In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Joseph Allen Stone.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1707

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Joseph Allen Stone.

Filed March 2, 2020
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69VI-PR-18-129

Todd E. Deal, Virginia, Minnesota (for appellant Joseph Stone)

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Leah Stauber , Assistant County Attorney,
Virginia, Minnesota (for respondent St. Louis County Public Health and Human Services)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his civil commitment as a mentally ill and dangerous (MI&D)
person, arguing that the district court clearly erred by finding that he is substantially likely
to engage in acts capable of inflicting serious physical harm on another in the future. We
affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant Jo seph Allen Stone has a significant history of mental illness and
assaultive criminal behavior . He has bipolar schizoaffective disorder and was civilly
committed as a result of mental illness from July 2015 through May 2016, and June 2016
through December 2017.1 His criminal history between 2002 and 2016 includes 1 3
convictions for violent conduct such as domestic assault (two), obstructing legal process
(two), and felony assault against a police officer.
In June 2018, Stone was charged with obstructing legal process with force after he
physically assaulted law-enforcement officers arresting him pursuant to a warrant . Stone
remained agitated and became “increasingly aggressive” in jail , making delusional
statements that precipitated a mental -health assessment by jail staff. By July, Stone was
placed on a jail management plan due to his behavior. The plan required Stone to be fully
shackled during personal interactions and supervised by officers armed with Tasers .
Despite the plan, Stone physically assaulted his attorney during a jail meeting in August.
Following the recommendations of a court-appointed examiner, who se interview
was cut off after 5-10 minutes due to Stone’s behavior, the district court deemed Stone
incompetent to stand trial. The state filed a petition to commit Stone as MI&D. A second
examiner was appointed at Stone’s request . As before, the examiner’s interview was
terminated after only 15 minutes because Stone was “entirely uncooperative ,” rendering
the examiner unable to “ask any relevant questions due to [Stone’s] incessant interruptions

1 Stone’s psychiatric records show that he was also hospitalized seven other times for
periods up to three months between March 2014 and October 2016.

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and delusional digressions.” The examiner’s report describes Stone’s mental illness and
acute psychotic symptoms in detail. It states that Stone denies his mental illness and “will
not voluntarily commit to treatment in any respect,” and recommends civil commitment
where “he would be ordered to adhere to neuroleptic medication(s) . . . and manage his
mental illness.” On September 12, following a hearing, the district court is sued an initial
order civilly committing Stone as MI&D pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 1(a)
(2018).
In November, Jason Lewis, Ph.D., submitted a 60 -day evaluation report to the
district court, opining that Stone continued to meet the statutory criteria for civil
commitment and remain ed “acutely psychotic.” Dr. Lewis submitted an updated report
containing essentially the same findings prior to the August 2019 final commitment review
hearing. At Stone’s request, the district court appointed examiner Shane Wernsing, M.D.,
just before the final hearing. Dr. Werns ing met with Stone on August 25 , and used a
structured clinical interview tool, the “HCR-20,” to assess risk based on historical, clinical,
and risk-management factors. Dr. Wernsing opine d that Stone’s clinical risk factors had
improved, including his active symptoms, impulsivity, and responsiveness to treatment .2
And he noted that in his experience, Stone’s is the first case “where an apparently clinically
significant improvement” in a p erson initially committed as MI&D occurred just before
the final commitment hearing. But Dr. Wernsing concluded that Stone still me ets the

2 At the time of the hearing, Stone had been taking court -ordered neuroleptic medications
for nine months.

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criteria for MI&D commitment because historical factors are most predictive of future
dangerousness.
On August 28, the district court conducted t he final review hearing pursuant to
Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 2(a) (2018) . The district court considered the examiners’
reports and Stone’s medical records. And the court heard testimony from Dr. Lewis ,
Dr. Wernsing, and Stone. In its order for indeterminate civil commitment, the district court
notes the examiners’ somewhat divergent views regarding Stone’s response to treatment
and current mental status. The district court found that the medical records support
Dr. Wernsing’s testimony that Stone’s clinical status has improved, but rejected the notion
that this reduced Stone’s risk of future violence because Stone is in an environment that
ensures medication and sobriety compliance. The court concluded that Stone meets the
statutory criteria for MI&D commitment and that there are no appropriate less-restrictive
alternatives. Stone appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Appellate review of a MI& D commitment order is limited to whether the district
court complied with the statute and whether its findings of fact justify its legal conclusions.
In re Knops , 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995). We review the district court’s factual
findings for clear error based on the record as a whole, In re Civil Commitment of Ince, 847
N.W.2d 13, 22 (Minn. 2014), and defer to the court’s credibility determinations , Knops,
536 N.W.2d at 620.
A person is MI&D if the person is mentally ill, and as the result of that illness
presents a “clear danger to the safety of others.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17(a) (2018).

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Clear danger is shown by an overt act capable of causing “serious physical harm to another”
and “a substantial likelihood that the person will engage in acts capable of inflicting serious
physical harm on another.” Id. If, at the final review hearing, the district court finds clear
and convincing evidence “that the patient continues to be a person who is mentally ill and
dangerous, then the court s hall order commitment of the proposed patient for an
indeterminate period of time.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 3 (2018).
Stone concedes that the evidence establishes that he is mentally ill and engaged in
an overt act that caused serious harm to anothe r. His sole argument on appeal is that the
district court clearly erred by finding that he is substantially likely to engage in acts that
are capable of seriously harming another person in the future . He specifically points to
evidence that adjustments in his medication allowed him to make significant progress just
before the August 2019 final hearing. We are not persuaded.
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it lacks support considering the evidence as
a whole. In re Civil Commitment of K ropp, 895 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Minn. App. 2017),
review denied (Minn. June 20, 2017). But, “[i] f the evidence as a whole sustains the
[decision-maker’s] findings, it is immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable
basis for inferences and findings to t he contrary.” Id. Contrary to Stone’s assertion, the
record contains ample and largely undisputed evidence to support the district court’s
finding that there is a substantial likelihood that Stone will engage in acts capable of
inflicting serious physica l harm on another. “Whether the individual is mentally ill and
dangerous to either himself or others and is in need of confined therapy turns on the
meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists.”

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Addington v. T exas, 441 U.S. 418, 429, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1811 (1979). Accordingly, we
begin our analysis with the testimony and reports of Dr. Lewis, the court’s examiner, and
Dr. Wernsing, Stone’s examiner.
In his November 2018 report, Dr. Lewis comprehensively addressed Stone’s long
history of violent and threatening behavior, which continued after his June 2018 arrest. He
correlated Stone’s violent behavior to his mental illness, noted Stone “lacks insight into his
illness and need for treatment ,” and opined Stone was likely to engage in future violent
acts. In addition to Stone’s historical risk factors, Dr. Lewis opined that “Mr. Stone also
presents with clinical risk factors associated with an increased risk for future violence (e.g.,
problems with insight, problems with symptoms of major mental disorder, problems with
instability/impulsivity).” After reevaluating Stone in August 2019, Dr. Lewis reported that
Stone remained “acutely psychotic” ; showed grossly disorganized thoughts; made
statements that were paranoid, delusional , and nonsensical; and demonstrated only
“marginal clinical improvement.” Dr. Lewis concluded that Stone “presents a substantial
likelihood of engaging in future violence” due to both his “historical risk factors,” which
show “an increased baseline risk for future violent behavior,” and his “uncontrolled”
clinical risk factors.
Likewise, Dr. Wernsing’s report and testimony indicates that Stone continues to
meet the criteria for MI&D commitment . As to the likelihood that Stone would commit
violent acts against another in the future, Dr. Wernsing opined that this commitment
criterion was met because Stone’s historical risk factors are weighted more heavily than

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clinical risk factors because they are most predictive of futur e dangerousness. This is
consistent with Dr. Lewis’s testimony regarding the risk-assessment factors.3
Stone’s testimony supported the experts’ opinions regarding his mental status. That
Stone continues to suffer delusions was evident in his testimony, including when he told
the district court that “snakes and mice” had come into his bedding the week before, and
they were “biting my legs and stuff, but I’m not sure what they’ve done to try to collect all
of them.” And when asked if there were any snakes or lasers in the courthouse, Stone
replied that there were lasers in the “center courtroom.”
The district court, as fact -finder, was free to assess and weigh all of the evidence.
See In re Civil Commitment of Ramey, 648 N.W.2d 260, 269 (Minn. App. 2002) (deferring
to the district court’s role as fact-finder and assessor of witness credibility), review denied
(Minn. Sept. 17, 2002). And the court was permitted to give greater weight to Stone’s past
conduct than to his recent clinical improvement. See State v. Ward, 369 N.W.2d 293, 296-
97 (Minn. 1985) (relying on experts’ testimony that patient posed danger to public and
holding that patient’s good behavior in treatment was not determinative of dangerousness).

3 Dr. Wernsing likewise explained, “Historical factors are the most robust predictor of risk
and generally cannot change. Clinical factors involve current presentation and are
considered amenable to treatment. Risk management factors pertain to how a patient will
adjust to future circumstances. Clinical and risk management factors lack the empirical
robustness demonstrated by historical factors.”

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Because we observe no clear error in the di strict court’s findings, we affirm Stone’s civil
commitment as MI&D.4
Affirmed.

4 Because we affirm the district court’s decision that Stone meets the criteria for MI&D
commitment, we need not consider his argument that he should be committed as mentally
ill and chemically dependent.