James Robinson, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) .

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1575

James Robinson,
Appellant,

vs.

Metropolitan Council,
Respondent.

Filed March 8, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Bryan, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-18-7065

Jeremy L. Brantingham, Brantingham Law Office, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

John P. Brendel, Brendel and Zinn, Ltd., St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Ross,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this action for uninsured-motorist benefits, appellant challenges the district
court’s posttrial determination that respondent was the prevailing party and entitled to costs
and disbursements. We conclude that because the statutory offset provisi ons do es not
apply to the postverdict payment in this case, the district court abused its discretion when

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it determined that respondent was the prevailing party. We reverse the district court ’s
decision and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
On February 21, 2014, appellant James Robinson was riding on a Metro Transit bus
insured by respondent Metropolitan Co uncil when an uninsured motor vehicle struck the
bus and injured Robinson. On April 26, 2018, Robinson filed a complaint against
Metropolitan Council fo r uninsured-motorist benefits, see king to recover damages for past
and future medical expenses and past and future pain and suffering. Prior to trial, both
parties made “total -obligation offers” of settlement under Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 68. Robinson offered to settle for $4,000 and Metropolitan Council offered to
settle for $500.
At trial, Robinson testified that Metropolitan Council had not paid for any of his
medical bills and that he had been denied coverage since the acciden t. Metropolitan
Council agreed that it was responsible for the payment of any medical bills for any injuries
Robinson sustained as a result of the accident. Accordingly, the only questions submitted
to the jury were whether Robinson’s injuries were perma nent and what amount of damages
Robinson suffered as a result of the accident. On March, 29, 2019, t he jury found that
Robinson was not permanently injured, that $1,537.17 would compensate Robinson for
past medical expenses, and that Robinson was not entitled to damages for future medical
expenses or pain and suffering.
On April 3, 2019, the district court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The district court concluded that because Robinson had failed to satisfy the $4,00 0

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threshold required by Minnesota Statutes section 65B.51, subdivision 3 (2018),
Metropolitan Council was entitled to judgment d ismissing Robinson’s claim and entitled
to costs and disbursements. On April 4, 2019, Robinson moved for amended findings,
arguing t hat section 65B.51, subdivision 3, is inapplicable because it only applies to
noneconomic detriment and the jury awarded Robinson economic damages. On April 8,
2019, t he d istrict court denied the motion, reiterating that Robinson did not meet the
thresholds in section 65B.51, subdivision 3, and further explaining that Minnesota Statutes
section 65B.51, subdivision 1 (2018), requires the deduction of economic loss benefits
“paid or payable. ” Applying the offset provisions of subdivision 1, the district court
reduced the recovery amount to zero and again awarded Metropolitan Council their costs
and disbursements.
On May 1, 2019, Robinson requested that the district court allow him to move for
reconsideration, and the district court granted the request. In his motion for
reconsideration, Robinson maintained his position that the district court should not have
reduced the jury verdict to zero and argued that he was the prevaili ng party because the
jury award exceeded Metropolitan Council’s Rule 68 offer. In support, Robinson included
a June 24, 2019 letter from Metropolitan Council enclosing a check in the amount of the
jury award. Robinson argued that this letter was Metropolitan Council’s acknowledgement
that Robinson prevailed.
On August 1, 2019, the district court denied Robinson’s motion for reconsideratio n
and ordered judgment in Metropolitan Council ’s favor . The district court restated its
position that Robinson’s net r ecovery is zero based on section 65B.51, subdivision 1:

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The problem with this argument is that the law requires
the Court to deduct from a verdict any economic loss benefits
“paid or payable” to the claimant. . . . In this case, the entire
amount of medic al expenses found by the jury must be
deducted, leaving Mr. Robinson with a net recovery of zero.

Metropolitan Council did pay the $1,537.17 (the
amount of Mr. Robinson’s damages) after the jury verdict. Mr.
Robinson argues that this is a concession by Metropolitan
Council that he was the victor at trial. It is not. It is at most a
concession that this amount was “paid or payable, ” and, as
explained above, must be deducted from Mr. Robinson’s net
recovery.

As Mr. Robinson’s recovery at trial was zero, he was
not the prevailing party. The Court affirms its earlier rulings,
and Metropolitan Council may seek costs and disbursements.
Mr. Robinson’s Motion for Reconsideration is denied, as is his
request for costs and disbursements.

This appeal follows.
DECISION
Robinson argues that the district court erred by concluding that , based on a net
recovery amount of zero, Metropolitan Council was the prevailing party. Because
controlling legal authority precludes reducing the jury verdict to zero, we conclude that the
district court abused its discretion in determining that Metropolitan Council was the
prevailing party.
“The prevailing party in a civil matter is entitled to recover costs and reasonable
disbursements.” O’Brien v. Dombeck , 823 N.W.2d 895, 90 1 (Minn. App. 2012) ; Minn.
Stat. §§ 549.02, subd. 1, .04, subd. 1 (2018). “The prevailing party in any action is the one
in whose favor the decision or verdict is rendered and judgment entered.” Borchert v.
Maloney, 581 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn. 1998) . To determine the prevailing party, “the

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general result should be considered, and inquiry made as to who has, in the view of the
law, succeeded in the action.” Id. (quotation omitted). This determination is a “pragmatic”
one that “depends on a careful weighing of the relative success of the parties to a lawsuit,
a process that invests a certain amount of discretion in the district court.” Posey v. Fossen,
707 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Minn. App. 2006) ; O’Brien, 823 N.W.2d at 902 (the prevailing -
party determination “depends on a pragmatic analysis that takes into account [a party ’s]
success on the merits and recovery of damages”). The district court has “discretion to
determine which party, if any, qualifies as a prevailing party.” Benigni v. County of St.
Louis, 585 N.W.2d 51, 54-55 (Minn. 1998). This court will not reverse the district court ’s
determination unless the decision is “against logic and facts on the record,” arbitrary or
capricious, or based on an erroneous view of the law. Posey, 707 N.W.2d at 714.
In this case, the district court determined that Metropolitan Council was the
prevailing party because it concluded that section 65B.51, subdivision 1, required reducing
Robinson’s net recovery at trial to zero.1 Section 65B.51, subdivision 1, states:
With respect to a cause of action in negligence accruing as a
result of injury arising out of the operation, ownership,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle with respect to which

1 In its April 3, 2019 order, the district court relied on section 65B.51, subdivision 3 , to
reduce Robinson’s damages to zero. W e agree with the parties that this subdivision is
inapplicable. Section 65B.51, subdivision 3, establishes a threshold for nonecono mic
damages, but the jury only awarded Robinson damages for medical expenses. Compare
Minn. Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 8 (2018) (defining “noneconomic detriment”) with Minn. Stat.
§ 65B.44, subd. 2 (2018) (defining medical expenses as economic losses); see also Johnson
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 574 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. App. 1998) (“The statutory
No-Fault thresholds apply to Johnson’s [uninsured motorist] action for noneconomic loss;
however, because the jury awarded damages for only economic loss, Johnson is entitled to
those damages, reduced by any no -fault benefits that she has already received from S tate
Farm.”).

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security has been provided as required by sections 65B .41 to
65B.71, the court shall deduct from any recovery the value of
basic or optional economic loss benefits paid or payable, or
which would be payable but for any applicable deductible.

Minn. Stat. § 65B.51, subd. 1. The district court determined that because Metropolitan
Council “did pay the $1,537.17 (the amount of Mr. Robinson ’s past medical expenses )
after the jury verdict,” this amount “must be deducted, leaving Mr. Robinson with a net
recovery of zero.” Because “Mr. Robinson ’s net recovery at tri al was zero,” the district
court determined that “he was not the prevailing party.”
The offset in section 65B.51, subdivision 1, however, does not apply to the damages
in this case. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lennartson , 872 N.W.2d 524, 531 -32
(Minn. 2015) (holding that the offset applies to an award of tort damages, offsetting
benefits that a claimant has received prior to recovering any damages in the negligence
action). The holding distinguishes tort damages from other types of damages based on
causes of action related to an insurance contract, and establishes a firm deadline requiring
benefits to be paid prior to trial in order for the offset provision to apply. Id. Thus,
Lennartson prevents insurance carriers from denying payment, going t o trial, receiving an
adverse verdict, paying the amount awarded, and then recovering litigation costs and
disbursements as the “prevailing party.”
At oral argument, Metropolitan Council conceded that Lennartson applies and that
it precludes the district court’s decision to reduce Robinson’s net recovery to zero. Rather
than distinguish Lennartson or urge its reconsideration, Metropolitan Council argued that
Robinson could not rely on Lennartson to reverse the district court ’s decision because

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Robinson did not file an affidavit with the district court to establish a necessary fact:
nonpayment prior to trial. We disagree . The fact of nonpayment prior to trial was
established before the district court. At trial, Robinson testified that Metropolitan Council
had not paid for any of his medical bills and that he had been denied coverage since the
accident.2 In addition, in his motion for reconsideration, Robinson attached a June 24,
2019 letter from Metropolitan Council enclosing a check in the amount of the jury award.
Finally, in its August 1, 2019 order, the district court acknowledged that Metropolitan
Council paid the $1,537.17 after the jury verdict. Given the interpretation of section
65B.51 in Lennartson, and because the record shows that Metropolitan Council did not pay
Robinson until after the jury verdict, we conclude that the district court erred in reducing
Robinson’s net recovery to zero.
The parties also made arguments regarding their Rule 68 offers. Because we remand
the determination of prevailing party, we need not address the parties’ arguments regarding
the proper application of Rule 68 . Borchert, 581 N.W.2d at 840 . Borchert resolves the
conflict between Rule 68 and Minnesota Statutes section 549.04 and explains why a district
court should first determine who the prevailing party is based on the verdict rendered
before analyzing the implications of any Rule 68 offers:

2 Metropolitan Council objected to this testimony, arguing that it was inherently unfair and
prejudicial. The district court overruled the objection. During this exchange, Metropolitan
Council acknowledged to the district court that it had refused to pay Robinson and had
denied him coverage. Additionally, during closing arguments, Metropolitan Council again
acknowledged that it had not paid Robinson. While these statements are not evidence, they
demonstrate that the fact of nonpayment was presented to the district court and that
Metropolitan Council acknowledged this fact.

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In resolving this conflict, the first question we must
address is whether Borchert is a prevailing party under Minn.
Stat. ch. 549 because if she is not, she is not entitled to recover
her costs and disbursements under any circumstances. . . .

In determining who qualifies as the prevailing party in
an action, “the general result should be considered, and inquiry
made as to who has, in the view of the law, succeeded in the
action.” The prevailing party in any action is one in whose
favor the decision or verdict is rendered and judgment entered.

. . . .

Having concluded that Borchert is the prevailing party
does not, howeve r, end our inquiry; we must still determine
whether Rule 68 nonetheless precludes her from recovering her
costs and disbursements.

Borchert, 581 N.W.2d at 839 -40 (footnotes omitted). In addition, we observe that the rule
68 analysis only determines which party is entitled to costs and disbursements “after the
service of the offer .” Minn. R. Civ. P. 68.03(b) (emphasis added). The prevailing party is
still entitled to pre -offer costs and disbursements under Minn. Stat. §§ 549.02, .04. See
Althaus v. Krueger, 929 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Minn. App. 2019) (“[A]lthough Althaus is
entitled, as the prevailing party under Minn. Stat. §§ 549.02, .04, to pre -offer costs and
disbursements, by operation of rule 68.03(b)(1) , Althaus cannot recover costs and
disbursements incurred after service of the offer.”). Because the district court is in the best
position to make this determination, we remand to the district court to first determine the
prevailing party and then determine costs and disbursements in light of Lennartson and
Borchert.
Reversed and remanded.