State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 8).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1657

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Richard James Gibson,
Appellant.

Filed July 27, 2020
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge*

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69HI-CR-17-909

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Jeffrey M. Vlatkovi ch, Assistant County
Attorney, Hibbing, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Schellhas, Judge .

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction f or failing to register as a predatory offender ,
arguing that the evidence that he knowingly failed to register is insufficient to support his
conviction. We affirm.
FACTS
On September 22, 1997, appellant Richard James Gibson was convicted of second-
degree criminal sexual conduct, and the district court sentenced him to 64 months ’
imprisonment. As a result of this conviction under Minnesota law, Gibson was required to
register as a predatory offender for ten years after his release from incarceration. On the
day of his sentencing, Gibson completed and signed a Sex Offender Notification and
Registration Form. The form included Gibson’s current address and place of emp loyment.
By signing the form, Gibson acknowledged that he understood that he was required to
register as a sexual offender for ten years from the date that he was initially required to
register, excluding any period of confinement. Gibson also acknowledged that he
understood that he was “legally required to supply the requested data under Minn. Stat.
§ 243.166” and that “failure to comply or to provide false information” could result in a
gross misdemeanor or felony conviction.
On June 4, 2001, in preparat ion for his July 30, 2001 release from prison, Gibson
completed and signed the Minnesota Predatory Offender Registration form. On this form,
Gibson initialed a series of declarations indicating that he understood the various
obligations of his registration. These declarations included Gibson’s understanding that :

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(1) he had the duty to register as a predatory offender; (2) he had to register for a period of
ten years from the date he initially had to register; (3) if he was convicted of any new
offense, he would be required to register for ten years after his release from incarceratio n;
and (4) the term of his registration would be extended by five years if he was convicted of
any violation of Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (2000). Under the listed terms, the form pr ovided:
I HAVE READ AND/OR HAD READ TO ME, THE ABOVE
REQUIREMENTS. I UNDERSTAND IT IS MY DUTY TO
REGISTER AND THAT FAILURE TO DO SO IS A
FELONY IN VIOLATION OF MINN. STAT. § 243.166.

Gibson signed the form d irectly under this statement.
On September 16, 2002, the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) sent Gibson
a letter to verify his registration information. The letter stated that Gibson’s registratio n
term was August 19, 2002, through August 18, 2012. The letter also stated that the “end
date is subject to change based on violations of the registration requirements, commissio n
of new offenses, or any period of incarceration after 8/01/2000,” and that the BCA would
“inform [Gibson] in writing when [Gibson] . . . completed [his] registration period.” Gibson
completed the registration form on September 20, 2002. Th e form included statements
similar to those that Gibson acknowledged with his initials on the 2001 registration form,
but the form also included a statement that Gibson understood that he was required to
“register any changes of employment, vehicles, other residences, including all property
[Gibson owns], lease[s] or rent[s].” Gibson again initialed each statement and signed the
bottom of the form on September 20, 2002.

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On July 23, 2004, Gibson was convicted of violating the predatory -offend er
registration requirements under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5 (2002). Based on his
conviction, Gibson’s ten -year registration period started over and was extended by five
years. The end date of Gibson’s registration period was therefore extended to July 3, 2019.
On July 23, Gibson completed a Predatory Offender Court Notification and Registratio n
Advisory. He initialed the statements on the form that provided that he understood the
registration requirements, including that incarceration for a new offense would restart his
ten-year registration requirement, and that his registration requirement would be extended
if he was convicted of violating Minn. Stat. § 243.66 subd. 5. Gibson’s initials on the form
also reflected his understanding that he was required to register any changes in employment
and vehicles. After reading and initialing the document, Gibson signed the form.
In the fall of 2004, Gibson moved to Kentucky. On October 4, 2004, the BCA
mailed Gibson a registration verification letter that was similar to the one previously mailed
to him in September 2002, except that the letter stated that Gibson’s registration term was
now October 24, 2003, through October 23, 2013. The letter also stated that Gibson’s
registration term was subject to change.
On September 19, 2005, the BCA sent Gibson another letter informing him t hat,
due to a change in Minnesota law, individuals not living in the state of Minnesota were no
longer required to register in Minnesota and requested that Gibson complete and return an
enclosed verification form. The letter also stated that the change in Minnesota law did not
change Gibson’s requirement to register in Kentucky, and that if he returned to Minneso ta,
he would be re quired to register through his end registration date . The letter set forth

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Gibson’s registration term as July 4, 2004, though July 3, 2019, and included the following
explanation: “10 Years from Incarceration + 5Yrs Violation Conv .”
With the September 1 9, 2005 letter, the BCA e nclosed a registration form like the
previous forms completed by Gibson. The form included numerous statements regarding
Gibson’s registration obligations. Paragraph three of the form stated: “I understand that I
must register for a minimum period of 10 years from the date I was originally registered. ”
Gibson placed a question mark next to this statement, instead of initialing it. But he did
initial the statements that noted his understanding that incarceration would restart his
registration period and that any convictions under Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (2004) would
extend his registration period by five additional years. Gibson also initialed the statement
that he understood that he was required to register any changes in his vehicles and
employment. He signed the bottom of the form on October 7, 2005.
In 2017, Gibson moved back to Minnesota, and Kentucky state police called him in
Minnesota to inform him that he was required to register in Minnesota. On October 15,
2017, Gibson went to the Hibbing Police Department to register as a predatory offender
and met with a police officer , who provided Gibson with a registration form. Gibson
completed the form, registering his address as a home in Hibbing, Minnesota. He did not
list any place of employment or vehicles on the form.
At some point, Gibson sent a letter to the BCA, asking about his end registratio n
date. The parties dispute the date on which Gibson sent the letter, which is undated. In the
letter, Gibson noted that he “was informed [his] registry date [was in] 2019” but believed
that his end registration date was in 2013, and he asked the BCA to “please look into this.”

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An officer with the St. Louis County Sheriff’s Office testified at trial that he understood
that Gibson sent the letter after he met with police o n October 15, 2017. Gibson testified
that he sent the letter to the BCA in 2005, after he received the BCA’s September 19, 2005
letter. But the return address on the letter was the Hibbing address that Gibson registered
as his home address on October 15, 2017.
On October 30, 2017, the BCA responded to Gibson’s undated letter and informed
him that his end registration date was July 3, 2019. Specifically, the letter explained that
Gibson’s ten -year registration period was restarted and extended for five additional years
when Gibson was convicted of violating the predatory -offender registration requirements
under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5.
On October 19, 2017, police went to Gibson’s registered home addre ss in Hibbing.
Gibson was not home, but police spoke with his aunt, who said that Gibson was in Duluth
and had just been terminated from his employment. On October 24, police again went to
Gibson’s Hibbing address and spoke with Gibson, who told them that he was hired by
General Cleaners in Duluth at the end of September 2017 and was terminated on October
18, 2017. He also told the police that he had been driving back and forth from his Hibbing
home to Duluth until he was cited for having a revoked or suspended license.
On December 7, 2017, respondent State of Minnesota charged Gibson with violating
the predatory-offender registration requirements under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a)
(2016). Gibson waived his right to a jury trial, and the district cour t conducted a bench
trial. The state called the two police officers involved with Gibson’s registration and
alleged violation. Gibson testified in his own defense. He testified that he received and read

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the BCA’s September 19, 2005 letter that informed him that his registration requirement
would end on July 3, 2019. He also testified that he received a phone call from Kentucky
state police who told him he needed to regi ster in Minnesota, that he went to the Hibbing
Police Department on October 15, 2017, and registered his Hibbing address with police.
He confirmed that at the time he registered his Hibbing address as his home, he was
employed in Duluth and was driving vehicles to and from Duluth but did not register his
place of employment or vehicles.
The district court found Gibson guilty of knowingly violating his predatory-offend er
registration requirements and sentenced him to 24 months in prison.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
I. The evidence i s sufficient to support the “knowing” element o f Gibson’s
failure-to-register offense.

Gibson argues that the state failed to prove that he knowingly failed to register as a
predatory offender. He asserts s pecifically that “the BCA told [ Gibson] that he was only
required to register until 2013, which conflicted with his 2019 registration end date, and
the BCA did not respond to [Gibson’s] requests for clarification prior to October 15, 2017.”
The parties disagree over whether the traditional direct -evidence standard or the
heightened circumstantial-evidence standard applies to our review of the sufficiency of the
evidence. Gibson argues that his conviction was based on circumstantial evidence. The
state argues that the conviction was based on direct evidence, and notes that: (1) Gibson
signed registration forms acknowledging his understanding of the requirements of

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registration, including the requirement to register his place of employment and v ehicles;
(2) Gibson testified that he received the September 19, 2005, letter from the BCA
informing him that he was required to register until July 3, 2019; (3) Gibson testified that
Kentucky state police informed him that he was required to register in M innesota; and
(4) Gibson acknowledged that he registered his residence at the Hibbing Police Department
but did not provide information concerning his place of employment or vehicles.
Direct evidence is evidence “based on personal knowledge or observation and that,
if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592,
599 (Minn. 2017). Moreover, direct evidence can be provided in the form of testimony by
a person who perceived the fact through their senses or physical e vidence of the fact itself.
State v. Williams, 337 N.W.2d 387, 389 (Minn. 1983). Although some inference is required
to interpret evidence presented through testimony, that “does not render otherwise direct
evidence circumstantial.” State v. Brazil, 906 N. W.2d 274, 279 (Minn. App. 2017), review
denied (Mar. 20, 2018).
Because we conclude that the district court based Gibson’s conviction on direct
evidence, we apply the dir ect-evidence standard of review. Under this traditional standard
of review, we condu ct “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient.” State
v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). We assume that the
district court believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved evidence to the contrary. State
v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). “We use the same

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standard of review in bench trials and in jury trials in evaluating the sufficiency of the
evidence.” State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011).
To convict a predatory offender of failing to register, the state is required to prove
that: (1) the defendant is required to register as a predatory offender; (2) the defendant
knowingly violated a registration requirement or intentionally provided false informatio n
to law enforcement; (3) the registration time period has not elapsed; and (4) venue. Minn.
Stat. § 243.166 (2016). Gibson challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence concerning
the second element—that he “knowingly violated” his registration requirements. See State
v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d 600, 603-04 (Minn. 2017) (providing that “the knowledge and the
violation must occur at the same time ”).
Here, Gibson testified at trial that he believed that his registration requirement
expired in 2013, not 2019, citing the BCA letters that contained conflicting end registratio n
dates. He claimed that when he received the BCA’s September 19, 2005 letter, he sent a
handwritten letter along with his October 7, 2005 registration form, explaining his
confusion over his end registration date and requesting that the Minnesota BCA “please
look into this.” Gibson testified that the BCA did not respond to his letter until October 30,
2017, nearly 12 years after he sent his letter of inquiry. The district court found Gibson’s
testimony about when he se nt the undated letter not credible. Specifically, the court noted
Gibson’s residence in Kentucky in 2005, and that he the address listed in Gibson’s undated
letter to the BCA was his address in Hibbing, Minnesota —the address he first registered
with the Hibbing Police Department in 2017.

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The district court found that the balance of Gibson’s testimony was credible direct
evidence that established his guilt. See Williams 337 N.W.2d at 389 (providing that
“[d]irect evidence is the testimony of a person who perceived the fact through his sense,
and testifies to it”). Gibson acknowledged in his testimony that he signed several forms in
which he acknowledged that h e understood his registration requirements. He testified that
he received the September 19, 2005, letter from the BCA, which informed him that his end
registration date was July 3, 2019. He confirmed that Kentucky state police told him that
he was required to register in Minnesota upon his return to the state in 2017. Based on his
conversation with the Kentucky state police, he acknowledged that he went to the Hibbing
Police Department on October 15, 2017, and registered his home address in Hibbing but
did not register his place of employment or vehicles. Although neither party offered as
evidence the 2017 offender registration form, Gibson testified that he did not list his
employment or vehicles on that form as he was required to do by Minn. Stat. § 243.166,
subd. 4(a). The district court found this evidence conclusively establishes that Gibson knew
that he needed to register when he registered a t the Hibbing Police Department but simply
chose not to report his place of employment or vehicles.
We con clude that the evidence is sufficient to support Gibson’s conviction for
failing to register as a predatory offender.
Affirmed.