Jeremy D. Mount, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1717

Jeremy D. Mount,
Appellant,

vs.

Allana M. Mount,
Respondent.

Filed June 22, 2020
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

McLeod County District Court
File Nos. 43-CV-19-142, 43-FA-16-525, 43-FA-12-559

Jeremy D. Mount, Sandstone, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Benjamin G. Stabenow, Gavin, Janssen & Stabenow, Ltd., Glencoe, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRYAN, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court committed the following two errors: (1) the
district court dismissed appellant’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim and
(2) the district court determined that appellant ’s litigation conduct justified declari ng him
a “frivolous litigant.” We affirm the district court’s decisions because appellant fails to

2
cite any legal authority to support his arguments on appeal, because appellant fails to allege
facts sufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and because
the district court did not abuse its discretion in declaring appellant a frivolous litigant.
FACTS
Appellant Jeremy D. Mount and Respondent Allana M. Mount were married to each
other and have two children. Their marriage ended in 2014 when the district court finalized
a dissolution judg ment and decree. Since that time, the parties have contested various
modification motions in the family court file,1 disputed a 2016 order for protection (OFP),
and litigated appellant’s 2019 civil suit against respondent. In June 2019, respondent filed
a motion to dismiss the civil claims against her . Respondent also asked the district court
to declare appellant a frivolous litigant . The district court granted both motions, and this
appeal followed.
A. Appellant’s Civil Claims2
Appellant sued respondent for contempt, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, defamation, and libel.3 Appellant’s claim for civil contempt related

1 The district court later awarded respondent sole physical and legal custody and restricted
appellant’s parenting time after appellant was sentenced to 21 years in federal prison.
2 Appellant did not properly initiate his first complaint and subsequently filed and served
a “second” complaint in May 2019. We only consider the May 2019 complaint.
3 The final paragraph of the complaint is titled “Malicious Persecution and Vindictive
Intentions” and includes part of a statement that respondent posted on social media in 2016.
This paragraph does not constitute an independent claim. The district court construed the
statement as part of the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim , but dismissed
appellant’s claim because the two -year statute of limitations bars claims based on
statements from 2016. See Minn. Stat. § 541.07(1) (2018). Appellant does not challenge
the district court’s application of the statute of limitations. Therefore, we do not address
the statement that respondent posted on social media.

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to his belief that respondent violated a variety of term s in the parties’ divorce decree .
Appellant’s claims of invasion of privacy and defamation concerned statements respondent
made to the children’s medical care providers. Appellant’s claims for intentional infliction
of emotional distress and libel concerned a letter written by respondent to the federal judge
prior to appellant’s sentencing hearing. Appellant alleged that respondent’s letter included
false claims of sexual abuse. Although appella nt attached the letter to his complaint, he
did not state any facts regarding how respondent’s letter caused severe emotional distress.4
The district court dismissed each of appellant’s claims. Appellant only c hallenges the
decision to dismiss the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim.5
B. Appellant’s Litigation Conduct
At various points in the parties’ disputes, the district court admonished appellant for
his litigation conduct. For example, in an or der in the OFP matter dated November 14,
2017, the district court stated that appellant had engaged in “significant abuse of the process
with his multiple motions and submissions of ex parte correspondence.” The district court
expressed “significant concern as to [appellant’s] abuse of the Court process” and informed

4 Appellant alleg es that the conduct underlying the claims f or invasion of privacy an d
defamation caused distress, but we must analyze each claim separately.
5 Appellant also makes two additional a ssertions on appeal. First, appellant alleges that
respondent committed “obstruction of justice in [appellant’s] sente ncing hearing by ‘fruit
of a poisonous tree.’” Any argument challenging appellant’s federal sentence or attempting
to raise criminal charges against respondent exceeds the scope of our review , and we do
not consider this argument. Second, appellant asser ts that the district court judge had a
conflict of interest on this case. Appellant, however, did not request removal of the judicial
officer in this case, and although appellant requested that the judicial officer remove herself
in the family case in April 2018, appellant did not challenge the disposition of that request.
Thus, appellant forfeited this issue. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988).

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appellant that he “shall consider himself on notice that if this abuse of the process by him
continues,” the district court would “consider issuing an Order declaring him to be a
frivolous litigant.” In addition, in an order in the family court case d ated April 25, 2018,
the district court stated that appellant had “filed a number of motions and demands, some
of which had no basis whatsoever in the law (such as a demand that the Court prosecut e
[respondent] for criminal charges).”
After appellant brought the civil suit, respondent requested th at the district court
declare appellant a frivolous litigant pursuant to rule 9 of the Minnesota General Rules of
Practice. The district court conducted a hearing on the motion and granted the request. In
its order, t he district court referenced the other case files and found that appellant’s
litigation conduct in the cases met each of the three definitions of a frivolous litigant listed
in the rule. See Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 9.06(b). In addition, the district court found that each
of the seven factors listed in the rule weighed in favor of granting respondent’s motion .
See Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 9.02(b). Specifically, the district court found that appellant had
attempted to relitigate matters, such as the issuance of an OFP. Appellant filed 41 written
pleadings during the two years that the OFP was in effect, including a request for a new
trial four days before the OFP expired. Similarly, in the family case the district court found
that appellant filed 33 pleadings, letters, and other documents over a two-year period. The
district court determine d that the vast majority of these requests were unsuccessful, not
based in fact, and not warranted b y law, such as requests to impose criminal penalties
against respondent, to prosecute respondent’s lawyer, and to terminate the employment of
a local agency’s domestic violence victim advocate. The district court also found that the

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dismissed civil suit was a continuation of this conduct, and that the purpose of appellant’s
litigation conduct was to harass respondent, causing her to accrue attorney’s fees and miss
work to attend hearings. Moreover, the district court considered how prior sanctions did
not deter appellant’s conduct. For instance, in 2016 appellant was ordered to pay
respondent $937.50 in attorney’s fees, yet he continued to make meritless filings. The
district court also noted that appellant will be incarcerated for the next 16 years, a nd
therefore will not be able to pay any security under rule 9. Therefore, the district court
declared appellant a frivolous litigant and restricted his ability to file pleadings in the
ongoing family and civil cases.6 Specifically, the district court required appellant to consult
with an attorney or obtain permission from the district court before filing pleadings.
D E C I S I O N
I. Forfeiture

As a threshold issue, appellant cites no legal authority to support any of his
arguments. Generally, we need not consider such arguments and deem them forfeited. See
State v. Modern Recycling, Inc ., 558 N.W.2d 770, 772 (Minn. App. 1997); see also, e.g.,
Dep’t. of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997)
(declining to address issue not adequately briefed). Although we need no t address the
merits of the appeal, we nevertheless proceed given the nature of the issues.

6 The OFP matter was closed upon expiration of the OFP in 2018.

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II. Dismissal of Intentional-Infliction-of-Emotional-Distress Claim
Appellant argues that the district court erred in dismissing his intentional-infliction-
of-emotional-distress claim. We conclude that the complaint did not allege sufficient facts
to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
We review de novo the district court’s decision to grant a m otion to dismiss ,
accepting th e factual allegations in the complaint as true . Sipe v. STS Mfg, Inc ., 834
N.W.2d 683, 686 (Minn. 2013) (citation omitted). To make a viable claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege the following four elements: (1) that
the conduct complained of was extreme and outrageous , (2) that the conduct was
intentional or reckless , (3) th at th e conduct caused emotional distress , (4) and that the
distress suffered was s evere. Kelly v. City of Minneapolis , 598 N.W.2d 657, 663 (Minn.
1999). To satisfy the third element, a plaintiff must allege “a causal connection between
the conduct and the emotional distress, ” especially where the distress could have come
from multiple sources. Langeslag v. KYMN Inc ., 664 N.W.2d 860, 869 (Minn. 2003)
(determining that inconclusive medical records could not support the alleged cause of a
party’s emotional distress where there was medical i ssues from multiple sources). To
satisfy the fourth element, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered distress “so severe that
no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.” Wenigar v. Johnson, 712 N.W.2d
190, 208 (Minn. App. 2006) (quoting Cafferty v. Garcia’s of Scottsdale, Inc., 375 N.W.2d
850, 853 (Minn. App. 1985)) (noting that courts “may look to the intensity and duration of
the distress,” and observing that the distress must exceed “the type that people commonly
encounter and endure in their lives”).

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In this case, the complaint does not allege facts that can establish either the third or
the fourth elements. Appellant failed to make allegations tying any distress to respondent’s
letter. To the extent that appellant now argues that the lengthy prison sentence caused him
distress, this argument is unavailing. As noted above, where multiple sources could cause
distress, a plaintiff must allege a causal connection between the emotional distress and the
defendant’s conduct. Although appellant attached respondent’s sentencing letter to the
complaint, he did not assert any facts addressing whether or how this letter influenced the
federal court. In addition, appellant does not allege that as a result of respondent’s letter,
he suffered distress “so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.”
Wenigar, 712 N.W.2d at 208 (quotation omitted). Without more, t he complaint fails to
state a claim because it does not allege a causal connection between respondent’s conduct
and appellant’s distress and be cause it does not allege that a ppellant suffered severe
emotional distress.
III. Declaration of Appellant as a Frivolous Litigant

Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion when it declared him a
frivolous litigant. Because we conclude tha t the record supports the district court’s
decision to declare appellant a frivolous litigant, we affirm the district court.
On a party’s motion or on its own initiative, a district court may impose restrictions
on a frivolous litigant’s ability to file new claims, motions, or requests. Minn. R. Gen.
Prac. 9.01. A “frivolous litigant” is a person who “repeatedly relitigates or attempts to
relitigate” the validity of an issue already decided, who “repeatedly serves or files frivolous
motions, pleadings, [or] letters ,” who uses tactics that are frivolous or intended to cause

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delay, or who institutes and maintains a claim that is not well grounded in fact and
warranted by existing law . Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 9.06(b)(1)-(3).7 In determining whether
to declare someone a frivolous litigant and impose sanctions, the district court must
consider seven factors. Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 9.02(b).8 The district court may also consider
other relevant factors when determining whether sanctions are appropriate. Id. This court
reviews a district court’s ultimate determination that a party is a frivolous litigant for abuse
of discretion. See Szarzynski v. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 295 (Minn. App. 2007).
In this case, the record supports the district court’s decision to declare appellant a
frivolous litigant. During a two -year timeframe, appellant filed 41 pleadings in the OFP
matter and 33 in th e family co urt case. Many pleadings sought to relitigate the district
court’s previous decisions and were without any basis in fact or law, such as requests to
impose criminal penalties against respondent, to prosecute respondent’s lawyer, to
terminate the employment of a local agency’s domestic violence victim advocate , and for

7 In this case, the district court considered the substance of appellant’s requests in three
different case types, each with their own court file num ber. Given the definitions in r ule
9.06, the district court was not precluded from considering the family c ase and the OFP
case, even though respondent’s motion was only filed in the civil matter.
8 Courts must consider the following seven factors: (1) the frequency and number of claims
pursued by the frivolous litigant with an adverse result; (2) whether there is a reasonable
probability that the frivolous litigant will prevail on the claim, motion, or request;
(3) whether the claim, motion, or request was made for purposes of harassment, delay, or
vexatiousness, or otherwise in bad faith; (4) injury incurred b y other litigants prevailing
against the frivolous litigant and to the efficient administration of justice as a result of the
claim, motion, or request in question; (5) effectiveness of prior sanctions in deterring the
frivolous litigant from pursuing frivolous claims; (6) the likelihood that requiring security
or imposing sanctions will ensure adequate safeguards and provide means to compensate
the adverse party; and (7) whether less severe sanctions will sufficiently protect the rights
of other litigants, the public, or the courts. Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 9.02(b).

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a new trial in the OFP matter four days before that OFP expired. In addition, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the seven factors that it considered when
restricting appellant’s ability to file pleadings in the future. The record indicates that
appellant made a high number of unsuccessful requests, resulting in adverse rulings relating
to modification of custody, parenting time, the OFP, and the 2019 civi l suit. Further, the
district court had previously admonished appellant for filing meritless requests and abusing
court process. As a result of appellant’s conduct, respondent incurred costs and legal fees,
and the district court’s previous sanctions did not deter appellant’s conduct . For these
reasons and because of appellant’s inability to pay any security under rule 9 , the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it restricted appellant’s ability to file pleadings in
the family case and to ini tiate new civil suits. Specifically, t he district court required
appellant to consult with an attorney or obtain permission from the district court before
filing pleadings. These restrictions still permit appellant to access the court system, but
also protect the rights of respondent, the public, and the courts.
Affirmed.