Michael Anthony Guardia, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1692

Michael Anthony Guardia,
Respondent,

vs.

Jennifer Marie Mattson,
Appellant.

Filed June 15, 2020
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-18-1882

Maury D. Beaulier, St. Louis Park, Minnesota (for respondent)

Michael D. Dittberner, Linder, Dittberner & Winter, Ltd., Edina, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant mother challenges the district court’s order increasing respondent father’s
parenting time. We affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant-mother Jennifer Marie Mattson and respondent -father Michael Anthony
Guardia are the parents of M.A.G., born in 2012, and M.T.G., born in 2013. Mother and
father married in January 2012. In D ecember 2016, a Texas district court dissolved their
marriage in a judgment and decree that appointed mother and father as “Joint Managing
Conservators” of the children, designated mother as the “primary managing conservator”
and father as a “non-custodial parent,” and allowed mother to determine the location of the
children’s primary residence.
The judgment and decree awarded father parenting time during the school year from
Friday afternoon through Monday morning following the second, fourth, and fifth Friday
of every month, as well as overnight on Thursdays if he lived within 100 miles of the
children’s primary residence. The judgment and decree awarded father parenting time
during the summer from Friday night through Sunday night following the second , fourth,
and fifth Friday of every month, as well as 30 days of parenting time if he lived within 100
miles of the children’s primary residence. The judgment and decree generally allowed
father to exercise his extended summer parenting time consecutively . At the time of the
dissolution, mother resided in Minnesota and father resided in Texas. Father moved to
Minnesota in June 2017.
In December 2018, father moved the Minnesota district court for an order modifying
custody and granting him additional parenting time. Father asked the district court to order
a 5-2-2-5 parenting -time schedule during the school year such that mother would have
parenting time every Monday and Tuesday, father would have parenting time every

3
Wednesday and Thursday, and mother and father would generally alternate weekends. In
January 2019, the district court ordered a parenting-time evaluation. In February 2019, the
district court formally accepted jurisdiction over the matter, denied father’s motion to
modify custody, and again directed the parties to participate in the parenting -time
evaluation. In April 2019, the parenting-time evaluator recommended that the district court
adopt a 5 -2-2-5 parenting -time schedule for the entire year and allow each pare nt two
nonconsecutive weeks of vacation until M.T.G. turned eight, at which point the weeks of
vacation could be consecutive.
In June 2019, father moved the district court to adopt the parenting-time evaluator’s
recommendations or to modify physical custody. In July 2019, mother moved the district
court to deny father’s motion and to modify father’s extended summer parenting time such
that he could exercise it consecutively for no more than 15 days at a time.
Following a hearing, the district court granted fat her’s motion to adopt the 5 -2-2-5
parenting-time schedule recommended by the parenting -time evaluator, “[c]ommencing
immediately,” and adopted the parenting -time evaluator’s recommendation regarding
father’s extended summer parenting time. The district court did so based on its application
of the best-interests standard. Mother asked the district court to stay implementation of the
5-2-2-5 schedule. There is no indication that the district court granted that request. Mother
appeals.
D E C I S I O N
“The district court has broad discretion in determining parenting -time issues and
will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.” Dahl v. Dahl, 765 N.W.2d 118,

4
123 (Minn. App. 2009). The district court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law
or makes findings of fact that are unsupported by the record. Hagen v. Schirmers , 783
N.W.2d 212, 215 (Minn. App. 2010).
I.
Custody modifications are governed by Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d) (2018), which
provides that a district court may not modify a n existing custody order unless “a change
has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the parties and . . . the modification is
necessary to serve the best interests of the child.” One such circumstance exists if a “child’s
present environment endan gers the child’s physical or emotional health or impairs the
child’s emotional development and the harm likely to be caused by a change of
environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change to the child.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.18(d)(iv).
Modification of a parenting -time schedule is generally governed by Minn. Stat.
§ 518.175, subd. 5(b) (2018), which provides that “[i]f modification would serve the best
interests of the child, the court shall modify . . . an order granting or denying parenting
time, if t he modification would not change the child’s primary residence.” But i f a
requested parenting-time modification would result in a de facto custody modification, the
district court must apply the standard for custody modification when ruling on the request.
In re Custody of M.J.H., 913 N.W.2d 437, 438, 441 (Minn. 2018). The question of which
legal standard applies to a motion to modify parenting time is a question of law that this
court reviews de novo. Id. at 440.

5
In M.J.H., t he Minnesota Supreme C ourt explained how a court is to determine
whether a motion to modify parenting time is a de facto motion to modify physical custody,
such that the endangerment standard applies. Id. at 441-43. The supreme court emphasized
that “a motion for equal parenting time should not be treated as a motion for joint physical
custody entirely on the basis that the sole physical custodian would no longer have the
majority of the parenting time.” Id. at 442. The court explained that
when determining whether a motion to modify parenting time
is a de facto motion to modify physical custody for purposes of
deciding whether the endangerment standard applies, a court
should consider the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether the proposed modification is a substantial change that
would modify the parties’ custody arrangement. The factors
considered may include the apportionment of parenting time,
the child’s age, the child’s school schedule, and the distance
between the parties’ homes, but these factors are not
exhaustive.

Id. at 443.
In M.J.H., the supreme court considered whether a father’s proposed modification.
would have modified physical custody, that is, whether it would have “effectively
modif[ied] [the mother’s] ‘routine daily care and control’ of the child.” Id. at 441 -42
(quoting Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(c) (2016) ( defining physical custody )). The
supreme court determined that the father’s proposed modification would have done so ,
reasoning as follows:
[Father’s] request would affect half of a ll school days by
increasing his parenting time from every other weekend,
Friday through Monday morning, to every other week, Sunday
through Sunday. [ Father’s] proposed modification . . . would
change [mother’s] daily care and control of the child from
nearly every school day to half of all school days. And the

6
modification would result in the child spending approximately
2 hours each weekday traveling between [father’s] home and
the child’s school, which would necessarily affect daily
routines and scheduling matters. Considering the child’s age,
school schedule, and the distance between the two parties’
homes, we conclude that [father’s] proposed modification is
substantial enough to change [mother’s] routine daily care and
control of the child.

Id. at 442 (quotation omitted). Because the father’s motion “modifie[d] the parties’ sole
physical custody arrangement,” the supreme court concluded that “the endang erment
standard in Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv) applie[d] to his motion.” Id.
In this case, t he district court determined that father’s requested parenting -time
modification would not constitute a de facto change in custody. Mother assigns error to
that determination, contending that the “district court’s order modifying parenting time was
a de facto modification of physical custody requiring application of the endangerment
standard.” She argues that “the 5 -2-2-5 schedule constitutes a de facto modific ation of
physical custody given the apportionment of parenting time, the children’s ages, and the
length of the commute between [father’s] home and the children’s school.”
As to the apportionment of parenting time and the children’s school s chedule, the
district court estimated that under the existing parenting-time schedule father had parenting
time “approximately 136 overnights annually” and that under the proposed 5-2-2-5
parenting-time schedule father would have parenting time “approximately 182 overnights
annually.” The district court found that “[b]oth parents are involved in the children’s
school and activities” and reasoned that “[a]lthough granting Father’s request will require

7
adjustments to the children’s schedules, doing so will not significa ntly alter the parties’
involvement in the children’s lives.”
Mother does not dispute that father had approximately 136 annual overnights of
parenting time under the Texas judgment and decree. Instead, she argues that it is
misleading to analyze father’s parenting time using the entire calendar year, which includes
father’s extended summer parenting time. Mother notes that the “change to equal parenting
time during the school year results in a 67% increase in school overnights (from 3 to 5
overnights) during a two-week period,” and argues that this change in school overnights is
significant.
But the increase in school overnights that mother highlights amounts to one
additional weekday of parenting time each week . Under the 5-2-2-5 schedule, father has
parenting time on every Wednesday and Thursday, rather than just every Thursday. Father
already had parenting time from Friday afternoon through Monday morning on alternating
weekends, and the district court found that he was already involved in the children’s school
and activities. Under the circumstances presented by this record, we are not persuaded that
one additional weekday of parenting time each week during the school year is a substantial
change that will have a significant impact on mother’s routine daily care and control of the
children. Such a change is far less disruptive than the shift to alternating weeks of parenting
time that the supreme court considered a de facto modification of custody in M.J.H. See
id. at 439, 442.
As to the children’s ages, the district court noted that “[M.A.G.] is now seven years
old and [M.T.G.] is almost six years old” and that, “[g]iven their ages, the children are

8
starting school and developing their patterns with each parent.” Mother argues that the
district court “discounted the children’s ages as a factor in its determin[ation] whether a de
facto mo dification of physical custody was present,” but “raised concern about the
children’s ages in another portion of the findings by pointing to the children’s relative
youth as necessitating that the children did not spend more than one week away from one
parent” during the summer. Mother argues that “[i]f the children’s ages were that critical,
it would seem that their youth should have weighed in favor of viewing [father’s] motion
as seeking a de facto modification of physical custody.”
Mother’s suggestion that the district court’s approach is inconsistent and therefore
erroneous is unavailing. The parenting -time evaluator indicated that, because of the
children’s young ages, they had only a limited understanding of their parents’ weekly
parenting-time schedule. But the parenting-time evaluator expressed the separate concern
that, for such young children, an “extended absence from a parent can cause anxiety,
depressive thoughts, and confusion in the child.” Thus, the record supports a conclusion
that although the children’s ages weighed against extended parenting time for father in the
summer, their ages did not weigh against an increase of father’s parenting time during the
school year.
As to the distance between the parties’ homes, t he distric t court found that the
children’s school is “relatively equidistant from each [parent’s] residence” and reasoned
that “[i]ncreasing Father’s parenting time to 50% will not require the children to spend
excessive time commuting between the locations.” Mother argue s that the district court
erred by finding that the children’s school is “relatively equidistant” from each party’s

9
home because her home is significantly closer to the children’s school. Even if mother is
correct, the actual change in commute time resulting from the 5-2-2-5 schedule is relatively
minor, resulting in one additional round-trip commute for the children each week.
The change in commute time associated with the 5 -2-2-5 parenting-time schedule
here is far less significant than the one associated with the requested parenting -time
modification in M.J.H. The change in M.J.H. would have “result[ed] in the child spending
approximately 2 hours each weekday traveling between [the father’s] home and the child’s
school” on alternating weeks when the father had parenting time, “which would necessarily
affect daily routines and scheduling matters.” See id. at 442. When viewed in context, the
distance between the parties’ homes in this case does not, without more, indicate a de facto
change in custody. Therefore, any error in the district court’s finding that the parties’
homes are equidistant from the school can be ignored as harmless. See Minn. R. Civ. P.
61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored).
Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the apportionment of
parenting time, the children’s school schedules, the children’s ages, and the distance
between the parties’ homes, the district court did not err by concluding that father’s
proposed modification was not a substantial change that would modify the parties’ custody
arrangement. Because father’s motion to modify parenting time was not a de facto motion
to modify physical custody, the district court did not err by declining to a pply the
endangerment standard.

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II.
If a requested parenting -time modification “would not change the child’s primary
residence,” the district court applies the best -interests standard when deciding whether to
make that modification. Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(b). Although the legislature has
not defined “primary residence,” M.J.H., 913 N.W.2d at 440; see Minn. Stat. § 518.003
(2018), we have defined it as “the principal dwelling or place where [a] child lives,” Suleski
v. Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 335 (Minn. App. 2014).
In M.J.H., this court h eld that in determining whether a proposed modification of
parenting time would constitute a change in a child’s primary residence, “the district court
should consider not only the apportio nment of parenting time under the proposed
modification, but also the child’s other relevant attachments to each parent’s place of
residence and the impact of the modification on those attachments.” 899 N.W.2d 573, 574
(Minn. App. 2017), rev’d on other gr ounds, 913 N.W.2d 437 (Minn. 2018) . These
attachments “could include where the child attends school, participates in extracurricular
activities, socializes with peers, or worships.” Id. at 578.
The district court determined that father’s requested par enting-time modification
would not change the children’s primary residence. Mother challenges that determination,
contending that the “district court’s order modifying parenting time was a modification of
the children’s primary residence requiring applic ation of the endangerment standard.”
Mother argues that the supreme court’s statement in M.J.H. “that ‘physical custody’ and
‘primary residence’ are distinct concepts indicates that the supreme court may view the
‘totality of the circumstances’ type of ba lancing test as being inapplicable to a

11
determination of whether a parenting time modification involves modification of a primary
residence.” She asks this court to focus instead on “the apportionment of school
overnights.”
In M.J.H., the supreme court stated “that the terms ‘parenting time,’ ‘physical
custody,’ and a ‘child’s primary residence,’ are distinct yet overlapping concepts as defined
by the Legislature.” 913 N.W.2d at 440. But because the supreme court concluded that
the requested parenting-time modification in M.J.H. would have modified the parties’
custody arrangement, the supreme court did not address the primary-residence issue in that
case. Id. at 441-43. Thus, the supreme court did not reject this court’s holding regarding
that issue. We therefore follow the reasoning of our opinion in M.J.H. and consider the
apportionment of parenting time under the modified parenting -time schedule, as well as
the children’s relevant attachments to each parent’s place of residence and the i mpact of
the modification on those attachments. See 899 N.W.2d at 573.
We have already determined that the modified apportionment of parenting time was
not a substantial change. Moreover, t he fact that the modification did not change the
children’s school enrollment is significant. Because the children’s school is closer to
mother’s home, their participation in any school extracurricular activities are necessarily
more closely connected to mother’s home than father’s home. Although it would have
been helpful if the district court had made findings regarding other relevant factors, such
as whether the modification would impact where the children socialize with peers or
worship, mother does not assert that the new parenting-time schedule negatively affects the
children in those areas. And the record does not support such an assertion. On this record,

12
we cannot say that the district court erred by concluding that father’s requested parenting-
time modification would not change the children’s primary residence.
Because the district court correctly concluded that father’s requested parenting-time
modification would not change the children’s primary residence, the district court did not
err by applying the best-interests standard when deciding whether to grant father’s request.
III.
The district court’s decision in this case is governed by Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd.
5(b), which provides, “If modification would serve the best interests of the child, the court
shall modify . . . an order granting or denying parenting time, if the modification would not
change the child’ s primary resi dence. Consideration of a child’ s best interest includes a
child’s changing developmental needs.” We review a district court’s determination that a
modification of parenting time is in a child’s best interests for an abuse of discretion.
Suleski, 855 N.W.2d at 334, 337.
Mother contends that “adoption of the equal parenting time schedule [was]
unjustified even if it is not deemed to be a modification of a primary residence or a de facto
modification of physical custody.” Mother argues that the district court failed to make
findings justifying its order, complaining that the “district court summarily referenced
seven of the twelve best interest factors” in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2018 ), and
failed to explain why “the 5 -2-2-5 equal parenting time schedule would somehow be
beneficial in serving those factors.” The thrust of mother’s argument is that “there is no
support in the record for finding that modifying parenting time to a 5-2-2-5 schedule would
serve the children’s best interests.”

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Mother cites Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a), which provides, “In evaluating the
best interests of the child for purposes of determining issues of custody and parenting time,
the court must consider and evaluate all relevant factors,” including 12 listed factors.
Mother also cites Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(1) (2018), which provides that the “court
must make detailed findings on each of the [12 best-interest factors] based on the evidence
presented and explain how each factor led to its conclusions and to the determination of
custody and parenting time.”
Mother states that when modifying parenting time, “[d]istrict courts are not required
to make specific findings on every best intere st factor in 518.17, subd. 1(a); they are
required to consider only the relevant best interest factors.” She relies on Hansen v.
Todnem, which held that “[d]istrict courts a re not required to make specific, detailed
findings on each of the best-interest factors listed in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2016),
when considering requests to modify par enting time under Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 8
(2016).” 908 N.W.2d 592, 594 (Minn. 2018). Father also mentions Hansen in his brief.
In Hansen, the supreme court stated, “Minn. Stat. § 518.17 applies to the creation
and initial approval of par enting plans, but Minn. Stat. § 518.175 still governs parenting
time modifications.” Id. at 596. At issue was a request for parenting -time modification
under Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 8, which provides, “The court may allow additional
parenting time to a parent to provide child care while the other parent is working if this
arrangement is reasonable and in the best interests of the child, as defined in section 518.17,
subdivision 1.” Id. at 594, 597. The supreme court noted that “unlike Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 1(b)(1), nothi ng in the text of Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 8, require s the district

14
court to make specific and detailed findings on the best-interest factors.” Id. at 598. It then
explained:
[Minn. Stat. § 518.175, su bd. 8,] requires that the child -care
arrangement be “reasonable and in the best interests of the
child, as defined in section 518.17, subdivision 1.” That
language references only the definition of the best interests of
the child, which includes the factors listed in Minn. Stat.
§ 518.17, subd. 1(a). A reference to the definition does not,
however, compel detailed findings under Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 1(b).

Id. (citation omitted). The supreme court clarified that , when considering a modification
request under Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 8, a district court is “required to consider only
the relevant best-interest factors in section 518.17, subdivision 1,” and is “not required to
make specific and detailed findings on those factors.” Id. at 599.
Unlike the modification statute at issue in Hansen, the relevant modification statute
in this case, Minn. S tat. § 518.175, subd. 5(b), does not explicitly reference Minn. Stat.
§ 518.17, subd. 1 (2018). Moreover, in Hansen, the Minnesota Supreme Court said that
this court’s reliance on Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5 (2016), was “misplaced” in that case
because “[a]lthough subdivision 5 does govern parenting time modification requests,
subdivision 8 is specific to requests for ‘additional parenting time . . . to provide child care
while the other parent is working.’” Id. at 597 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 8).
While some caselaw could be read to assume that Hansen’s analysis under
subdivision 8 applies to motions made under subdivision 5, the parties do not cite, and
research has not revealed, any precedent requiring that motions to modify parent ing time

15
under Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5, be subject to the same rationale that Hansen used in
analyzing a motion to modify parenting time made under Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 8.
Nor are we comfortable simply assuming that Hansen does in fact apply here.
Hansen’s analysis is based on Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 8, and the specific language of
that provision. Neither that subdivision nor similar language is involved here. Further, in
light of Hansen’s rejection of this court’ s reliance on Minn. S tat. § 518.175, subd. 5, to
address a motion to modify parenting time properly subject to Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd.
8, we are reluctant, without more, to simply import Hansen’s analysis under Minn. Stat.
§ 518.175, subd. 8, into this case involving a motion under Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5.
We therefore leave for another day the issue of Hansen’s potential application to a
modification proceeding under Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5 (2018). See In re Civil
Commitment of Kropp , 895 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Minn. App. 2017) (“ Minnesota appellate
courts decline to reach an issue in the absence of adequate briefing.”), review denied (Minn.
June 20, 2017).
Nevertheless, even Hansen is clear that “[t]he district court must make sufficient
findings to enable appellate review.” 908 N.W.2d at 597 n.2. To be sufficient, those
findings must allow an appellate court to assess whether the district court appropriately
exercised its discretion. See Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld , 249 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Minn. 1976)
(noting, on appeal of a custody award, that findings of fact explaining a district court’s
exercise of its discretion are necessary to “(1) assure consideration of the statutory factors
by the [district] court; (2) facilitate appellate review of the [district] court’s custody
decision; and (3) satisfy the parties that this important decision was carefully and fairly

16
considered by the [district] court”); In re Welfare of Child of J.R.R., ___ N.W.2d___, ___
2020 WL 1845256 , at *6 (Minn. App. Apr. 13, 2020) (citing this aspect of Rosenfeld).
Although more fulsome best -interests findings would have been helpful here, the district
court adequately explained its parenting-time decision.
The district court’s best-interests findings are as follows:
Based upon the totality of the evidence as well as the
observation by the Court of the parties, and having considered
the parenting time evaluation and the findings of the evaluator,
the Court finds that the evaluator’s recommended parenting
time schedule is in the best interests of the children and will
order it below.

In particular, the or der below supports the children’ s
needs, Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(1); is consistent with the
history and natu re of each parent’s participation in providing
care for the children, Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(6); should
further the willingness and ability of each parent to provide
ongoing care for the children, Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(7);
should maintain the ongoing relationships between the children
and each parent, Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(9); should
benefit the children in maximizing parenting time with both
parents, Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(10); should improve the
disposition of each parent to support the children’s
relationships with the other parent, Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd.
1(11); and should further the willingness and ability of parents
to cooperate in the rearing of their children; to maximize
sharing information and minimize exposure of the children to
parental conflict; and to utilize methods for resolving disputes
regarding any major decision concerning the life of the
children, Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(12). Other factors are
neutral or inapplicable.

(Emphasis added.)
It is apparent that the district court heavily relied on the parenting -time evaluation.
We defer to the district court’s credibility determinations, including its decision to rely on

17
an expert’s evaluation. See Kremer v. Kremer , 827 N.W.2d 454, 463 (Minn. App. 2013)
(stating that it “was within the district court’s discretion to rely on [a] custody evaluator’s
testimony and report” and deferring to the district court’s credibility determinati on
regarding that evidence), review denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 2013). We note that the district
court considered both the parenting-time evaluation and an independent rebuttal report that
mother submitted. The district court rejected that rebuttal report, explaining that although
the report “pointed out issues that could have been addressed ,” the author of the rebuttal
report “did not identify a fatal deficiency in the parenting time evaluation.”
It is also apparent that the district court reasoned that it was in the children’s best
interests to maintain their relationships with each parent and to maximize their time with
each parent. Lastly, it is apparent that the district court reasoned that it was in the children’s
best interests to adopt a parenting -time schedule that would reduce the opportunity for
contact, and therefore conflict, between the parents.
The parenting -time evaluation supports the district court’s reasoning . The
parenting-time evaluator reported that father’s home is “clean and spacious and allows
many open areas for the [children] to run and play,” that during the evaluator’s home visit
there were “examples of spontaneous affection between [father] and the [children] that
appeared quite warm and genuine,” and that “it was clear” that the children “enjoy their
time with their father.” The parenting -time evaluator reported that “[s]chool records
suggest the children are doing quite well, both academically an d socially, and there does
not appear to be evidence that the children do better during stays at one home versus the
other.” The parenting-time evaluator noted that the children’s principal reported that “she

18
has witnessed the children excited to see both parents,” that the children seem happy, and
that, “in her estimation, both parents appear to attempt to shield the children from their
conflict.”
The parenting-time evaluator also described several benefits of a 5 -2-2-5 weekly
schedule, including that it would be predictable and thereby “help to reduce the confusion
and uncertainty which seems t o be causing [M.T.G.] anxiety-related stress,” that it would
provide “a more accurate picture of each parent’s respective contributions towards their
children’s needs while allowing the children to go a maximum of only five days without
seeing a parent,” and that it would allow “ nearly all transitions to occur at the school,
minimizing face -to-face exchanges and allowing a parallel parenting approach.” The
parenting-time evaluator acknowledged that there were potential drawbacks to a 5 -2-2-5
parenting-time schedule and that such a schedule was unlikely to resolve the conflict
between the parties. But the parenting -time evaluator concluded that “on balance, and by
a narrow margin,” a 5-2-2-5 schedule was “the best solution for [the] family.”
Again, the district court has “broad discretion” in determining parenting-time issues.
Dahl, 765 N.W.2d at 123. Having reviewed the record in detail and considered mother’s
arguments, we are not persuaded that the district court abused its broad discretion here.
Affirmed.