In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 8).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1634

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:

V. L. and A. R., Parents.

Filed April 13, 2020
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge*

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-JV-19-268

Patrick D. McGee, Forest Lake, Minnesota (for appellant-mother V.L.)

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Robert Hamilton, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Ramsey County Social Services Department)

Angela Sorum, St. Paul, Minnesota (guardian ad l item)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M. , Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge;
and Peterson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
PETERSON, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s termination of her parental rights (TPR),
appellant argues that the record does not support the district court’s determinations that:

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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(1) she failed to satisfy the duties of the parent-child relationship; (2) she is a palpably unfit
parent; (3) the county made reasonable eff orts to reunite the family; (4) the child is
neglected and in foster care; and (5) TPR is in the child’s best interests. We affirm.
FACTS
While she was pregnant, appellant -mother V.L. began working with the Ramsey
County Social Services Department ’s (RCSSD) Moth ers First Program, which assists
pregnant women and young mothers who struggle with substance abuse. V.L. completed
a rule 25 chemical-use as sessment through Mothers First in November 2017.
On December 12, 2017, V.L. prematurely gave birth to E.L. At the time of the birth,
V.L. tested positive for amphetamines, and E.L.’s meconium tested positive for
amphetamines and cannabinoids. V.L. admitted to an RCSSD child-protection worker that
she took methamphetamine the day before E.L.’s birth and that she had used the drug since
she was 18 years old.
When E.L. was ready to b e discharged from the hospital in January 2018, the St.
Paul Police Department placed a 72 -hour child-protection hold on E.L. V.L. admitted to
an amended CHIPS petition at an eme rgency protective-care hearing. Temporary legal
custody of E.L. was transferred to the RCSSD, which placed E.L. in foster care with his
maternal aunt. E.L.’s presumed father’s parental rights were terminated by court order on
March 27, 2019.
An RCSSD social worker worked with V.L. to develop a case plan, which set forth
the following requirements for V.L.: (1) undergo a rule 25 assessment and follow all
recommendations, with six months of sobriety as demonstrated through random urine

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analyses (UAs); (2) undergo a mental -health diagnostic assessment and follow all
recommendations; (3) participate with in -home services to establish a healthy and sober
parenting routine; (4) establish stable sober housing; and (5) assure that she is able to meet
E.L.’s basic needs.
V.L. entered herself into a number of chemical-dependency treatment programs, but
never maintained an extended period of sobriety. V.L. entered inpatient treatment at
Tapestry on December 19, 2017, but left on December 24, 2017. V.L. consistently objected
to inpatient treatment because she could not have E.L. with her. She entered inpatient
treatment at Avivo, which allows children, in February 2018, but was discharged for
uncooperative behavior on March 2, 2018. The RCSSD had arranged for V.L. to have a
trial home visit with E.L. at Avivo, but the RCSSD terminated the trial visit when V.L. was
discharged.
V.L. successfully completed a 30-day inpatient treatment program at Tapestry in
April 2018, but she failed to complete the aftercare and out patient components of the
program. She began attending outpatient treatment at the Tubman Chrysalis Center in June
2018 but was discharged in August 2018 because she required a higher level of care.
V.L. entered inpatient treatment at RS Eden on September 17, 2018, but left against
staff advice on October 12, 2018. In January 2019 , she began outpatient treatment at New
Beginnings but left without completing the program in February 2019 to attend treatment
at Roots Recovery. V.L. was discharged from Root s Recovery in March 2019 due to her
positive drug tests and some missed sessions. The RCSSD Mothers First program
discontinued working with V.L. in March 2019 because she was not making meaningful

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progress after more than a yea r of assistance. Finally, V.L. began outpatient treatment at
My Home, Inc. in May 2019, but she had a number of missed mee tings and positive drug
tests. In addition to this treatment history, V.L. also rejected referrals to two inpatient
programs where she could have had E.L. with her.
V.L. appeared for UAs four times from June through September 2018, and all four
times she tested positive. She also tested positive for amphetamines on March 13, April
19, and July 3, 2019. On July 11, 2019 , which was four days before the start of her TPR
trial, s he tested positive for amphetamines and fentanyl.
V.L. was also unsuccessful at completing treatment for her mental -health issues.
Following her diagnostic assessment in November 2017, V.L. met with her therapist in
November 2018 and agreed to a mental-health treatment plan. V.L. was discharged from
therapy in February 2019 because she miss ed too many sessions. At the time of trial, s he
was not receiving mental-health treatment and was not taking her prescribed medications.
V.L. successfully completed other aspects of her case plan. She achieved safe and
stable housing beginning in June 2018 when she moved in with her father. She also
completed parenting classes at F athers First. Finally, she provided for E.L.’s care during
her s upervised visits, and neither the RCSSD nor E.L.’s guardian ad litem (GAL) had
concerns about E.L.’s safety during these visits.
Following a four-day trial—during which V.L. did not appear for the final day —the
district court terminated V.L,’s parental ri ghts on four statutory bases: (1) V.L.
substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties
imposed by the parent -child relationship under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2)

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(2018); (2) V.L. was palpably unfit to be a party to the parent -child relationship under
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2018); (3) following E.L.’s placement out of the
home, reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, failed to correct the conditio ns
leading to E.L.’s placement under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5) (2018); and
(4) E.L. was neglected and in foster care under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(8)
(2018). This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Statutory Bases
V.L. argues that the four statutory bases relied on by the district court do not support
termination of her parental rights. Appellate courts give considerable deference to a district
court’s TPR decision. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn.
2008). Appellate courts will affi rm a district court’s TPR “when at least one statutory
ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence and termination is in
the best interests of the child, provided that the county has made reasonable efforts to
reunite the family.” Id. (citation omitted). “[W]e review the factual findings for clear error
and the statutory basis for abuse of discretion. A finding is clearly erroneous if it is
manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence . . . An abuse of discretion occurs if t he
district court improperly applied the law.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T. , 814 N.W.2d
76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012) (citations and quotation omitted).

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Because it is only necessary to show that one statutory ground for termination is
supported by clear and convincing evidence, we will address only one of the four statutory
grounds that the district court applied as a basis for terminating V.L.’s parental rights. 1
E.L. was neglected and in foster care
V.L. argues that the district court abused its discretion by finding that E.L. was
neglected and in foster care. Under the TPR statute:
“Neglected and in foster care” means a child:
(1) who has been placed in foster care by court order;
and
(2) whose parents’ circumstances, condition, or conduct
are such that the child cannot be returned to them; and
(3) whose parents, despite the availability of needed
rehabilitative services, have failed to make reasonable efforts
to adjust their circumstances, condition or cond uct, or have
willfully failed to meet reasonable expectations with regard to
visiting the child or providing financial support for the child.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 2 4. (2018).
The statute also provides:
In determining whether a child is neglected and in foster
care, the court shall consider, among other factors, the
following:
(1) the length of time the child has been in foster care;
(2) the effort the parent has made to adjust
circumstances, conduct, or conditions that necessitates the
removal of the child to make it in the child’s best interest to be
returned to the parent’ s home in the foreseeable future,
including the use of rehabilitative services offered to the
parent;
(3) whether the parent has visited the child within the
three months pr eceding the filing of the petition, unless
extreme financial or physical hardship or treatment for mental

1 We express no opinion about the three remaining statutory bases that the district court
concluded were proved.

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disability or chemical dependency or other good cause
prevented the parent from visiting the child or it was not in the
best interests of the child to be visited by the parent;
(4) the maintenance of regular contact or
communication with the agency or person temporarily
responsible for the child;
(5) the appropriateness and adequacy of services
provided or offered to the parent to facilitate a reunion;
(6) whether additional services would be likely to bring
about lasting parental adjustment enabling a return of the child
to the parent within an ascertainable period of time, whether
the services have been offered to the parent, or, if services were
not offered, the reasons they were not offered; and
(7) the nature of the efforts made by the responsib le
social services agency to rehabilitate and reunite the family and
whether the efforts were reasonable.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 9 (2018).
V.L. argues that the district court failed to consider three of the factors that Minn.
Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 9 , directs courts to consider when determining whether a child is
neglected and in foster care; namely the fifth, sixth, and the seventh factors. V.L’s assertion
that the district court did not address these factors is not supported by the record. The
district court found:
62. [V.L.], despite receiving referrals and/or services
from at least ten (10) chemical dependency treatment centers
and two (2) me ntal health providers, has failed to make
reasonable efforts to address her chemical dependency and
mitigate her mental health prognosis. She rejected every
referral and recommendation for in -patient treatment except
one (1). [V.L.] relapsed after the single in-patient program she
completed when she did not follow the aftercare and out -
patient components of the program. While relapse may be part
of an addict’s long road to sobriety, [V.L.’s] failure to commit
to aftercare and out-patient programming demonstrates that her
relapse was not part of an on-going struggle toward health and
healing, but a continued denial to seriously address her
chemical dependency issues. [V.L.] enrolled herself in

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multiple programs that were not recommended, without
communicating with her RCSSD worker. This provided her
with more freedom and unsupervised time than an in -patient
program, with the result that she continued to use drugs. The
testimony of the Mothers First worker was credible and
compelling that [V.L.] wants, bu t is incapable of completing,
in-patient treatment, in particular noting [V.L.’s] rejection of
at least two (2) in -patient programs that would have allowed
her to have [E.L.] with her. Few such programs are available.

63. [V.L.’s] continued use of drugs despite her
lengthy history with multiple treatment centers, including her
refusal to engage with centers that allowed [E.L.] to stay with
her as she requested, indicate that additional services are not
likely to bring about lasting parental adjustment en abling
[E.L.] to return to her care within an ascertainable period of
time.

. . .

65. Lasting parental adjustment would require
[V.L.’s] cooperation with her social workers and treatment
providers. [V.L.] says she cooperates, but her actions show her
cooperation is on her terms. She avoids her RCSSD worker,
and refuses to follow mental health and in -patient treatment
referrals. She ran between parenting and out-patient programs
to avoid in -patient treatment. . . . Her inability to cooperate
with the professionals assigned to assist her also demonstrates
that additional services are not likely to bring about lasting
parental adjustment enabling [E.L.] to return to her care within
an ascertainable period of time.

66. RCSSD provided reasonable efforts to re unify
[V.L.] and [E.L.]. These efforts have not been successful for
more than a year.

These findings directly address factors five, six, and seven. Finding 62 specifically
addresses factor five by recognizing that V.L. was provided or offered services f rom at
least ten chemical-dependency treatment centers and two mental -health providers, but she
failed to make the reasonable efforts that she needed to make to benefit from these services.

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The finding also explains that V.L.’s failure to benefit from the services was caused by her
failure to commit to aftercare and outpatient programming and her denial to seriously
address her chemical-dependency problem.
Finding 63 specifically addresses factor six by recognizing that, given V.L.’s refusal
or failure to engage in programs that were made available to her, providing additional
services is not likely to be successful. This finding also recognizes that V.L. was
appropriately offered services that allowed E.L. to stay with her as she requested. Also,
finding 65 specifically addresses factor six by explaining that, because V.L. is not able to
cooperate with professionals assigned to assist her, it cannot be determined that additional
services will make it possible for E.L. to be returned to her care.
Finally, finding 66 specifically addresses factor seven by stating that RCSSD
provided reasonable efforts to reunify V.L. and E.L. Although finding 66, by itself, is
somewhat conclusory, it must be read in light of the district court’s extensive findings about
specific services that were provided or offered to V.L. Finding 66 also recognizes that
RCSSD tried to help V.L. for more than a year, which is an indication of the reasonableness
of RCSSD’s efforts.
Findings 62, 63, 65, and 66 are not clearly erroneous. When they are read in context
with the district court’s other findings, these four findings demonstrate that the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that E.L. was neglected and in foster
care.

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Best Interests
V.L. argues that t he district court also abused its discretion by finding that TPR is
in E.L.’s best interests. “We review a district court’s ultimate determination that [TPR] is
in a child’s best interest for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. ,
805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
To support her contention that TPR is not in E.L.’s best interests, V.L. relies on the
GAL’s testimony that E.L. “knows who [h]is mother is and enjoys visiting with her.” But,
although the GAL recommended that it is in E.L.’s best interest to maintain contact with
V.L., the GAL limited that recommendation with the qualifier: “if it’s safe for [E.L.], and
[V.L.] is able to demonstrate behaviors that don’t put [E.L.’s safety] at risk.” Ultimately,
the GAL recommended TPR because V.L. had not demonstrated t hat she “has an insight
into [her] drug abuse and how that would cause safety risks for [E.L.]”
The district court concluded that “[V.L.] clearly loves [E.L.] and she demonstrate s
this love for him appropriately for many hours every week. Her visits, though, are limited
and supervised.” The district court determined that “ [b]y the nature of being a toddler,
[E.L.] will make constant demands on [V.L.] and require constant monitor ing all while he
is incapable of complying with parental demands. [V.L.] has demonstrated that she is not
fit to manage suc h a relationship” due to her ong oing chemical-abuse and menta l-health
issues. The district court did not abuse its discretion by de termining that TPR is in E.L.’s
best interests.
Affirmed.