of the company.5
Still, wife argues that the district court, ra ther than relying on J.K. Real Estate’s
book value, should have turned to the terms of the compa ny’s buy/sell agreement for the
method of valuing the company. See, e.g. , Rogers v. Rogers , 296 N.W.2d 849, 852
(Minn. 1980) (stating that a company’s buy/ sell agreement should be considered when
valuing a company in a dissolution proceeding, but that the agreement is not dispositive of
value). One of the methods for valuing the company in the Member Control Agreement is
the selection of an accountant to conduct a valuation of the seller’s interest, which wife
characterizes as an appraisal. But this argument brings us full circle to the fact that neither
party submitted an appraised value of J.K. Real Estate. Therefore, wife’s assertion that the
district court erred by not following the term s of the buy/sell agreement is not supported
by the record.
Finally, wife argues that even if book va lue is an appropriate measure, the book
value relied on by the district court was incorrect. The district court found that the balance
sheet indicated total assets of $4,195,287.66, and total liab ilities of $5,208,671.17. Wife
asserts that evidence wa s presented at trial that J.K. Real Estate had assets totaling
$4,569,374.75, and that the liabilities should have been reduced by $3,867,042.47 because

5 We note that, consistent with our analysis above, in order to establish that an increase in
J.K. Real Estate’s value during the course of the marriage was a marital asset, it needed to
be established what portion of that increase in value was attributable to husband’s efforts.
See Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 192. The parties do not address this aspect of the issue, but
because the district court did not clearly err by finding that J.K. Real Estate had a negative
value, it is not necessary to reach this issue here.

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two debts had been satisfied. But the company’s accountant testified that while the Wells
Fargo debt was satisfied, this occurred because two additional debts were incurred to pay
it off.
Regarding the other obligation that wife asserts was satisfied, the September 2017
balance sheet includes an entry under long-term liabilities for “IRET Shares Debt Basis[,]
[$]2,550.740.68.” Wife relies on testimony and exhibits which indicate that a $2,900,000
mortgage taken out by J.K. Real Estate, and guaranteed by Investor s Real Estate Trust
(IRET), on February 20, 2007, wa s satisfied as of June 16, 2015. But because wife does
not point to evidence clearly connecting the satisfied mortgage to the liability listed on the
balance sheet, we cannot say that the district court’s finding was clearly erroneous.
Furthermore, wife still does not point to any evidence purporting to establish a total
valuation of J.K. Real Estate as of September 30, 2017 other than the balance sheet.
Therefore, the district court properly relied on the September 30, 2017 balance sheet as the
best evidence of the company’s value.6
 J.K. Self Storage
Wife next argues that the district court erred by relying on the appraised market
value of J.K. Self Storage. Husband and wife retained the accounting firm of Miller Welle
Heiser to appraise the market value of J.K. Se lf Storage. The district court adopted that

6 Wife also argues that the district court improperly valued Benton Development based on
the September 30, 2017 balance sheet. Howeve r, because we affirm the district court’s
determinations that husband’s interest was nonmarital, as was the increase in value during
the period of the marriage, we do not reach wife’s claim re garding the district court’s
valuation of this entity.

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valuation. Wife argues this was an error because the appraiser included a ten percent
marketability discount and gains taxes.7 Further, wife asserts that the district court should
have considered independent ap praisals of individual parcel s of land owned by J.K. Self
Storage which were not submitted to Miller Welle Heiser as part of its appraisal of the
company. Because the appraised value was not below the liquidation value of the entity,
and because wife did not provide the appraise rs with her individual appraisals of the
individual parcels, the district court did not err by relying on the appraised market value of
J.K. Self Storage.
To attempt to persuade us otherwise, wife, relying on Nardini, asserts that the
inclusion of the discount and taxes impermissi bly lowered the value of J.K. Self Storage
beyond a certain floor. In Nardini, the supreme court stated that for the purposes of a
marital property division, the value of a fam ily business “cannot be less than a sum equal
to the net proceeds which could be realized from the forced sale of the tangible assets of
the business and the collection or assignment of intangibles such as accounts receivable,
and after payment of all liabilities.” 414 N.W.2d at 189. But here, the appraiser stated that
this floor value was taken into consideration. 8 As a result, the inclusion of the discount

7 In their determination of the market value of J.K. Self Storage, the appraisers included a
$238,285 liability fo r built-in gains taxes on the di fference between the book and
fair-market value of the real estate.
8 In his analysis the appraiser stated that “the liquidation premise of value was considered
and rejected as not applicable, as the going-concern value results in a higher value for the
interest than the liquidation value, whether orderly or fixed.”

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value9 and gains taxes in the appraisal did not lower the appraised value of J.K. Self Storage
below the minimum value identified in Nardini.
Nor did the district court err by declining to rely on the appraisals of two individual
parcels of land submitted by wife to the district court. First, in its denial of wife’s motion
for amended findings, the district court ackn owledged that it “did receive as exhibits
appraisals for properties owned by J.K. Self Storage. [The appraiser] also testified, and the
[district] court found, that [the appraiser] asked the parties for appraisal documents but
there was no response.” Second, the appraisals wife relies on are from August 2013, more
than four years before the valuation date.
Allocation of Debt
Wife argues that the district court e rroneously allocated to husband a $300,000
promissory note owed to husband’s father as husband’s marital debt, because the obligation
was also included in the liabilities of Motors-N-More. Marital debt is apportionable under
the same statute that governs di vision of marital property. Filkins v. Filkins ,
347 N.W.2d 526, 528 (Minn. App. 1984). In denying wife’s motion for amended findings,
the district court noted that no evidence was offered or received at trial linking the liability
listed on Motors-N-More’s books to the prom issory note from husband’s father. On

9 While not relied on by wife, Nardini does state that “there is no justification for
discounting an undivided interest in a corporation all of whose shares are owned by one or
both spouses.” 414 N.W.2d at 189. This statement is however distinguishable on two
bases. First, J.K. Self Storage is not en tirely owned by husband and wife. Second, the
discount in Nardini was a discount for lack of control, not a marketability discount.

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appeal, wife points to two portions of the record which, she claims, establish this link. We
examine each portion below.
First, wife asserts that husband testified that the two obligations were the same.
Wife points to husband’s deposition testimony, 10 where he stated in a discussion of
Motors-N-More that “as time goes on and we st art to expand and they were able to get
other floor-planning money—and then my dad loaned us the money to put in there.” But
this statement does not identify the amount of money loaned by husband’s father, nor does
it establish the obligation listed on Motors-N-More’s books was the same as the personal
obligation set forth in the promissory note.
Wife next broadly asserts that the comp any’s accountant testified that the two
obligations were identical. Yet she does not cite to any specific te stimony in support of
this claim. Our review of the accountant’s testimony does no t indicate any discussion of
the promissory note owed to husband’s father, nor that the obligation listed on
Motors-N-More’s books is the same obligati on set forth in the promissory note. The
accountant did provide the following testimony regarding the couple’s capital contributions
to Motors-N-More:
Q: And did the Kents contribute funds into that corporation?
A: Define funds.
Q: Money?
A: Equity or a loan?

10 Wife relies on husband’s deposition testimony rather than his trial testimony. While a
copy of the deposition transcript was received into evidence, the parties do not address the
evidentiary status of husband ’s statements contained in the deposition. Because we
conclude that the district court did not clearly err by finding that no evidence was presented
at trial linking the two obligations, it is not necessary to reach the evidentiary issues related
to the deposition.

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Q: Equity or a loan.
A: They did not contribute equity; a loan was contributed.
. . . .
Q: Do you have firsthand knowledge where those funds
came from?
A: I do not.
Q: Do you have an understandi ng of how much those funds
are?
A: I believe it to be $200,000.

This discussion pertains to wife’s capital contribution to Motors-N-More of $220,000, not
to a loan made by husband’s father. Therefore, the district court did not err when it found
that no evidence was presented at trial linking the promissory note husband owed his father
to the obligation listed on Motors-N-More’s books.
Spousal Maintenance
Wife argues that the district court erred by awarding her maintenance in the amount
of $950 per month. We review a district court’s original award of maintenance for an abuse
of the district court’s broad discretion. Curtis v. Curtis , 887 N.W.2d 249, 252
(Minn. 2016). A district court abuses its di scretion regarding maintenance if its findings
of fact are unsupported by the record or if it improperly applies the law. Dobrin v. Dobrin,
569 N.W.2d 199, 202 & n.3 (Minn. 1997).
First, wife asserts that th e district court erred by consid ering her gross, rather than
net, income. See Kostelnik v. Kostelnik, 367 N.W.2d 665, 670 (Minn. App. 1985) (stating
that, within the context of a payor spouse’s ability to pay, courts must determine their net
income), review denied (Minn. July 26, 1985). However, as noted by the district court in
its denial of wife’s motion for amended findings, the district court would have considered
wife’s net income but wife did not submit it as evidence at tria l. Therefore, the district

18
court did not abuse its discretion by using the only income figures for wife actually
submitted at trial.
Next, wife argues that the district cour t impermissibly required her to invade the
principal of her property settlement in order to pay her living expenses. The district court
found that husband and wife “were affluent and enjoyed a comfortable standard of living
during the marriage.” The district court found that wife’s reasonable monthly budget was
$4,102, but did not make a fi nding regarding the marital st andard of living during the
marriage.11
In its consideration of wife ’s financial resources, the district court noted that she
was “awarded assets, including vehicles, and a property equalizer payment in the amount
of $168,832. She was already awarded $220,0 00 from the sale of the marital home and
$39,143 from the sale of the cabin . . . . [W ife] took the bulk of the household goods and
furnishings.” While a district court must co nsider the income generated from the marital
property received in the dissolution as part of its determination of spousal need, “a district
court cannot require a maintenance-seeking spouse to invade the principal of the property
[award] . . . to pay living expenses.” Curtis, 887 N.W.2d at 254 (quotation omitted).
Because the district court did not make a finding regarding the amount of income
potentially generated by the property settlement, and considering the fact that husband was

11 The closest finding to a mari tal standard of living made by the district court was the
following: “[Husband] denied that the partie s spent $30,000 monthly on expenses as a
married couple and instead estimated that th ey spent between $15, 000 to $18,000 per
month. [Husband] testified that the lifestyles they live now are similar to that they had in
the marriage.”

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allowed to pay the settlement in monthly allotments of $2,000, the record is incomplete.
This is especially so considering that no finding was made establishing the marital standard
of living. See Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(c) (listing the marital standard of living as a
factor to be considered by a district court when determining the amount of a maintenance
award). Wife’s spousal maintenance award is therefore remanded so that the district court
can make a finding on what amount of monthly income can be generated by wife’s property
settlement without invading the principal, and whether it is sufficient, along with the other
factors considered by the district court, to meet the marital standard of living. On remand,
the district court should make a finding on wife’s marital standard of living as well.
Need-Based Attorney Fees
Wife argues that the district court er red by denying her reque st for need-based
attorney fees. Appellate courts review an aw ard of need-based attorney fees for an abuse
of discretion. Gully v. Gully , 599 N.W.2d 814, 825 (Minn. 1999). But cf. Minn.
Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2018) (stating that the district court “shall” award need-based
attorney fees if statutory requirements are met).
A district court shall award need-b ased attorney fees if it finds:
(1) that the fees are necessary for the good faith assertion of the
party’s rights in the procee ding and will not contribute
unnecessarily to the length and expense of the proceeding;
(2) that the party from whom fees . . . are sought has the means
to pay them; and
(3) that the party to whom fees . . . are awarded does not have
the means to pay them.

Id. The district court denied wife’s request for need-based attorney fees on the basis of the
third factor, finding that after considerin g “the property distribution ordered herein,

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including the property already divided, in addition to the permanent maintenance award”
need-based attorney fees were not warranted.
As discussed above, the district court did not find the amount of income that could
be generated from wife’s property award. Therefore, when the district court states that the
property award is sufficient to negate wife’s claim for need-based attorney fees, it is unclear
whether the district court is referring to the pr incipal of the award or the income that can
be generated therefrom. This court has held that when a spouse must liquidate a substantial
portion of her property award to pay her attorney fees, a district court abuses its discretion
by denying a request for need-based attorney fees. Schultz v. Schultz , 383 N.W.2d 379,
383 (Minn. App. 1986). Because the district court’s findings do not indicate whether wife
would be able to pay her fees out of the income generated by the property award, or would
require her to liquidate a portion of her property settlement to pay her attorney fees, remand
is therefore warranted so the district court can make the necessary findings.
Child Support
Wife argues that the district court erred by not ordering an upward deviation in child
support, and by not ordering husband to pay child support for June 2019. The district court
has broad discretion to provide for the support of the parties’ children. Rutten v. Rutten,
347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984). A district court abuses its discretion when it sets support
in a manner that is against logic and the facts on record, or it misapplies the law. See id.
Following the basic-support guidelines se t forth in Minn. Stat. § 518A.35, subd. 2,
(2018), the district court found that husband and wife’s combined-basic-support obligation

21
was $2,727—the maximum allowed under the guidelines for two children12—and that after
the parenting expense adjustment, 13 husband had a basic suppor t obligation of $900 and
wife had none. After factoring in their respective medical-support obligations, husband
had a net-child-support obligation of $900 and wife’s was $117, for a total child-support
award to wife of $783 per month.
Wife argues that the district court shoul d have ordered an up ward deviation from
the basic-support guidelines pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 518A.35, subd. 3(b) (2018). Under
that provision, the district court can order an upward deviation if it finds that the children
have “other substantial, demonstrated need[s] for the additional support for those reasons
set forth in section 518A.43,” which include the standard of living enjoyed by the children
during the course of the marriage. Minn. Stat. § 518A.43, subd. 1(3) (2018).
Here, the district court did not make a finding that the children had substantial
demonstrated needs warranting an upward deviation. Furthermore, the district court noted
that father’s monthly budget included $6,522 in expenses for the children. Therefore, the
district court did not abuse its discreti on by following the guidelines in setting the
monthly-child-support award.
Wife next contends that the district cour t erred by setting father’s first child-support
payment for July 1, 2019, asserting that he should have been ordered to pay beginning on
June 1, 2019. The district court’s order imposing father’s child support obligation was

12 Because the couple’s oldest child had graduated high school by June 1, 2019, he was no
longer considered a child for the purposes of calculating child support. Minn.
Stat. § 518A.26, subd. 5 (2018).
13 How the district court arrived at this number is unclear, but wife does not challenge it.

22
dated May 22, 2019. Additiona lly, father was already provid ing up to $4,500 per month
for the children’s extracurricula r expenses under the terms of the December 2018 partial
judgment and decree. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering
that father’s child-support payments commence on July 1, 2019.
Security
Finally, wife asserts the district court erred by implicitly denying her request to
secure her property award with liens on husband’s interests in his business entities.14 Wife
does not support her claim with any citation to authority or argument, but merely asserts
that she “is concerned that any additional prope rty awarded to her will [not be] secure.”
An assignment of error in a brief based on “mere assertion” and not supported by argument
or authority is waived unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.
Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co. , 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971).
Therefore, this argument is waived.
In light of the complexity of the issues raised by wife, we conclude by summarizing
our preceding conclusions. We affirm the majority of the district court’s careful, detailed
findings, with the following limited excep tions. We reverse the district court’s
spousal-maintenance award and remand for additional findings on the marital standard of
living and what amount of income may be generated by wife’s property award. Relatedly,
we reverse the district court’s denial of wife’s request for need-based attorneys fees so the

14 In this section of wife’s brief, she also requests, with out citation to authority or
supporting argument, that she be awarded a 1/3 ownership interest in Motors-N-More. This
argument is also deemed waiv ed on the same basis as wi fe’s unsupported request for
security.

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district court can find whether the income ge nerated from wife’s property settlement is
sufficient to pay her attorneys fees. Finally, we remand wife ’s request for an equitable
accounting of the $211,531 husband withdrew from J.K. Self Storage in 2017 so the district
court can make a finding as to whether those funds are marital and, if so, how they should
be divided between the parties. On remand, the district court may, in its discretion, reopen
the record.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.