A19-1701 A19-1702 A19-1703

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A19-1700
A19-1701
A19-1702
A19-1703

Court of Appeals Hudson, J.

State of Minnesota,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: December 30, 2020
Office of Appellate Courts

Guy Gerald Sanschagrin,

Respondent (A19-1700),

Kristine Knudson Sanschagrin,

Respondent (A19-1701),

Jeffery Lowell Cameron,

Respondent (A19-1702),

Linda Kay Cameron,

Respondent (A19-1703).

________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota;

Martin H.R. Norder, Kelly & Lemmons, P.A., Saint Paul, Minnesota, and;

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Timothy J. Keane, Leland P. Abide, Kuta k Rock LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota for
appellant.

Wynn C. Curtiss, Chestnut Cambronne, PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondents.

Susan L. Naughton, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae League of Minnesota Cities.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S
A letter contesting a notice of zoning violation is not a “request” as defined in Minn.
Stat. § 15.99, subd. 1(c) (2020), because it is not on an agency application form and does
not clearly identify a request for governmental approval of an action. Therefore, the
automatic approval provision in Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2(a) (2020), does not apply to
respondents’ letter contesting a notice of zoning violation.
Reversed.
O P I N I O N
HUDSON, Justice.
In this case we must decide whether a letter contesting a notice of zoning violation
is a “request” as defined by Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. (1)(c) (2020), and therefore entitles
respondent property owners to the benefit of the automatic approval provision in Minn.
Stat. § 15.99, subd. (2)(a) (2020). The automatic approval provision in Minn. Stat. § 15.99,
subd. 2(a), requires agencies to “approve or deny within 60 days a written request relating
to zoning . . . for a permit, license, or other g overnmental approval of an action.” Failure
to deny such a request within 60 da ys “is approval of the request.” Id. Here, four joint
owners of an undeveloped lot on Lake Minneto nka received a notice of zoning violation
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from the City of Shorewood af ter installing a dock on the lot. The property owners
contested the zoning violatio n in a written letter to the city planning commission. The
question presented is whether the owners’ lette r is a “request” that triggered the 60-day
response deadline in Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2(a).
Respondents were criminally charged with violating section 1201.03, subdivisions
14.b and 14.e, of the Shorewood City Ordinances. They filed a pretrial motion to dismiss
for lack of probable cause, a sserting, among other arguments, that the City’s failure to
respond to the letter they sent in response to the notice of z oning violation resulted in the
automatic approval of their dock. The distri ct court agreed and granted the motion to
dismiss, concluding that the City’s failure to respond within 60 days to the letter constituted
an automatic approval of respondents’ use of a dock on their property, under Minn. Stat.
§ 15.99, subd. 2(a). The court of appeals affi rmed. Because we conclude that the letter
was not a “request” under Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 1(c), and therefore the 60-day response
deadline under subdivision 2(a) was not triggered, we reverse.
FACTS
Respondents Guy Gerald Sanschagrin, Kristine Knudson Sanschagrin, Jeffery
Lowell Cameron, and Linda Kay Cameron (colle ctively, “the Owners”) jointly own an
undeveloped parcel of real property in the City of Shorewood, fronting Lake Minnetonka.
In April 2017, the Owners installed a dock on the property. On May 11, 2017, the City
issued a notice of zoning violation to the Owners, stating that the dock violated the
Shorewood Code of Ordinances because the pr operty lacked a “pri ncipal dwelling” and
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because the Owners did not occupy the property. 1 The notice directed them to either
remove the dock or appeal the order to the City Council in writing by May 17, 2017.
On May 13, 2017, the Owners responded to the C ity by letter. They asserted that
the city code only prohibited “permanent” or “floating” docks on unoccupied property and
they had installed a “seasonal” dock as define d in the code of ordinances for the Lake
Minnetonka Conservation District (LMCD code). 2 Asserting that the more-restrictive
LMCD code controlled when the city code was silent, the Owners asserted that their dock
did not violate the City’s zoning code.
The Shorewood City Council scheduled th e Owners’ appeal to be heard at the
council meeting on June 12, 2017. At the meeting, the City Council considered the
Owners’ request for additional time to review the City’s position regarding their appeal.
The City Council approved a motion referring the Owners’ appeal back to the City
Planning Commission for the formal appeal process and further review of city regulations
and ordinances.
One month later, on July 12, 2017, the City notifie d the Owners that it had
withdrawn its notice of viola tion and that all pending hear ings related to the Owners’
appeal were cancelled. The City noted that should it decide in the future to pursue a

1 The Owners’ homes are near the property itself, but are not located directly on the
lake.

2 Under the LMCD Code, a “seasonal dock” means “any dock which is so designed
and constructed that it may be removed from the Lake on a seasonal basis. All components
such as supports, decking and footings mu st be capable of removal by manual means
without use of power equipment, machines or tools other than handheld power tools.” Lake
Minnetonka Conservation District Code of Ordinances art. 1, § 3.01, subd. 89 (2019).
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violation of the city code, notice of such violations would be provided . T h e O w n e r s
continued to use the dock unimpeded for the re st of the season, removing it entirely from
the property in the fall of 2017.
At meetings in late July 2017, the C ity Council considered amendments to the
ordinances that govern use of docks by residents, and adopted an amended ordinance. As
affecting the Owners’ property, the amended ordinance prohibited the use of any dock—
permanent, seasonal, or otherwise—because there was no principal dwelling on the
property and the lot was too small to host any dwelling.
In the spring of 2018, the City sent the Owners a letter, reminding them that under
the amended city code, a dock could not be installed on their property. Subsequently, the
City issued a notice requiring the Owners to remove dock sections and equipment stored
on the property in violation of the city code. The Owners responded by notifying the City
that they had removed some non-dock materials, but otherwise asserted that storage of the
dock sections was a permitted non-conforming use and that th e 2017 amended ordinance
did not apply to their property. The City did not respond.
In June 2018, the Owners again installed the dock on the property. The City then
issued a notice to the Owners, stating that the dock violated the amended city code. Again,
the Owners submitted a written response to the City, asserting that the City was mistaken
in its conclusions, noting again that the amended ordinances did not apply to their property,
and asking the City to withdraw the violation notice. The City did not respond to this letter.
The Owners’ attorney then submitted a letter to the City to restate their appeal, contending
that the dock was a legal nonconforming use of the property. The City declined to hear the
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Owners’ appeal, deeming it untimely. Fina lly, in September 2018, the Owners were
charged by criminal complaint with two misdemeanor violations of the city code.
The Owners moved to dismiss the charges for lack of probable cause. They asserted,
among other arguments, that the City’s fi rst notice on May 11, 2017, was a “zoning
decision” and that their appeal letter of Ma y 13, 2017, was a “written application relating
to zoning” under Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 1( c). Therefore, under Minn. Stat. § 15.99,
subd. 2(a), the Owners argued, the City’s failure to approv e or deny their request to
withdraw the violation notice within 60 days resulted in the automatic approval of their use
of a dock on the property.
The district court granted the Owners’ pretrial motion to dismiss. The court agreed
that the City’s first notice was a zoning decision, and the Owners’ May 2017 appeal letter
in response to that notice, “[f]airly read,” could only be viewed as a request by the Owners
for the City to withdraw its determination that the dock violated the City’s zoning code.
The district court further concluded that, because the City’s withdrawal of the first notice
was not an approval or denial of the Owners’ dock, the Owners’ request for zoning action
was automatically approved by operation of law under Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2(a). The
City appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed. State v. Sanschagrin , No. A19-1700, 2020
WL 1673741, at *1 (Minn. App. Apr. 6, 2020). 3 Relying on our decision in 500, LLC v.

3 The court of appeals found that dismissa l of the City’s comp laint met the critical-
impact test for a pretrial appeal. Sanschagrin, 2020 WL 1673741, at *2. This conclusion
is not challenged by the Owners and thus is not at issue here.
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City of Minneapolis, 837 N.W.2d 287 (Minn. 2013), the court of appeals concluded that
the first appeal letter “met all of the plai n-language requirements for a zoning request”
under section 15.99, subdivision 1(c), because it was “related to” and had “a connection to
zoning.” Sanschagrin, 2020 WL 1673741, at *3. The court also he ld that the Owners’
letter “contained an implicit request for Shorew ood to approve their interpretation of the
zoning ordinance’s inapplicability” that properly invoked section 15.99. Id. Finally, the
court agreed that the City’s failure to approve or deny the Owners’ request resulted in the
approval of that request as a matter of law. Id.
ANALYSIS
We are required here to consider the applicability of the automatic approval
provision of Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2(a), to the Owners’ letter in response to the City’s
notice of zoning violation. To do so, we must determine whether the Owners’ May 2017
letter in response to the City’s first violation notice was a request, which is defined in Minn.
Stat. § 15.99, subd. 1(c), as a “written application related to zoning . . . for a permit, license,
or other governmental approval.”
When interpreting a statute, we “first determine whether the statute’s language, on
its face, is ambiguous.” Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant , 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn.
2001). A statute is ambiguous “when the language therein is subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation.” Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp. , 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn.
1999). If the statute is ambiguous, then we may “go beyond the language at issue to
ascertain the intent of the Legislature.” Johnson v. Cook County, 786 N.W.2d 291, 293−94
(Minn. 2010). In determining whether a statut e is ambiguous, we construe statutes as a
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whole so that statutory language is understood in context. State v. Bowen , 921 N.W.2d
763, 765 (Minn. 2019). If the language of the statute is una mbiguous, we apply its plain
meaning. Am. Tower, L.P., 636 N.W.2d at 312.
We turn to whether the Owners’ first appeal letter was “request,” that is, “a written
application relating to zoning” that tri ggered the 60-day time period and automatic
approval provision of Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2(a). In 500, LLC, we said that the phrase,
“a written request relating to zoning,” is unambiguous and “refers to a written request that
has a connection, association, or logical relationship to the regulation of building
development or the uses of property.” 837 N.W.2d at 291. At issue there was an
application for a certificate of appropriate ness, which was submitted to a heritage-
preservation commission by a developer. Id. at 288–89. The par ties agreed that the
developer’s application for a certificate of appropriateness was a “written request” under
Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2(a). Id. at 290.
Relying on our decision in 500 LLC, the court of appeals in this case held that the
term “request,” defined as “a written applica tion related to zoning,” Minn. Stat. § 15.99,
subd. 1(c), is also unambiguous. Sanschagrin, 2020 WL 1673741, at *2. Then, the court
held that the Owners’ first appeal letter met all the plai n-language requirements of a
“request” related to zoning and concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the
charges against the Owners for lack of probable cause. Id. at *3. The Owners urge us to
adopt this reasoning, arguing that our decision in 500, LLC controls the outcome of this
appeal.
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The reliance on 500, LLC is misplaced. The specific question in 500, LLC was
whether an application to a heritage-pre servation commission for a certificate of
appropriateness qualified as “a written request relating to zoning” governed by Minn. Stat.
§ 15.99, subd. 2(a). 837 N.W.2d at 288. We did not consider whether a “written request”
had been made; that point was undisputed—the question before us was simply whether the
request was “relat[ed] to zoning.” See 500, LLC, 837 N.W.2d at 290 (“The parties disagree
only about whether an application for a certificate of appropriateness ‘relat[es] to zoning’
under Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2(a).” (alteration in original)) . Consequently, our
interpretation of section 15.99 in 500, LLC focused exclusively on the terms “relating to”
and “zoning” in subdivision 2(a), which were (and remain) undefined in the statute. Id. at
290–91.
The question here is different. At issue here is not whether the request “relates to
zoning,” but whether the Owners’ letter was a “request” for “other governmental approval
of an action” under subdivision 1(c). Unlike the terms “relating to” and “zoning” examined
in 500, LLC, the Legislature provided a specific definition for the term “request” in Minn.
Stat. § 15.99, subd. 1(c). “When a word is defined in a statute, we are guided by the
definition provided by the Legislature.” Wayzata Nissan, LLC v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. ,
875 N.W.2d 279, 286 (Minn. 2016). Statutory definitions are applied in their entirety and
we “have no opportunity to ignore pa rt of the legislature’s definition.” State v. Peck ,
773 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Minn. 2009).
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Thus, we now turn to the text of the stat ute and the statutory definitions therein.
Under Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2(a), “[a]n agency4 must approve or deny within 60 days
a written request relating to zoning . . . fo r a permit, license, or other governmental
approval of an action.” The statute defines “request” as follows:
“Request” means a written application re lated to zoning . . . for a permit,
license, or other governmental approval of an action. A request must be
submitted in writing to the agency on an application fo rm provided by the
agency, if one exists. . . . A request not on a form of the agency must clearly
identify on the first page the specific permit, license, or other governmental
approval being sought. No request shall be deemed made if not in
compliance with this paragraph.

Id., subd. 1(c). “Failure of an agency to deny a re quest within 60 days is approval of the
request.” Id., subd. 2(a). The 60-day timetable begins when the agency receives a written
request containing all the necessary information and any applicable fee.
5 Id., subd. 3(a).
Under Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 1(c), a “request” can be made in one of two ways:
either (1) “on an application form provided by the agency” or (2) “ not on a form of the
agency.” If a request is not made on the form of the relevant agency, then it “must clearly
identify on the first page the specific permit, license, or other governmental approval being
sought.” Id.

4 The definition of “agency” includes “a st atutory or home rule charter city, county,
town . . . and any other political subdivision of the state.” Id., subd. 1(b). The City of
Shorewood is an agency under this definition.

5 At the court of appeals, the City argued that the Owners’ first appeal letter did not
qualify as a “request” because it did not incl ude an applicable fee under section 15.99,
subdivision 3(a). The court concluded that the City forfe ited this argument on appeal
because it did not raise the issue before the district court. Sanschagrin, 2020 WL 1673741,
at *2 n.4. We agree.
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The Owners’ May 2017 letter was not a re quest made on an application form
provided by the City; rather, it was a letter in resp onse to a notice of zoning violation.
Accordingly, the Owners were required to clearly identify “the specific permit, license, or
other governmental approval being sought” on the first page of the letter. The first page of
the Owners’ letter included the following statements:
“We respectfully appeal this order to the City Council per your direction,
by this writing to you . . . and assume any order to remove the dock will
be held in abeyance until this matter is ultimately resolved.”

“[W]e believe we are not in violation of the City’s code.”

“[W]e have placed a seasonal dock at the property, which is neither
permanent nor floating, and, theref ore, our dock is not violation of
1201.03 Subd. 14. b.”

The court of appeals determined that, taken together, these statements formed “an implicit
request for Shorewood to approve their interpretation of th e zoning ordinance’s
inapplicability.” Sanschagrin, 2020 WL 1673741, at *3.
We disagree. The Owners’ letter does not identify a specific license or permit that
they sought from the City, nor do they contend that they requested a license or permit. We
also reject the notion that the Owners’ letter contained an “implicit request” for
governmental approval. Such a concept is inconsistent with the plain language of a
“request,” which requires a “clear[]” identification of the “specific” governmental approval
being sought. Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 1(c). By definition, an implicit request is not clear
or specific. See Implied, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“Not directly or clearly
expressed; communicated only vaguely or indirectly.”). The only possibility that remains
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under the plain language of subdivision 1(c) is that the Owners’ letter clearly identifies the
specific “other governmental approval” sought.
Section 15.99 does not define the phrase “governmental approval,” though it could
mean something other than a permit or license. See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 842 N.W.2d 433,
437‒38 (Minn. 2014) (holding that “care” and “support” have distinct definitions to avoid
rendering either term superfluous in the statut e at issue). When interpreting statutes, the
canon against surplusage “favors giving each word or phrase in a statute a distinct, not
identical, meaning.” State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Minn. 2017). In a legal
sense, “approval” means “[t]o give formal sanction to; to confirm authoritatively.”
Approval, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). Under a br oad reading of the phrase
“governmental approval,” the Owners’ letter as king the City to give formal sanction to
their interpretation of the city code could be seen as a request for “governmental approval”
within the meaning of subdivision 1(c).
On the other hand, the meaning of the phrase “other governmental approval” could
also be derived by looking at its use in th e context of accompanyi ng statutory language.
See State v. Suess, 52 N.W.2d 409, 415 (Minn. 1952) (“[T]he meaning of doubtful words
in a legislative act may be determined by reference to their association with other associated
words and phrases.”). Therefore, one co uld narrowly interpret the phrase “other
governmental approval” to be analogous to a zoning permit or license.
Either one of these interpretations is reasonable depending on whether one focuses
on the definition of “approval” or its position in relation to the neighboring words “permit”
and “license” in the statute. Because the phrase “other governmental approval” is open to
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multiple reasonable interpretations, we find th is phrase to be ambiguous. We therefore
turn to the canons of statutory construction to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’s
intent. State v. Vasko , 889 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. 2017); see Minn. Stat. § 645.16(4)
(2020). In so doing, we conclude that the statute should be narrowly construed against the
application of the automatic approval penalty for several reasons. See Hans Hagen Homes,
Inc. v. City of Minnetrista, 728 N.W.2d 536, 543 (Minn. 2007) (noting that several rules of
construction favored a narrow c onstruction of the subdivision 2(a) automatic approval
provision).
First, the canon of ejusdem generis suggests that the phrase “other governmental
approval” must be akin to a zoning permit or a license. Ejusdem generis, Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (a Latin phrase meaning “of the same kind or class”). We have
recognized that “where words particularly designating specific acts or things are followed
by and associated with words of general import,” the rule of ejusdem generis states that
“the latter are generally to be regarded as comprehending only matters of the same kind or
class as those particularly stated.” State v. End , 45 N.W.2d 378, 381 (Minn. 1950)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The princip[le] underlying [the]
rule of ejusdem generis is that the legislature had in mind things of the same kind and was
speaking of them as a class.” Foley v. Whelan, 17 N.W.2d 367, 371 (Minn. 1945) (italics
added). Here, the specific terms “permit” an d “license” inform the meaning of the more
general term “other governmental approval” contained within the same class of terms.
A “permit” is defined as “[ a] certificate evidencing permission; an official written
statement that someone has a right to do something.” Permit, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th
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ed. 2019). Similarly, a “license” is defined as “[t]he certificate or document evidencing
such permission.” License, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Therefore, using the
canon of ejusdem generis , we interpret the phrase “other governmental approval” to
likewise refer to the official permission that a person must seek and receive from an agency
before undertaking the specific action that the pe rson proposes to pur sue. Under this
interpretation, it is evident th at the phrase “oth er governmental approval” envisions a
prospective request for agency permission , rather than retroa ctive approval by the
government of a person’s unilateral action or view of the law. This interpretation of “other
governmental approval” is also consistent with other provisions of section 15.99, which
incorporate variations of the term “application.” Section 15.99 includes ten references to
the “applicant” and includes a subdivision entitled “Application; extensions.” Minn. Stat.
§ 15.99, subd. 3 (2020). The interpretation of “governmental approval” as analogous to a
formal application is relevant when viewing the statute in its entirety and construing it to
give effect to all its provisions. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020).
Second, when construing a statute to ascerta in legislative intent, we consider “the
object to be attained” and “the consequences of a particular interpretation.” Minn. Stat.
§ 645.16(4), (6). Sanctioning an implicit request for governmental approval would
undermine the objective of the statute, which is to “establis h[ ] time deadlines for local
governments to take action on zoning applications.” Am. Tower, L.P., 636 N.W.2d at 312.
Requiring agencies to determine whether a request is an “implicit” one for zoning action
would require agencies to make subjective decisions about whether a “request” subject to
section 15.99 has been submitte d. Such subjectivity would result in more, not less,
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uncertainty in the time deadlines for zoning actions as agencies and property owners debate
whether each correspondence in a zoning dispute containe d an “implicit request” that
triggered the automatic approval provision of section 15.99.
Finally, when interpreting ambiguous statutes, we are guided by the rule of statutory
construction that presumes that “the legislature intends to favor the public interest as
against any private interest.” Minn. Stat . § 645.17(5) (2020). Construing “other
governmental approval” to encompass any written submission that contests a zoning
violation would inevitably complicate a municipality’s ability to fulfill its responsibilities
with respect to land use, while also risking inconsistent a pplication of zoning laws. See,
e.g., In re Stadsvold , 754 N.W.2d 323, 329 (Minn. 20 08) (explaining that zoning laws
control land use and development for public purposes). Because zoning ordinances
regulate a vast array of pe rmitted and unlawful property uses, the automatic, though
inadvertent, approval of a less-than-explicit request to approve nonconforming uses could
have a far-reaching impact across the state. Here, the public interest in the predictable and
consistent application of the legislatively-created automatic approval provision outweighs
the Owners’ private interest in securing automatic approval of a dock installation based on
their interpretation of the regulations governing the use of docks in the city of Shorewood.
See Hans Hagen Homes, Inc. , 728 N.W.2d at 543 (stating that the public interest in the
process for amending zoning or dinances favors a “narrow construction of the automatic
approval penalty” over private interests in automatic approval). But see Frank’s Nursery
Sales, Inc. v. City of Roseville , 295 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn. 1980) (holding that “zoning
16
ordinances should be construed strictly agai nst the city and in favor of the property
owner”).
We therefore conclude that the Owners ’ letter was not a “request” for “other
governmental approval of an action” under Minn. Stat. § 15 .99, subd. 1(c). Thus, the
automatic approval provision in section 15.99, subdivision 2(a) does not apply, and the
district court erred by granting the Owners’ pr etrial motion to dismiss the charges. Our
decision does not preclude the Owners from pur suing their alternativ e challenges to the
City’s charges and the amended ordinance. We merely hold that the Owners’ interpretation
of section 15.99 fails as a matter of law because their May 2017 letter contesting the City’s
notice of zoning violation was not a “request” for “other governmental approval of action”
as defined in Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 1(c).6
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the court of appeals and remand to the district
court to reinstate the City’s complaint and for further proceedings.
Reversed.

6 The City argues that, assuming a proper request was made, its withdrawal of the
notice of violation within the 60-day time period ended the City’s enforcement action and
effectively rendered moot the Owners’ request for zoning action. Because we hold that the
Owners’ first appeal letter was not a “request ” under Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 1 (c), we
do not need to reach this issue. See Lipka v. Minn. Sch. Emps. Ass’n, Local 1980 ,
550 N.W.2d 618, 622 (Minn. 19 96) (“[J]udicial restraint bids us to refrain from deciding
any issue not essential to the disposition of the particular controversy before us.”).