State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1582

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lanell Thaddeus Crenshaw,
Appellant.

Filed April 6, 2020
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-12176

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jordan W. Rude, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Lanell T. Crenshaw, Bayport, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRYAN, Judge
In this appeal after remand for resentencing , appellant challenges his sentence of
288 months, which constitutes a double upward duration al departure. Appellant argues
that his constitutional rights were violated for the following two reasons: (1) he asserts that

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he received no notice of the state’s intent to seek an upward departure to enhance his
sentence; and (2) he asserts that he did not waive his jury trial right regarding the
aggravating sentencing factor. Because these constitutional challenges lack merit , we
affirm.
FACTS
In 2016, respondent State of Minnesota charged a ppellant Lanell Thaddeaus
Crenshaw with two counts of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree and o ne count of
criminal sexual conduct in the second degree. Approximately seven months before
Crenshaw’s trial , respondent filed its notice of intent to seek an upward sentencing
departure based on its belief that Crenshaw’s criminal conduct harmed multiple victims,
among other grounds. Crenshaw was present while his trial counsel, respondent, and the
district court discussed the content of a special verdict form that would be submitted to the
jury regarding multiple victims. Crenshaw was also present at trial when the district court
instructed the jury to read the special verdict form and presented the special verdict form
to the jury.
The jury convicted Crenshaw of all three counts. On the special verdict form, the
jury specifically found that Crenshaw engaged in sexual penetration and/or sexual conduct
with more than o ne victim in relation to the first count of criminal sexual conduct in the
first degree. The district court sentenced Crenshaw to life imprisonment, concluding that
a “heinous” element existed. Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 3 (2016). Crenshaw appealed

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his sentence, and this court reversed the life sentence and remanded for resentencing.1 On
remand, the district court resentenced Crenshaw to 288 months’ imprisonment, a double
upward departure from the presumptive sentence, based on the jury’s finding that appellant
committed his offense against multiple victims. Crenshaw appeals this sentence.
D E C I S I O N
Crenshaw argues that the sentence is unlawful for two reasons. 2 First, he argues
that the sentence is unlawful because the state failed to provide notice of its intent to seek
an upward departure from the presumptive sentence . He asserts that he “was never
informed of any aggravating factors . . . and only learned about them on the day of re -
sentencing.” Second, he argues that his sentence is unlawful because he never waived his
right to a jury trial on the existence of an aggr avating factor. Neither of Crenshaw’s
arguments has merit.
Generally, the decision to depart from the presumptive sentence rests within the
discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion .
State v. Hagen, 690 N.W.2d 155, 157 (Minn. App. 2004) (applying Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 -04, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004)). This court reviews de novo a

1 See State v. Crenshaw, No. A17-1237 (Aug. 20, 2018), for this court’s analysis and for
more detailed facts underlying appellant’s conviction.
2 Respondent’s brief also addresses whether the aggravating factor used by the district court
to enhance his sentence was an element of another offense of convi ction. Because
Crenshaw does not argue that the sentence is unlawful for this reason, we need not address
respondent’s argument that the sentence satisfies State v. Edwards, 774 N.W.2d 596, 602
(Minn. 2009) and State v. Fleming, 883 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2016).

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constitutional challenge under Blakely. Id. In this case, the record does not support
Crenshaw’s constitutional challenges.
First, Crenshaw claims that he was never informed of the state’s intent to seek an
upward departure. The record, however, does not support this claim. Respondent provided
notice of its intent seek an upward sentencing departure based on harm to multiple victims
seven months before the trial . In addition, Crenshaw and his attorney had ample
opportunity to prepare for this part of the trial, and they were present when the district court
discussed the content of the special verdic t form to be submitted to the jury regarding
multiple victims. Therefore, we conclude that respondent provided sufficient and timely
notice of its intent to seek an upward departure.
Second, Crenshaw asserts that we must reverse the upward departure becau se he
never waived his right to a jury trial on the existence of an aggravating factor. We conclude
that Crenshaw cannot prevail on this constitutional challenge because instead of waiving
his right to a jury trial on the aggravating factor , Crenshaw exer cised this right and
submitted the issue to the jury. No constitutional violation occurred.
Affirmed.