State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1569

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Quintin Isaiah Bianco,
Appellant.

Filed October 12, 2020
Reversed and remanded
Frisch, Judge

Stevens County District Court
File No. 75-CR-19-105

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Aaron Jordan, Stevens County Attorney, Morris, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Veronica M. Surges, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FRISCH, Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant requests that we vacate his conviction of violation of
a harassment restraining order, arguing that his plea was not accurate . Because appellant
did not admit facts that substantiate his guilt, we reverse and remand.

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FACTS
Appellant Quintin Isaiah Bianco was formerly in a relationship with victim’s
daughter, who is under victim’s guardianship. Victim petitioned for a harassment
restraining order (HRO) f ollowing escalating incidents of harassment by Bianco. On
August 17, 2018, the district court issued an HRO prohibiting Bianco from (1) harassing
victim; (2) having direct or indirect contact with victim; or (3) “mak[ing] false or
defamatory statements about [victim], including to the public, to [victim’s] employer, or
on-line.”
Between February 10, 2019, and March 25, 2019, multiple posts containing various
allegations about victim originated from Bianco’s Facebook account. On March 25, 2019,
Bianco called social services alleging that victim abused her daughter and denied her
daughter medical care.
The state charged Bianco with violation of the HRO, Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 6
(2018). Bianco entered into a plea agreement , and the district court held a plea hearing.
At the hearing, the state attempted to elicit sworn testimony from Bianco to establish a
factual basis for the offense. When Bianco denied certain facts, the district court took over
questioning of Bianco, accepted his plea, and adjudicated him guilty. Bianco now appeals
and seeks reversal of his conviction, arguing that the district court should not have accepted
his guilty plea because the facts to which he admitted do not establish that he violated the
HRO.

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D E C I S I O N
The validity of a guilty plea is a question of law that we review de novo. State v.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must
be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Id. A guilty plea is inaccurate if it is not supported
by a proper factual basis. State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994).
Typically, counsel or the district court establish a factual basis in support of a guilty
plea by “asking the defendant to explain in his or her own words the circumstances
surrounding the crime.” Id. The defendant’s explanation “usually will suggest que stions
to the court which then, with the assistance of counsel, can interrogate the defendant in
further detail.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). A district court “must
be particularly attentive” when a defendant pleading guilty “is ask ed only leading
questions.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716. When a defendant “makes statements that negate
an essential element of the charged crime,” the plea is inadequate “because such statements
are inconsistent with a plea of guilty.” State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2003).
Bianco attempted to plead guilty to violating the HRO. The elements of this offense
are that Bianco (1) knew an active HRO existed, (2) violated a term or condition of the
HRO, and (3) knew that his actions violated the HRO. See Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 6;
State v. Andersen, 946 N.W.2d 627, 637 (Minn. App. 2020) (holding that state must prove
defendant knew his actions violated HRO). At the plea hearing, Bianco admitted that he
knew the HRO existed at the time of the alleged violations. Bianco now argues, however,
that his testimony did not establish that he knowingly violated a term or condition of the
HRO.

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Report to Social Services
Bianco argues that he did not admit to knowingly making false statements or
prompting third-party contact by reporting victim to social services. The state responds
that Bianco’s report to social services violated the HRO’s prohibition against direct or
indirect contact with victim and making false statements.
At the plea hearing, Bianco testified that he called social services at the request of
victim’s daughter to report alleged abuse. Bianco maintained that he had reason to believe
the allegations were true when he made the report.
We have never held that a report of alleged illegal activity may constitute indirect
contact in violation of an HRO. Rather, such a report is presumptively valid when the
report is objectively reasonable and made through the proper channels . See Peterson v.
Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 765 (Minn. App. 2008) (reversing a finding that a report to law
enforcement constituted harassment). To overcome the presumption, a district court must
find that the defendant acted with an improper intent. Id. at 765-66. Here, Bianco reported
domestic and child abuse, implicating public-safety and child-welfare concerns.1 The plea
colloquy does not establish that Bianco acted with improper intent , and the district court
did not make such a finding. Accordingly, the testimony at the plea hearing did not

1 The state relies on State v. Egge, in which we affirmed a finding of indirect contact where
the defendant named the victim as a beneficiary to an insurance policy, then directed the
insurance agent to call the victim. 611 N.W.2d 573, 575 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied
(Minn. Aug. 15, 2000). Unlike the circumstance in Egge, Bianco did not direct a third
party to contact victim.

5
establish that Bianco’s report to social services amounted to indirect contact or a false
statement in violation of the HRO.
Facebook Posts
The state next argues that Bianco admitted to posting false statements about victim
on Facebook in violation of the HRO. The HRO prohibited Bianco from “mak[ing]
false . . . statements about [victim], including to the public . . . or on-line.” Bianco argues
that, while he admitted to posting certain statements about victim on Facebook, he did not
admit that he knew that any of thos e statements were false at the time he posted them.
Bianco also references his testimony that his Facebook account was hacked and that he did
not remember posting particular comments about victim.2
Although the Facebook posts themselves are not part of the record, which
necessarily limits our review, we have carefully reviewed the transcript of the plea hearing.
The transcript shows that —despite repeated efforts of the state and the district court to
elicit a factual basis from Bianco to substantiate his guilty plea—Bianco clearly, expressly,
and repeatedly denied posting statements that he knew to be false. Bianco denied authoring
many of the posts. As to the posts that he admitted to writing, Bianco testified that his
posts were based on what he believed to be truthful information. Although Bianco admitted
that he should not have posted statements on Facebook that he did not know to be true —
and he further admitted that he was unaware whether some of the information was true at

2 Bianco also claims that the Facebook posts were not directed at the public. But the HRO
plainly prohibited Bianco from making any false or defamatory statements online,
regardless of the intended audience.

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the time—such admissions do not amount to a violation of the HRO, which only prohibits
Bianco from making “false or defamatory” statements.
The state argues that Bianco’s testimony shows selective memory, not failed
memory.3 Although our review of the transcript shows that Bianco was evasive and
equivocal, credibility determinations are beyond the scope of our review. See Aljubailah
v. James , 903 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. App. 2017) (“An appellate court w ill neither
reconcile conflicting evidence nor decide issues of witness c redibility.” ( quotation
omitted)).
The state alternatively argues that Bianco admitted to making defamatory
statements about victim. While the HRO prohibits false or defamatory statements, Bianco
did not admit to facts showing that he made defamatory statements. Criminal defamation
requires knowledge of the false and defamatory character of the statement. See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.765, subd. 2 (2018) (“Whoever with knowledge of its false and defamatory
character . . . communicates any false and defamatory matter to a third person . . . is guilty
of criminal defamation . . . .” ( emphasis added)); see also Andersen , 946 N.W.2d at 633
(stating common-law rule that mens rea is generally required for criminal offenses). As
set forth herein, Bianco did not admit that he knew his statements were false at the time he
made them.

3 Citing State v. Winchell, the state argues that Bianco attempted to plead “not very guilty.”
363 N.W.2d 747, 749 (Minn. 1985). But Winchell is not on point. There, the defendant
admitted to the facts necessary to support his guilty plea, only challenging facts relevant to
sentencing. Id.

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Because Bianco did not admit the facts that establish a violation of the HRO, we
reverse and remand to allow Bianco to withdraw his plea.4
Reversed and remanded.

4 Bianco raises additional arguments in a pro se supplemental brief that we need not address
given our disposition.