In re the Marriage of: Peter M. Boldon, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1636

In re the Marriage of:
Peter M. Boldon, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Claudia M. Hendrix,
Appellant.

Filed November 30, 2020
Reversed and remanded
Segal, Chief Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-FA-12-1732

Eric B. Bjerva, Arctos Law PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Victoria A. Elsmore, Collins, Buckley, Saun try & Haugh, P. L.L.P., St. Paul, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Considered and decided by Florey, Pr esiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SEGAL, Chief Judge
Appellant appeals the denial of her motion for modification of spousal maintenance.
Because there was a misapplication of law, we reverse and remand.

2
FACTS
Appellant-wife Claudia M. Hendrix and respondent-husband Peter M. Boldon were
married for 26 years before their divorce in 2013. The parties have two sons, now in their
twenties, who have autism and related condit ions. Hendrix was the primary caretaker of
the two boys and, as set out in the district court’s findings, “chose a career which gave her
flexibility to be present for the children duri ng the marriage and afterwards.” The older
son is now self-sufficient, but the younger son still has ongoing needs and attends a college
to learn independent life skills.
The parties entered into a partial marita l termination agreement (MTA), which the
district court incorporated into its December 20 13 judgment dissolv ing the parties’
marriage. The judgment states that each party claimed living expenses of about $8,665 per
month, but that “[f] or purposes of the settlement,” th eir then-current monthly living
expenses were $7,500. At the time of dissolu tion, Boldon had a year ly gross income of
$207,400 and Hendrix had a yearly gross income of $68,000. The only significant marital
assets of the parties were retirement account s that the judgment divided as the parties
agreed.
The judgment also provided for temporary spousal maintenance to Hendrix to be
stepped down as follows: $3,500 per month for 36 months; then $3,000 per month for 18
months; $2,000 per month for th e next 18 months (through Fe bruary 2019); and, finally,
$1,000 per month with temporary maintena nce ending after September 2022. The
judgment did not contain any restrictions on Hendrix’s right to seek modification of spousal

3
maintenance, but did contain an express waiver (known as a “ Karon waiver”1) barring
Boldon from seeking spousal maintenance from Hendrix.
On April 30, 2019, Hendrix moved the di strict court to increase her monthly
maintenance award to $3,000, and to make the award permanent. To support her motion,
Hendrix asserted that, since the dissolu tion, her annual income had increased by
approximately $9,800, giving her a monthly income of $6,483, but that her reasonable
monthly expenses were $9,880. Hendrix claimed that, as a result, she had not become self-
supporting at the marital standard of living. 2 She also asserted that Boldon’s monthly
income had increased to over $19,000.
The district court denied Hendrix’s motio n to modify maintenance. The court
relied, in significant part, on the fact that the temporary maintenance award in the judgment
was pursuant to a stipulation. The court no ted that, while there was no evidence in the
record to demonstrate that Hendrix had anticipated the possibility that she may not achieve
self-sufficiency during the temporary maintenance period, there was also no evidence that
she had not. The court thus excluded Hendrix’s failure to achieve se lf-sufficiency as a
basis for claiming a “substantial change of circumstances” justifying a modification.
Hendrix appeals.

1 Karon v. Karon , 435 N.W.2d 501 (Minn. 1989) (allowing parties to stipulate that they
waive any right to future modification of maintenance; codified into law pursuant to 1989
Minn. Laws. ch. 248, § 7, at 838 (Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 5)).

2 Hendrix also states that she took on a second job as an assistant teacher in addition to her
full-time position as a research associate, but th ere does not appear to be evidence in the
record on the amounts earned from this second job or whether it is ongoing.

4
D E C I S I O N
In this appeal, Hendrix challenges the denial of her motion to modify spousal
maintenance. We review decisions regarding modification of spousal maintenance awards
for an abuse of discretion, but re view questions of law de novo. Hecker v. Hecker ,
568 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1997); Melius v. Melius, 765 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Minn. App.
2009).
A maintenance award may be modified upon a showing of one or more of eight
statutory factors, “any of which makes the terms [of the existing award] unreasonable and
unfair.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a) (2018). In a proceeding to modify maintenance,
the burden on the party seeking modification is to show that th ere has been both a
substantial change in circumstances, and that the change renders the existing award
unreasonable and unfair. Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 198-99 (Minn. 1987); see
Hecker, 568 N.W.2d at 709 (citing this aspect of Nardini). If a district court modifies a
maintenance award, it determines the amount and duration of the modified award by using
the factors for an award of maintenance under Minn. Stat. § 518.522. Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.39, subd. 2(e) (2018).
Hendrix claims that the district cour t misapplied the law by placing too much
emphasis on the fact that the judgment was based on a stipulation and should not have
relied on the case of Beck v. Kaplan, 566 N.W.2d 723, 726 (Min n. 1997), as the guiding
precedent. In denying Hendrix’s motion to modify spousal maintenance, the district court
noted that “[w]hile the court does not have evidence that [Hendrix] attempted to negotiate
a provision which enabled her to claim a change of circumstan ces should she not be able

5
to become self-supporting, there is no evid ence that she did not anticipate this as a
possibility.” Relying on Beck as its authority, the district court thereby reached the
conclusion that Hendrix’s claimed failure to achieve self-sufficiency was not a change of
circumstances that could justify a modification of spousal maintenance.
The district court’s reliance on the case of Beck v. Kaplan, however, is misplaced.
In Beck, the former wife moved the court for an increase in a stipulated permanent award
of maintenance that had been in place for nineteen years. 566 N.W.2d at 725. The former
wife claimed she had not been able to achiev e self-sufficiency and that there had been a
substantial increase in the cost of living si nce the divorce without any increase in her
spousal maintenance payments. Id. at 725-26. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the
former wife’s arguments on the grounds that the record demonstrated she had specifically
sought, but failed to obtain, a cost-of-living adjustment clause during the negotiations for
the stipulated marital termination agreement. Id. at 726-27.
The Beck case is distinguishable in several significant ways. First, as the district
court acknowledged, there is no evidence in the record in the current case that Hendrix
sought, but failed to obtain, a provision allowing her to seek future modification of spousal
maintenance. We further note that Beck involves a stipulation providing for a permanent
award of spousal maintenance, not a temporary award as in this case.
In addition, Minn. Stat. § 518.552 was amended eleven years after the divorce in
Beck was finalized to provide that, in the event of “uncertainty as to the necessity of a
permanent award, the court shall order a permanent award leaving its order open for later
modification.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 3; 1985 Minn. Laws ch. 266, § 2. After this

6
amendment, an award of permanent maintena nce became the defau lt in the event of
uncertainty over need.3 See Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 196 (noting that the 1985 amendment
served to clarify the legislature’s intent that “doubts with re spect to duration [of
maintenance] are to be resolved in favor of permanency”).
Instead of Beck, more apt guidance can be found in the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
opinion in the case of Hecker v. Hecker, decided only a month after Beck. In Hecker, the
supreme court affirmed an award of permanent maintenance even though there had been a
stipulation between the parties providing only for temporary maintenance. On the question
of deference to be accorded a stipulated agreement, the court stated that, while the
stipulation represents the parties’ voluntary acquiescence in an
equitable settlement, . . . once it has been merg ed into the
judgment and decree, it does no t operate as a bar to later
consideration of whether a change in circumstances warrants a
modification. . . . Instead, its relevance in a modification
context is in the identificati on of the baseline circumstances
against which claims of substantial change are evaluated.

568 N.W.2d at 709 (citation omitted). The c ourt then affirmed the district court’s
conclusion that a substantial change in circ umstances had been demonstrated under the
facts presented in that case, even though the stipulated agreement provided for temporary
spousal maintenance.

3 In addition, this same session law also introduced the concept of seeking to maintain the
“standard of living establishe d during the marriage” as a c onsideration in the award of
spousal maintenance. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1(b); 1985 Minn. Laws ch. 266, § 2. In
1988, another amendment provided for biennial adjustments in maintenance to account for
increases in the cost of living. 1988 Minn. Laws ch. 668, § 25 (currently codified in Minn.
Stat. § 518A.75, subd. 1(a) (2018)).

7
Similarly here, the fact that the tempor ary maintenance award was the result of a
stipulated agreement should not be determinative in the absence of an actual waiver of the
right to seek modification in the future. Instead, the motion for m odification should be
analyzed under the factors set out in Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, with the stipulation serving as
“the identification of the baseline circumst ances against which claims of substantial
change” are to be evaluated.4 Id. This is particularly true where, as in this case, the MTA
contained an express waiver barring Boldon from seeking future spousal maintenance, but
contained no corresponding restri ction on Hendrix, thereby preserving her right to seek
future modifications.
For all of the above reasons, we conclude that the district court misapplied the law
by failing to consider, as a possible basis to support Hendrix’s motion to modify her
maintenance award, her allegation that she faile d to achieve self-sufficiency. Therefore,
we reverse the denial of that motion and remand for the district court to readdress whether
Hendrix showed a substantial change in circumstances rendering her existing maintenance
award unreasonable and unfair. In reaching our conclusion, we do not express any opinion
on the merits of those questions. On rema nd, the district court shall have discretion
regarding whether to reopen the record.
Reversed and remanded.

4 Thus, for example, the district court should determine Hendrix’s current reasonable
expenses as part of its evaluation of Hendrix’s motion for modification, and measure that
against the baseline of her expenses at the time of the dissolution set out in the judgment.