Tiffany Hall, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1621

Tiffany Hall,
Appellant,

vs.

Pipestone, LLC, et al.,
Defendants,

JJKEL Lodges, LLC, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed April 13, 2020
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Mower County District Court
File No. 50-CV-17-1229

Christopher J. Moreland, Ross D. Stadheim, Halunen Law , Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

George E. Antrim, III, George E. Antrim, III, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondents)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court ’s denial of her requests for judgment as a
matter of law (JMOL) or a new trial on her claims of retaliation under the Minnesota
Whistleblower Act (the MWA) and reprisal under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (the
MHRA). We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Tiffany Hall, who is African American, sued respondents JJKEL Lodges
LLC and Larry Powell. She asserted claims against JJKEL based on retaliation under the
MWA, and race discrimination and reprisal under the MHRA. She asserted claims against
Powell based on reprisal under the MHRA, as well as tortious interference with contract.
Hall’s final amended complaint set forth the following allegations. Hall had been
employed as a housekeeper for JJKEL at AmericInn in Austin from March 2013 to
September 21, 2016. Hall filed a complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) on September 16, 2016 , because she was “being harassed and
discriminated against regularly” at work. Hall’s supervisor, Powell, received notice of the
EEOC grievance, and on September 20, “got very upset and began yelling at [Hall]” after
she admitted that she had filed the grievance. Powell immediately suspended Hall for the
rest of the day, and she “was frightened and surprised by [Powell’s] aggressive, noisy, and
boisterous demeanor towards her and felt her rights were being violated by the suspension,
so she called 9-1-1.” Powell fired Hall the next day and admitted in his deposition “that
the sole reason for [Hall’s] termination was her call to the police.”

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Hall dismissed her race -discrimination and tortious -interference-with-contract
claims, and the case was tried to a jury over four days. After the respondents rested, Hall
moved for a directed verdict on her retaliation and reprisal claims. The district court denied
Hall’s motion. The jury returned a special verdict finding that respondents did not
terminate Hall’s employment in violation of the MHRA or the MWA.
Hall moved for JMOL or a new trial on the following grounds: irregularities in the
proceedings deprived her of a fair trial, misconduct of the respondents prejudiced her,
errors of law occurred at trial, and the jury’s findings were not justified by the evidence or
were contrary to law. The district court summarily denied Hall’s motions for JMOL and a
new trial. Hall appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I.
If a party moves for JMOL after a jury returns a verdict, the district court may
“(1) allow the judgment to stand, (2) order a new trial, or (3) direct entry of judgment as a
matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 50.02. JMOL “may be granted only when the evid ence
is so overwhelming on one side that reasonable minds cannot differ as to the proper
outcome.” Kedrowski v. Lycoming Engines, 933 N.W.2d 45, 55 (Minn. 2019) (quotations
omitted); see Longbehn v. Schoenrock , 727 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn. App. 2007) (“The
jury’s verdict will not be set aside if it can be sustained on any reasonable theory of the
evidence.” (quotation omitted)). “In applying this standard, (1) all the evidence, including
that favoring the verdict, must be taken into account, (2) the evidenc e is to be viewed in
the light most favorable to the verdict, and (3) the court may not weigh the evidence or

4
judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Kedrowski, 933 N.W.2d at 55 (quotation omitted);
see also Covey v. Detroit Lakes Printing Co. , 490 N.W.2 d 138, 141 (Minn. App. 1992)
(“Because it is the jury’s function to determine credibility, review of a jury verdict is even
more limited when the decision rests upon weighing the credibility of witnesses.”).
Construing the evidence in the light most favora ble to the verdict “does not mean
that [courts] are precluded from actually examining the evidence to assess whether there is
a sufficient basis for the jury’s finding.” Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220, 229
(Minn. 2010). An appellate court reviews a district court’s decision whether to grant JMOL
de novo. Kedrowski, 933 N.W.2d at 55. This court therefore independently determines
whether there is “any competent evidence reasonably tending to support” the jury’s verdict,
without deferring to the district court’s ruling. Janke v. Duluth & Ne. R.R. Co., 489 N.W.2d
545, 548 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 1992).
Hall challenges the district court’s denial of JMOL on her retaliation and reprisal
claims. We address each challenge in turn.
Retaliation Claim Under the MWA
Hall contends that the “jury’s finding that respondents did not violate the MWA
when they terminated [her] has no reasonable support in fact and is contrary to law, thus
mandating JMOL in [her] favor.”
The MWA provides:
An employer shall not discharge, discipline, threaten,
otherwise discriminate against, or penalize an employee
regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions,
location, or privileges of employment because:

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(1) the employee, or a person acting on behalf of
an employee, in good faith, reports a violation, suspected
violation, or planned violation of any federal or state law or
common law or rule adopted pursuant to law to an employer or
to any governmental body or law enforcement official[.]

Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(1) (2018).
An employee generally may prove a whistleblower -retaliation claim in one of two
ways. First, an employee may directly prove that an employer took adverse action against
the employee because the employee engaged in statutorily protected conduct. Cokley v.
City of Otsego , 623 N.W.2d 625, 630, 632 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn.
May 15, 2001). Second, an employee may prove retaliatory motive by establishing
(1) statutorily protected conduct by the employee, (2) an adverse employment action by
the employer, and (3) a causal connection between the two. Moore v. City of New Brighton,
932 N.W.2d 317, 323 (Minn. App. 2019), review denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2019).
A report is not statutorily protected conduct under the MWA unless it was made in
good faith. See Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(1). “‘Good faith’ means conduct that does
not violate section 181.932, subdivision 3.” Minn. Stat. § 181.931, subd. 4 (2018). Section
181.932, subdivision 3, provides that “[t]his section does not permit an employee to make
statements or disclosures knowing that they are false or that they are in reckless disregard
of the truth.” Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 3 (2018).1 Thus, a report is not made in good

1 In 2013, the legislature amended the MWA to add the current definition of “good faith.”
2013 Minn. Laws ch. 83, § 1, at 468. The supreme court has interpreted this amendment
as superseding the prior judicially crafted definition of “good faith” that required a
whistleblower to seek to expose an illegality when reporting unlawful conduct.
Friedlander v. Edwards Lifesciences, LLC, 900 N.W.2d 162, 165-66 (Minn. 2017).

6
faith—and therefore not statutorily protected conduct—if the employee who ma kes the
report knows that it is false or that it is in reckless disregard of the truth.
The parties do not dispute that Hall made a report to law enforcement within the
meaning of the MWA by calling the police to report Powell’s conduct. The 911 call was
entered into evidence at trial and played for the jury. During the call, Hall stated, “[M]y
supervisor just attacked me, cursing me out, and saying that he’s sending me home.” The
911 dispatcher stated, “He pushed you out of work —you’re saying?” Hall replied, “Yes,
he telling me to get out of his facility.” When Hall asked whether she needed to remain at
AmericInn, the dispatcher stated, “I suppose if you want an officer and you’re saying that
he assaulted you.” Hall responded, “ Yes,” but did so before the dispatcher said the word
“assaulted.” To the extent that Hall reported that Powell “attacked” her, her report to police
suggested a potential violation of criminal assault statutes. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 609.224,
subd. 1 (2018) (stating that a person commits fifth -degree assault if the person “commits
an act with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death” or
“intentionally inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily harm upon another”).
Powell testified that he discharged Hall on September 21, 2016. The parties do not
dispute that this discharge constituted adverse action against Hall under the MWA. Powell
admitted that he had previously testified in his deposition that he terminated Hall because
she called the police and that his deposition testimony was true.
Because the evidence indisputably establishes that Hall called the police alleging
conduct that implicated a potential violation of criminal -assault statutes and Powell fired
Hall for making that call, the disputed issue is whether Hall’s report to the pol ice was

7
statutorily protected conduct under the MWA, that is, whether it was made in good faith.
See Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(1). In analyzing that issue, we view the evidence “in
the light most favorable to the verdict” and defer to the jury’s evaluation of the credibility
of witnesses. Kedrowski, 933 N.W.2d at 55; Covey, 490 N.W.2d at 141.
Hall’s testimony regarding the incident that prompted her 911 call was as follows.
While Hall was cleaning a room at the hotel , Powell confronted her about th e EEOC
grievance she had filed and then suspended her. Hall went to Powell’s office and asked
him whether he was going to give her any documentation regarding the suspension. Powell
told her he would bring documentation out to her in the lobby and “slamm ed his door.”
Powell left his office about a minute later, approached Hall “aggressively,” stood over her,
yelled and screamed, and was “pointing his finger in [her] face.”
Powell’s testimony described the incident as follows. Powell approached Hall while
she was cleaning a room at the hotel and talked to her about her conduct that past weekend,
including a written warning completed by another employee who supervised Hall. The
conversation became heated and hostile , and Powell eventually told Hall to g o home
because she was suspended for the day. Powell went to his office after the conversation .
Hall entered his office and asked for a note regarding her suspension. Powell told Hall to
go home and come back the next day. When Powell left his office, Hall was seated in the
hotel lobby. Powell told Hall to go home multiple times, but she said she was not going to
leave unless he called the police. Powell testified that he did not put his hands in Hall’s
face at any time that morning and did not hover over her when she sat in the hotel lobby.

8
To the extent that Hall’s and Powell’s versions of the events differ, this court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and defer to the jury’s
determination that Powell was more credible than Hall. See Kedrowski, 933 N.W.2d at 55;
Covey, 490 N.W.2d at 141.
Hall argues that “Powell largely corroborated [her] description of their ‘conflict’
(his word), and acknowledged that it unfolded in all materially relevant regards just as she
described.” She notes that Powell conceded that “during the course of their interaction he
was ‘mad,’” that “voices [were] raised,” that Powell’s “temper was likewise ‘raised’ and
‘flared,’” and that he was “‘heated’ and ‘hostile’” toward Hall during the altercation.
Although Powell testified that the conversation in the hotel room became heated and
hostile, his testimony did not support Hall’s suggestion that he was physically aggressive
when he spoke to her in the hotel lobby. For example, Powell testified that he did not put
his hands in Hall’s face at any time that morning or hover over her when he spoke to Hall
in the hotel lobby. More importantly, Hall’s assertion in the 911 call that Powell “attacked”
her is not supported by Powell’s testimony. Our standard of review requires us to view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and defer to the jury’s evaluation of
witness credibility. Powell’s version of the events supports a conclusion that Hall’s report
to the police that Powell “attacked” her was false. Because a report is in bad faith and thus
not statutorily protected under the MWA if the reporter knows it is false or in reckless
disregard of the truth, see Minn. Stat. §§ 181.9 31, subd. 4, .932, subds. 1(1), 3, it was
reasonable for the jury to conclude that Hall’s report was not statutorily protected under

9
the MWA. The district court therefore did not err by denying Hall’s motion for JMOL on
her retaliation claim under the MWA.
Reprisal Claim Under the MHRA
Hall contends that the “jury’s finding that respondents did not violate the MHRA
when they terminated [her] has no reasonable support in fact and is contrary to law.”
Under the MHRA, it is an unfair discriminatory practice for any individual who
participated in alleged discrimination as an employer to “intentionally engage in any
reprisal against any person because that person . . . opposed a practice forbidden under this
chapter.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.15(1) (2018). “A reprisal includes, but is not limited to, any
form of intimidation, retaliation, or harassment.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.15 (2018).
Like a retaliation claim under the MWA , an employee can prove an employer’s
retaliatory motive for a reprisal claim under the MHRA directly or circumstantially. Potter
v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 622 N.W.2d 141, 145 (Minn. App. 2001). An employee may prove
retaliatory motive using circumstantial evidence by establishing statutorily protected
conduct by the employee, adver se employment action by the employer, and a causal
connection between the two. Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 81 (Minn. 2010).
Hall argues that she engaged in statutorily protected conduct by making “multiple
filings with the EEOC describing and o pposing [racial] discrimination.” Hall further
argues that she suffered adverse employment actions when Powell “suspended her on
September 20, 2016, and fired [her] one day later.” Lastly, Hall argues that “Respondents
have admitted the existence of a causal connection between [her] opposition to their racial
discrimination and the adverse employment actions she suffered.” (Emphasis omitted.)

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Hall notes that Powell admitted that he brought up Hall’s September 16, 2016 EEOC
complaint when he confronted h er on September 20, that Powell was angry about the
complaint, that Powell “suspended Hall on the spot,” and that Powell fired her one day
later. (Emphasis omitted.)
Although Hall identifies her suspension as an adverse employment action, t he jury
was not asked to decide whether that suspension violated the MHRA. Instead, the special
verdict form asked, “Did [respondents] terminate [Hall’s] employment in violation of the
Minnesota Human Rights Act?” As to Hall’s termination, Powell testified that he did not
fire Hall based on anything related to Hall’s EEOC complaint. If, as the jury apparently
found, Powell’s testimony wa s credible, Powell did not discharge Hall because of her
EEOC complaint. Because it was reasonable for the jury to conclude, based on Powell’s
testimony, that respondents did not discharge Hall because of her EEOC complaint, the
district court did not err by denying Hall’s motion for JMOL on her reprisal claim under
the MHRA.
II.
Under Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01, a district court may grant a motion for a new trial on
seven different grounds, including “[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court, . . . jury,
or prevailing party, . . . whereby the moving party was deprived of a fair trial,” “[e]rrors of
law occurring at the trial . . . objected to at the time ,” or because “[t]he verdict . . . is not
justified by the evi dence, or is contrary to law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 5 9.01(a), (f), (g).
“Granting a new trial is left largely to the discretion of the [district] court, and a [district]

11
court’s decision will be reversed only for a clear abuse of discretion.” 2 Baker v. Amtrak
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 588 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Minn. App. 1999).
Hall contends that she is entitled to a new trial because the “jury’s findings that
Respondents did not violate the MWA and/or MHRA when they fired [her]” are not
justified by the evidence or are contrary to law under Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01(g). Hall
argues that “[f]or the same reasons explained at length” in her JMOL arguments, “[her]
presentation of direct evidence irrefutably establish[ed] each element of her claims.”
On appeal from a denial of a motion for a new trial, an appella te court should not
set aside a jury verdict unless it is “manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence viewed
as a whole and in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Roemer v. Martin, 440 N.W.2d
122, 124 (Minn. 1989) ( quotation omitted). Although the new -trial standard is less
rigorous than the standard for granting JMOL, it is still a demanding standard. See Clifford
v. Geritom Med, Inc. , 681 N.W.2d 680, 687 (Minn. 2004) (noting that the new -trial
standard is a demanding standard, though it is less rigorous than the standard for granting
judgment notwithstanding the verdict). Because the district court is in a better position to

2 The district court did not explain its decision to deny Hall’s new-trial motion. Hall argues
that “the absence of any analysis conceals the bases for [the district court’s] decision and
precludes this Court from knowing whether it appropriately exercised its discretion.”
Although this is not such a case, a district court’s failure to explain a discretionary decision
can result in a remand. See In re Welfare of I.N.A., 902 N.W.2d 635, 643-44 (Minn. App.
2017) (remanding because this court could not “ determine based on the record and
restitution order before us whether the district court abused its discretion by making a
finding unsupported by the evidence or against logic and the facts on recor d, because the
[district court’s] order [was] unclear”), review denied (Minn. Nov. 28, 2017).

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determine whether the verdict is justified by the evidence, this court will not reverse its
decision to deny a motion for a new trial absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id.
As explained above, Hall did not present evidence that irrefutably established the
elements of her claims. As to her retaliation claim under the MWA, Hall’s testimony
regarding her altercation with Powell on September 20, 2016, is inconsistent with Powell’s
testimony. If the jury believed Powell’s testimony, it was reasonable for it to conclude that
Hall’s report was in bad faith and not statutorily protected conduct under the MWA. As to
Hall’s reprisal claim under the MHRA, Powell testified that he did not fire Hall because of
Hall’s EEOC complaint. If the jury believed Powell’s testimony, it was reasonable for it
to conclude that respondents did not terminate Hall’s employ ment because o f statutorily
protected conduct under the MHRA.
The jury’s findings that respondents did not terminate Hall’s employment in
violation of the MWA or the MHRA are not “manifestly and palpably contrary to the
evidence viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the verdict.” See Roemer,
440 N.W.2d at 124 (quotation omitted). The district court therefore did not abuse its
discretion by refusing to grant Hall a new trial on the ground that the jury’s verdict was not
justified by the evidence or was contrary to law.
III.
Erroneous evidentiary rulings can constitute errors of law that justify the grant of a
new trial under Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01(f). Kedrowski, 933 N.W.2d at 62. Hall contends
that she is entitled to a new trial because the district court “made a number of erroneous

13
evidentiary rulings that might reasonably have changed the result of trial.” We address
each of Hall’s assertions of evidentiary error in turn.
September 20, 2015 Police Report
Hall argues that the “district court erred in admitting irrelevant and unfairly
prejudicial evidence of a police report [she] filed on September 20, 2015.” Evidence is not
admissible unless it is relevant, that is, it must have a “tendency to make the exi stence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401, 402. “Although
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantia lly outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 403.
Prior to trial, Hall moved to e xclude a September 20, 2015 police report, which
indicated that Hall went to a police station and reported “harassment that [was] occurring
at work by [a] co -worker.” At trial, Hall argued that the police report was irrelevant
because it originated a year before the incident at issue and that there was “an extreme
danger of conflating” the September 20, 2015 report with the report regarding the
September 20, 2016 incident. The district court denied Hall’s motion in limine, reasoning
that the September 20, 2015 police report was relevant because it was documentation of
the “on-going harassing behavior” alleged in Hall’s complaint, went “ directly to the
reasonableness of her second police report,” and “explain[ed] the relationship” between
the parties.

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On appeal, Hall argues that the 2015 police report was irrelevant because she was
not “required to either allege or prove that it was ‘reasonable’ for her to make her second
police report in 2016” for that report to be a good faith report under the MWA. Hal l is
correct that the September 20, 2015 police report is not relevant to her claim under the
MWA. But because the harassment mentioned in the September 20, 2015 police report is
also mentioned in Hall’s September 16, 2016 EEOC complaint, it was somewhat relevant
to her reprisal claim under the MHRA. The district court therefore did not err by admitting
the September 20, 2015 police report.
Character Evidence
Hall argues that the district court “erred in admitting irrelevant character evidence.”
Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is generally not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. Minn. R. Evid.
404(a).
Hall asserts that the district court erred by allowing respondents’ counsel to elicit
testimony from S.B., a housekeeper at AmericInn, that Powell “is generally a nice person.”
Hall argues that S.B.’s testimony was irrelevant because it did not address any of the
elements of the retaliation and re prisal offe nses at issue here. Hall argues that
“Respondents’ sole reason for calling [S.B.] was to reinforce the notion that on occasions
other than when he fired [her], Mr. Powell is generally a nice person.” Specifically, she
asserts that the following testimony from S.B. was improper character evidence:
Q: Before we get into that further, what I’d like you to do is
talk about Larry Powell a little bit.
A: He’s a great guy.

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. . . .
Q: . . . Now focusing on Larry, why do you think he’s a great
boss?
A: [He] helps when you need it. He’s there for you, if you
need something, he can help you, if you need it. And he’s just
a great guy to be around.
. . . .
Q: Is he the intimidating kind of guy?
A: No.
Q: What do you mean when you give me that answer?
A: He’s just a great guy. He jokes around with you. He’s just
warm, and just great to be around.
. . . .
Q: Has he ever personally helped you outside of just what he
has to do to pay you to work?
A: Yeah.
Q: Tell us about that.
A: He’s helped me get into a place for me and my kids. He’s
helped me out with the money for it.

Hall did not object to that testimony. Hall’s only objection was to the question,
“Has [Powell] ever intimidated you?” But S.B.’s response, “No,” is different from S.B.’s
unobjected-to explicit testimony that Powell was a “great guy.”
“Errors of law occurring at the trial” may be the basis for a new trial only if they
were “objected to at the time or, if no objection need have been made pursuant to Rules 46
and 51, plainly assigned in the notice of motion.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01(f); see Minn. R.
Civ. P. 46 (exceptions unnecessary); Minn. R. Civ. P. 51.03 (objections to jury
instructions). Because Hall failed to object to the challenged evidence, it cannot be a basis
for a new trial under Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01(f).3

3 We note that if Hall had objected to S.B.’s testimony that Powell was a “great guy,”
exclusion of the evidence would have been appropriate under Minn. R. Evid. 404(a).

16
Evidence that Hall Did Not Fear Powell
Hall argues that the district court erred by allowing Powell’s spouse, C.P., to provide
speculative testimony regarding whether Hall felt unsafe, fearful, or threatened by Powell
during the September 20, 2016 incident. “A witness may not testify to a matter unless
evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal
knowledge of the matter.” Minn. R. Evid. 602.
Respondents’ counsel asked C.P. whether she had ever observed Hall looking “like
she was afraid or threatened by some situation” and whether Hall’s claims that she felt
unsafe or threatened by Powell’s conduct on September 20, 2016, was consistent with what
C.P. knew of Hall’s personality. C.P. testified that she did not “believe [Hall] ever felt like
she was threatened or afraid” because Hall “never acted that way ” and C.P. never
“perceived it in anyway.” Hall objected to this line of questioning as speculati ve and
irrelevant. The district court overruled her objections.
C.P. testified that she did not witness the altercation between Hall and Powell on
September 20 and did not know whether Hall felt threatened or afraid during the incident.
Thus, C.P.’s testimony regarding whether Hall felt unsafe, fearful, or threatened by Powell
was based on speculation, and the district court erred in allowing it.
The Death of Powell’s Son-In-Law
Hall argues that the “district court erred in admitting irrelevant and unfairly
prejudicial testimony from [C.P.] about the death of her son -in-law.” See Minn. R. Evid.
401, 402, 403.

17
C.P. testified that in 2014, she stepped down from her position as general manager
for the hotel. Respondents’ counsel asked C.P. why she stepped down, and C.P. began to
explain that her daughter had just had a baby and that she was helping her daughter with
daycare. Hall objected. At a subsequent bench conference, Hall’s counsel noted that C.P.
had had an emotional response while she was answering the question and argued that the
reason why C.P. stepped down was not relevant and that “it’s prejudicial if [C.P. is] going
to cry in front of the jury.” Respondents’ counsel explained that C.P.’s son-in-law had died
and argued that C.P.’s testimony was relevant to the extent that it explained how her role
at the hotel had changed. In response, Hall stated, “[T]his is a passion and prejudice
argument . . . in the extreme.” The district court allowed the testimony, reasoning, “I think
maybe the emotion is already busted up, at this point, with this bench conference, as to why
she left the role.”
C.P. continued her testimony and testified, “[M]y daughter’s husband was killed,
our son -in-law, and she had a two -year-old and a five -week-old baby.” C.P. further
testified that she completely disassociated herself from the hotel “in 2016 when [her son -
in-law] was killed in an accident,” that her daughter and the children moved in with her
and Powell, and that because she was focused on them, Powell had to take on C.P.’s duties
at the hotel.
Hall argues that because C.P.’s “son -in-law passed away two years after she
[stepped down it] could not have played any role in that decision” and that evidence
regarding his death therefore was “irrelevant and inadmissible.” Hall also argues that “the
only possible purpose to be served by” the evidence “was to engender sympathy amongst

18
the jurors for the Powells, and to confuse or mislead them about the timing and reason for
[C.P.’s] departure from her role as General Manager.”
The relevance of C.P.’s reasons for stepping down from her position as general
manager at the hotel in 2014 is not apparent to us. And C.P.’s testimony that her son -in-
law was killed in an accident in 2016, leaving behind his wife and two young children,
inappropriately invoked sympathy for the Powells. We therefore conclude that the district
court erred by allowing this testimony. See Minn. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403.
Prejudice
“Entitlement to a new trial on the grounds of improper evidentiary rulings rests upon
the complaining party’s ability to demonstrate prejudicial error.” City of Moorhead v. Red
River Valley Coop. Power Ass’n, 830 N.W.2d 32, 39-40 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).
“An evidentiary error is prejudicial if it might reasonably have influenced the jury and
changed the result of the trial.” George v. Estate of Baker, 724 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2006).
“Evidence that would have virtually no value in resolving the disputed fact questions is not
prejudicial.” Kedrowski, 933 N.W.2d at 62 (quotation omitted); see also George, 724
N.W.2d at 9 (“[T]he admission of evidence that is cumulative or is corroborated by other
competent evidence will be deemed harmless and will not warrant a new trial.”).
In assessing whether erroneously admitted evidence might reasonably have
influenced the jury and changed the result of the trial, appellate courts consider the record
as a whole, including whether the erroneously admitted evidence was the only evidence in
the case or was evidence regarding an issue that was central to the case; whether there was
other, unobjected to, evidence on the same issue and the cumulative weight of that

19
evidence; whether there was otherwise ample evidence to sustain the verdict; and whether
a cautionary instruction was requested. Kedrowski, 933 N.W.2d at 62 (considering whether
erroneously admitted evidence had value in resolving disputed fact questions); George,
724 N.W.2d at 9 (considering whether erroneou sly admitted evidence was cumulative or
corroborated by other competent evidence); Kingsley v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2 , 251
N.W.2d 634, 635 -36 (Minn. 1977) (considering whether there was otherwise ample
evidence to sustain the verdict and whether a cautionary instruction was requested).
The district court erred by allowing C.P.’s testimony regarding whether Hall felt
afraid or threatened during the altercation between Hall and Powell on September 20, 2016,
as well as C.P.’s testimony regarding the death of Powell’s son -in-law. Hall’s argument
regarding the prejudicial impact of C.P.’s testimony is limited to a statement of the
prejudice standard set forth above and an assertion that the error “might reasonably have
changed the result.” (Quotation omitted.) Hall does not explain or develop that assertion
in the context of the trial record as a whole. For the reasons that follow, Hall’s undeveloped
assertion of prejudice is not persuasive.
Resolution of this case at trial came down to whether the jury believed Hall or
Powell regarding the September 20, 2016 incident and Powell’s reason for firing Hall. As
described above, the testimony of Hall and Powell was inconsistent regarding some crucial
aspects of Hall’s clai ms, such as whether Hall’s statement in her 911 call that Powell
“attacked” her was accurate, whether Powell was physically aggressive toward Hall during
the incident, and whether Powell fired Hall because she filed an EEOC complaint.

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C.P.’s speculative testimony regarding whether Hall had felt threatened or afraid is
unlikely to have influenced the jury because C.P. admitted that she did not witness the
September 20 altercation between Hall and Powell. Moreover, as Hall argued to the jury
in closing, t he only person who had direct knowledge regarding whether Hall felt
threatened or afraid during that incident was Hall herself. The potential influence of C.P.’s
testimony regarding the death of her son -in-law is more significant because it may have
engendered sympathy for the Powells and made the jury more likely to believe Powell.
However, any prejudicial impact of the erroneously admitted testimony from C.P.
was mitigated by the testimony of S.R., a maintenance worker at the hotel, which was
consistent with Powell’s testimony. S.R. testified that he saw Powell talk to Hall in
Powell’s office and heard Powell tell Hall to go home for the day. S.R. also testified that
he saw Powell speak with Hall in the hotel lobby and again tell her to go home for the day.
Lastly, S.R. testified that Powell did not raise his voice or have his hands close to Hall’s
face when talking with Hall in the lobby. S.R.’s testimony tended to corroborate Powell’s
version of the events. Moreover, the jury had ample opportunity to judge the credibility of
Powell and Hall based on their demeanor and testimony at trial, as well as on the recordings
of Hall’s 911 call and the police interviews of Powell and Hall, which were admitted as
evidence at trial.
In sum, given the trial record as a whole—which establishes that the jury had ample
opportunity to assess the relative credibility of Hall and Powell by means other than C.P.’s
inadmissible testimony—we reject Hall’s undeveloped assertion that the evidentiary errors

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were prejudicial and necessitate a new trial. The district court therefore did not abuse its
discretion by refusing to grant Hall a new trial based on those errors.
Cumulative Error
Hall contends that she “is entitled to a new trial based on the cumulative effect of
the errors committed at trial.” As support, Hall adds another assertion of err or, that “the
district court erroneously refused to strike a juror for cause ,” which when taken
cumulatively with the other errors, had the effect of denying her a fair trial.
“An appellant may be entitled to a new trial in rare cases where the errors, when
taken cumulatively, have the effect of denying the appel lant a fair trial.” State v. Fraga,
898 N.W.2d 263, 278 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). But appellate courts have only
developed and applied the cumulative-error doctrine in criminal cases. See, e.g., State v.
Williams, 908 N.W.2d 362, 366 (Minn. 2018); Fraga, 898 N.W.2d at 278; State v. Penkaty,
708 N.W.2d 185, 200 (Minn. 2006). Hall does not provide any authority supporting
application of the cumulative-error doctrine in a civil case. Assuming without deciding
that the doctrine applies here, Hall has failed to establish that the district court’s alleged
error in refusing to strike a juror for cause resulted in an unfair trial. As Hall acknowledges,
the relevant juror ultimately was not seated on the jury. Although Hall argues that the
alleged error “forc[ed her] to use a peremptory strike” and prejudiced “her ability to seat a
fair and impartial jury,” she does not explain why the seated jury was unfair and partial.
Because Hall has not establish ed that the additional alleged error affected the
partiality of the jury or the fairness of her trial, it could not tip the prejudice scale in Hall’s

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favor. Once again, g iven the record as a whole, Hall has not met her burden to show
prejudicial error justifying a new trial.
Affirmed.