State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1616

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Antwan Darnell Cosey,
Appellant.

Filed December 14, 2020
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-6128

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presid ing Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction, appellant challenges his
second-degree murder conviction on the ground that the district court impermissibly

2
instructed the jury on the order in which to consider the offenses and improperly excluded
evidence necessary to his claim of self-defense. 1 Because appellant’s substantial rights
were not affected by the district court’s error in its instruction to the jury and appellant was
not prejudiced by the district court’s evidentiary rulings, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Antwan Darnell Cosey shot and killed victim F.G. in February 2018.
Following the shooting, the state charged appellant with second-degree intentional murder,
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2016). The district court later submitted
for jury consideration the lesser-included of fense of unintentional second-degree felony
murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2016). Whether appellant acted
in self-defense when he pulled the trigger was the main issue at trial. Appellant
encountered the victim on the sidewalk in front of the apartment of the victim’s girlfriend.
During an exchange, both men were facing each other for a confrontation when appellant
reached for a firearm and shot the victim in the chest. The exchange lasted approximately
46 seconds. Appellant fled the scene and was arrested in Florida in March 2018. He gave
a statement to Minneapolis police the day after his arrest.

1 Appellant also raises several issues in a pro se supplemental brief, including violations of
due process and his rights pursuant to the First Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Fourth
Amendment, and Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. He also raises an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim. Appellant’s factual statements recite error but are
unsupported by legal authority and inadequa tely briefed. Thus, these arguments are
forfeited. See State v. German, 929 N.W.2d 466, 476-77 (Minn. App. 2001) (stating pro
se litigants generally held to sa me standards as attorneys and conclusory arguments that
cite no applicable law are forfeited).

3
After closing arguments, the district cour t instructed the jury that “you don’t
consider the lesser crime unless or until you decide there’s a reasonable doubt on the greater
crime.” Appellant’s counsel did not object to this jury instructi on. The jury found
appellant guilty of second-degre e intentional murder and did not return a verdict for the
lesser-included offense. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not commit reversible error by its jury instruction.
Appellant argues the district court committed reversible error by its jury instruction
and that such instruction significantly impacted the jury’s verdict. We agree the instruction
constituted error that is plain, but we are not persuaded that this error affected appellant’s
substantial rights.
A district court has broad discretion in selecting jury instructions. State v. Kelley,
855 N.W.2d 269, 274 (Minn. 2014). Absent an objection, this court may reverse if a jury
instruction constituted plain error. Id. at 273-74. Appellant must first satisfy three
requirements pursuant to the plain-error doctrine by showing: 1) an error; 2) that is plain;
and 3) that affected his substantial rights. State v. Woodard, 942 N.W.2d 137, 144 (Minn.
2020). If appellant satisfies this burden, this court “may correct the error only if it seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Kelley,
855 N.W.2d at 273 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Crowsbreast, 629 N.W.2d 433,
437 (Minn. 2001) (citation omitted)); see also Woodard, 942 N.W.2d at 144 (stating court
will address error to ensure fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings only if appellant
satisfies burden on plain-error doctrine).

4
A. The district court committed plain error.
Plain errors are those that are “clear or obvious,” which may be demonstrated by
contravening case law. State. v. Prtine , 784 N.W.2d 303, 314 (Minn. 2010) (quotation
omitted). A district court comm its plain error when “suggest [ing] the order in which the
jury should consider the charges.” Id. at 317. The district court instructed the jury not to
“consider the lesser crime unless or until you decide there’s reasonable doubt on the greater
crime.” The district court again told the jury, “[o]nly if there’s a not guilty verdict on count
1 [second-degree murder] do you consider the ot her count.” Because the district court
committed plain error by so inst ructing the jury, we next co nsider whether that error
affected appellant’s substantial rights.
B. Appellant’s substantial rights were not affected.
Appellant bears the “heavy burden” to prove his substantial rights were affected by
a plain error. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d at 283. A defendant’s s ubstantial rights are affected if
“there is a reasonable likelihood that giving the instruction in question had a significant
effect on the jury verdict.” Id. (quotation omitted). It follows that an instruction directing
a jury to consider a greater offense first doe s not have a significant effect on a verdict “if
no rational jury would have acquitted the defendant of th e more serious charge based on
the evidence at trial.” Woodard, 942 N.W.2d at 145. This court considers the effect of the
instruction by analyzing the strength of the evidence presented and the nature of the
defense. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d at 284.

5
1. The Evidence Presented at Trial
To convict appellant of second-degree inte ntional murder, the state had to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant caused the death of another “with intent to effect
the death of that person . . . .” Minn. Stat § 609.19, subd. 1(1). The lesser charge of
unintentional second-degree murder requires a defendant to cause the death of another
“without intent to effect the death of any person, while committing or attempting to commit
a felony offense.” Id., subd. 2(1).
The state called 19 witnesses to testify during the trial, including three witnesses
who observed the shooting. The state also pr esented surveillance video of the shooting.
The evidence demonstrated the following:
 Appellant walked away then back towards the victim three times.
 As reflected by eyewitness testim ony and appellant’s statements,
appellant was aware of the ap artment camera’s location and,
according to eyewitness testimony, appellant said he would not fight
on camera and thereafter “lured” the victim away from the building’s
cameras.

 Two witnesses, T.B and D.S, rejected appellant’s claims that the
victim was the initial aggressor. Contrary to the testimony of
appellant, neither witness heard the victim threaten to kill appellant.

 A third witness, D.Q., a tenant of the building with a view of the
sidewalk, heard a loud, verbal alte rcation with swearing from both
sides.

 Appellant shot the victim in the chest from what appeared in the video
to be a close distance, stepping forward to do so.

 Testimony from the medical examin er established that the bullet
entered on the victim’s left side, struck the left lung, heart, right lung,
and exited the right side of the victim’s body.

6

 The victim was unarmed.
 Appellant fled the scene without offering aid to the victim.
 Appellant requested money from an acquaintance to obtain a bus
ticket out of state, ultimately to Florida, and did not inform the
acquaintance of any legal trouble.

 On March 9, appellant was arrested in Florida on a bus bound for
Texas.

 Nine months after speaking with police, appellant wrote to his former
landlord, who initially identified a ppellant for the police, asking the
landlord to retract his statement.

The Minneapolis police inte rviewed appellant for two h ours while in Florida after
his arrest, resulting in a 70-page transcript. The transcript presented to the jury contained
all but six pages redacted by the district court’s order. Appellant also testified. Appellant
presented evidence from both the interview transcript and testimony as follows:
 Appellant testified that he purchased a gun about a month before the
shooting for purposes of self-defense.

 Appellant testified he was polite throughout the exchange, only
raising his voice to tell the victim to calm down, and that the victim
was “hostile and aggressive.”

 Appellant stated he could have initially wa lked away from the
exchange, but said as it progressed he felt the victim would not let him
walk away.

 Appellant agreed there was nothing “blocking” the sidewalk, alley, or
street to prevent him from leaving the encounter.

 Appellant extensively testified that the victim threatened to take
appellant’s gun and shoot appellant, after appellant warned the victim
he was armed. The latter testim ony contradicts appellant’s earlier

7
statement to police, also heard by the jury, in whic h he told the
interviewing officers the victim “assumed” appellant had a gun.

 Appellant, as his explanation for le aving the state after the shooting,
said he wanted to “buy time” before his ultimate arrest and that he
planned to turn himself in to police in Florida.
As required by Kelley, after analyzing the strength of the evidence presented, we
next turn to the nature of the defense. 855 N.W.2d at 284.
2. The Nature of the Defense
Appellant presented testimony and argued that he shot the victim in self-defense.
Because appellant claimed self-defense, “[the] state has the burden of disproving one or
more” elements of self-defense “beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Johnson ,
719 N.W.2d 619, 629 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted ). A successful self-defense
justification requires:
(1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the
defendant; (2) the defendant’s actual and honest belief that he
or she was in imminent danger of . . . bodily harm; (3) the
existence of reasonable grounds for that belief; and (4) the
absence of a reasonable possibi lity of retreat to avoid the
danger.

State v. Devens, 852 N.W.2d 255, 258 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). For a self-defense
justification to stand, one may use only the level of force “reasonably necessary to prevent
the bodily harm feared.” Id.
The state’s evidence clearly disproved the first and fourth elements, (1) the absence
of aggression or prov ocation on the part of the defe ndant, and (4) the absence of a
reasonable possibility of retrea t to avoid the danger. Add itionally, the state presented
evidence that the level of force used by appellant exceeded the feared harm. See

8
Montanaro v. State , 802 N.W.2d 726, 733 (Minn. 2011) (concluding self-defense
instruction could not have had significant effect on the jury’s verdict because “no
reasonable jury could find [defendant’s] actions to be a reasonable use of force”).
In summary, considering both prongs of the Kelley analysis, the state presented
significant evidence of intent a nd disproved, at a minimum, two prongs of self-defense.
The district court’s error had no significant effect on the jury’s verdict because “no rational
jury would have acquitted the defendant of the more serious charge based on the evidence
at trial.” Woodard, 942 N.W.2d at 145. Therefore, appellant’s substantial rights were not
affected by the error.
Because we conclude appellant’s substan tial rights were not affected, we need not
determine whether the instructi on affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings. Id. at 144.
II. Appellant was not prejudiced by the court’s evidentiary rulings.
The district court prohibited, either th rough testimony or appellant’s statement to
police, evidence of: (1) the da ngerous character of appellant ’s neighborhood and recent
threats against appellant explaining why he purchased a gun; (2) prior attacks against
appellant, including attacks from behind; (3) the victim’s associations with gang members;
(4) police officers previously killing appellant’s friend; and (5) fears he would be harmed
if he turned himself in to the police. Appellant argues the district court improperly
restricted this evidence because it was necessary for the jury to fully consider his self-
defense claim. In particular, appellant claims that without the excluded evidence, the jury
was unable to: (1) consider the genuinene ss and reasonableness of appellant’s fear;

9
(2) understand his inability to retreat; and (3 ) consider testimony re lated to appellant’s
flight from the scene and the state.
This court reviews the evidentiary rulings of a district court limiting the scope of a
criminal defendant’s testimony for an abuse of discretion. State v. Greer, 635 N.W.2d 82,
91 (Minn. 2001). A district court abuses its discretion when it has “based its ruling on an
erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” Nelson v. State,
947 N.W.2d 31, 36 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted). “Erro neous exclusion of defense
evidence is subject to harmless error analysis.” Greer, 635 N.W.2d at 90.
We will assume, without deciding, that th e district court erred in excluding the
evidence. In applying the harm less error test, “we must be satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that the average jury (i.e., a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict if
the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized.”
State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Minn. 2015) (citations and quotation omitted).
Despite the evidentiary exclusions, a ppellant was able to present significant
evidence supporting self-defense:
 Appellant stated “that whole area, um, I’ve- I’ve been terrorized and
jumped by people. And had random people just start stuff with me
for no reason.”

 Appellant testified he did not “trust turning [his] back to [the victim]
after he had seen – that he was going to take the gun and kill me with
it.”

 Appellant testified extensively that the victim threatened to take
appellant’s gun and shoot him.

10
 Appellant also testified that he felt he was unable to walk away from
the victim, and that specific fear caused by the victim made appellant
feel he was unable to retreat.

 Appellant stated he had been prev iously attacked from behind, in
similar situations: “I’ve had situations where people then did all that,
threaten me say all that, and then I turn my back and go - you know,
walk away, and then they runnin’ up behind me, attacking me and
stuff like that.”

 Appellant explained why he had the gun: “to protect my life, when
people lookin’ for me, I’m not lookin’ for no conflict.”

Likewise, appellant was able to present evidence to explain why he fled the scene
and ultimately the state:
 Appellant stated that he did not “really wanna dip like that” because
he was scared, stating he could get killed and that “cops can shoot me
and stuff like that. Like, I was just scared, man.”

 Appellant admitted during trial tes timony that he, in a “small part,”
left town to get away from the poli ce in an effort to “buy time,” and
that he was in Florida to investigate a person taking financial
advantage of his mother.

Given the strength of the state’s case, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that an average jury would have reached the same verdict with the addition of the excluded
evidence. Therefore, the district court’s erro r, if any, in excluding the offered evidence
was harmless.
Affirmed.