State of Minnesota,

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A19-1671

Court of Appeals McKeig, J.
Took no part, Chutich, J.

State of Minnesota,

Appellant/Cross-Respondent,

vs. Filed: May 5, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts
Michael James Boss,

Respondent/Cross-Appellant.

________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota;
Charles W. Hanson, Brown County Attorney, New Ulm, Minnesota; and
Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, William C. Lundy, Certified Student
Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota, for appellant/cross-respondent.

Jacob M. Birkholz, Michelle K. Olsen, Birkholz Law, LLC, Mankato, Minnesota, for
respondent/cross-appellant.

William Ward, Minnesota State Public Defender, Cathryn Middelbrook, Chief Appellate
Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul,
Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Board of Public Defense.
________________________

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S Y L L A B U S
Minnesota Statutes § 260C.425, subd. 1 (2020), does not require the State to prove
that a child is actually in need of protection or services for a defendant to be found guilty
of encouraging the need for protection or services.
Reversed.
O P I N I O N
MCKEIG, Justice.
Under Minnesota Statutes § 260C.425, subd. 1 (2020), it is a gross misdemeanor for
“[a]ny person who by act, word, or omission encourages, causes, or contributes to the need
for protection or services.” This case asks us to determine whether the State must prove
that a child is actually in need of protection or services for a defendant to be found guilty
of violating this statute. We hold that Minn. Stat. § 260C.425, subd. 1, does not require
the State to prove that the child is actually in need of protection or services. We, therefore,
reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
FACTS
The daughter of appellant Michael Boss, L.B., had a ten-year-old friend, A.G. The
two met at school, and A.G. would frequently go to the Boss house to spend time with L.B.
A.G., who lived with her aunt, would have sleepovers at the Boss residence and go to
church and on other outings with the Boss family.
On December 4, 2017, Boss, who was 48 years old, sent A.G. a Christmas stocking,
through his daughter L.B. The stocking contained a note and candy from Boss. Boss had
folded the note several times and wrote warnings on the note that it was “For [A.G.] only!
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(Make sure y ou are alone before opening).” As the note unfolded, Boss had written
additional warnings: “If you are not [A.G.], turn back now!” and “Anyone but [A.G.]
crossing this point is in Big Trouble!” The inside of the note said:
[A.G.]—I [heart] u! (and miss you)
When the Lord tells you,
take a walk down central street by yourself
(probably sometime around midnight or after midnight)
(don’t cross railroad tracks)
I just want to talk. Look 4 me by the train tracks
Obey the Lord above all other things!
(throw this out after you are done reading it)
Do not be afraid, God is with you
Mike.
In the bottom right hand corner, Boss drew a map and indicated an abandoned property
where he wanted A.G. to meet him.
When A.G. got home that day, she showed the note to her aunt, M.C., who is her
legal guardian. A.G. told her aunt that Boss had told her he wanted to marry her, that he
loved her, and he had tried to give her a ring made out of string. She reported that on at
least one occasion when A.G. slept over at the Boss residence, Boss woke her up early in
the morning by tickling her and rubbing her on her side. He did not touch her on any other
part of her body. A.G. was scared when she received the note from Boss. She was afraid
if she followed the instructions on the note, that Boss would do something to her.
A.G. did not follow the instructions on the note. Instead, M.C. and A.G. went to the
police department that evening to file a report. They brought with them the note from Boss
as well as a cell phone that Boss had previously given A.G. M.C., on behalf of A.G., filed
for a harassment restraining order (HRO) against Boss, which was granted the next day.
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On the evening of December 4, the officer who took the report conducted
surveillance on the Boss residence to see if Boss would leave his house to meet A.G. There
was a snowstorm that evening, and the officer did not witness Boss leave his residence.
The officer used A.G.’s cell phone to send messages to Boss as A.G. Someone responded
to the text messages, but the officer did not know if it was Boss.
After the district court granted the HRO, Boss sent multiple emails to an employee
with Brown County Human Services who worked in A.G.’s school. The first message
detailed Boss’s plan to adopt A.G. despite her aunt’s opposition. He explained “as a last
ditch effort to try and clear things up, I wrote [A.G.] a note to try and meet with her one
last time” before his family moved, referring to the note in the stocking. He admitted he
“said some loving things to her over the past year (that God told me to say).” In a second
email message, Boss provided more details about his understanding of God’s plan for A.G.,
which meant putting A.G. in his “care for the rest of [his] life,” with eventual marriage as
“an option.” He did not want to jeopardize A.G.’s future by breaking any laws. In yet
another email, Boss acknowledged that he “believed God had a plan for [them] to be
married many years down the road if she wanted that.”
The Brown County employee forwarded the email messages to the police. The State
charged Boss with one count of contributing to the need for protection or services, under
Minn. Stat. § 260C.425, subd. 1(a). Boss pleaded not guilty and waived his right to a jury
trial.
A.G. and M.C. testified at Boss’s bench trial, as did the officer who took the initial
report. The officer testified that the note in the stocking concerned him because it appeared
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Boss “was trying to have a ten- year-old leave their house in the middle of the night to go
and meet up with him.” He further testified that the language of Boss’s emails to the Brown
County employee were consistent with Boss engaging in grooming behavior towards A.G.
Boss did not testify.
At the close of the State’s case, Boss moved for a judgment of acquittal. Boss
asserted that “there was no inappropriate contact, that there was not a dangerous or
injurious condition that ever existed” with regards to A.G., and “[ n]othing inappropriate
actually occurred.” He argued that A.G. was never in danger, and that he was not charged
under Minn. Stat. § 609.17 (2020), with attempt to make A.G. a child in need of protection
or services or charged under Minn. Stat. § 609.175, subd. 2 (2020), with a conspiracy to
do so.
Recognizing that the State did not charge an attempt offense, the district court found
that Boss had encouraged A.G. to leave her house without her legal guardian’s permission;
had encouraged A.G. to meet with an adult who had a delusional fantasy about marrying
her, which would have placed A.G. in a dangerous or injurious environment; and that even
though A.G. did not meet Boss, it was sufficient that he encouraged her to do so. The
district court concluded that requiring the child to actually be in need of protection or
services would make the word ‘encouraged’ in section 260C.425 superfluous. Thus, the
court found Boss guilty of violating Minn. Stat. § 260C.425, subd. 1(a). He was sentenced
to 365 days in jail, with 275 days of that time stayed for two years.
Boss appealed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the evidence was
insufficient to prove that A.G. was “actually in need of protection or services.” State v.
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Boss, A19-1671, 2020 WL 4045685, at *7 (Minn. App. July 20, 2020). The court said that
“[e]ven when an offender encourages a child’s need for protection or services, a criminal
conviction requires that the child must actually be in need of protection or services.” Id. at
*3. Then, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to find Boss guilty of attempt, the
court of appeals reduced Boss’s conviction to attempt, pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02,
subd. 12(c), and remanded the case to the district court for sentencing on the lesser-
included offense. Id. at * 7.1
The State sought review of that portion of the court of appeals’ decision requiring
proof that a child is actually in need of protection or services to sustain a conviction under
Minn. Stat. § 260C.425. Boss sought review of the court’s decision to vacate his conviction
but remand for resentencing based on an attempt crime that was never charged by the State.
We granted both petitions for review.2

1 Judge Johnson concurred with the court’s finding that the evidence was insufficient
to sustain Boss’s conviction. Id. However, he dissented from the majority’s decision to
find the evidence sufficient to convict Boss of an attempt offense. He reasoned that because
the State did not charge Boss with attempt, nor did the district court make findings of fact
or conclusions of law regarding an attempt charge, the correct disposition would be to enter
a judgment of acquittal. Id.

2 Boss sought review on whether the court of appeals has authority to reduce a
defendant’s conviction to a lesser-included offense sua sponte, even under Minn. R. Crim.
P. 28.02, subd. 12(c), despite the State not charging that offense. Although we granted
review on this issue, our decision to reverse the court of appeals on the issue presented by
the State’s petition for review makes it unnecessary to reach the issue in Boss’s petition for
review. We express no opinion on the correctness of the Court of Appeals’ decision on
that issue.

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ANALYSIS
The meaning of a criminal statute that is i ntertwined with the issue of whether the
State proved a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt presents an issue of statutory
interpretation that we review de novo. State v. Townsend , 941 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn.
2020). Our first step is to determine whether, on its face, the statute’s language is
unambiguous. State v. Jama, 923 N.W.2d 632, 636 (Minn. 2019). “[W]hen the language
of a statute is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation, it is unambiguous and we
must apply its plain meaning.” State v. Culver , 941 N.W.2d 134, 139 (Minn. 2020). We
consider the canons of interpretation provided in Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (2020), to determine
whether the language of a statute is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.
State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn. 2015).
Minnesota Statutes § 260C.425, subd. 1(a), provides as follows:
Any person who by act, word, or omission encourages, causes, or contributes
to the need for protection or services is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.

(Emphasis added). Boss asserts that in order to sustain his conviction under this statute,
the State must prove that the child actually needed protection or services. In other words,
Boss argues that merely encouraging a child to engage in activities or conduct that could
be dangerous, and thus could present a need for protection or services, is insufficient to
sustain a conviction under section 260C.425 if there is no direct evidence that the child
actually was in danger.
The State disagrees. The State argues that the Legislature intend ed to prevent
children from actually becoming in need of services by prohibiting acts that would
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encourage the need for services. The State a rgues that the particular outcome that would
result from the defendant’s encouragement — a need for protection or services—does not
have to actually occur, because the Legislature criminalized acts that encourage, cause, or
contribute to a need for protection or services.
Thus, we start, as did the court of appeals, with the word “encourages” in section
260C.425. The operative acts —“encourages, causes, or contributes,” are not defined in
Minn. Stat. § 260C.425 or in chapter 260C. “In the absence of statutory definitions, we
may consider dictionary definitions to determine the meaning of a statutory term.” State
v. Alarcon, 932 N.W.2d 641, 646 (Minn. 2019).
The court of appeals looked to the definition of “encourage,” in Black’s Law
Dictionary: “[ t]o instigate; to incite to action; to embolden; to help.” Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Based on this definition, the court concluded that section
260C.425 “criminalizes an individual’s acts, words, or omissions that incite a child to act
in a manner that would result in his/her need for protection or services,” even though the
child may decide “on his/her own volition not to act in accordance with the offender’s
encouragement.” 2020 WL 4045685, at *3; see also id. (stating that the child’s decision
not to act “does not mean that the encouragement did not happen”). We agree.
The essence of the word “encourage” is an effort to persuade the listener, to
overcome. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 747 (3d ed. 2002) (“to spur
on”); The American Heritage Dictionary 606 (3d ed. 1992) (“[ t]o stimulate; spur”); see
also State v. Melchert- Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 23 (Minn. 2014) (reasoning that the word
“encourages,” in a different statute, “broadly include[s] speech that provides support or
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rallies courage”). Whether the recipient of the encouragement acts on that effort does not
change the fact that the encouragement occurred.
With this definition in mind, the court of appeals next considered whether the State
was required to prove that there was an actual need for protection or services. Boss, 2020
WL 4045685, at *4. The court of appeals concluded that the child must actually be in need
of services. Id. It noted that, by definition, a child is in need of protection or services only
if one or more of the statutory factors for that status is shown. Id. at *4 (citing to the factors
enumerated in Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6 (2020)). Interpreting the statute to not
require the State to prove that the child was actual ly in need, the court reasoned, would
“fail[] to harmonize and give effect to the definition of ‘child in need of protection or
services’ found” in Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6. See 2020 WL 4045685, at *4.
The State argues that this conclusion renders the word “encourage” superfluous
because the statute also criminalizes actions that cause a child to need protection or
services, or contribute to a need for those services; thus, actions that encourage a need for
services must mean something other than an actual need for protection or services. Boss
contends that the court of appeals correctly interpreted the statutory language to require the
State to prove an actual need for protection or services. To conclude otherwise, he argues,
would require assuming the Legislature intended to criminalize mere encouragement
“without any detrimental state of being.”
We read statutes as a whole and give effect to all of its provisions. Am. Family Ins.
Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000). We conclude that the State has the
better argument here, based on the plain language of the statute. The phrase “the need for
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protection or services” is not defined in Minn. Stat. § 260C.425. We agree with the court
of appeals that the factors that define a child “in need of protection or services” may be
relevant when assessing whether a defendant’s conduct encouraged, caused, or contributed
to a need for services. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6 (defining “a child who is in
need of protection or services” as a child who has a quality or attribute that can be addressed
by services, as for example, when a child is abandoned, abused, without necessary care and
support, or is a runaway). But this definition cannot alter the plain meaning of the language
in section 260C.245, nor render superfluous the plain words of that statute. See Allan v.
R.D. Offutt Co., 869 N.W.2d 31, 35 (Minn. 2015) (adopting an interpretation that provided
effect to separate reference s in a statute to employment status). Requiring the State to
prove that the child actually needed services as a result of the defendant’s encouragement
converts “encourages” into the equivalent of “causes.” See Cause, Black’s Law Dictionary
(“Something that produces an effect or result.”). This cannot be the correct result. See
Roberts v. State, 945 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Minn. 2020) (explaining the court construes
statutory language to preserve all words and phrases and avoid rendering any language
superfluous).
Additionally, Minn. Stat. § 260C.425, subd. 2 (2020), states that “[a] prior or
pending petition alleging that the child is . . . in need of protection or services is not a
prerequisite to a complaint or a conviction under this section.” Presumably , if the State
must prove that a child actually needs services as a result of a defendant’s encouragement,
a petition alleging that need would also be required, contrary to the express language of
this subdivision. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.141 (2020) (describing the procedures for
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asserting a child is in need of protection or services, including the petition supporting that
assertion).
By concluding that the encouragement has to result in actual services, the court of
appeals effectively inserted “actual” as a qualifier into the need -for-services phrase in the
statute, thus, creating an independent element, as follows:
Any person who by act, word, or omission encourages, causes, or contributes
to the need for protection or services and actual services are needed is guilty
of a gross misdemeanor.

This interpretation cannot be correct. See State v. Carufel, 783 N.W.2d 539, 545 (Minn.
2010) (rejecting an interpretation of statutory language that would require adding words).
Concluding that an actual need for services is not an element of an “encouraging” offense
does not, as Boss argues, ignore “half of the elements of the criminal statute and focus
solely on the parts they can prove.” Rather, it reads the result of the encouragement—“the
need for protection or services” —together with just one of the prohibited acts —
encouragement, i.e., inciting a child to do something. Thus, although we agree with the
court of appeals that “encourage” encompasses acts even when the child does not follow
the encouragement, we disagree with the court of appeals’ conclusion that the State must
prove that actual services were needed. The court of appeals therefore erred in reversing
Boss’s conviction.
“When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts carefully
examine the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from
them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Boldman, 813 N.W.2d
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102, 106 (Minn. 2012). The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict
and we assume that the fact -finder disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the
verdict. State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016). “The verdict will not be
overturned if the fact-finder, upon application of the presumption of innocence and the
State’s burden of proving an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably have
found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.” Id. There is sufficient evidence to
sustain Boss’s guilty verdict. Thus, there is no need to remand to the court of appeals to
address Boss’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the proper interpretation
of the statute.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and affirm
Boss’s conviction.
Reversed.

CHUTICH, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.