State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1691

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Christopher Edward Coleman,
Appellant.

Filed August 17, 2020
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Mower County District Court
File No. 50-CR-18-59

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kristen Nelsen, Mower County Attorney, Megan Burroughs, Assistant County Attorney,
Austin, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Publi c Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal -Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction, following a stipulated -facts trial, for
possessing a firearm as a prohibited person. He argues that (1) the district court erred by

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finding that he provided police with valid voluntary consent to search his apartment and
denying his motion to suppress evidence revealed by that sea rch and (2) that the state’s
case was founded primarily on the testimony of an accomplice for which the state lacked
sufficient corroborating evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
On January 7, 2018, appellant Christopher Coleman and his girlfriend, Samantha
Bennett, were driving back to Coleman’s apartment after picking up another individual,
Kaira Green, from a local store. Coleman stated that he intended to show Green the
aftermath of a burglary of his apartment unit that occurred earlier that day. Upon parking
in the driveway of his building, Coleman left his vehicle running and entered the building
with Bennett and Green. Once they were inside, Coleman heard two car doors slam closed
and turned to see his car backing out of the driveway. Coleman ran out towards the vehicle
and claimed that he heard gunshots, at which point he turned and went back into the
building. By the time Coleman returned, Bennett was on the phone with 911 operators.
Green and Bennett would both later report to police that they also he ard gunshots after
Coleman ran outside. After the vehicle had left the property, Coleman asserts that he went
back outside and ran after it, that he followed a pedestrian he suspec ted to be involved in
the theft of his vehicle, and that he made it about on e block away from his house before
flagging down the squad car that was responding to Bennett’s 911 call.
The responding officers brought Coleman back to his building and “froze” the
scene—informing Coleman, Green, and Bennett that they could not leave unt il they gave
a statement to the detective assigned to the case. Coleman asserts that he overheard

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conversations between the officers suggesting that they did not completely believe his
story. Later, at the officers’ request, Coleman agreed to go to the p olice station to be
interviewed by the detective. Coleman was handcuffed in the squad car, but he was not
told that he was under arrest, and the district court found that he was handcuffed pursuant
to standard transportation procedure. When Coleman arrived at the police station, he was
led to an interview room, and the handcuffs were removed.
The investigation of the scene revealed several 9-millimeter shell casings outside of
Coleman’s building. The police also recovered Coleman’s car and observed that two
windows had been shattered and that there were three bullet holes in the back body of the
car consistent with 9-millimeter bullets.
During Coleman’s interview, the detective requested permission for the officers at
the scene to search Coleman’s apartment—explaining his desire to rule out the possibility
that Coleman had any involvement in the shooting. The detective testified that Coleman
was not, at that time, considered a suspect, and that he sought the search because he
believed “something . . . was still missing”—pointing to the fact that there were bullet holes
on the outside of the vehicle which could not have been made by the driver. After Coleman
initially provided an ambiguous answer, the detective asked for clarification, whereupon
Coleman consented to the search. The search of Coleman’s apartment revealed a 9 -
millimeter handgun hidden in the laundry room of Coleman’s building. The parties would
eventually stipulate that after Coleman’s retreat to the building following the gunshots, he
handed Bennett the gun that police discovered and told her to hide it.

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The state charged Coleman with unlawful possession of a firearm in viola tion of
Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1b(a) (2016) . Later, the state amended the complaint to add
three additional charges, including attempted murder and assault. The state dropped the
later-added charges after Coleman assented to a stipulation agreement with the state and
agreed to waive his right to jury trial pursuant to rule 26, subdivision 3. Before trial,
Coleman filed a motion to suppress the handgun found in his apartment, which the district
court denied following a contested omnibus hearing. Af ter argument, the district court
issued a judgment of conviction against Coleman. Coleman appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. Consent
Coleman first argues that the consent to search his residence he ostensibly gave to
the detective was involuntary and therefore inv alid. The search, he argues, violated his
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure , and accordingly, the
handgun should have been suppressed.
Police searches conducted in the absence of a warrant are usually per se
unreasonable, but an exception is made where the owner of the property to be searched
voluntarily consents. State v. Hanley , 363 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Minn. 1985). This court
reviews a district court’s finding on the voluntariness of consent for clear error. State v.
Alayon, 459 N.W.2d 325, 330 (Minn. 1990). The issue is one of fact and requires an
analysis of the totality of the circumstances which seeks to ascertain whether, in obtaining
consent, the conduct of the police was coercive. Id. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 227 -28, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2047-48 (1973)). “Whether consent was voluntary is

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determined by examining the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the
encounter, the kind of person the defendant is, and what was said a nd how it was said.”
State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 102 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted).
In arguing that the totality of the circumstances in this case reveal that his consent
was involuntary, Coleman cites the following: (1) the fact that he and the others were told
that they could not leave the scene until the detective assigned to the case got a statement
from them; (2) the fact that he was handcuffed for his transport to the police station; (3) the
fact that the detective did not tell him he was free to leave the interview, to not answer the
detective’s questions, or to refuse to consent to the search; (4) his assertion that the
detective’s reason for requesting search was untruthful because Coleman was in fact a
suspect; and (5) his assertion that th e officers at the scene did not believe his story.
Ultimately, Coleman argues that these circumstances displayed an exercise of law
enforcement’s authority, and that “the full weight of law enforcement’s authority” suggests
that one is not or would not feel free to terminate the encounter.
As the district court noted, the extent to which a defendant feels free to terminate
the encounter with law enforcement is pertinent to the issue of voluntariness. See Florida
v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (1991). With respect to Coleman
being kept at the scene, we agree with the district court that “the police must have some
authority to freeze the situation,” and that it was not unreasonable for them to do so in this
case. Appelgate v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 402 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Minn. 1987). “[E]ven
if the circumstances are such that no one person can be singled out as the probable offender,
the police must sometimes be allowed to take some action intermediate to that of arrest and

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nonseizure activity.” Id. The district court noted (1) that Coleman specifically asked
whether he was under arrest and the off icers responded that he was not and (2) that
Coleman and the others were only kept at the scene for approximately 30 minutes.
Coleman contends also that the police officers and detective suspected him of being
involved in this crime. He claims to have overheard police officers discussing their
suspicion of him and points to the detective’s statement that he wanted to “rule out”
Coleman. It is true that an officer’s suspicions can be relevant to whether the person being
questioned would feel free to leave. Stansbury v. California , 511 U.S. 318, 324-25, 114
S. Ct. 1526, 1529-30 (1994). However, this is true only to the extent that those suspicions
are communicated to the individual being questioned “by word or deed,” and “only to the
extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the position of the individual . . . would
gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of action.” Id. at 325 (quotation omitted). At most,
under the circumstances of this case, the detective’s statement would amount to only an
ambiguous hint that he suspected Coleman of any wrongdoing. Moreover, “[e]ven a clear
statement from an officer that the perso n under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in
itself, dispositive . . . for some suspects are free to come and go until the police decide to
make an arrest.” Id. This was not only true of Coleman in this case, but also would have
been clear to a reasonable person in his situation. While the detective did not explicitly tell
Coleman that he was free to leave, Coleman voluntarily agreed to meet with the detective;
he was explicitly told that he was not under arrest; the detective testified that the doors out
of the interview room and police station were unlocked; and while Coleman was
handcuffed for the transportation, he was not handcuffed in the police station. While

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Coleman argues that he did not believe the officers, that he did not feel free to r efuse to
meet with the detective, and that he did not feel free to end the interview, we cannot say
that the district court’s finding that a reasonable person would have felt free to leave is
clearly erroneous.
In sum, Coleman argues not that the district court erred in its interpretation or
application of law . Rather, Coleman disagrees only with the court’s conclusion that the
circumstances of this case would not have caused him to feel as if he was unable to
terminate the encounter. While certain circumstances of the totality may weigh in favor of
Coleman’s position, they are not so strong as to permit us to conclude that the district court
clearly erred.
II. Corroboration of accomplice testimony
Because Coleman stipulated to a court trial pursuant to subdivision 3 of rule 26.01,
he argues also that Bennett was an accomplice to the crime for which he was convicted,
that the district court erred in concluding otherwise, and that the state lacked sufficient
corroborating evidence of her testimony to satisfy the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 634.04.
(2018) (“A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless it is
corroborated by such other evidence as tends to convict the defendant of the commiss ion
of the offense.”). We disagree.
“If the question of whether a witness is an accomplice is disputed or subject to
differing interpretations, then the issue is one of fact . . . .” State v. Pendleton, 759 N.W.2d
900, 907 (Minn. 2009). Coleman asserts that Bennett was an accomplice under two
different theories, the first of which is that she was charged with and convicted of the same

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crime. “The test for determining if a witness is an accomplice is whether the witness could
have been indicted and convicted for the crime with which the defendant is charged.” Id.
(quotation omitted). Coleman argues that Bennett was convicted of the same crime, despite
the fact Coleman was convicted under Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1b(a), whereas Bennett
was convicted under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(10)(iii) (2016). In its order, the district
court, citing State v. Pendleton , noted that “[w]here people have acted in ways that
constitute separate crimes by statute, those who are guilty of one crime are not accomplices
of those who are guilty of a separate crime.” Pendleton, 759 N.W.2d at 907. Nevertheless,
Coleman maintains that these are the “same crimes,” seemingly because they are both
characterized by prohi bited possession of a firearm, but he cites no authority for this
interpretation of the law.1
Alternatively, Coleman argues that Bennett was an accomplice because she played
a knowing role in the commission of the crime and did not attempt to prevent it. He cites
State v. Parker for the argument that one may be an accomplice if one aided and abetted
the crime’s commission by failing to object to it, assenting to it, or by lending one’s
approval to it. 164 N.W.2d 633, 641 (Minn. 1969). He argues that beca use Bennett did
not mention the gun shots to the 911 operator, did not immediately inform police about the
whereabouts of the handgun, and generally had a proximate relationship with him, she was
an accomplice.

1 Coleman cites two phrases from different cases which he insists support his contention
that the statutory classification of the crime does not matter, but the only relevance of the
cited language is that it is somewhat syntactically analogous to Coleman’s argument.

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Parker was more recently expounded on in State v. Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d 631, 640
(Minn. 2012). First, Scruggs notes that what made Parker unique and led to finding the
otherwise uninvolved defendant an accomplice was that “the defendant intended his
presence to aid and it did aid the perpetrators of a crime.” Id. Here, the district court found
that Bennett was not aware that Coleman had a handgun until he handed it to her after
reentering the building, and Coleman does not challenge that finding. Second, Scruggs
noted that Parker did not hold that t he presence of the conditions to which Coleman
refers—the ostensible accomplice’s failure to object, assenting to the act, and close
association—compels finding accomplice liability, but rather that such could be sufficient
to support such a finding. Id. at 641. Therefore, even if Bennett’s actions in this case were
identical to the accomplice’s in Parker, the district court would have still been within its
discretion—as the fact finder—to not consider her an accomplice.
Because the district court did not err by not considering Bennett an accomplice,
Bennett’s testimony did not need to be corroborated as that of an accomplice.2
Affirmed.

2 While we need not analyze it, we note that we agree with the district court in that even if
Bennett was an accomplice, her testimony would have been sufficiently corroborated by
other evidence.