In re the Matter of: Melissa Hall, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1607

In re the Matter of:
Melissa Hall, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Martin Nicholas Jurek,
Appellant.

Filed August 24, 2020
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-DA-FA-18-1314

Katie E.C. Kelley, Nancy Zalusky Berg, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Lee A. Hutton, III, Justin H. Evans, Hutton Kluz Evans LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Pres iding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Halbrooks,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’ s grant of an order for protection (OFP),
arguing that the district court erred because: (1) two of its factual findings are not supported
by the record; (2) respondent was not reasonab ly in fear of imminent harm; and (3) the
totality of the circumstances did not warrant an OFP. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Martin Nicholas Jurek and respondent Melissa Hall had an on-again and
off-again relationship that began around 2000 until they separated in October 2016. Jurek
and Hall have a daughter and have lived apart since their separation.
In October 2018, Hall petitioned for an OFP against Jurek.1 The petition stated that
the most recent abuse related to medical decisions for their daughter and occurred between
August and October 2018. As the basis for the petition, Hall claimed that Jurek’s disruptive
and aggressive behavior made her afraid of imminent harm due to his anger issues and past
behavior, which included incidents where he wo uld trap Hall in rooms or corners of their
residence and yell at her. The petition also described an incident when Jurek grabbed Hall’s
jaw while the two were in a ca r, and another incident when Jurek grabbed Hall’s neck at
their home.
The district court granted an emergency ex parte OFP and set the matter for an
evidentiary hearing. At the evidentiary hearing, Hall testified that there were times during

1 Hall’s petition was initially on behalf of hers elf and her daughter, but the daughter was
later dismissed as a party pursuant to a stipulation between Jurek and Hall.

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the relationship when Jurek would “just start drilling” her by “yelli ng [and] screaming.”
She stated that during these incidents, she “w ould often be on the floor or he’d push me
into a room and stand in a doorway” while Jure k stood over her. Hall testified that she
was scared during these incidents because she could not stand and did not know what Jurek
was going to do to her. Hall testified that she would fake asthma attacks to stop Jurek’s
yelling, and it was usually effective.
Hall recounted another incident when Ju rek called her profane names and grabbed
her jaw to stop her from talking. Hall also testified that Jurek c onfronted her at their
residence and grabbed her throat. In concluding her testimony, Hall stated Jurek’s behavior
was “getting ramped up,” and that she was scared that Jurek would “get triggered and snap
and do something to harm [her]” if she made a medical decision on behalf of their daughter
that Jurek did not like.
Jurek testified that Hall would “shut down” and act violently towards him whenever
they had “tough conversations.” Jurek also testified that Hall would start hyperventilating
and fall to the floor due to her yelling at him. Jurek stated that wh en this happened, he
would console her in an effort to make her feel better. Jurek’s testimony recounted an
incident when Hall hit, yelled, and screamed at him while he was driving. Jurek stated that
he had to block Hall from hitting him and stopped the car after pulling off of the highway.
Jurek denied calling Hall profane names or grabbing her jaw, and he claimed that anything
he did was in self-defense. Jurek testified that he did not grab Hall’s throat at the residence,
but rather that Hall yelled at him and he put his arm against the wall.

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The district court granted the OFP. In its order, the district court found two instances
constituting domestic abuse: one when Jurek grabbed Hall’s jaw and another when Jurek
grabbed her throat. As a basis for its findings, the district court found that Hall’s testimony
was more credible. The district court also found Hall’s testimony more credible when she
described the interactions between her and Jure k that led her to be in fear of imminent
harm—highlighting Hall’s testimony about faking asthma attacks to stop Jurek’s behavior.
The district court found that the two instances of physical harm, in addition to the history
between the parties, put Hall reasonably in fe ar of imminent harm when making medical
decisions for their daughter, which also constituted domestic abuse. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Jurek argues that the district court s hould not have granted Hall’s OFP because:
(1) two of the district court’s factual findi ngs were unsupported by the record; (2) the
district court’s finding that Hall was reasonabl y in fear of imminent harm was erroneous;
and (3) the district court erred by finding that the totality of the circumstances warranted
an OFP. We review a district court’s decision to grant an OFP for an abuse of discretion.
Ekman v. Miller , 812 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn. App. 20 12). “A district court abuses its
discretion if its findings are unsupported by the record or if it misapplies the law.”
Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 98 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted). We
review the district court’s findings for clear error. Ekman, 812 N.W.2d at 895. A district
court’s findings are clearly erroneous if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
decision, they are “manifestly contrary to th e weight of the evidence or not reasonably
supported by the evidence as a whole.” Id. (quotation omitted). We defer to the district

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court’s credibility determinations and do not reconcile conflicting evidence. Pechovnik,
765 N.W.2d at 99.
Under the Domestic Abuse Act (DAA), a district court may issue an OFP to
“restrain the abusing party from committing acts of domestic a buse.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518B.01, subd. 6(a)(1) (2018). “Domestic abuse” includes “physical harm, bodily injury,
or assault,” or “the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault”
against a family or household member by another family or household member. Id., subd.
2(a)(1)-(2) (2018).
The supreme court has held that a petitioner need only establish that past physical
harm, bodily injury, or assault occurred, regardless of when such domestic abuse occurred.
See Thompson ex. rel. Minor Child v. Schrimsher , 906 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Minn. 2018)
(“[U]nder subdivision 2(a)(1) of the [DAA], a petitioner need only show th at ‘physical
harm, bodily injury, or assault’ ha s actually occurred, regardless of when it occurred, to
satisfy the first definition of domestic abuse.”). Once a petitioner has established that
domestic abuse occurred, the district cour t may then examine “all of the relevant
circumstances proven” when deciding whether to grant the OFP. I d . Relevant
circumstances may include “the timing, frequency, and severity of any alleged instances of
‘domestic abuse,’ along with the likelihood of further abuse.” Id.
Sufficiency of the evidence
Jurek argues that two of the district c ourt’s findings were not supported by the
record. He contends that the district court clearly erred by embellishing Hall’s testimony

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and finding that Jurek choked Hall when he grabbed her throat and that Hall would fake
asthma attacks to prevent Jurek’s behavior from escalating.
The district court’s findings are supported by the record. Hall testified that Jurek
grabbed her by the throat and that she had to push his hand away. While Jurek contends
that the district court embellished Hall’s testim ony because his actions did not rise to the
level of “choking,” a finding of physical harm does not requi re that Jurek choked Hall.
Hall also testified that she would fake asthma attacks when Jurek would yell and scream at
her because she was scared an d did not know what Jurek wa s going to do to her. In
addition, the district court found Hall’s te stimony about the neck-grabbing incident and
fake asthma attacks more credible than Jurek’ s testimony. Therefore, the district court’s
findings were not clearly erroneous.
Fear of imminent harm
Jurek argues that the district court clearly erred by finding that he inflicted fear of
imminent physical harm against Hall. He cont ends that the district court clearly erred
because Hall petitioned for an OFP to prohibit him from making medical decisions for their
daughter and because neither Hall’s testimony nor the record established her fear of
imminent or physical harm.
First, we note that Jurek mischaracteriz es the basis for Hall’s petition, which was
that she was fearful of imminent harm by Ju rek when she made medical decisions about
their daughter due to his past behavior and issues with controlling his emotions. Second,
the district court did not make a finding that Ju rek manifested an intent to inflict fear of
imminent physical harm. Rather, the district court found two instances of physical harm,

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and that Hall was reasonably in fear of imminent harm when making medical decisions for
their daughter based on the totality of the circumstances, all of which amounted to domestic
abuse. In this case, because the district court found tw o instances of domestic abuse
pursuant to subdivision 2(a)(1), those findings were sufficient to suppo rt the grant of the
OFP, irrespective of whether Jurek inflic ted fear of imminent physical harm as
contemplated by subdivision 2(a)(2).
Totality of the circumstances
Jurek argues that the district court clearly erred by finding that Hall developed a fear
of imminent physical harm based on the totality of the circumstances. Jurek asserts that
the district court clearly erred because Hall has not established the same degree of past
physical harm as was present in Pechovnik.
The district court did not clearly err by finding that Hall developed a fear of
imminent physical harm based on the totality of the circumstances. The decision about
whether to grant an OFP is within the discretion of the district court, and the DAA receives
liberal construction in favor of a petitioner. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d at 98-99. As such,
Hall did not need to establish the same degree of past physical harm as was present in other
cases.
In addition, “[p]resent intent to inflict fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury,
or assault can be inferred from the totality of the circumstances, including a history of past
abusive behavior.” Id. at 99. In this case, Hall testif ied to multiple instances of physical
and verbal abuse over the span of the couple’s relationship. The district court, after making
credibility determinations, then found two instances of domestic abuse and emphasized

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these instances when it determ ined that Hall was reasonably in fear of imminent bodily
harm when making medical decisions for thei r daughter, which also constituted domestic
abuse. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that an OFP
was warranted based on the totality of the circumstances.
As a final matter, Jurek argues that the record demonstrates that he had not harmed
or threatened to harm Hall since their separation in 2016. However, domestic abuse under
subdivision 2(a)(1) of the DAA does not need to occur within a specific timeframe. See
Thompson, 906 N.W.2d at 499 (“The fact that specific temporal language does not appear
in subdivision 2(a)(1) suggests that to obtain an ordinary OFP—one that is not granted ex
parte and does not call for the seizure of th e abuser’s firearms—the petitioner need not
demonstrate that the danger of physical harm is immediate or imminent.”).
Affirmed.