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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A19-1664

Hennepin County Chutich, J.
Dissenting, Hudson, Thissen, JJ.
Jamil Joshua Eason, Took no part, Moore, J.

Appellant,

vs. Filed: October 28, 2020
Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,

Respondent.

________________________

Brad Colbert, Legal Assistan ce to Minnesota Prisoners, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for
appellant.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant Hennepin
County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s
postconviction claim that the judge who presided over his trial committed reversible error
by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offenses of first-degree heat of passion
manslaughter and second-degree unintentional felony murder.

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2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s
postconviction claim that the prosecutor co mmitted prosecutorial misconduct when she
declined to reoffer a plea agreement that appellant had previously rejected on the record.
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s
postconviction claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when neither of his
trial attorneys discussed the State’s final plea offer with him or gave him an opportunity to
accept it.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
CHUTICH, Justice.
A Hennepin County jury found appellant Jamil Joshua Eason guilty of first-degree
intentional felony murder in connection with the November 2012 death of Jay Arthur
Rosio. Eason filed a direct appeal, but voluntarily dismissed his appeal before the State
filed its responsive brief. In 2016, Eason filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief
and requested appointment of counsel. After the district court denied the request for
counsel and the petition, Eason appealed. We concluded that the district court erred in not
granting the request to appoint counsel, and remanded the case for appointment of counsel
and further postconviction proceedings. State v. Eason , 906 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn.
2018).
Following remand, appointment of counsel, and a hearing, the case now comes to
us on Eason’s appeal of the district court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief.
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

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FACTS
On November 2, 2012, appellant Jamil Joshua Eason stabbe d and strangled Jay
Arthur Rosio during a burglary and lit Rosio’ s home on fire. Minneapolis firefighters
responding to the fire found Rosio dead on the basement floor and notified the police after
discovering stab wounds. A later investigation discovered that the fire, which came from
several sources of accelerant, had been intentionally set.
An autopsy determined that Rosio had di ed of complex homicidal violence. He
suffered 16 blunt force injuries and at least 4 chop wounds to the head, several wounds to
the face, 2 or 3 stab wounds to the trunk, at least 13 blunt force injuries to the extremities,
and cuts on his hands. Rosio’s body showed si gns of strangulation as well. In addition,
Rosio’s heightened carbon monoxide level suggested that he was breathing for a time after
the fire was set. Eason was subsequently arrested, charged with second-degree intentional
murder, and indicted on first-degree intentional felony murder.
While in jail awaiting trial, Eason confesse d his crime to another inmate, R.L. Eason
told R.L. that he broke into Rosio’s home to steal electronics. Eason told R.L. that, once
inside, he heard a noise and went downstairs to investigate. There he encountered Rosio,
who was startled and asked Eason what he was doing. Eason told Rosio that he was there
to rent a place. In describing what happened next, Eason told R.L. that when Rosio turned
away, he “choked the old guy ou t.” As Eason started looking for items to steal in the
basement, he tripped over Rosio. Rosio awok e, told Eason to leave, and “went for a

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knife.”1 Eason told R.L. that he “snatched the knife” and “went all ham on him,” which
R.L. interpreted to mean that Eason had “gone crazy on [Rosio].” Eason further confided
that in the struggle Eason had cut Rosio on top of the head and stabbed him in the chest.
Eason told R.L. that after Rosio stopped moving, Eason gathered items to steal, cleaned off
the knife and himself, set the home on fire, and left. After Eason confessed, R.L. contacted
police.
Because two of Eason’s claims before us concern unsuccessful plea negotiations,
we set forth the history of the negotiations in detail. The week befo re Eason’s trial, the
prosecutor offered a plea agreement with a sentencing range of between 420 to 480 months
based upon a guilty plea to second-degree intentional mu rder and agreement to two
aggravating sentencing factors. Eason declined the offer on the record. The district court
then asked Eason whether he un derstood the plea offer, and if he had had time to speak
with his counsel about it. Eason said that he did. The district court further asked Eason
“[a]nd do you understand that if you don’t accept the offer, the offer is rejected, it’s not
like just sitting out on the table for you to accept some other time later?” Eason responded,
“[y]es sir.”
On the second day of jury selection, Eason made a counteroffer of 360–480 months,
which the prosecutor discussed with her supe rvisors and declined. Eason’s attorney
responded by asking wh ether the original offer was still available, and the prosecutor
informed him that it was not.

1   Testimony at trial showed that the knife was actually a 30-inch sword.

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Later that day, the prosecutor made a “las t and final offer” on the record to allow
Eason to plead guilty to second -degree intentional murder for an aggravated sentence of
480 months. The last and fina l offer also required Eason to waive his right to a hearing
under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and admit to two aggravating factors.
Eason was present when the offer was made. The judge responded, “Okay. And, sir, you’ll
have time to talk with your attorneys about it. We don’t need to take the time right now.”
The court recessed, and Eason conferred with his attorneys.
During the recess, Eason’s attorneys did not discuss the last plea offer. Rather, after
receiving Eason’s consent, Eason’s attorneys a pproached the prosecutor and asked if she
would allow Eason to plead guilty to the previously offered 420–480 month sentence. The
prosecutor declined Eason’s request. Eason’s attorney made a record of this conversation
and the State’s rejection, expressing his frustration and stating that “there is absolutely no
reason that [the State] should not leave the original offer of 420 to 480 on the table.” Jury
selection then continued. No further plea negotiations ensued.
Eason’s three-day trial included testimony from firefighters, police officers, and
experts from the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension who described the crime scene, Rosio’s
injuries, and the murder investigation. The jury also heard testimony from two witnesses
that, on the night that Rosio was murdered, Eason had gone to a barbershop and sold a
laptop and cell phone that he had stolen from Rosio. R.L, the informant, also testified.
Eason did not testify a nd called no witnesses. At the close of the evidence, Eason’s
attorneys asked the district court to submit jury instructions on the lesser-included offenses
of first-degree heat of passion manslaught er and second-degree unintentional felony

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murder. The district court deni ed the request. The jury su bsequently found Eason guilty
of first-degree intentional felony murder even though it had the opportunity to find him
guilty of the lesser-included o ffense of second-degree inten tional murder. The district
court sentenced Eason to life in prison with the possibility of supervised release after thirty
years.
Eason timely filed a notice of appeal, but then voluntarily dismissed this direct
appeal. See State v. Eason, 906 N.W.2d 840, 841 (Minn. 2018) (explaining the procedural
posture). In 2016, Eason filed a pro se pe tition for postconvictio n relief and requested
appointment of counsel. Id. The district court denied Eason’s postconviction petition
without holding an evidentiary hearing or appointing counsel. Id.
Upon Eason’s appeal from this decision, we concluded that Eason’s right to counsel
had not been fully vindicated. We therefor e remanded his case to the district court for
appointment of counsel to represent Eason in a first review by postconviction proceeding.
Id. at 843.
With assistance of counsel, Eason f iled a petition for postconviction relief
contending that: (1) the judge who presided over his trial committed reversible error by
denying his request for lesser-included jury instructions; (2) the prosecutor had abused her
prosecutorial discretion in plea negotiations; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of
trial counsel during the plea negotiations. The district court denied Eason’s claims related
to the jury instructions and pr osecutorial discretion, but granted an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether Eason received ineffective assistance of counsel.

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At the postconviction eviden tiary hearing, the district court heard testimony from
Eason’s two trial lawyers and the prosecutor. Eason’s defense attorneys each stated that
they did not discuss the State’s last and final offer with Eason. Eason also testified, stating
that he would have been willing to accept th e State’s last plea offer and to provide a
sufficient factual basis to admit guilt.
After assessing the credibility of the witnesses, the district court made findings of
fact and reached several conclusions, includ ing that Eason “was aware of the” State’s
offers. “Throughout the proce ss of plea negotiations, Eason was influenced by others in
custody who were, apparently , telling him to not plead.” Trial counsel “reasonably
believed [Eason] would not accept a plea of 480 months, if asked again.” The district court
noted that Eason’s confession at the last ev identiary hearing “seemed driven more by a
sense of buyer’s remorse than by a true represen tation of what he would have done at the
time.” The district court was “not satisfied that Eason would have pleaded or would have
been able to lay an adequate factual basis at the time of trial.” Finally, the district court
concluded that it was “unlikely the State would have accepted [Eason’s] plea.”
Accordingly, the district court conclu ded that Eason’s claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel failed under each prong of the test announced in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Eason now appeals.
ANALYSIS
We review the district court’s denial of Eason’s requested postconviction relief for
an abuse of discretion. Davis v. State, 784 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. 2010). A district court
“abuses its discretion when its decision is ba sed on an erroneous view of the law or is

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against logic and the f acts in the record.” Riley v. State , 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn.
2012). In making this determination, we revi ew a district court’s factual determinations
for clear error, Scherf v. State, 788 N.W.2d 504, 507 (Minn. 2010), and review the district
court’s legal conclusions de novo, Leake v. State , 737 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. 2007).
Eason alleges that the district court abused its discretion in three ways and seeks a new
trial, or in the alternative, requests a remand to allow him to accept the last and final plea
offer made by the State at trial. We address each of his arguments in turn.
I.
Eason first contends the district cour t abused its discretion in denying his
postconviction claim that the judge who presided over his trial committed reversible error
by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offenses of first-degree heat of passion
manslaughter and second-degree unintentional felony murder.
A defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction when (1) the lesser
offense is included in the charged offense; (2) the evid ence provides a rational basis for
acquitting the defendant of the offense charged; and (3) the evidence provides a rational
basis for convicting the defendant of the lesser-included offense. State v. Dahlin ,
695 N.W.2d 588, 598 (Minn. 2005). When considering this three-part test, the trial judge
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction.
Id. The judge may not weigh the evidence or make cred ibility determinations when
deciding if a lesser-included offense instruction is warranted. Id.

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A.
We first turn to Eason’s argument that th e district court abused its discretion in
denying his postconviction claim that the judge who presided over his trial committed
reversible error by not instruc ting the jury on the lesser-incl uded offense of first-degree
heat of passion manslaughter. Because Eason’s request for a fi rst-degree heat of passion
manslaughter instruction is a lesser-include d offense of first-degree intentional felony
murder, the issue turns on whether the evidence presented at trial, when viewed in a light
most favorable to Eason, provided the jury a rational basis to acquit Eason of first-degree
intentional felony murder, and convict him of first-degree heat of passion manslaughter.
See State v. Stewart , 624 N.W.2d 585, 590 (M inn. 2001) (noting that first-degree heat of
passion manslaughter is a lesser-included offe nse of first-degree intentional felony
murder).
An intentional killing may be mitigated to first-degree heat of passion manslaughter
if (1) the killing was done in the heat of passion, and (2) the pass ion was provoked by
words and acts of another such as would prov oke a person of ordina ry self-control under
like circumstances. State v. Buchanan , 431 N.W.2d 542, 549 (Mi nn. 1988); Minn. Stat.
§ 609.20(1) (2018) (explaining that a pers on commits first-degree heat of passion
manslaughter when the person “intentionally causes the death of another person in the heat
of passion provoked by such words or acts of another as would provoke a person of
ordinary self-control under like circumstances. ”). The first element is subjective and the
second is objective. Buchanan, 431 N.W.2d at 549. Moreover, the phrase “under like

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circumstances” does not “encomp ass the unique mental charac teristics of a particular
defendant.” State v. Bird, 734 N.W.2d 664, 677 (Minn. 2007).
We need not consider the first subjective element here because even when we view
the alleged words and acts of Rosio in a light most favorable to Ea son, they would not
provoke a person of ordi nary self-control under like circumstances. See  State v.
Hohenwald, 815 N.W.2d 823, 834 n.5 (Minn. 2012). Our precedent is instructive on this
issue.
We have previously determined that the victim’s act of shooting the defendant in
the head would provoke a person of ordinary self-control into a heat of passion. State v.
Johnson, 719 N.W.2d 619, 628 (Minn. 2006). By contrast, we have determined in other
cases that a victim’s act of “reach[ing] for a gun” does not satisfy the elements of a heat-
of-passion defense when the de fendant was the initial aggressor. 2 Stiles v. State ,
664 N.W.2d 315, 322 (Minn. 2003). In another case, we concluded that a victim’s act of
“grabb[ing] a knife” after the defendant “smacked” her was insufficient to provoke a person
of ordinary self-control to ac t in the heat of passion. State v. Hale , 453 N.W.2d 704,
706−07 (Minn. 1990); see also State v. Nystrom , 596 N.W.2d 256, 262 (Minn. 1999)
(holding that a victim’s physical gesture challenging the defendant to fight as the defendant
rode away on his bike was insufficient to provoke a person of ordinary self-control).

2 Quoting the district court’s order in Stiles, we observed that “[ t]o suggest that any
move by [the victim] to protect himself as [the defendant] pointed a loaded shotgun at him
should somehow mitigate this homicide to one of heat-of-passion is as absurd as claiming
a right to self-defense.” Stiles, 664 N.W.2d at 322.

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Here, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Eason, we conclude
that this case is closer to Stiles and Hale. Rosio did not say or do anything that would have
provoked a person of ordinary self-control into a heat of passion. Like the victims in Stiles
and Hale, Rosio simply reached for a weapon afte r Eason assaulted him. Consequently,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Eason’s postconviction claim that
the trial judge committed reversible error by no t providing the jury an instruction on the
lesser-included offense of first-degree heat of passion manslaughter.
B.
We next turn to Eason’s argument that th e district court abused its discretion in
denying his postconviction claim that the judge who presided over his trial committed
reversible error by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree
unintentional felony murder. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion b ecause even when th e evidence is viewed in a light most
favorable to Eason, there was no rational basi s for a jury to acquit Eason of first-degree
intentional felony murder and to convict him of the lesser-included offense of unintentional
felony murder.
First-degree felony murder requires an in tent to kill during the commission of a
felony; second-degree felony murder does no t require such a showing of intent. State v.
Dimmick, 586 N.W.2d 127, 129 (Minn. 1998). Inte nt “means that the actor either has a
purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if successful,
will cause that result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2018). “Intent to kill may be
inferred from the manner of the killing.” State v. Hall, 722 N.W.2d 472, 477 (Minn. 2006);

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see also State v. Harris , 405 N.W.2d 224, 229 (Minn. 1987) (finding intent to kill after
considering the severity of injuries to the victim); State v. Campbell, 161 N.W.2d 47, 55
(Minn. 1968) (noting that in tent to cause death “may be inferred from the manner of
shooting the victim”).
In State v. Prtine, we concluded the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on
second-degree unintentional fel ony murder because the victim ’s 63 stab wounds were
“indicative of an intent to kill.” 784 N.W.2d 303, 317 (Minn. 2010). We reached a similar
conclusion in State v. Dimmick , 586 N.W.2d 127, 129 (Minn. 1998). In Dimmick, the
victim was cut and stabbed over 35 times wh ile she was nearly prone on the floor, her
jugular vein was cut, her sp inal column was penetrated, her nose was broken, and she
received two large contusions to her head. 586 N.W.2d at 129–30. We concluded there
was no rational basis for a jury to acquit Dimmick of the first-degree murder offenses and
to convict him of the lesser-included offense of second-degree unintentional felony murder
because the “viciousness of the attack on [the victim] went well beyond anything necessary
to merely incapacitate her.” Id. at 130.
Here, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Eason, Rosio was
stabbed with a 30-inch blade several times in the trunk, had four “chop” wounds to the
head which fractured his skull, and was strangled. Eason also set the home on fire before
he left. Like the victim’s injuries in Prtine and Dimmick, Rosio’s injuries went well beyond
a single blow and we re of such a nature an d quantity that no reas onable jury could have
inferred that Eason did not intend to kill Rosio. Based on this record, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Eason’s postconviction claim that the

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judge who presided over his trial committed reversible error by not instructing the jury on
the lesser-included offense of second-degree unintentional felony murder.
II.
Eason next alleges that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct, and urges us
to remand his case and allow him to accept the State’s previously offered plea deal. He
asserts that the State suffered no prejudice by his belated decision to reconsider its offer,
and notes that he was an uns ophisticated defendant who did not grasp the gravity of his
situation until jury selection began. The State contends that the district court was correct
when it concluded that the State was under no obligation to make or to reopen a plea offer.
We agree with the State.
“Neither the constitution nor [Minnesota] Ru les of Criminal Procedure give to a
criminal defendant an absolute right to have his plea of guilty accepted.” State v. Goulette,
258 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Minn. 19 77). Generally, the decisions of prosecutors in plea
bargaining are solely with in their discretion. See State v. Streiff , 673 N.W.2d 831, 836
(Minn. 2004) (discussing the “division of power” and how “bringing charges and plea
bargaining . . . rests almost entirely with the prosecutor”); State v. Andrews, 165 N.W.2d
528, 532 n.4 (Minn. 1969) (noting that the prosecutor “has no duty to initiate . . . or make
a [plea] bargain”). And “unless the prosecutor abuses his or her discretion or demonstrates
improper intent, the judiciary is powerless to interfere with th e prosecutor’s charging
authority.” S tate v. Lee , 706 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. 20 05) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

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The American Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution
Function states that the “prosecutor should be open, at every stage of a criminal matter, to
discussions with defense counsel concerning disposition of charges by guilty plea or other
negotiated disposition.” ABA Standards Rela ting to the Prosecution Function 3–5.6(a)
(2017). The standard also counsels that “[t]he prosecutor should not set unreasonably short
deadlines, or demand conditions for a disposition, that are so coercive that the voluntariness
of a plea or the effectiveness of defense counsel is put into question. A prosecutor may,
however, set a reasonable deadline before tria l or hearing for acceptance of a disposition
offer.” Id. at 3–5.6(d).
Applying these principles to the history of negotiations here, we conclude that the
district court properly rejected Eason’s clai m of prosecutorial misconduct. The week
before trial, after notifying the victim’s fa mily, the State extended an offer to Eason to
plead guilty to second-degree intentional murd er for a sentence of between 420 and 480
months, which he rejected. Before voir dire began, the prosecutor made a record of the
offer and her understanding that Eason had declined it. The district court then confirmed
that Eason was aware of the offer, had spoken to counsel about it, still declined to accept
the offer, and understood that the offer was not “sitting out on the table for you to accept
some time later.”
Eason made an unsuccessful counteroffer through counsel, which the State rejected.
Defense counsel then asked about the earlier de al, and the State said that its initial offer
was “off the table.” During the second day of jury selection, the State made its final offer
of 480 months. Defense counsel, after receiving Eason’s consent, again asked the State if

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it would allow Eason to plead to the State’s original offer. The prosecutor declined, and
the trial continued.
Nothing in these negotiations reflects an abuse of discretion by the prosecutor or an
improper intent. No case law suggests that a prosecutor is under a duty to reoffer a plea
offer that has been rejected, and such a rule would go against basic contract principles. See
generally Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009) (“Although the analogy may
not hold in all respects, plea bargains are essentially contracts.”); Skylar Reese Croy, When
“Ministers of Justice” Violate Rules of Pr ofessional Conduct During Plea Bargaining:
Contractual Consequences, 33 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 201, 204 (2020) (noting that scholars
and courts have long recognized that plea agreements are unilateral contracts). Moreover,
Eason did not move the district court to accept his guilty plea to a reduced charge or attempt
to show that it would be a manifest injustice not to accept such a plea. Cf. Streiff ,
673 N.W.2d at 833, 839 (reversing a district court’s acceptance of a guilty plea to a lesser
offense because prosecution for the greater offense did not amount to a manifest injustice).
Because Eason rejected the pl ea deal offered to him, a nd given the br oad discretion
afforded to a prosecutor during plea negotiations, the State was not required to reoffer the
deal. Accordingly, the district court did no t err in rejecting Eas on’s claim of abuse of
prosecutorial discretion.
III.
Eason’s final claim is that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when neither
of his trial attorneys discussed the State’s final plea offer with him or gave him an
opportunity to accept it. The State, by contrast, asserts that the district court properly found

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that the representation of defense counsel was reasonable and that Eason “would not accept
a plea to a higher charge, for an already-rejected offer” even if counsel asked him again.
After considering the context of the plea negotiations here, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Eason’s claim.
The right to effective assi stance of counsel applies during the plea negotiation
process. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140 (2012). “If a plea bargain has been offered,
a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel in considering whether to accept
it.” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 168 (2012). In determining whether a defendant has
been denied this right during the plea negotiation process, courts apply the two-part test of
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). Frye, 566 U.S. at 140; Peltier v.
State, 946 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. 2020).
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, Eason must demonstrate “that ‘counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ ” and “that ‘there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’ s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.’ ” Fields v. State , 733 N.W.2d 465, 468 (Minn.
2007) (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687–88). We ma y address the prongs in either
order, and a claim may be disposed of on one prong without analyzing the other. Jackson
v. State, 817 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. 2012).
An attorney meets the objectively reas onable standard wh en the attorney
“exercise[s] the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would
perform under similar circumstances.” White v. State, 248 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Minn. 1976).

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A “strong presumption” exists “that counsel’s performance was reasonable.” Zornes v.
State, 880 N.W.2d 363, 370 (Minn. 2016).
The United States Supreme Court has pr ovided some guidance about what is
effective assistance in the c ontext of plea bargaining. In Frye, the Supreme Court
concluded that defense couns el was ineffective when he did not communicate time-
sensitive plea offers to the defendant before they expired. Frye, 566 U.S. at 145. In doing
so, it set forth a “general rule [that] defens e counsel has the duty to communicate formal
offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable
to the accused.” Id. Noting that defining “the du ties and responsibilities of defense
counsel . . . is a difficult question” given the nuances of the “art of negotiation,” the Court
believed it neither “prudent nor practical to try to elaborate or define detailed standards for
the proper discharge of defense counsel’s participation in the process.” Id. at 144–45.
The Court did note that “[t]hough the stan dard for counsel’s performance is not
determined solely by reference to codified standards of professional practice, these
standards can be important guides.” Id. at 145. The Court then quoted the American Bar
Association’s recommendation that defense counsel “promptly communicate and explain
to the defendant all plea offers ma de by the prosecuting attorney.” Id. (quoting ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty 14-3.2(a) (3d ed. 1999)).
We have also considered the effectiveness of counse l in the context of plea
negotiations. In State v. Powell, Powell, who was then 16 years old, claimed that he never
knew about two plea offers because his counsel did not communicate the offers to him.
578 N.W.2d 727, 730 (Minn. 1998). Defense counsel disputed this contention by affidavit,

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contending that he had communicated both offers to Powell; he also stated that Powell had
adamantly asserted his belief that he was in nocent and that witnesses would change their
testimony. Id. at 730. The prosecutors also affirmed by affidavit that the second offer was
communicated, in their presence, by defense counsel to Powell, who rejected it. Id.
Under these circumstances, we upheld the district court’s conclusion that Powell
failed to establish that his counsel was ineffective. Id. at 732–33. We noted that the
“postconviction court found that the offers were communicated and we conclude[d] that
the court did not abuse its discretion in relyin g on the affidavits of the attorneys involved
to establish that the offers were in fact communicated.” Id. at 732.
Notably, we rejected the dissent’s conclu sion that counsel’s assistance would be
ineffective if no further discussion of the second plea offer occurred other than
communication of the offer in the presence of prosecutors. Id. at 732–33. In requiring no
further advice about the second plea, we stressed the importance of the context of the trial
and rapport between counsel and client, stating: “Because of respondent’s insistence of his
innocence, belief that the witnesses would change their testimony at trial, and rejection of
the first plea offer, counsel could have reas onably concluded that additional discussion
would have served no purpose.” Id. at 732. Under the circumstances present in Powell,
we did not require defense counsel to do more than ensure that the second plea offer was
communicated.
Applying these principles and considering the context of the fluid plea negotiations
here, we conclude that Eason cannot show that his counsels’ assistance fell below the
standard of objective reasonablen ess. Unlike the defendants in Frye and Powell, Eason

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was aware of every plea offer, and actively par ticipated in the plea negotiation process.
The record shows that Eason ha d extensive conversations with his attorneys before trial
and during jury selection about the plea nego tiations. He testified at the postconviction
hearing that his attorneys spok e to him “intensely” about the State’s first plea offer and
recommended that he take it.
Defense counsel for Eason confirmed th at they had “strongly suggested” and
“jointly recommended to him on a number of occasions” that Eason take the first offer, but
Eason stated that he did not want to plead guilty. Against advice of counsel, Eason rejected
the first offer, and he knew that it would be no longer available when he did so.
Over the next day of jury selection, Eason and his counsel continued to have
conversations about the risks of trial and potential benefits that he could receive by
pleading guilty and receiving a fi xed sentence. Counsel advise d Eason that “there is a
world of difference between a sentence of ye ars and a sentence where he may never get
out of jail.” He told Eason about a 19-year-o ld client who was eligible for parole after
serving 17 and a half years but who was still in prison at ag e 46. According to Eason’s
counsel, Eason then asked counsel if he c ould negotiate further; after securing Eason’s
agreement, counsel then proposed the counteroffer of 360–480 months. Importantly, the
initial offer by the State and the counteroffer by Eason each had 480 months as the high
number. Defense counsel had advised Eason that, when considering the sentencing range
of the first offer, he should know that the j udge may well give him the highest number in
that range. With this knowledge, Eason sou ght a wider range of 360–480 months in his
counteroffer to the 420–480 mont hs that the State originally proposed. Th e counteroffer

20
suggests that Eason had the ability to ask his counsel to continue negotiating and was
focused on the lower number in the range.
The record further shows th at the State extended the fi nal offer, a flat 480 months
in prison, on terms similar to the previous offer, that is, pl eading guilty to second-degree
intentional murder and waiving Blakely. After receiving Eason’s permission to do so,
defense counsel made another attempt on the record, with Eason present, at reaching a plea
agreement that could have potentially cut the length of any sentence imposed by up to five
years. Counsel outlined the co urse of negotiations, noted th e negligible time lapse when
the State’s first offer was on the table a nd when it was removed, and implored the
prosecutor to “sit alone in a dark room for about ten minutes and determine whether or not
she really wants to pull that [o ffer of 420–480 months] off the table . . . .” Upon hearing
counsel’s impassioned speech, the district cour t properly noted that it could not “direct
anything with regard to plea offers or negotiations.” After confirming with the prosecutor
that the State did not wish to reconsider its final offer, the district court called for trial
proceedings to resume. No further settlement negotiations ensued.
Given the vigorous and thorough nature of defense counsel’s advice to Eason and
their strenuous advocacy for him during these plea negotiations, as well as the presumption
of competence afforded by Strickland, we would be hard pressed to conclude that Eason
received ineffective assistance of counsel. Th e dissent attempts to characterize Eason’s
ongoing conversations and on-the-record advo cacy as evidence that Eason’s “attitude
towards accepting a plea offer varied from meeting to meeting.” Rather, the record before
us suggests that during the first and second day of jury selection, Eason and his counsel

21
were engaging in ongoing, open, and honest dialogue about his best course of action, and
focused on securing Eason a plea deal with a lower range than was offered by the
prosecutor.
To be sure, defense counsel did not explicitly ask Eason if he would accept or reject
the State’s final offer. While best practices may recommend that a defense attorney discuss
each and every offer with a client, we decline, as did the Supreme Court in Frye, to adopt
a bright-line rule requiring such advice and inquiry, especially when the defendant is fully
aware of all offers and has been counseled about a previous similar offer. To hold
differently would restrict counsel’s ability to conduct tailored conversations with a client.
And considering the potential for a perceived power imbalance between counsel and client,
such a bright-line rule could lead a client to feel coerced into pleading guilty. See State v.
Kaiser, 469 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Minn. 1991) (requiring further hearing to determine whether
defendant’s attorney had coerced him into pleading guilty and whether defendant should
be allowed to withdraw plea).
The record here shows that Eason’s counsel thoroughly discussed the implications
and consequences of the original plea offer with Eason. The final offer for a fixed number
of months under the same te rms as the State’s initial offe r—made in Eason’s presence—
contained no nuance to further explain. This offer came af ter Eason had already rejected
a more favorable plea bargain with that same number as the high range, and had asked his
counsel to negotiate a range with a lower bottom number. As defense counsel testified at
the postconviction hearing, “You know, he—we rejected the 420 to 480, maybe we thought
that he would reject the 480 and without discussion.”

22
Under these circumstances, where Eason knew of both plea offers, was thoroughly
counseled about the first offer and rejected it, and defense counsel continued to zealously
advocate for him to receive th at potentially better offer, the district court correctly
concluded that Eason failed to meet his burden of showing that his attorneys’ conduct fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness. Because we conclude that Eason’s claim
fails under the first Strickland prong, we need not consider whether he demonstrated
prejudice under the second prong of the analysis.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.
Affirmed.

MOORE, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of submission, took
no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

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D I S S E N T
HUDSON, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent because the district court abused its di scretion in denying
Mr. Eason’s postconviction claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. A district court
abuses its discretion when its decision to deny relief is “against logic and the facts in the
record” or “based on an erroneous view of the law.” Riley v. State, 792 N.W.2d 831, 833
(Minn. 2011). Applying this standard here, I would reverse the order denying relief to
Mr. Eason because the record supports his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel and
the district court did not properly apply Strickland. The appropriate remedy is to remand
to the district court for the State to reoffer its last and final plea offer to Mr. Eason.
I.
In a criminal justice system where over ninety percent of criminal cases are resolved
through plea bargains, “the nego tiation of a plea bargain, rath er than the unfolding of a
trial, is almost always the critical point for a defendant.” Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134,
144 (2012); see also Padilla v. Kentucky , 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010) (“[W]e have long
recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes
of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.”). The Sixth Amendment
requires that defendants have “access to co unsel’s skill and knowledge” during those
negotiations. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984); see also Frye, 566 U.S.
at 143; Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58–59 (1985). When a defendant claims that counsel
failed to render effective assistance during plea negotiations, the court must apply the two-

D-2
prong test from Strickland to determine whether to grant the defendant postconviction
relief. Frye, 566 U.S. at 140.
A.
I begin with the first Strickland prong, which requires Mr. Eason to show that
defense counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. Mr. Eason carried this burden, and the district court abused
its discretion when it held otherwise. I reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, the
record demonstrates that counsel’s performan ce did not satisfy the objective standard of
reasonableness set forth by Strickland. Second, the district court improperly scrutinized
Mr. Eason’s lack of action regarding the Stat e’s last and final plea offer and used his
inaction as a reason to deny postconviction relief.
1.
The “measure of attorney pe rformance” under the first Strickland prong is
“reasonableness under preva iling professional norms.” Id. at 688. I apply this standard
using the American Bar Association (ABA) standards as a guide for reasonableness, along
with precedent on ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See id. (“Prevailing norms of
practice as reflected in American Bar Asso ciation standards and the like, e.g., ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice . . . , are guides to determining what is reasonable . . . .”).
ABA Model Rule 1.4, regarding communi cations between attorney and client,
requires lawyers to “explain a matter” to a c lient “to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.” ABA Model
Rule 1.4(b); see also Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.4 (using the same language as the ABA

D-3
Model Rule on attorney-client communicati ons). The ABA Criminal Justice Standards
further elaborate on the duties of counsel wh en the representation involves a criminal
matter. Standard 4-5.1 requires defense counsel to “advise the client with candor” prior to
“significant decision-points” and “act diligently” to counsel the client regarding what must
be “considered before final decisions are made.” ABA Criminal Justice Standard 4-5.1(b).
“After advising the client, defense counsel should aid the client in deciding the best course
of action and how best to pursue and implement that course of action.” Id. at 4.5-1(i).
Regarding plea offers, defense counsel must both “promptly communicate” plea offers to
clients and “provide advice as outlined” by Standard 4-5.1. Id., 5.1(c).
In this case, the last and final offer fro m the State was certainly a “significant
decision-point” at which Mr. Eason needed the advice of counsel. But Mr. Eason and his
defense attorneys testified at the postconvic tion evidentiary hearing that there was no
discussion about the offer. Thus, counsel di d not explain the State’s final offer to
Mr. Eason as the rules of professional responsibility require. Both counsel acknowledged
under oath at the evidentiary hearing that their failure to discuss the offer with Mr. Eason
was a deviation from their normal standards of practice and likely violated their ethical
duties to him as a client.
While I have serious concerns about whether Mr. Eason received representation that
satisfies the ethical standards of our profession based of the language of the ABA standards,
I also realize that the ABA standards are “ only guides” to determine whether counsel’s
performance was objectively reasonable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. I therefore look to

D-4
precedent on ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to plea bargaining to
determine whether the facts of this particular case justify postconviction relief.
In Missouri v. Frye , the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel applies to lapsed and rejected plea offers. See 566 U.S. at
143–44. The case involved a defendant charge d with a felony offense that carried a
maximum sentence of 4 years in prison. Id. at 138. The State sent a letter to the defendant’s
attorney, offering two different pleas with the potential to significantly minimize the time
spent in jail. Id. at 138–39. Defense counsel did not advise the defendant of the offers and
they expired. Id. at 139. The defendant then entered into a different plea and received a
3-year jail sentence. Id. The defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief, and on
appeal the Court held that co unsel failed to render effective assistance by “allow[ing] the
offer to expire without advising the defendant or allowing him to consider it.” Id. at 145.
Notably, the Court in Frye did not cabin its holding regarding ineffective assistance
to defense counsel’s failure to communicate the offer to the defend ant. The Court also
noted that allowing the o ffer to expire “without advising the defendant” was
constitutionally significant. Id. (emphasis added). As the Court has recognized, the right
to counsel means little if defendants do not have “access to counsel’s skill and knowledge.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685. In sum, communicatio n of a plea offer is only one part of
effective assistance of counsel. Defendants must also have the benefit of counsel’s advice
and professional judgment regarding the offer. Cf. Powell v. Alabama , 287 U.S. 45, 69
(1932) (“[A defendant] requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him.”). Under Frye, when defense counsel did not advise Mr. Eason

D-5
about the State’s last and fi nal plea offer, defense counsel did not render the effective
assistance the Constitution requires.
I acknowledge that our decision in State v. Powell, 578 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1998),
complicates this analysis. We held in Powell that the lack of discussion between attorney
and client regarding a plea offer did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel because
“counsel could have reasonabl[y] concluded that additional discussion would have served
no purpose.” Id. at 732. But our decision in Powell does not defeat Mr. Eason’s claim for
relief.1
The case involved a 16 year old boy, Kye Powell, convicted of second-degree felony
murder after a jury trial. Id. at 728–29. Powell filed a petition for postconviction relief
and raised an ineffective a ssistance of counsel claim. Id. at 729. He alleged that his
attorney did not discuss the terms of two plea offers with him. Id. at 730. The district court
did not hold an evidentiary hearing, but accepted an affidavit from Powell’s attorney. Id.
The attorney swore in his affidavit that he communicated the offers to Powell, that Powell
was “adamant” he was innocent and would not plead guilty, and that Powell believed that
witnesses would testify at trial that he was not involved in the killing. Id. The district court
denied postconviction relief, finding that Powell would not have accepted either plea offer
because he believed that witnesses woul d testify in his favor at trial. Id. at 731. We
affirmed the district court’s ruling, explaining that based on the defendant’s “insistence of

1 I note here that the Supreme Court’s decision in Frye postdates our decision in
Powell. It is unclear under Frye whether, in a situation where an attorney fails to discuss
a plea offer with a client, a court may deny postconviction relief because the attorney could
have reasonably concluded that discussing a plea offer would have served no purpose.

D-6
his innocence, belief that witnesses would change their testimony at trial, and rejection of
the first plea offer, counsel c ould have reasonabl[y] concluded that additional discussion
would have served no purpose.” 2 Id. at 732.
The description by defense counsel of Eason’s mindset leading up to the time of the
lapsed plea is markedly different. Defense counsel in Powell described a client who never
wavered in his belief that he would prevail at trial, and consistently refused to plead guilty.
In contrast, Mr. Eason’s attorneys described a client whose attitude towards accepting a
plea offer varied from meeting to meeting. Counsel explained that they would have
conversations about a potential plea bargain with Mr. Eason where they thought they “had
made some headway, but then the next time we would meet him he had obviously been
influenced by other forces.” 3 Eason’s other counsel offere d a similar description of his
mindset. In a situation where a defendant is not consistently adamant in his refusal to plead
guilty, the analogy to Powell fails.

2 Contrary to the district court’s statem ent that “Mr. Eason’s counsel was reasonable
in concluding that he would not accept a plea,” the record shows that Mr. Eason’s attorneys
reached no such conclusion. To the contrary, his attorneys testified that they do not even
remember the State’s last and final offer. One of Eason’s lawyers described how he was
“embarrassed by the fact that on the transcript it reveals that apparently [the State] made
an offer of a flat 480.”
Furthermore, the question in this case is not whether the attorneys in fact reasonably
concluded that Mr. Eason would not accept the plea, but whether they could have reached
such a conclusion. See Powell, 578 N.W.2d at 732. As discussed herein, the record shows
that they could not have done so.

3 Defense counsel made the same observation on the record on the day of the State’s
last and final plea offer.

D-7
Then there is the record, which forecloses the possibility that Mr. Eason’s attorneys
could have reasonably believed he would reject the State’s last and final offer. On July 8,
2013, Mr. Eason rejected the State’s offer to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of 420
to 480 months. On the morning of July 10, Mr. Eason told counsel that he “thinks he ought
to take [their] advice” and asked if defense counsel could “do any more negotiating” of a
plea deal for him. Counsel then went to th e State’s attorney, Ms. Russell, and offered for
Mr. Eason to plead guilty with a possible sentence of 360 to 480 months in prison.
Ms. Russell rejected that offer.4 Sometime after this exchange, and right before the lunch
recess, the record captures Ms. Russell making the State’s last and final offer. Then after
lunch, the record shows counsel asking Ms. Russell to agree to a plea for 420 to 480
months, which she rejects.
In other words, the record shows that Mr. Eason offered to plead guilty twice on the
day of the State’s last and final plea offer—on e time before the offer, and one time after.
Counsel communicated these o ffers to the State on Mr. Ea son’s behalf. The record
demonstrates that defense counsel knew Mr. Eason was willing to plead guilty in the

4 The discussion in the morning between Mr. Eason and defense counsel was off the
record, as were the discussions in the morning between counsel and the State. But during
the court’s afternoon session on July 10, counsel went on the record to “make the
chronology clear” regarding the plea discussions between the defense and the State. It was
at this point that counsel de scribed his off-the-record conv ersations that morning with
Mr. Eason and the State.
Counsel for the State confirmed that the plea negotiations in the morning of July 10
occurred as described by defense counsel. She testified at the postconviction evidentiary
hearing that she remembered the 360 to 480 offer in the morning, which she rejected after
a discussion with her supervisi ng attorneys. She also testif ied that she recalled defense
counsel later asking whether the original offer was still on the table, and that she told him
it was not.

D-8
morning and that he remained willing to do so in the afternoon. Thus, it would have been
unreasonable for defense counsel not to disc uss the State’s last and final offer with
Mr. Eason based on a belief that such disc ussions would be useless because he would
refuse to plead guilty. Any difference between the range-of-months offers and the flat offer
of 480 months does not change this analysis , because counsel advised Mr. Eason that he
was likely to receive a sentence of 480 months even if the plea was to a range of months,5
and Mr. Eason understood this.6
In affirming the district court’s decision to deny relief to Mr. Eason, the court cites
to a conversation between Mr. Eason and his counsel about one of counsel’s former clients,
regarding the former client’s eligibility for parole. The timi ng of this discussion further
strengthens Mr. Eason’s claim for relief, because it is consistent with his testimony that he
wanted to plead guilty on July 10 after reconsidering his options.
Taking “all the circumstances” into consideration, I would hold that Mr. Eason met
his burden to show that his counsel’s representation in connection with the State’s last and
final plea offer fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

5 Defense counsel testified, “I told him that if you take an offer with a spread you’ve
got to presume that the judge is going to give you the upper-most number.”

6 Defense counsel testified that Mr. Eason understood on the afternoon of July 10 that
he could receive a sentence of 480 months if he pleaded guilty with an offer of a possible
range of months:

Q: Okay. So with regard to the 360 to 480 when you made that counteroffer
was he willing to accept a sentence of 480? He was understanding that that
was possible?

A: I wouldn’t have made it if he didn’t understand that.

D-9
688. I would further hold that our reasoning in Powell v. State does not defeat Mr. Eason’s
claim, because his ambivalence regarding the decision to plead guilty and the timeline of
the plea negotiations on July 10 demonstrate that his counsel could not have reasonably
concluded that there was no need to discuss the State’s last and final offer with him before
it lapsed.
The court shies away from adopting a bright line rule that requires defense counsel
to discuss each and every plea offer with a client. The court’s timidity is confounding and
disheartening given the centrality of the plea bargaining pro cess to our criminal justice
system and the significan t liberty interests at stake for criminal defendants. Put bluntly,
plea bargaining determines who goes to jail and for how long. See Frye, 566 U.S. at 144.
Against this backdrop, it is not too much to require that defense counsel communicate and
explain each and every plea offer to the de fendant to render the effective assistance
mandated by the Constitution, and this court should so hold.
2.
Instead of focusing its discussion of the Strickland reasonableness prong solely on
whether Mr. Eason’s attorneys effectively advised him about the State’s last and final offer,
the district court repeatedly emphasized how Mr. Eason took no action to accept the offer
on his own. Paragraph 25 of the district c ourt’s order states, “Mr. Eason also had ample
opportunity to accept the offer. He had time during the proceedings and recesses of July 10
to make it clear to his attorneys or the Court he wanted to plea.” In paragraph 26, the court
observes that Mr. Eason’s “ability to accept the offer was not hampered by his attorney’s
attempt to get a better deal.” Then in para graph 28: “Mr. Eason was sitting there as the

D-10
various pros and cons of a plea . . . were discussed.” Finally, in paragraph 30: “Mr. Eason
had knowledge, understanding, and opportunity to accept the plea offer. He made no effort
to communicate his willingness to accept the 48 0-month deal to anyone. Had Mr. Eason
raised his hand, passed a note, spoken up, or lashed out, the facts might turn the other way.”
These statements demonstrate that the di strict court improperly shifted the focus
away from the performance of counsel and instead put the spotlight on Mr. Eason’s actions.
But the proper inquiry of a postconvic tion court with respect to the first Strickland prong
is whether counsel provided reasonably eff ective assistance as the Sixth Amendment
requires. The inquiry is not whether the de fendant could have effectively advocated for
himself in the absence of counsel’s assi stance. By resting its decision on the Strickland
reasonableness prong on the acti ons of Mr. Eason rather than on the performance of his
attorneys, the district court based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law.7
The error is especially troub ling in the case of Mr. Eas on. The suggestion that an
18-year old who “virtually didn’t go to sc hool” and was “functionally illiterate” should
have spoken up in court to accept a plea offer that his attorneys had not discussed with him
is remarkable, and contrary to basic principles of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Almost
100 years ago, the Supreme Court recognized that even “the intelligent and educated
layman has small and so metimes no skill in the science of the law.” Powell v. Alabama,

7 The district court ignored the fact that M r. Eason watched on July 10 as his attorney
implored the State to reoffer the 420 to 480 month deal, and the State declined. It would
not have made sense for Mr. Eason to ask hi s attorneys during trial if he could accept a
plea offer after he watched on the second day of jury selection as the State told the district
court and his attorney that there would be no more plea offers.

D-11
287 U.S. at 69. And “[i]f that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of
the ignorant and illiterate, or t hose of feeble intellect.” Id. To expect Mr. Eason to have
the “knowledge” and “understanding” to advise himself in connection with the State’s plea
offer is to flip the Sixth Am endment right to counsel on its head. I would therefore hold
that the district court abused its discretion with respect to its analysis of the first Strickland
prong.
B.
I next consider whether Mr. Eason sa tisfied his burden under the second Strickland
prong, which requires him to show that the “unreasonable” performance of his attorneys
had an “adverse effect” on his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. Specifically, he must
demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. As his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim involves a lapsed plea offer, he must make two specific showings. First, he
must establish that there is a “reasonable probability th[at] [he] would have accepted” the
plea offer had he received effective assistance of counsel. Frye, 566 U.S. at 148. Second,
he must show a “reasonable probability that the prosecution would have adhered to the
agreement and that it would have been accepted by the trial court.” Id. at 150.
1.
To satisfy his burden to show a reasonabl e probability that he would have accepted
the plea, Mr. Eason points to both his own te stimony and the testimony of his attorneys.
In my view, this testimony establishes a reasonable probability that Mr. Eason would have
accepted the state’s last and final offer had he received effective assistance of counsel.

D-12
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Eason expl ained that he wanted to plead guilty on
July 10, 2013 because he saw “everything was really like closing in” and he “really wanted
to get everything over and done with.” De fense counsel’s statemen ts on the day of the
State’s last and final offer corroborates Mr . Eason’s testimony. On the afternoon of
July 10, counsel explained that after Mr. Easo n saw the court begin to empanel a jury for
the trial, “the impact of what he’s dealing with began to manifest itself to him.”8 Counsel
also confirmed at the evidentiary hearing th at Mr. Eason was open to the possibility of a
plea throughout the negotiations. When asked about his client ’s attitude towards a plea
bargain, counsel said that Mr. Eason “was co operative, and he was willing to accept the
concept of pleading guilty.”
The district court was skeptical of Mr. Eason’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing,
concluding that it was “driven more by a sense of buyer’s remorse than by a true
representation of what he woul d have done at the time.” Bu t other parts of the district
court’s order are in tension with this conclusion. The district court found the testimony of
Mr. Eason’s defense attorneys “to be credible, as both are experienced trial attorneys who
presented internally consistent testimony, corroborated by the record and other testimony.”
Following this logic, the district court should have credited Mr. Eason’s testimony that he

8 Defense counsel went on to say that Mr. Eason “really does, at this point, seem to
understand in a much more complete sense where he stands in relation to this and what the
ramifications are.”

D-13
would have accepted the State’s last and final offer, because the statements of his defense
attorney corroborate Mr. Eason’s testimony on this issue.9
Other testimony at the evidentiary hearing likewise supports Mr. Eason’s contention
that he would have admitted the factual basis for the plea. Two aspects of the testimony at
the evidentiary hearing are important on this point.
First, both Eason and his defense counse l testified that he likely would have
admitted to the crime as part of a plea bargain. Mr. Eason explained, “I’m pretty sure that
if . . . everything was correctly communicated to me and we would have got to that stage,
[defense counsel] would have explained to me that I would have to state factual basis,
which I would have.” Later on in the postconviction evidentiary hearing, defense counsel
confirmed Mr. Eason’s statement. The State’ s attorney specifically asked Mr. Friedberg

9 Federal courts have recognized the significance of evidence corroborating a
defendant’s postconviction claim that they w ould have pleaded guilty had they received
effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 45–46 (3d Cir.
1992) (reasoning that defense counsel’s c onfirmation of a defendant’s “self-serving
allegations” could “qualify as sufficient confirming evidence” that a defendant would have
accepted a plea if properly counseled); Lewandowski v. Makel, 949 F.2d 884, 889 (6th Cir.
1991) (concluding that the “ objective evidence” in the reco rd supported the defendant’s
testimony that he would not have withdrawn his plea had he received effective assistance
of counsel); Benton v. Nagy , No. CV 15-12855, 20 18 WL 6201598, at *11 (E.D. Mich.
Nov. 27, 2018) (holding in favor of the defendant on the second Strickland prong because
the record showed that it was the defendant “who instructed defense counsel to pursue a
plea agreement,” which confirmed the defendant’s testimony that he would have accepted
a plea offer); Wolford v. United States, 722 F. Supp. 2d 664, 691 (E.D. Va. 2010) (citing
to the record of pre-trial pr oceedings to show that the de fendant wanted to plead guilty,
which in turn supported her claim that she would have ac cepted a plea had she received
accurate advice from counsel).

D-14
whether “not wanting to ad mit to second-degre e murder” was an issue in the plea
discussions with his client, and Mr. Friedberg responded “[t]hat wasn’t a problem.”10
Second, Eason waived his Fift h Amendment right to remain silent and testified at
the evidentiary hearing about the factual basis for the plea agreement. He testified that he
intentionally caused the victim’s death, and that it was not an accident. He testified that he
attacked the victim in the victim’s home. He testified that he did not dispute that the victim
was cut 12 to 14 times with a machete. He admitted that he started a fire to try to cover up
the crime. These admissions add credibility to Mr. Eason’ s claim that he would have
provided the necessary factual basis had he accepted the State’s last and final offer. Even
the district court acknowledged at the evid entiary hearing that Mr. Eason’s admissions
likely satisfied the “zone of privacy” and “particular cruelty” aspects of the plea. 11 For
these reasons, I would hold that Mr. Eason established a re asonable probability that he
would have accepted the plea and laid the necessary factual basis for the plea.

10 This statement by defense counsel is pa rtially corroborated by the prosecutor, who
testified that the sticking point in negotiations with defense counsel was not “any substance
regarding the plea” but rather the question of “numbers.” The State rejected the defense’s
offer to plead guilty on the morning of July 10 not out of “concern about whether the factual
basis could be put in,” but because she did not believe a minimum of 360 months in prison
“was appropriate.”

11 The district court made the following statement during Mr. Eason’s factual basis
testimony at the evidentiary hearing:

[Mr. Eason] has admitted to doing this in the victim’s home, which would
qualify as zone of privac y. He’s admitting to setting fire to the house
recognizing the victim wa s in there and recognizi ng it would do additional
harm to the body and that was not necessary in order to complete the crime.
So I think the particular cruelty is satisfied from a factual and legal basis.

D-15
2.
I am also satisfied that Eas on met his burden under the second Strickland prong to
show that the State would have adhered to the agreement and the district court would have
accepted the plea had his attorneys properly a dvised him in 2013. As Mr. Eason aptly
notes, it is difficult to conclude that the St ate would not ha ve followed through with the
plea bargain when it was the State that made the last and final offer to Mr. Eason. I doubt
it is the State’s practice to communicate offers to the defense that it has no intention to
honor if the defendant fulfills his end of the bargain. The prosecutor may have personally
disagreed with the prospect of a plea for Mr. Eason, but she nonetheless made two different
offers on the State’s behalf for Mr. Eason to plead guilty, and did so under the guidance of
her managing attorney.
In its order denying relief, the district court cited Mr. Eason’s “references to possible
self-defense claims” as a reason why he could not demonstrate that the State and the court
would have accepted the plea. Mr. Eason’s tes timony, however, is unclear on this point.
Although Mr. Eason said that he took the machete away from the victim to disarm him,
which might imply self-defense , he admitted that he then used the weapon against the
victim. He testified that he continued to hit the victim in the head with the machete, before
stabbing him and setting his clothes on fire. Th is testimony is not consistent with a self-
defense claim.
And while this is a close issu e, the standard under the second Strickland prong is
“reasonable probability”—not certainty. Base d on the record and the testimony of all
parties involved at the evidentiary hearing, I conclude there is a reasonable probability that

D-16
the State would have adhered to the agreement had defense counsel taken the time in 2013
to advise Mr. Eason and walk him through the plea entry process. Cf. Cullen v. United
States, 194 F.3d 401, 407 (2d Cir. 1999) (reas oning that a defendant “might well have
abandoned his claim of innocence” had he been “properly” counseled regarding the state’s
plea offer).
As for the district court and whether it wo uld have accepted the plea bargain, the
record indicates that the distri ct court believed in 2013 that the case could be resolved
without a trial. On July 10, 2013, the day of the State’s last and fina l offer, the district
court made the following statement: “Obviously this case is one that can be properly
resolved to the satisfaction of both parties a nd a plea agreement can be reached.” If the
district court believed at the time that Mr. Eason would not follow through with the factual
basis for the agreement, why make such a st atement? And although the district court’s
remark does not definitively establish that it would have accepted the agreement, it does
support Mr. Eason’s argument that there is a reasonable probability the district court would
have accepted his plea in 2013 had he received effective assistance of counsel.
For these reasons, I conclude that Mr. Eason met his burden to show prejudice under
the second prong of Strickland, and I would therefore hold that the district court abused its
discretion in denying him postconviction relief.
II.
I turn finally to the question of the appropriate remedy for ineffective assistance of
counsel related to a lapsed plea offer. The Supreme Court considered this question in Lafler
v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012). The Court explained that if a lapsed offer “was for a guilty

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plea to a count or counts less serious than the ones for which a defendant was convicted
after trial,” then “the proper exercise of discretion to remedy the constitutional injury may
be to require the prosecution to reoffer the plea proposal.” Id. at 171; see also Kimmelman
v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 379 (1986) (“The Sixt h Amendment mandates that the State
bear the risk of constitutionally deficient assistance of counsel.”).
After the State reoffers the plea proposal, “the judge can then exercise discretion in
deciding whether to vacate the conviction fro m trial and accept the plea or leave the
conviction undisturbed.” Lafler, 566 U.S. at 171. This process is consistent with our prior
decisions in postconviction relief cases. See Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 542 (Minn.
2007) (“[W]e hold that if the postconviction court determines that Leake is entitled to relief
on this ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, Leake may accept the original plea
agreement offered by the state and be resentenced in accord with its terms.”); State v. Ray,
273 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Minn. 1978) (“If defendant can show that he would have been able
to take advantage of the negotiations [to plead guilty to aggravated assault with a 10 year
prison sentence] . . . and . . . that he would in fact have accepted the offer if his counsel had
advised him to do so, then we believe postconviction relief in the form of a reversal of the
20-year burglary sentence, leaving defendant with a 10-year senten ce for aggravated
assault, would be justified under the unique circumstances of this case.”).
The State’s last and final plea offer to Mr. Eason was to plead guilty to second-
degree intentional murder, waive Blakely, and agree to an aggrav ated sentence of 480
months. Mr. Eason subs equently went to trial and was convicted of first-degree felony
murder and sentenced to life w ith the possibility of release af ter 30 years. As the lapsed

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plea was to a less serious charge than first- degree felony murder, the appropriate remedy
is to remand to the district court for the State to reoffer the plea to second-degree intentional
murder, at which point the court can exercise its discretion to determine whether to accept
the plea.

THISSEN, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Hudson.