State of Minnesota, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1612

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Steven Paul Jonsgaard,
Appellant.

Filed August 10, 2020
Reversed
Cochran, Judge

Winona County District Court
File No. 85-CR-18-660

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Karin L. Sonneman, Winona County Attorney, Stephanie E. Nuttall, Assistant County
Attorney, Winona, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appe llate Public Defender, Adam Lozeau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Frisch, Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
A forged signature on the front of a pe rsonal check, purporting to be that of the
check’s maker, is not a false endorsement as contemplated by Minn. Stat. § 609.631,
subd. 2(2) (2016).

2
O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
In this appeal from the judgment of convi ction, appellant Stev en Paul Jonsgaard
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of check forgery—
falsely endorsing a check in vi olation of Minn. Stat. § 609.63 1, subd. 2(2). Because the
evidence is insufficient to prove that appe llant falsely “endorsed” a check within the
meaning of Minn. Stat. § 609.631, subd. 2(2), we reverse.
FACTS
Over a period of less than two weeks, a person wrote 18 checks to pay for
merchandise at Midtown Foods (Midtown) fro m a checkbook belonging to S.H. (the
account holder). The person made the checks payable to Midtown and signed the account
holder’s name on the signature line on the front of the checks. When Midtown attempted
to deposit the checks, the bank returned th em as unpayable because the checking account
had been closed. Midtown notified the polic e department about th e person offering bad
checks.
Midtown has a business practice that when it accepts a check, the cashier inserts the
check into a register. The register prints information on the back, including a time-stamp
showing when the check was inserted and the words “For Deposit Only.” Using the
time-stamps on the returned checks, a Midtown employee located surveillance footage of
most of the check transactions . The surveillance footage, which was provided to police,
showed the same person writing the checks.

3
The account holder did not write the checks and did not give anyone permission to
write the checks. Police took an image from the surveillance footage and showed it to a
person who was friends with both the account holder and Jonsgaard. The mutual friend
told police, and testified at trial, that the person in the image was Jonsgaard.
Videos of the check transac tions were introduced at tria l. Jonsgaard testified that
he was not the person in the videos writing the checks, but he acknowledged that he
shopped at Midtown every other day. He also testified that police had mistaken him for a
person named Jeremy on multiple occasions, including during a recent traffic stop. On
rebuttal, the state introduced pictures of people named Jeremy who had been mentioned in
police reports involving traffic stops within the time frame that Jonsgaard referenced. The
state argued that Jonsgaard did not look sim ilar to the men in the pictures. Jonsgaard
argued that he did.
The jury found Jonsgaard guilty of check forgery by falsely endorsing a check.
After trial, Jonsgaard brought a motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that there was no
evidence that he “endorsed” the checks beca use the word “endorse” means to “write
something on the back of a document” and there was no evidence that he signed the backs
of the checks. In a written order denyi ng Jonsgaard’s motion, the district court
acknowledged that “[l]ong-held legal and commercial custom and practice” supported
Jonsgaard’s argument that endorsing a check means signing it on the back. But, the district
court ultimately concl uded that the commonly understood meaning of “endorse” could
include a signature anywhere on a check, and that this broad definition of “endorse” applied

4
to the term as used in the ch eck-forgery statute. The dist rict court sentenced Jonsgaard
to 24 months in prison.
Jonsgaard appeals.
ISSUE
Is the evidence sufficient to prove that Jonsgaard fals ely endorsed the checks at
issue?

ANALYSIS
Jonsgaard challenges the sufficiency of th e evidence supporting his conviction of
check forgery under Minn. Stat. § 609.631, subd. 2(2). A person is guilty of check forgery
if the person, with the intent to defraud, does any of the following:
(1) falsely makes or alters a check so that it purports to
have been made by another or by the maker under an assumed
or fictitious name, or at another time, or with different
provisions, or by the authority of one who did not give
authority; or
(2) falsely endorses or alters a check so that it purports
to have been endorsed by another.

Minn. Stat. § 609.631, subd. 2 (2016). The state charged Jonsgaard with check forgery
only under the second provision, alleging that he “falsely endorsed one or more checks so
that they purported to have been endorsed by another.”
1 The word “endorse” is not defined
in the statute. See Minn. Stat. § 609.631 (2016).

1 The state did not charge Jonsgaard with ch eck forgery under the first provision, Minn.
Stat. § 609.631, subd. 2(1). The only other charge brought by the state against Jonsgaard
was theft by check under Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(3)(i) (2016), but that charge was
dismissed before trial.

5
“When we consider a claim of insufficien t evidence, our review is limited to a
painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the
verdict which they did.” State v. Bowen, 921 N.W.2d 763, 765 (Minn. 2019) (quotation
omitted). But “[w]hen a sufficiency-of-the-evi dence claim turns on the meaning of the
statute under which a defendant has been convicted, we are presented with a question of
statutory interpretation that we review de novo.” Id. (quotation omitted). Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction, the evidence is clearly sufficient to
prove that Jonsgaard wrote th e checks and signed the front of them. But Jonsgaard
maintains that a false signature on the front of a check purporting to be that of the check’s
maker does not constitute a false en dorsement. Because Jonsgaard’s
sufficiency-of-the-evidence cl aim turns on the meaning of the word “endorse” as
used by the check-forgery statute, we revi ew de novo the statutory interpretation
question presented by this case.
The object of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature’s
intent. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018); see also Bowen, 921 N.W.2d at 765. “[W]ords and
phrases are construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and
approved usage; but technical words and phrases and such others as have acquired a special
meaning . . . are construed according to such special meaning or their definition[.]” Minn.
Stat. § 645.08(1) (2018); see also Cocchiarella v. Driggs , 884 N.W.2d 621, 624
(Minn. 2016) (“In accordance with our cannons of interpretation, we construe technical
words and phrases according to their special meaning, a nd other words and phrases

6
according to their common and approved usage.” (quotations omitted)). A statute must be
interpreted as a whole, considering su rrounding sections “to avoid conflicting
interpretations.” Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 624 (quotati ons omitted). And a statute
must be construed in a manner that “give[ s] effect to all its provisions.” Minn.
Stat. § 645.16. If the language of the statute is clear, “we apply the plain language of the
statute and decline to explore its spirit or purpose.” Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 624.
“A word has a special meaning if courts have ascribed a well-established and
long-accepted meaning to it.” Cox v. Mid-Minnesota Mut. Ins. Co. , 909 N.W.2d 540,
543 (Minn. 2018) (quotation om itted). “In deciding whether words in a statute have a
technical meaning or an ordinary meaning, we look at the context in which the phrase
appears.” Hous. & Redev. Auth. of Duluth v. Lee , 852 N.W.2d 683, 691 (Minn. 2014).
“Whether to ascribe ‘a technical or special meaning [to a word or phrase] depends in part
upon the context in whic h the word appears.’” Bowen, 921 N.W.2d at 766 (quoting
State v. Rick, 835 N.W.2d 478, 484 (Minn. 2013)).
We first consider whether th e word “endorse” has a spec ial meaning in relation to
checks. Concluding that it does, we next consider whether that special meaning is
applicable to the check -forgery statute. Finally, we ex amine whether the evidence is
sufficient to prove that Jonsgaard falsely endorsed a check.
A. The word “endorse” has a well-esta blished and long-accepted meaning
with respect to checks.

It is common knowledge that the word “endorse” has a special meaning with respect
to checks. Contemporary and historical dictionary definitions of the word “endorse” reflect

7
a technical meaning of the word as it applies to checks and other financial documents. See,
e.g., The American Heritage Dictio nary of the English Language 589 (5th ed. 2011)
(defining “endorse” as “2. To write one’s signat ure on the back of (a check) to obtain the
amount payable or to make the amount payable available to a third party or to the bearer,”
among other definitions); New Oxford American Dictionary 573 (3d ed. 2010) (defining
“endorse” as “2. Sign (a check or bill of exchange) on the back to make it payable to
someone other than the stat ed payee or to accept resp onsibility for paying it”); The
American Heritage Dictionar y of the English Language 452-53 (2d ed. 1982) (defining
endorse as “1. To write one’s signature on the back of (a check, for example) as evidence
of the legal transfer of its ownership, esp. in return for the cash or credit indicated on its
face”).
The existence of a technical definition of “endorse” is reflected in legal dictionaries
as well. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “indorse”2 as “[t]o sign (a negotiable instrument)
usu[ally] on the back, either to accept responsibility for paying an obligation memorialized
by the instrument or to make the instrument payable to someone other than the payee.”
925 (11th ed. 2019). Black’s defines “indorser” as “[s]omeone who transfers a negotiable
instrument by indorsement; specif[ically], one who signs a negotiable instrument other
than as maker, dr awer, or acceptor .” Id. at 926. Thus, according to Black’s Law
Dictionary, an endorser is, by definition, someone other than the person who made the
check.

2 “Indorse” is an alternative sp elling of the word “endorse.” See Black’s Law Dictionary
925 (11th ed. 2019).

8
Consistent with the dictionary de finitions of “endorse” and with Black’s Law
Dictionary’s definitions of “indorse” and “indor ser,” it is also well-established in
Minnesota law that the word “endorse” carries a special meaning with respect to checks.
Minnesota law clearly establishes that an endorsement is a specific type of signature on a
check that is distinguishable from the signature of the person who made the check. This
distinction between an endors ement and the signature of a maker is reflected both in
Minnesota statutes and Minnesota caselaw.
The Minnesota Uniform Commercial C ode—Negotiable Instruments (UCC), see
Minn. Stat. §§ 336.3-101 to -606 (2018), provides a spec ific definition of the word
“endorsement”:
“Endorsement” means a signature, other than that of a signer
as maker, drawer, or acceptor , that alone or accompanied by
other words is made on an instrument for the purpose of
(i) negotiating the instrument, ( ii) restricting payment of the
instrument, or (iii) incurring endorser’s liability on the
instrument, but regardless of the intent of the signer, a
signature and its accompanyi ng words is an endorsement
unless the accompanying words, terms of the instrument, place
of the signature, or other circumstances unambiguously
indicate that the signature was made for a purpose other than
endorsement.

Minn. Stat. § 336.3-204(a) (emphasis added).
3 Thus, whether a signature is an
endorsement depends on the purpose of the signature, and an endorsement is not a signature

3 Other Minnesota statutes reflect an understa nding of the word “endorsement” that is
consistent with th e UCC definition. See Minn. Stat. §§ 47.605, subd. 2 (using the word
“endorse” to refer to a payee’s signature intended to “cash, deposit, or otherwise negotiate”
a check), 471.391 (suggesting th at an “endorsement” is a signature by the payee on the
back of a check), 520.09 (referring to endorsement as an action that a fiduciary might take,
if empowered to do so, to deposit in a bank a check payable to a principle) (2018).

9
by the person making, drawing, or accepting the instrument. Id.4 “By definition, an
indorser is any person other than the maker, drawer, or acceptor of an instrument.” 6B
Part 1 David Frisch, Lawrence’s Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code § 3-204:3 at
251 (3d ed. 2016).
The UCC governs negotiable instrument s, including personal checks. Minn.
Stat. § 336.3-102; see also Minn. Stat. § 336.3-104(f) (def ining a check as a type of
negotiable instrument).
5 According to the UCC, a check is a “draft”—an instrument in
which a drawer orders another to pay a sum of money. See Minn. Stat. § 336.3-104(a), (b),
(e), (f) (defining “negotiable instrument,” “i nstrument,” “draft,” and “check”). The
“drawer” is the person who “signs or is identified in a draft as a person ordering payment.”

4 There are several types of endorsements under the UCC. A special endorsement
specifically identifies a new payee, or specifica lly notes that the instrument is payable to
its bearer and identifies the bearer. Minn. Stat. § 336.3-205(a). A blank endorsement is an
endorsement that is not a speci al endorsement, rendering the check payable to its bearer.
Id. (b). “A blank [e]ndorsement is usually the signature of the [e]ndorser on the back of
the instrument without other words.” Minn. Stat. § 336.3-205, Unif. Comm. Code cmt. 2.
And an endorsement can be restrictive. See Minn. Stat. § 336.3-204(a) (providing that a
signature restricting payment of the instru ment is an “endorsement”). For example,
endorsing a check with the words “for deposit only” requir es the checks to be handled in
accordance with th e endorsement. See W. Iowa Farms Co. v. First Savings Bank ,
135 F.3d 1257, 1259 (8th Cir. 1998).

5 A negotiable instrument is an “unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of
money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order,” if it
meets certain conditions. Minn. Stat. § 336. 3-104(a). The “negotia tion” of a negotiable
instrument such as a check means “a transfer of po ssession, whether voluntary or
involuntary, of an instrument by a person ot her than the issuer to a person who thereby
becomes its holder.” Minn. Stat. § 336.3-201(a).

10
Minn. Stat. § 336.3-103(a)(5). 6 Thus, under the UCC, the person who writes a personal
check is the drawer, and by definition, not an endorser.
The distinction between an endorsement a nd a signature of a maker is reflected in
caselaw that significantly predates Minnesota’s adoption of the UCC. See, e.g., People’s
Bank of Minneapolis v. Howes , 61 N.W. 457, 457 (Minn. 1894); see also Denn v. First
State Bank of Spring Lake Park , 316 N.W.2d 532, 534 (Minn. 1982) (noting that the
Minnesota legislature adopted the UCC in 1965). In People’s Bank of Minneapolis, Smith
owed a bank a sum of money. 61 N.W. at 457. For the purpose of securing the debt,
Howes made a promissory note to the order of Smith. Id. Smith endorsed the back of the
note, and another individual, Rockwood, signed his name under Smith’s. Id. Smith then
delivered the note to the bank. Id. At issue on appeal was whether Smith and Rockwood
were makers or endorsers. Id. at 457-58. The supreme court noted that “[i]t is well settled
by the decisions of this and other courts that under such circumstances the nominal payee
of the note, who signs his name on the back thereof, cannot be held as a maker, but only as

6 We recognize that the UCC terms governing negotiable instruments do not precisely align
with the terms used in the check-forgery statute. Under the UCC, the person who makes a
check is called the “drawer,” and the pers on who makes a “note,” another form of
negotiable instrument, is called the “maker.” Minn. Stat. § 336.3-103(a)(5), (a)(7). And
the definition of “check” under the check-forgery statute—meaning a “check, draft, order
of withdrawal, or similar negotiable or n onnegotiable instrument”—is explicitly broader
than the meaning of the word “check” under the UCC. Compare Minn. Stat. § 609.631,
subd. 1(b) (2016) with Minn. Stat. § 336.3-1 04(b), (e), (f) (defining a check as a type of
draft—a negotiable instrument that is an order to pay ). In this decision, we do not hold
that the provisions of the UCC apply to all criminal statutes invol ving checks or other
negotiable instruments. We merely rely on the UCC as eviden ce of a long-held
understanding of the technical meaning of the word “endorse” and the distinction between
the act of making a check and the act of endorsing it.

11
an [e]ndorser.” Id. at 458. The supreme court concluded that Smith and Rockwood were
both endorsers, and not makers, according to the note. Id.
Other supreme court opinions reflect a similar understanding of the difference
between an endorsement of a check and the si gnature of its maker, often noting that an
endorsement is a signature made by a payee or holder, not the person who originally drafted
the check. See Denn, 316 N.W.2d at 533 (describing a payee’s signature on a check as an
endorsement); Doeren v. Krammer, 170 N.W. 609, 610 (Minn. 1919) (observing that
person endorsed checks payable to another by writing the payee’s signature on the back of
the check); State v. Bjornaas , 92 N.W. 980, 980-82 (Minn. 1903) (observing that trial
evidence showed that a person forged an endorsement where he wrote the name of a payee
on the back of a check); Burrows v. W. Union Tel. Co. , 90 N.W. 1111, 1111-12
(Minn. 1902) (observing that a person who forged a name on the back of a check endorsed
it); Porter v. Winona & Dakota Grain Co., 80 N.W. 965, 966 (Minn. 1899) (observing that
it was “defined and settled” that a person was an endorser when “the note was made payable
to his order, and he placed his name on its back”).
Considering the dictionary definitions, Minnesota statutes, and Minnesota caselaw,
we conclude that the authorities overwhelmingl y support that there is a well-established
and long-accepted understanding that an endorsement on a check is a signature other than
that of the check’s maker. We turn next to whether this well-established and long-accepted
understanding applies to the use of the word “endorse” in the check-forgery statute at issue
in this appeal.

12
B. The special, technical meaning of “endorse” is applicable to the
check-forgery statute.

Having concluded that there exists a special, technical meaning of the word
“endorse” with respect to checks and other negotiable in struments, we must determine
whether to ascribe that technical meaning to the check-forgery statute. Our caselaw has
not previously defined “endorse” as used in the check-forgery statute. And we are unaware
of any caselaw addressing whether the signature on the front of a check, purporting to be
that of the maker, constitutes a false endorsement as contemplated by the check-forgery
statute.7 Thus, our precedent is not particularly instructive on this issue, and we turn to the
text of the check-forgery statute to interpret the meaning of the word “endorse.”
Because the word “endorse” is not defined in the check-forgery statute, we look to
the context in which th e word is used in the statute to determine whether to ascribe the
special, technical meaning discussed above. See Bowen , 921 N.W.2d at 766. The
check-forgery statute provides, in relevant part, that:
[a] person is guilty of check fo rgery if the person, with the
intent to defraud, does any of the following:
(1) falsely makes or alters a check so that it purports to
have been made by another or by the maker under an assumed

7 Minnesota appellate decisions that do address false endorsement have uniformly referred
to a false endorsement as a false signature of a payee written on a check, not a false
signature of a maker. See, e.g., In re Swokowski , 796 N.W.2d 317, 324 (Minn. 2011)
(alleging that an attorney committed check forgery where the attorney received an
insurance-settlement check on behalf of a client and the attorney “endorsed the check by
signing [the client’s] name w ithout the [client’s] knowledge”); In re N.R.R., No. CX-95-
2374, 1996 WL 393948, at *1-2 (Minn. App. July 16, 1996) (concluding that the evidence
was sufficient to adjudicate a juvenile delinque nt for falsely endorsing a check where the
evidence showed that the victim’s wallet was stolen, the juvenile’s wallet contained a check
made out to the victim, and “the check was endorsed and cashed” at a store frequented by
the juvenile).

13
or fictitious name, or at another time, or with different
provisions, or by the authority of one who did not give
authority; or
(2) falsely endorses or alters a check so that it purports
to have been endorsed by another.

Minn. Stat. § 609.631, subd. 2 (emphasis adde d). The language of the statute makes it
clear that the word “endorse” is used only in relation to checks. And the term “check” is
defined in the statute as “a check, draft, order of withdrawal, or similar negotiable or
nonnegotiable instrument.” Minn. Stat. § 609 .631, subd. 1(b). In this context, it is
reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended the word “endorse” to have its special,
technical meaning that relates to checks and other similar instruments.
Further, the overall structure of the stat ute reinforces the conclusion that the
legislature intended the word “endorse” to have its special, technical meaning in relation
to checks. The statute crimin alizes two different types of check forgery: (1) the false
making of a check and (2) the false endorsing of a check. And, as discussed above, the
technical meaning of “endorse” recognizes that the act of making a check is separate from
the act of endorsing a check. Moreover, Minnesota law de monstrates that the special
meaning of the word “endorse” has been consistently applied in cases and statutes dealing
with checks. For these reas ons, the legislature’s use of the word “endo rse” in the
check-forgery statute strongly suggests that the legislature intended the word “endorse” to
carry its special, technical meaning.
The state argues that the word “endorse” in the statute should not be given its
special, technical meaning used in relation to ch ecks. Instead, the state contends that the
word should be interpreted more broadly according to its common understanding. And the

14
state maintains that the co mmon understanding of the word “endorse” encompasses a
signature anywhere on a check, for any purpose. In support of its position, the state asserts
that “[c]ommon definitions of ‘endorse’ in clude ‘to sign one’s na me on (a commercial
document or instrument).’”8 The state also argues that if the legislature intended the word
“endorse” to be given a tech nical meaning, it would have defined the word in the
check-forgery statute. We are not persuaded.
As discussed above, Minnesota law specifies that “words and phrases are construed
according to . . . their common and approved usage; but technical words and phrases and
such others as have acquired a special meaning . . . are construed according to such special
meaning.” Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1). Because the word “endorse” has a special meaning in
relation to checks, section 645.08(1) instructs that “endorse” is to be construed consistent
with its special meaning, not the “common and approved usage” advanced by the state. If
the legislature had intended sec tion 609.631, subdivision 2(2) to cover any signature, as
argued by the state, it would not have used the technical term “endorse.” Instead, the
legislature would have used a more general word like “sign,” which does not carry a special
meaning in relation to checks. Nor does ca selaw support the state’s contention that the
word “endorse” must be defined for its special, technical mean ing to apply. A word can
have a special meaning even if it is not defined by statute. See, e.g. , County of
Dakota v. Cameron, 839 N.W.2d 700, 708 (Minn. 20 13) (determining that the phrase
“comparable property” has a technical meaning absent a statutory definition of the phrase);

8 The state cites only one dictionary definition in support of its assertion.

15
State v. Taylor, 594 N.W.2d 533, 535-36 (Minn. App. 1999) (construing the word “case”
in a statute relating to firearms to carry a technical meaning despite the word not being
defined in the statute).
Moreover, if “endorse” carried the purported common usage put forth by the state,
the other method of check forg ery set forth in subdivision (2 )(1) of the statute—the false
making of a check—would be rendere d superfluous. According to Black’s Law
Dictionary 1144 (11th ed. 2019), the meaning of “make” includes “executing, signing, or
delivering” a document. A check is signed when it is made. And if the state’s broad
interpretation of “endorse” were to apply, then subdivision 2(2) (prohibiting the false
endorsing of a check) would effectivel y encompass all conduct covered under
subdivision 2(1) (prohibiting the false making of a check). But, when the statute is
interpreted using the technical definition of the word “endorse ,” the two subdivisions are
harmonized. A common method of falsely maki ng a check is filling in the blanks of
another person’s check and forging that person’s name on the signature line on the front of
the check. See, e.g., State v. Flash, No. A19-1012, 2020 WL 1488340, at *1 (Minn. App.
Mar. 23, 2020); State v. Rogers , No. A17-1373, 2018 WL 37 16086, at *1 (Minn. App.
Aug. 6, 2018); State v. Tykwinski, Nos. A06-262, A06-451, 2007 WL 656430, at *1 (Minn.
App. Mar. 6, 2007).
9 And a person is guilty of falsel y endorsing a check if the person
forges the name of the payee on a check already made out to the payee. See, e.g., In re

9 These unpublished opinions are non-preceden tial and cited for their persuasive value
only. See Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3(c) (2018); see also State v. Zais , 790 N.W.2d
853, 861 (Minn. App. 2010) (stating that although unpublished opinions are not
precedential, they may have persuasive value), aff’d, 805 N.W.2d 32 (Minn. 2011).

16
Swokowski, 796 N.W.2d at 324. When the technical definition applies, both subdivisions
describe distinct conduct.
Consequently, in light of the well-esta blished, long-held understanding of the
meaning of the word “endorse” as used in re lation to checks, and considering the context
under which the word “endorse” is used in Minn. Stat. § 609.631, subd. 2(2), we conclude
that the special, technical meaning applies. An endorsement, as contemplated by Minn.
Stat. § 609.631, subd. 2(2), is a signature othe r than a signature purporting to be that of a
maker.10
C. The evidence is insufficient to prov e that Jonsgaard falsely endorsed a
check.

Having determined that the technical meaning of the word “endorse” applies to the
check-forgery statute, we turn to whether the evidence in this case is sufficient to support
Jonsgaard’s conviction for check forgery by falsely endorsing a check in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.631, subd. 2(2). To suppor t a conviction under Mi nn. Stat. § 609.631,
subd. 2(2), the evidence must establish that Jonsgaard “false ly endorse[d] or alter[ed] a
check so that it purports to have been endorsed by another.” We conclude that the evidence
is not sufficient because there is no evidence that Jonsgaard falsely endorsed or altered a
check. The evidence establishe s only that Jonsgaard falsely made checks by forging the
account holder’s name on the signature line on the front of 18 checks made out to Midtown.
This conduct falls under Minn. Stat. § 609.631, subd. 2(1), which precludes falsely making

10 We do not expressly define the words “endors e” or “endorsement” with respect to the
check-forgery statute because it is sufficient, in this case, to conclude that the signature of
a maker is not an endorsement.

17
a check. But the state did not charge Jonsgaard with falsely making a check. Instead, the
state charged Jonsgaard with falsely endorsing a check u nder Minn. Stat. § 609.631,
subd. 2(2). The forged signature on the front of the checks, purporting to be that of the
maker, does not constitute a false endorsement. The only endorsement of Jonsgaard’s false
checks was made by Midtown when its cash registers printed “For Deposit Only” on the
back of the checks. Because there is no evidence that Jonsgaard falsely endorsed or altered
a check so that it purported to be endorsed by another as required by Minn. Stat. § 609.631,
subd. 2(2), Jonsgaard cannot be guilty of the offense for which he was convicted.11
D E C I S I O N
Because the forged signatu res on the checks at issue—made on the signature line
on the front of the checks—are not endorsements, the evidence is not sufficient to support
Jonsgaard’s conviction for check forgery by falsely endorsing a check under Minn.
Stat. § 609.631, subd. 2(2). Accordingly, we reverse Jonsgaard’s conviction.
Reversed.

11 In his brief, Jonsgaard also argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district
court erred by allowing the state to impeach him with several prior convictions. Because
our disposition of the sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue requires us to reverse Jonsgaard’s
conviction, we do not reach the impeachment issue.