Teresa Michelle Peterson, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1660

Teresa Michelle Peterson, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed July 27, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Johnson, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-CR-17-1827

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney, Stephanie Shook, Assistant County
Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
In 2017, Teresa Michelle Peterson pleaded guilty to third-degree possession of
amphetamines in a school zone. In 2019, she petitioned for post-conviction relief, arguing
that she should be allowed to withdraw her guilty plea because she had a mistaken

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understanding of her criminal-history score. She argued in the alternative that she should
be resentenced to a shorter period of imprisonment and that a condition of her probation
should be amended. The post-conviction court denied Peterson’s motion to withdraw her
guilty plea but granted her alternative requests for resentencing and modification of the
probation condition. We conclude that the post -conviction court did not err by
resentencing Peterson instead of allowing her to withdraw her guilty plea. But we conclude
that the post -conviction court e rred by filing a warrant of commitment that did not
implement the relief that was granted with respect to the probation condition . Therefore,
we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions to file a second amended
warrant of commitment that conforms to the order granting post-conviction relief.
FACTS
In May 2017, a Crosby police officer searched Peterson’s purse in a school parking
lot and found marijuana, Ativan pills, and drug paraphernalia. The state charged Peterson
with (1) third-degree possession of amphetamines in a school zone, in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 152.023, subd. 2(a)(6) (2016); (2) fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance,
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2016); and (3) possession of a hypodermic
syringe or needle, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 151.40, subd. 1 (2016).
In June 2017, a pre-sentence investigator assigned Peterson a criminal-history score
of 1 based on a prior felony conviction in Wisconsin in 2004. In August 2017, Peterson
pleaded guilty to count 1 pursuant to a plea agreement in which the state agreed to dismiss
counts 2 and 3 and to recommend a 27-month stayed sentence and 20 years of supervised
probation. Peterson waived a pre -sentence investigation report. The district court

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sentenced Peterson in accordance with the state’s recommendation. The district court filed
a warrant of commitment that included 18 conditions of probation.
In January 2019, a probation officer filed a probation-violation report in which she
alleged that Peterson had violated eight conditions of her probation. Shortly thereafter,
Peterson petitioned for post-conviction relief and asserted three claims for relief. First, she
argued that her guilty plea was invalid on the ground that it was involuntary because she
had a mistaken belief that her criminal-history score was 1 (instead of 0) and because her
mental-health issues caused her to feel pressured to plead guilty . She requested that the
post-conviction court allow her to withdraw h er guilty plea. S econd, she argued in the
alternative that, if she were not allowed to withdraw her plea, the post-conviction court
should resentence her based on a criminal-history score of 0 and impose a 21-month stayed
sentence. Third, she argued, again in the alternative, that two of the probation conditions
in the warrant of commitment are unlawful on the ground that they would allow
unreasonable searches and seizures. She requested that the post-conviction court vacate
one condition and clarify the other.
The post-conviction court conducted a hearing in May 2019 at which the parties
presented oral arguments. The post -conviction court filed an order and memorandum in
August 2019 in which it granted the petition in part and d enied it in part . The post -
conviction court agreed with Peterson that her criminal -history score should have been 0 ,
not 1. The post-conviction court determined that the appropriate remedy for that error was
not plea withdrawal but, rather, resentencing based on the corrected criminal-history score.

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The post -conviction court also granted Peterson’s request for modification s of two
probation conditions by clarifying that any searches or seizures must be “lawful.”
Three days later , the district court rese ntenced Peterson to a 21-month stayed
sentence, which is the sentence she had suggested in the memorandum accompanying her
post-conviction petition . That same day, the post -conviction court filed two amended
warrants of commitment, both of which restate verbatim the conditions of probation that
were stated in the original warrant of commitment. Peterson appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. Remedy for Erroneous Criminal-History Score
Peterson first argues that the post-conviction court erred by denying her request for
plea withdrawal.
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. State v.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). A district court must grant a defendant’s motion
to withdraw a guilty plea if necessary to “correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P.
15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d at 94. To be constitutionally valid, “a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary,
and intelligent.” Taylor v. State , 887 N.W .2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016). If a defendant’s
guilty plea is not accurate, not voluntary, or not intelligent, the plea is invalid, and the
district court must permit the defendant to withdraw the plea. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d
643, 650 (Minn. 2007). A defendant bears the burden of showing that his or her guilty plea
is invalid. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94.

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“The voluntariness requirement ensures a defendant is not pleading guilty due to
improper pressure or coercion.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. In determining whether a
guilty plea is voluntary, a court must consider all relevant circumstances and “examine[]
what the parties reasonably understood to be the terms of the plea agreement.” Id. The
supreme court has held that, if a defendant decides to plead guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement with a mistaken belief about the resulting sentence, the defendant is entitled to
a remedy.
For example, in State v. Benson, 330 N.W.2d 879 (Minn. 1983), the supreme court
suggested that a defendant who had pleaded guilty pursuant to a mistaken belief concerning
his criminal-history score and his presumptive sentence “could withdraw [his] plea” or
“could let the [district] court resentence him” to “the shortest sentence within the
presumptive sentence range.” Id. at 880-81. In State v. DeZeler, 427 N.W.2d 231 (Minn.
1988), the supreme court considered the argument of a defendant who had pleaded guilty
under similar circumstances. Id. at 235. The supreme court reasoned that the defendant
could withdraw his guilty plea so long as his guilty plea was based on the mistaken
assumption that the presumptive sentence would be a stayed sentence and there were no
independent grounds for an upward departure from the presumptive sentence. Id. In State
v. Jumping Eagle , 620 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 2000), the supreme court again considered
similar circumstances and held that, on remand, the state should be allowed to present
argument to the district court as to whether plea withdrawal or sentence modification was
the most appropriate remedy. Id. at 45.

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In this case, the post-conviction court considered this line of opinions but reasoned
that the cases were “factually distinguishable from the present case.” The post-conviction
court reasoned as follows:
The criminal history scores of the defendants in [Benson,
DeZeler, and Jumping Eagle ] were discovered to be higher,
rather than lower. This means the defendants were facing more
time than they negotiated for, and even executed time rather
than stayed time. This is unlike Petitioner, who discovered she
would be facing the same disposition and less stayed time if
resentenced. The Court also finds it notable that no case law
was presented to the Court where, like Petitioner, a criminal
history score was found to be lower post -sentencing. The
Court has also not found such a case with those facts during its
research.

Accordingly, the post-conviction court concluded that plea withdrawal is not appropriate.
Peterson reiterates her argument that her guilty plea was based on mistaken belief
about her criminal -history score. But Peterson does not effectively challenge the post -
conviction court’s analysis. In effect, she received the same consideration as the defendant
in Jumping Eagle : consideration by the district court as to whether plea withdrawal or
resentencing is most appropriate. See 620 N.W.2d at 45. She cites no caselaw for the
proposition that plea withdrawal is required if a guilty plea is based on a mistaken
understanding that a longer sentence, rather than a shorter sentence, would be imposed.
We believe that the post -conviction court’s reasoning is logi cal: if a person is willing to
plead guilty and accept a sentence of a given length, the person presumably would have
been willing to plead guilty and accept a sentence that is shorter than the one to which she
agreed. Peterson contends that she “may have been eligible for diversion and ultimately

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dismissal,” but she does not develop the legal basis of the argument, and the factual basis
is lacking as well because Peterson said nothing about the issue in her affidavit.
Peterson also reiterates her argument that her mental -health issues caused her to
plead guilty. The post -conviction court reasoned that Peterson offered “no supporting
documentation, medical records, or third -party affidavits supporting the existence” of her
mental-health conditions, and that her self-diagnostic statements, even viewed in the light
most favorable to her claim, do not rise to the level of a manifest injustice. The post-
conviction court also noted that Peterson made sworn statements in the plea petition that
she had not been treated for any mental-health issues and was not taking any medications
at the time of her guilty plea. In addition, Peterson denied in her plea petition that any
person had made any promises or threats toward her to obtain her guilty plea, and she
denied under oath at the plea hearing that she was pressured or coerced in any way. The
post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Peterson’s argument for these
reasons.
Thus, the post-conviction court did not err by concluding that Peterson’s guilty plea
was voluntary and by resentencing her to a shorter stayed sentence instead of allowing her
to withdraw her guilty plea.
II. Condition of Probation
Peterson also argues that the post -conviction court erred by not granting her full
relief on her challenge to a condition of her probation.
As stated above, the original warrant of commitment stated 1 8 conditions of
probation. The fifteenth condition was, “Random testing at the request of any peace officer

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or probations agent or corrections officer.” In its order and memorandum ruling on
Peterson’s post -conviction petition, the post -conviction court stated that the fifteenth
condition should be modified to provide, “Lawful testing by any probation officer, peace
officer, or corrections officer.” (Emphasis added.) But the post-conviction court later filed
two amended warrants of commitment that did not incorporate the revision that had been
ordered. Instead, each of the amended warrants of commitment is identical to the warrant
that was filed in 2017.
On appeal, Peterson contends that the post -conviction court erred by not properly
amending the fifteenth condition, as provided in the post-conviction order, and by not
limiting the fifteenth condition to tes ting ordered by her probation officer . She requests
that this court “remand this case . . . with instructions to clarify that Peterson need only
submit to random chemical testing as required by probation.” In response, the state
concedes that the amended warrant of commitment “is incorrect” because it “still states
what was ordered at the original sentencing.” The state requests that “the matter be
remanded for correction of the warrant of commitment to be consistent wit h the district
court’s order.”
We agree that the post-conviction court erred by not filing a warrant of commitment
that conformed to the terms of its earlier order ruling on Peterson’s post -conviction
petition. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to amend the warrant of
commitment to incorporate the ordered modification to the fifteenth probation condition.
To the extent that Peterson seeks additional modifications to the fifteenth probation
condition based on caselaw arising under the Fourth Amendment , we decline to consider

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and resolve that part of her argument. The reasonableness of a search or seizure inevitably
depends on its particular facts . I t would be difficult , if not impossible, to define the
permissible scope of unknown future probationary searches in the man ner Peterson
requests. And even if it were possible, any such ruling by this court effectively would be
an advisory opinion. It is sufficient at this time to conclude that the post-conviction court,
when ordering modifications to the original warrant of commitment, did not err by ordering
that any such future testing must be “lawful.”
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.