State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1571

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Leontaye A. Slaughter-McCaskel,
Appellant.

Filed July 20, 2020
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-18-8323

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anthony C. Palumbo, A noka County Attorney, Robert I. Yount, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
In this direct appeal from a judgment of conviction for felony domestic assault,
appellant argues that the district court committed reversible error when defining the crime
in its jury instructions. Because any error in the jury instructions did not affect appellant’s
substantial rights, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Leontaye Slaughter -McCaskel
with one count of domestic assault by strangulation under Minn. Stat. § 609.2247, subd. 2
(2018). The state later amended the complaint and added a charge of felony domestic
assault—intentionally inflict or attempt to inflict bodily harm —under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.2242, subds. 1(2), 4 (2018).
At trial, T.H., the victim, testified that appellant punched and choked her after she
refused to give him a ride to his father’s residence. T.H. also explained that appellant called
her after he was charged and told her that she needed to drop the charge. Appellant did not
testify or call any witnesses.
In its final jury instructions, the district court gave this definition for the felony -
domestic-assault charge: “[W]hoever . . . intentionally inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily
harm upon another is guilty of a crime , if the person assaulted is a member of the
defendant’s family or household.” It then defined the elements of that crime:
First, [appellant] assaulted [T.H.] The term “assault” as
used in this case is the intentional infliction of bodily harm
upon another.

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. . . .
Second, the victim was a member of [appellant’s]
family or household. “Family or household member” includes
persons involved in a significant romantic or sexual
relationship.
Third, [appellant’s] acts took place on or about
December 19, 2018, in Anoka County.1

The jury found appellant guilty of felony domestic assault—inflict bodily harm —
but acquitted him of domestic assault by strangulation. Based on this guilty v erdict and
appellant’s criminal-history score, the district court imposed a 27 -month prison sentence.
On appeal, appellant challenges the district c ourt’s final jury instructions on the felony -
domestic-assault charge.
D E C I S I O N
I. Standard of Review
To begin , we observe that the parties dispute the applicable standard of review.
Appellant characterizes the alleged error as structural and seeks reversal despite not
objecting to the district court’s jury instructions. In response, the state asserts that we
should review only for plain error.
Errors in criminal cases are generally classified as either trial errors or structural
errors. State v. Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d 844, 851 (Minn. 2011). Structural errors represent
fundamental constitutional errors that defy harmless -error analysis and require automatic
reversal of a conviction . Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1, 7, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1833
(1999). Courts have found only a few errors to be so perverse as to constitute structural

1 Because appellant stipulated that he had two prior qualifying convictions, the jury was
not instructed on that element of felony domestic assault.

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error. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-82, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2083 (1993)
(constitutionally deficient reasonable-doubt jury instruction); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S.
39, 49-50, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 2217 (1984) (denial of public-trial right); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8, 104 S. Ct. 944, 950 n.8 (1984) (denial of the right to self -
representation at trial); State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238, 252-53 (Minn. 2005) (presence
of a biased judge as fact -finder); State v. Logan , 535 N.W.2d 320, 324 -25 (Minn. 1995)
(denial of right to impartial jury by not dismissing biased juror).
In contrast, trial errors occur while the case is presented to the jur y and can be
assessed to determine their prejudicial effect. Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d at 851. Most errors
are trial errors and are subject to review to decide whether their alleged prejudicial effect
requires reversal and a new trial. See, e.g., Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109
S. Ct. 2419, 2421 (1989) (jury instruction containing erroneous conclusive presumption);
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 2147 (1986) (erroneous exclusion
of the defendant’s testimony about the circumstances of his confession); State v. Finnegan,
784 N.W.2d 243, 251 n.6 (Minn. 2010) (continuing the trial in the defendant’s absence).
Here, appellant contends that the district court erred by including the word “attempt”
in its jury instruction defining the crime of felony domestic assault. In appellant’s view,
this instruction lessened the state’s burden of proof and constituted structural error.2 For

2 Appellant does not argue that the district court’s jury instructions directed a verdict for
the state on any element. Cf. State v. Moore, 699 N.W.2d 733, 738 (Minn. 2005) (holding
that erroneous jury instruction that deprived defendant of right to have jury decide
existence of all offense elements was not subject to harmless-error review).

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support, appellant cites Sullivan and asserts that its holding mandates automatic reversal
here.
In Sullivan, the Supreme Court considered “whether a constitutionally deficient
reasonable-doubt instruction may be harmless error.” 508 U.S. at 276, 113 S. Ct. at 2080.
Because this deficient instruction “vitiate[d] all the jury’s findings” and carried unc ertain
consequences, the Supreme Court declined to apply harmless -error review and reversed
the defendant’s conviction using structural-error analysis. Id. at 281-82, 113 S. Ct. at 2082-
83.
Unlike Sullivan, appellant challenges the language within the di strict court’s jury
instruction on an offense, not its reasonable -doubt instruction. It seems evident that this
argument seeks review of a trial error. We find support for this conclusion in other cases
discussing the interplay between trial errors and s tructural errors in the jury -instruction
context. For instance, the Supreme Court has held that an erroneous instruction on an
invalid alternative theory of guilt is non structural. Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 61 -
62, 129 S. Ct. 530, 532 (2008). So t oo has the Supreme Court held that the erroneous
omission of an offense element does not constitute structural error. Neder, 527 U.S. at 10-
11, 119 S. Ct. at 1834. And the Supreme Court has applied a harmless-error analysis when
a trial court has misstated offense elements. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 503, 107
S. Ct. 1918, 1922 (1987) (use of wrong term when defining standard in obscenity case);
Rose v. Clark , 478 U.S. 570, 5 79-80, 106 S. Ct. 3101 , 3107 (1986) (erroneous burden -
shifting on offense element).

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Minnesota courts have reached similar conclusions when analyzing whether a jury-
instruction error is a trial error or structural error. For example, our supreme court has
concluded that the erroneous omission of an offense element represents a trial error. State
v. Watkins, 840 N.W.2d 21, 27 (Minn. 2013). Likewise, “failure to properly instruct the
jury on all elements of the offense charged is plain error.” State v. Vance , 734 N.W.2d
650, 658 (Minn. 2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Fleck , 810 N.W.2d 303
(Minn. 2012).
Based on these principles, appellant’s alleged error is subject to review as a trial
error. The asserted instructional error did not pervade the whole trial or affect its
fundamental fairness. Nor does the alleged error here have “unquantifiable and
indeterminate” consequences. See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 282, 113 S. Ct. at 2083. Thus, this
case does not fit into the narrow class of cases requiring automatic reversal under
structural-error analysis.
II. The District Court’s Jury Instructions
Having classified th e alleged error as a trial error, we next consider appellant’s
alternative argument that the district court plainly erred. District courts have wide
discretion in selecting jury instructions. State v. Peltier , 874 N.W.2d 792, 797 (Minn.
2016). When viewed in their entirety, jury instructions must fairly and adequately convey
the applicable law. State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 142 (Minn. 2012).
Because appellant never objected to the district court’s jury instructions, we review
the challenged instruction under the plain-error doctrine. State v. Hayes, 831 N.W.2d 546,
555 (Minn. 2013); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02 (“Plain error affecting a substantial

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right can be considered by the court . . . on appeal even if it was not brought to the trial
court’s attention.”). To prevail under the plain -error doctrine, the challenging party must
show (1) an error; (2) that the error was plain; and (3 ) that this error affected substantial
rights. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998). When thes e three prongs are
met, an appellate court then decides whether to address the error “to ensure fairness and
the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Id. (citing Johnson v. United States , 520 U.S.
461, 467, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997)).
The district court’s jury instruction defining domestic assault matched the statutory
language. See Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(2). But appellant argues that the district
court plainly erred by including the word “attempt” in this instruction. The state responds
that no error occurred. We need not decide whether the district court plainly erred because
any error did not affect appellant’s substantial rights. See State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248,
261 (Minn. 2014) (not analyzing first two prongs of plai n-error doctrine because the third
prong was dispositive).
To affect a defendant’s substantial rights, an error must be prejudicial and impact
the trial’s outcome. State v. Wenthe , 865 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Minn. 2015). “An error in
instructing the jury is prejudicial if there is a reasonable likelihood that giving the
instruction in question had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” State v. Huber, 877
N.W.2d 519, 525 (Minn. 2016) (quoting Watkins, 840 N.W.2d at 28). The defendant
carries the “heavy burden” of showing prejudice. Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 741.
At trial, the state never argued that appellant was guilty of felony domestic assault
if he simply attempted to assault T.H. And the state’s case focused on a completed assault,

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evidenced by T.H.’s trial testimony and photographs showing her injuries during a medical
examination after the altercation with appellant. Put differently, the state submitted only
one theory of guilt to the jury on the felony-domestic-assault offense—a completed assault.
Also important to our decision is the lack of the word “attempt” in the district court’s
instruction defining “assault.”
In urging reversal, appel lant argues that the jury’s not -guilty verdict on the
domestic-assault-by-strangulation charge amplifies the alleged error. But substantial
record evidence , noted above, shows that appellant inflicted bodily harm against T.H.
separate from the alleged strangulation. See State v. Larson, 787 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn.
2010) (holding that any error in instructing the jury did not affect the appellant’s substantial
rights because the record containe d “considerable evidence” of her guilt). Because this
case involved a completed assault, there is no reasonable likelihood that the district court’s
allegedly erroneous jury instruction significantly affected the jury’s verdict.
In sum, appellant has not met his burden of showing that the district court’s alleged
instructional error affected his substantial rights.
Affirmed.