State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1641

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Otto Rene Gonzalez Bautista,
Appellant.

Filed September 8, 2020
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Nobles County District Court
File No. 53-CR-15-35

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Joseph M. Sanow, Nobles County Attorney, Worthington, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Lydia Maria Villalva Lijo,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Reyes, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant Ott o Rene Gonzalez Bautista appeals his conviction for first -degree
criminal sexual conduct, arguing that the state provided insufficient evidence and that the
district court plainly erred by allowing the nurse practitioner who examined the victim to

2
vouch for the victim’s credibility. There existed sufficient evidence to support the jury’s
guilty verdicts and the nurse practitioner’s testimony did not affect Gonzalez Bautista’s
substantial rights. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
On January 13, 2015, respondent State of Minnesota charged Gonzalez Bautista
with first-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a)
(2014), and second-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343,
subd. 1(a) (2014), for sexual penetration and sexual contact with a person under the age
of 13. Both charges arose from allegations of Gonzalez Bautista’s inappropriate sexual
behavior with victim L.M. A three-day jury trial occurred beginning on July 5, 2019 , in
Nobles county district court , and the following facts are consistent with the jury’s guilty
verdicts.
L.M., who was 12 years old when she testified, stated that L.B. was her babysitter
almost every day and sometimes overnight. Gonzalez Bautista lived in L.B.’s home, and
it was at L.B.’s home that Gonzalez Bautista committed the sexual conduct. L.M. testified
that Gonzalez Bautista began to touch her inappropriately when she was five or six years
old, and the incidents occurred for about one year. She testified that he would touch her
“bad parts” two to three times a day when L.B. babysat her. Gonzalez Bautista would rub
her vagina and insert two of his finger s inside of her. Sometimes the touching occurred
while he was w atching pornography. He a lso made her touch his penis, grabbing and
moving her hand if she did not do it when he asked.

3
On cross examination , Gonzalez Bautista’s trial counsel asked L.M. about sexual
abuse from John Doe, a man who also lived at L.B.’s home. L.M. testified that Doe also
abused her by inappropriately touching her “bad parts” when she was between the ages of
five and seven, and that he would insert his pinkie into her vagina. L.M. admitted that she
gets some things confused between what Gonzalez Bautista did and what Doe did
“[b]ecause it’s hard to like like because what they did was similar but there was some stuff
that was different that makes me mixed up.” She later clarified that she is confident that
Gonzalez Bautista sexually abused her while L.B. babysat her “[b]ecause he used to do it
mostly like every day when I was at their house.”
The state obtained testimony from the nurse practitioner from Child’s Voice who ,
within two months following the period in which L.M. was abused, completed the physical
and medical evaluation of L.M . The nurse practitioner testified that the results of L.M.’s
physical genital exam were normal, which means that “[s]he didn’t have any signs of
trauma on any part of her body.” The nurse practitioner testified that this is typical a s
genital tissue heals quickly and any acute stress typically does not last more than five days.
She opined that, “based on her history,” L.M. had been sexually abused . She explained
that “our histories are very important . . . a lot of times [children] cannot verbally give the
details that we as adults can. So it’s really important that we talk to the adults who are their
caregivers, ah, and the child as well.” On cross examination, the nurse practitioner stated
that L.M. did mention vaginal and anal penile penetration by Doe. She elaborated that it
is common for children to make additional statements about other sexual abuse when they
feel they are in a safe space.

4
Gonzalez Bautista denied all of the criminal sexual conduct during his testimony .
The jury found Gonzalez Bautista guilty on both counts. The district court entered a
conviction only for the first-degree criminal sexual conduct count and sentenced Gonzalez
Bautista to 144 months’ imprisonment. Gonzalez Bautista appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The state provided sufficie nt evidence to convict Gonzalez Bautista of first -
degree criminal sexual conduct.

Gonzalez Bautista argues that the state provided insufficient evidence to support his
conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct1 because (1) L.M.’s testimony was not
credible, (2) the state did not prove the specific timeframe in which the abuse occurred ,
and (3) L.M.’s testimony left a possibility that she confused Gonzalez Bautista with Doe.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts conduct “a
painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a
light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the
verdict which they did.” State v. Webb , 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). Appellate
courts “assume the jury believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the
contrary.” State v. Ortega , 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012). “This is especially true
whe[n] resolution of the case depends on conflicting testimony, because weighing
credibility of witnesses is the exclusive function of the jury.” State v. Pieschke,

1 Although Gonzalez Bautista ’s sufficiency -of-the-evidence argument covers both first -
and second-degree criminal sexual conduct, the district court entered a conviction for the
first-degree count only. Because Gonzalez Bautista was not adjudicated and sentenced for
second-degree criminal sexual conduct, we need not decide if there is sufficient evidence
for that count. See State v. Ashland, 287 N.W.2d 649, 650 (Minn. 1979).

5
295 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1980). “The verdict will not be overturned if the fact-finder,
upon application of the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proving an
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably have found the defendant guilty of
the charged offense.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016).
Gonzalez Bautista first argues that L.M.’s testimony was not credible because there
was no corroborating evidence and she “did not connect any specific incidents of abuse
with dates or events and she testified only in broad strokes.” Gonzalez Bautista argues that
we cannot assume that the jury fo und L.M. credible based on the guilty verdict because
multiple witnesses testified and they could have believed one of those witnesses instead of
L.M. We are unconvinced. First, “a conviction can rest on the uncorr oborated testimony
of a single credible witness.” State v. Foreman , 680 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. 2004)
(quotation omitted); see also Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1 (2014). Second, L.M. was the
only testifying witness , other than Gonzalez Bautista, to the incidents of sexual assault.
The state’s other witnesses relayed L.M.’s prior consistent statement, bolstering her
testimony. We infer from the jury’s verdicts that they found L.M. credible.
Gonzalez Bautista next argues that the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the offense occurred within the timeframe listed on the complaint. Our supreme court
has previously held that the exact date of an offense is not an essential element of criminal
sexual conduct crimes. State v. Becker, 351 N.W.2d 923, 927 (Minn. 1984). The jury was
provided a general timeframe based on the victim’s testimony regarding her age at the time
of the offense and the date of her disclosures. The complaint specified that the crime
occurred “on or about September, 2012 and continu [ed] through November, 2014.”

6
Because L.M.’s testimony supports the events having occurred within this date range,
Gonzalez Bautista’s argument fails.
Finally, Gonzalez Bautista argues that L.M.’s testimony left the possibility that she
confused Gonzalez Bautista with Doe as her abuser. We disagree. Though L.M. admitted
that she confused some of the abuse caused by the two individuals , she stated that she
definitely knew that Gonzalez Bauti sta sexually abused her “[b]ecause he used to do it
mostly like every day when I was at their house.” As previously analyzed, we must
presume the jury found L.M. credible and her testimony is eno ugh to support the
conviction.
II. The testimony of the nurse practitioner did not affect appellant’s substantial
rights.

Gonzalez Bautista argues that reversible error occurred because the nurse
practitioner testified that, “based on her history,” L.M. had been sexually abused. Gonzalez
Bautista claims this is improper vouching testimony. Because we conclude that any
purported error did not affect Gonzalez Bautista’s substantial rights, we need not decide
whether such testimony was improper vouching.
Because Gonzalez Bautista did not object to this aspect of the nurse practitioner’s
testimony at trial , he generally forfeits any right to appellate relief. State v. Webster ,
894 N.W.2d 782, 786 (Minn. 2017). However, appellate courts can review the claim
pursuant to the plain-error doctrine. Id. “Under the plain error doctrine, the appellant must
show (1) error ; (2) that was plain; and (3) that affected substantial rights.” State v.
Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d 780, 785 (Minn. 2017) ; see Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02 . An

7
appellant’s argument fails under the plain -error analysis if any one of these elements are
not met. See Webster, 894 N.W.2d at 786. Even if an appellant establishes these three
elements, appellate courts may only correct the error “if it seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d at 785
(quotation omitted).
The nurse practitioner testified, “Based on her history, um, I diagnosed that [L.M.]
had been sexually abused, even with a normal genital exam.” She later testified that
gathering the history from the child’s parents is important because “ [a] lot of times
[children] cannot verbally give the details that we as adults can.” She described her usual
examination by stating, “I will give my medical impression of what was disclosed du ring
that forensic interview, in conjunction with the history that I have got ten from the parents
as well.”
We will presume without deciding that the district court plainly erred by allowing
the nurse practitioner’s testimony . However, Gonzalez Bautista has not shown that the
error affected his substantial rights. “With respect to the substantial -rights requirement,
[the appellant] bears the burden of establishing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the
absence of the error would have had a signifi cant effect on the jury’s verdict.” State v.
Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 38 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
Gonzalez Bautista fails to meet this requirement . First, the jury heard L.M.’s
testimony, the testimony of the man to whom L.M. initially disclosed the abuse , the
testimony of the officer to whom L.M. initially disclosed the abuse, and L.M.’s complete
Child’s Voice interview. Therefore, Gonzalez Bautista has not shown there is a reasonable

8
likelihood that the absence of the nurse practitioner’s test imony would have had a
significant effect on the jury’s verdict. Gonzalez Bautista’s argument fails the plain-error
analysis because he did not show that his substantial rights were affected.
Affirmed.