State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1617

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Andrew Joseph Haman,
Appellant.

Filed January 4, 2021
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Ross, Judge

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-CR-18-752

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Edwin W. Stockmeyer, Zuri Balmakund, Assistant
Attorneys General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Dan McIntosh, Steele County Attorney, Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
A state trooper stopped Andrew Haman for speeding and, suspecting that Haman
possessed drugs, administered a dog sniff outside his car. The dog alerted, indicating drugs,
and the trooper searched and found psilocybin mushrooms and cocaine inside the car.
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Facing consequent drug-possession charges, Haman unsuccessfully asked the district court
to suppress the evidence on the theory that the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to
administer the dog sniff. Because the circumstances gave the trooper reasonable suspicion,
we affirm in part. But because our recent holding entitles Haman to benefit from an
amendment to the sentencing guidelines, we reverse in part and remand for resentencing.
FACTS
State Trooper Douglass Rauenhorst stopped Andrew Haman’s vehicle for speeding
in April 2018. The trooper noticed that Haman had glassy and bloodshot eyes and appeared
nervous, looking away. And the trooper saw onions on Haman’s dashboard. A records
check informed him that Haman had been previously convicted of drug possession and had
three prior marijuana-related license revocations. The trooper administered field sobriety
tests which Haman passed.
Trooper Rauenhorst asked Haman whether he had ever used marijuana, and Haman
told him no. The trooper decided to administer a dog sniff around the outside of Haman’s
car, which he began within two minutes after he conducted the field sobriety tests. The dog
sniffed intensely and began scratching at the driver’s door, indicating narcotics. Trooper
Rauenhorst therefore searched the inside of the car, and he found psilocybin mushrooms
and cocaine in the center console.
The state charged Haman with first - and fifth -degree possession of a controlled
substance under M innesota Statutes section 152.021, subdivision 2(a)(5) (2016) and
Minnesota Statutes section 152.025, subdivision 2( 1) (2016). Haman moved to suppress
evidence of the drugs found in his car, arguing that the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion
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to expand the scope of the stop and to conduct the dog sniff. The district court denied the
motion, and a jury found Haman guilty. The district court then denied Haman’s motion for
a downward dispositional departure and sentenced him to serve 85 months in prison.
Haman appeals.
DECISION
Haman challenges his convictions, arguing that the district court erred by denying
his motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search. We review a district court’s denial
of a motion to suppress de novo, accepting the district court’s factual findings unless they
are clearly erroneous. S tate v. Jordan , 742 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Minn. 2007). Haman’s
challenge is unconvincing for the following reasons.
Haman’s particular challenge, which is that Trooper Rauenhorst lacked a sufficient
basis to expand the scope of the stop to include a dog sniff outside his car, arises from
constitutional provisions limiting police activity. The United States and Minnesota
Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches a nd seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn.
Const. art I, § 10. Although a dog sniff around the exterior of a car is not a search requiring
probable cause under these provisions, it is “intrusive to some degree.” State v. Wiegard ,
645 N.W.2d 125, 134 (Minn. 2002). A police officer therefore may conduct this sort of dog
sniff during a routine traffic stop if, during the time needed to address the circumstances of
the stop, he develops reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related activity. Id. at 136.
Our de novo review therefore requires us to determine whether the trooper had that level
of suspicion.
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Trooper Rauenhorst did not need a high degree of suspicion to justify the dog sniff.
Reasonable suspicion requires only some particular and objective basis for suspecting
criminal activity. State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn. 1996). We are satisfied that
this level of suspicion existed here based on at least four circumstances. First, the trooper
perceived Haman to be evasive and nervous, looking away from the trooper during th e
routine stop. Second, the trooper noticed onions resting on the car’s dashboard, and the
trooper was aware that drug-possessing drivers sometimes attempt to mask the smell of
drugs using odorants. Third, the trooper learned that Haman had prior convictions for drug
offenses and three marijuana -related license revocations. And fourth, the trooper had
reason to believe that Haman lied to him, falsely denying that he had ever used marijuana.
These circumstances meet the low threshold of reasonable suspicion, justifying the
trooper’s prompt, brief, drug-detection dog sniff around the outside of Haman’s car.
Haman contests this conclusion on the notion that his successfully completed field
sobriety tests ended any suspicion. The notion overlooks the police act ivity that Haman’s
appeal challenges, which is only the dog sniff. Before the test, Haman’s bloodshot and
watery eyes had led the trooper to suspect that Haman may have been driving under the
influence of drugs or alcohol. Although Haman’s successful field test diminished that
suspicion, it did nothing to diminish the distinct suspicion that he possessed drugs inside
his car. And it was the latter suspicion, not the former, that led to the sniff.
Haman attempts to undermine the conclusion that the trooper’s suspicion was
reasonable by contesting the underlying factual basis. We accept a district court’s findings
of fact where, as here, the record contains evidence supporting them. See Asfaha v. State,
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665 N.W.2d 523, 526 (Minn. 2003). The facts that Haman says the trooper was not relying
on are facts that the trooper said he was relying on. These include Haman’s false denial of
having previously used marijuana and Haman’s record of drug possession. The testimony
therefore supports the district court’s factual findings.
Haman does correctly question whether the district court appropriately sentenced
him using the right criminal-history score. Whether the district court properly calculated a
defendant’s criminal-history score is a question of law we review de novo. See State v.
Scovel, 916 N.W.2d 550, 554 (Minn. 2018). The sentencing commission amended the
sentencing guidelines effective August 1, 2019, before Haman’s sentencing, so that a
district court may now assign a custody-status point only if the offender was on probation
at the time he committed the current offense. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.2.a
(Supp. 2019). Haman maintains that, because he was not on probation when he committed
the current offense, he should benefit from the change in the sent encing guidelines. We
have recently so held in State v. Robinette , 944 N.W.2d 242, 249–51 (Minn. App. 2020),
review granted in part (Minn. June 30, 2020). We therefore reverse and remand for the
district court to resentence Haman.
In a supplemental brief, Haman raises additional arguments that he did not raise in
the district court. We generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time on
appeal. Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996). We therefore will not addre ss
these arguments on the merits.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.