State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1659

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Anike Tatiaramika Jiles,
Appellant.

Filed July 27, 2020
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-18-2488

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Heather Pipenhagen, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and John P.
Smith, Judge.

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
Anike Tatiaramika Jiles intentionally injured a 22-month-old child whom she was
babysitting by forcing the child’s hands into extremely hot water and holding them there
until the child suffered severe burns . Jiles pleaded guilty to first -degree assault and
admitted to the existence of three aggravating factors. T he district court impos ed a
sentence of 206 months of imprisonment, which is twice as long as the maximum
presumptive sentence. We conclude that the district cour t did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing Jiles and, therefore, affirm.
FACTS
On September 23, 2018, Jiles was babysitting L.G., the 22-month-old daughter of a
woman with whom Jiles was romantically involved. At some point in the evening, Jiles
placed L.G.’s hands in hot water, causing severe burns. After law-enforcement officers
arrived, Jiles told a medic that the girl had sustained the injuries while washing her hands.
But after L.G. was taken to a hospital, the treating physician told law enforce ment that he
believed that the child’s injuries were consistent with a “dipping” type of injury, whereby
the child’s hands were submerged into hot liquid. Jiles later changed her story and told a
police officer that she was washing a personal item in the bathroom sink and forgot that
the sink was still full of hot water and bleach when she sent the child to go wash her hands.
After being questioned further, Jiles again changed her story and said that she was helping
the child wash her hands by standing behind her when the child exclaimed that the water
was “hot, hot,” and Jiles realized that the child’s hands were badly burned. As a result of

3
the burns, L.G. underwent multiple skin -graft surgeries an d will re quire additional
treatment, including additional surgeries, in the future.
The state initially charged Jiles with third-degree assault, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.223, subd. 1 (2018), and child endangerment, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.378,
subd. 1(b)(1) (2018). Later, after the severity of L.G.’s injuries became more apparent, the
state amended the complaint to add a charge of first-degree assault, in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2018). The state also gave notice of its intent to seek an upward
departure based on three aggravating factors: the particular vulnerability of the victim, the
particular cruelty of the offense, and the fact that Jiles was in a position of trust or authority.
Jiles pleaded guilty to first -degree ass ault and a dmitted to the three aggravating
factors asserted by the state. The district court ordered a pre-sentence investigation (PSI).
The PSI report stated that there were no identifiable mitigating factors but “substantial
and/or compelling aggravating factors.” The probation officer noted that the presumptive
sentencing range was 74 to 103 months and recommended that the district court impose a
prison sentence of 206 months.
Before sentencing, Jiles moved for a downward dispositional or durational
departure. She argued that she was amenable to probation, has a strong support system,
was remorseful, had taken positive steps since committing the crime, and lacked a criminal
history. The district court denied Jiles’s motion and imposed a sentence 206 months of
imprisonment. The district court noted that it had made an upward durational departure
based on the child’s particular vulnerability, the particular cruelty of the crime, and Jiles’s
position of authority. Jiles appeals.

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D E C I S I O N
I. Motion for Downward Departure
We begin by addressing an argument in Jiles’s pro se supplemental brief , which
logically precedes the other arguments made by her and on her behalf. She argues that the
district court erred by denying her motion for a downward dispositional departure on the
ground that she is particularly amenable to probation. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.a.7
(2018).
The requirement that a defendant be “particularly” amenable to probation “ensure[s]
that the defendant’s amenability to probation distinguishes the defendant from most others
and truly presents the ‘substantial[ ] and compelling circumstances’ that are necessary to
justify a departure.” State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2014) (quoting Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.D.1). In determining whether a defendant is particularly amenable to
probation, a district court may consider, among other things, “the defendant’s age, [her]
prior record, [her] remorse, [her] cooperation, [her] attitude while in court, and the support
of friends and/or family.” State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). A district court
need not discuss all of the Trog factors if the district court denies a motion for a downward
dispositional departure. State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 254 (Minn. App. 2011).
In this case, the district court considered Jiles’s argument and found that she is not
particularly amenable to probation. The district court referred specifically to Jiles’s failure
to timely submit to psychological evaluations and her failure to follow through with
treatment despite evidence that she needed it. The district court said to Jiles, “ what that
tells me is that at every turn, you are going to question probation.” This statement indicates

5
that the district court considered Jiles to be not amenable to probation. Jiles contends that
she previously successfully completed a term of probation, engaged in anger-management
counseling, and received mental -health a nd chemical -dependency treatment . But o ther
evidence in the record , particularly Jiles’s psychological evaluation, indicates that she is
not amenable to probation. The district court was well within its discretion when it
considered but rejected Jiles’s argument that she is particularly amenable to probation
Thus, the district court did not err by denying Jiles’s motion for a downward
dispositional departure.
II. Duration of Sentence
With the assistance of appellate counsel, Jiles argues that the district court erred by
imposing a sentence of 206 months of imprisonment. She does not argue that the district
court erred by departing upward from the presumptive sentence range. She acknowledges
that the district court’s selection of a sentence was a matter of discretion and that this court
applies an abuse -of-discretion standard of review. She contends that the sentence is
excessive in light of mitigating factors. She requests that this court “reduce the excessive
sentence to a term that is commensurate to [her] level of culpability.”
In general, “the extent of [an upward sentencing] departure should be limited to that
justified by the reason for departure .” State v. Schantzen , 308 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn.
1981). “We will inter fere with the district court’s sentencing discretion only when the
sentence is disproportionate to the offense or unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the
defendant’s conduct.” State v. Ali, 895 N.W.2d 237, 247 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
The supreme court has stated that, as a general rule, an upward durational departure that is

6
otherwise proper will not be reversed so long as it is no more than “double the presumptive
sentence length.” State v. Evans, 311 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Minn. 1981). To be more specific,
“the Evans rule . . . authorize[s] a sentence that is twice the upper end of the presumptive
sentencing range.” State v. Barthman, 938 N.W.2d 257, 269 (Minn. 2020). In this case,
the 206-month sentence imposed on Jiles is exactly twice the upper end of the presumptive
sentencing range, 103 months. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A (2018).
Jiles contends that the 206-month sentence is an abuse of discretion in light of
multiple mitigating factors. She asserts that she has certain cognitive and psychological
limitations that impair her executive functioning and rational decision -making, such as
obsessive-compulsive tendencies and her own experience of being abused as a child. A
district court should consider a defendant’s diminished capacity as a mitigating factor when
imposing a sentence. State v. Wall, 343 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Minn. 1984). Nonetheless, “[t]he
degree to which [a defendant] lacked substantial capacity for judgment is the type of factual
issue best decided by the trial cou rt” and may be offset by the vulnerability of the victim.
State v. Barsness, 473 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Minn. App. 1991). The record does not reflect
that Jiles has cognitive or behavioral deficits that significantly impair her capacity for
judgment. We have reviewed Jiles’s confidential psychological evaluation , and we
conclude, for reasons that we refrain from disclosing in this opinion, that it supports the
district court’s sentence. See Minn. R. Pub. Access to R ecs. of Jud. Branch 4,
subd. 1(b), (f).
Jiles also asserts that she expressed remorse after the incident by comforting L.G.
after burning her, accompanying L.G. to the hospital, keeping her mother informed about

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her treatment, and continuing to express regret at sentencing. At the sentencing he aring,
Jiles expressed remorse during her opportunity for allocution. In response, the district court
stated to Jiles that her claims of remorse are undercut by her failure to follow through on
chemical-dependency treatment and mental-health treatment. This statement indicates that
the district court did not believe that Jiles was remorseful.
The state contends that this court should compare Jiles’s sentence to sentences
imposed on other defendants in similar cases. See State v. McLaughlin, 725 N.W.2d 703,
715 (Minn. 2007). The state has cited one precedential opinion and several non -
precedential opinions in which similarly long sentences were imposed for first -degree
assaults against young children. See State v. Petschl, 692 N.W.2d 463, 472-73 (Minn. App.
2004) (affirming 196-month sentence where defendant fractured skull of three -week-old
infant), review denied (Minn. Jan. 20, 2005); see also State v. Ahmed, No. A18-0977, 2019
WL 1430689 , at *5 (Minn. App. Apr . 1, 2019) (affirming 201 -month sentence w here
defendant abused two -month-old infant, causing severe and permanent injuries), review
denied (Minn. May 28, 2019 ); State v. Crump , No. A15-1690, 2016 WL 6826235 , at *1
(Minn. App. Nov. 21, 2016) (reviewing conviction of defendant sentenced to 206 months
for assaulting 15-month-old infant, causing brain damage), review denied (Minn. Feb. 14,
2017); State v. Tate, No. A14-1339, 2016 WL 952444, at *7-8 (Minn. App. Mar. 14, 2016)
(affirming 206-month sentence where defendant shot four-year-old child in leg), review
denied (Minn. May 31, 2016). Jiles cites opinions in which defendants were convicted of
and sentenced for the crime of malicious punishment of a child causing great bodily harm,
a crime she says the state could have charged in this case. But that is not the crime to which

8
Jiles pleaded guilty , so th e sentences imposed in those cases do not provide a proper
comparison.
In sum, the mitigating factors on which Jiles relies do not demonstrate that the
district court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence of 206 months of imprisonment.
The evidence of Jiles’s cognitive and psychological limitations was not especially
convincing. The district court expressly rejected Jiles’s personal statements that she was
remorseful. And the sentence that was imposed is not disproportionate in light of sentences
imposed in other cases of first-degree assaults against small children.
Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err by imposing a sentence of 206
months of imprisonment.
Affirmed.