In re the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Ahmed Kadir

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1733

In re the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Ahmed Kadir

Filed February 18, 2020
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-MH-PR-18-485

Kathleen K. Rauenhorst, Rauenhorst & Associate s, P.A., Roseville, Minnesota (for
appellant Ahmed Kadir)

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Margaret C. Galvin, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Ramsey County)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.*
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s order committing him as mentally ill and
dangerous, appellant argues that because the record does not show that he intended to cause
harm or that he is a danger to himself or others, his commitment petition should be
dismissed outright or that his confinement should be less restrictive than was ordered by

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
the district court. Because the record supports the dis trict court’s determination that
appellant is mentally ill and dangerous, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Ahmed Kadir has been under commitment as a mentally ill pers on in
Ramsey County since 2014 and has received case management services since that time.
Appellant has been diagnosed with schizophrenia, multiple episodes , severe, and with an
unspecified personality disorder with antisocial features.
Appellant has been hospitalized nine times for various reasons, including
medication non-compliance, paranoia, homicidal ideations, and as a result of two incidents
in which appellant was wielding a knife and/or hammer on the light rail and threatening
community members and the police. During his hospitalizations, appellant has been
aggressive, paranoid and delusi onal, and has made “vague threats.” He has also been
combative and refused medication. Appellant has a history of being “fixated on genocide”
and having thoughts of “killing many people.” Appellant’s case managers have found
books about nuclear bombs in his apartment and have twice found kn ives and “booby
traps” in his apartment. Appellant has, on at least two occasions, threatened to kill his case
manager.
On July 10, 2018, while civilly committed as mentally ill and court-ordered to take
neuroleptic m edication,1 appellant drove his vehicle on I -94, swerved through multiple

1 He was living in the community, receiving services and oversight through the intensive
services of Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) team case manag ement, which
monitored his neuroleptic medications and offered support within the community.

3
lanes of traffic at a high rate of speed, and collided with another vehicle occupied by two
women.2 Appellant then exited his vehicle and jumped off a bridge to avoid arrest, falling
approximately 40 -50 feet. While at the hospital after the incident, appellant made
comments to hospital staff related to committing “a terroristic act.” Due to these
comments, an FBI agent was dispatched to the hospital to speak with appellant. Appellant
admitted to the agent that he got into his vehicle, drove on I-94, selected a vehicle to strike,
and drove his vehicle into the selected vehicle with the intent to cause an accident tha t
would harm or kill others.3
Regions Hospital filed a petition for the commitment of appellant as a mentally ill
and dangerous person . The petition was approved and filed by the Ramsey County
Attorney’s Office in September 2018. In December 2018, appellant waived his initial
commitment hearing and agreed to be committed to the Minnesota Security Hospital for a
sixty-day evaluation. On December 12, 2018, the district court ordered an initial
commitment as a person who is mentally ill and dangerous. According to the terms of his
waiver document, appellant returned to the district court in July 2019 for a trial de novo.
Following the trial, the district court issued findings of fact, conclusions of law and
an order. The district court, finding appellant mentally ill and dangerous, committed
appellant indeterminately to t he custody of the commissioner of human services and the
Minnesota Security Hospital in St. Peter. This appeal followed.

2 The passenger sustained unspecified injuries and was transported to the hospital while the
driver reported being “very stiff and sore” but refused to be transported to the hospital.
3 Appellant was charged with second-degree assault in Hennepin County as a result of the
incident.

4
D E C I S I O N
Appellant contends that he does not meet the statutory criteria to be held for an
indeterminate period of tim e as mentally ill and dangerous , and that the record does not
support the district court’s finding that he is a danger to himself or others. Under Minn.
Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17(a) (2018), a person who is mentally ill and dangerous to the
public is defined as a person:
(1) who is mentally ill; and (2) who as a result of that mental
illness presents a clear danger to the safety of others as
demonstrated by the facts that (i) the person has engaged in an
overt act causing or attempting to cause serious physical harm
to another and (ii) there is a substantial likelihood that the
person will engage in acts capable of inflicting serious physical
harm on another.

A person may be committed as mentally ill and dangerous if the district court finds by clear
and convinc ing evidence that the person meets the requirements of Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.02, subd. 17. On appeal, review is “limited to an examination of the [district]
court’s compliance with the statute, and the commitment must be justified by findings
based upon evi dence at the hearing.” In re Knops , 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995).
This court will not reverse a district court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. In re
Civil Commitment of Janckila, 657 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Minn. App. 2003). And “[t]he record
is viewed in the light most favorable to the [district] court’s decision.” Knops, 536 N.W.2d
at 620.
Appellant argues that the county failed to meet the statutory requirement of showing
that he “ engaged in an overt act causing or attempting to cause seri ous physical harm to
another” under Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17(a) , because the county did not prove that

5
appellant intended to cause harm. Appellant’s contention that the county must prove, and
the district court must find , intent to cause serious ph ysical harm, is contrary to caselaw.
In In re Jasmer , the supreme court considered whether Jasmer’s act of firing a gun at a
fifteen-year-old boy from a distance of approximately 65 to 80 feet constituted an “attempt”
within the meaning of the commitment statute, to cause serious physical harm. 447 N.W.2d
192, 194 -95 (Minn. 1989). The supreme court concluded that the commitment statute
“does not require that an overt act ‘attempting to cause serious physical harm to another’
constitutes an ‘attempt’ with in the meaning of [the criminal statute]” which requires an
“intent to commit a crime.” Id. at 195 (citation omitted); see Minn. Stat. § 609.17, subd. 1
(2018) (defining the crime of attempt as “[w]hoever, with intent to commit a crime, does
an act which is a substantial step toward, and more than preparation for, the commission
of the crime is guilty of an attempt to commit that crime”). The supreme court explained
that:
If a mentally ill person deliberately aims and fires a .410
shotgun at another person or drives an automobile at a speed of
100 m.p.h. into a crowd of people on a residential street, that
person has ‘engaged in an overt act causing or attempting to
cause serious physical harm to another’ regardless of intent or
the outcome of the action.

Id. at 195 (citation omitted). The action is dangerous to the public whether the actor had
the intention to cause harm or even recognize d its potential for causing serious harm. Id.
And the statutory requirements have been met if the state proves by clear and convincing
evidence that as a result of a mental illness a person pres ents a clear danger to others

6
because “the person has engaged in an overt dangerous act capable of causing serious
physical harm to another.” Id. at 195-96.
Here, the district court found , and the record amply supports the finding, that as a
result of his mental illness, appellant presents a clear danger to the safety of others as
demonstrated by the fact tha t he engaged in an overt act causing or attempting to cause
serious physical harm to another. The record shows the following: appellant’s most recent
diagnoses include schizophrenia, multiple episodes , severe; and unspecified personality
disorder with antisocial features. Dr. Andrea Lovett, who examined appellant in October
2018 and April 2019, testified that appellant suffers from mental illness, specifically
schizophrenia, and explained that when appellant is experiencing symptoms of his mental
illness, he has auditory and visual hallucinations as well as delusional beliefs. Dr. Lovett
explained that appellant’s paranoid delusions have caused him to react with “anger,
agitation, and threatening and aggressive behavior on numerous occasions.” Dr. Lovett
testified that as a result of appellant’s mental illness he presents a clear danger to the safety
of others.
Moreover, the district court determined that appellant committed an overt and
dangerous act capable of causing serious physical harm, and the record supports the district
court’s conclusion. Appellant testified that on July 10, 2018, while driving his vehicle on
the highway, he aimed his vehicle at another vehicle because he wanted to create a crash
in order to hurt the person in the vehicle he hit. The district court noted that “[i]t is obvious
that motor vehicle crashes at highway speeds can and do result in serious physical harm or
death” and appellant does not dispute this. Re gardless of appellant’s intent —though the

7
record reflects that he did intend to cause serious harm or death 4—the record supports the
district court’s finding that appellant suffers from a mental illness and that as a result of the
mental illness, appellant presents a clear danger to others because he has engaged in an
overt and dangerous act capable of causing harm to others. The district court’s findings
are not clearly erroneous and the district court complied with the statutory requirements.
Appellant next argues that he does not pose a future risk of inflicting seriou s
physical harm to another. “Dangerousness may be demonstrated by past conduct together
with a determination the person is likely to engage in future violent conduct.” In re Lufsky,
388 N.W.2d 763, 766 (Minn. App. 1986). “The prediction that ‘there is a substantial
likelihood that the person will [in the future] engage in acts capable of inflicting serious
physical harm on another’ must be accompanied by evidence that on at least one occasion
in the past the person ha s engaged in an overt dangerous act – that is, an act ‘causing or
attempting to cause serious physical harm to another.’” Jasmer, 447 N.W.2d at 195. “The
question of dangerousness is a factual determination for the [district] court, which should
not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous.” In re Hofmaster , 434 N.W.2d
279, 282 (Minn. App. 1989).
Here, the district court concluded that “there is a substantial likelihood that the
[appellant] will engage in acts capable of inflicting serious physical harm on another.” This

4 Following appellant’s actions on July 10, 2018, in which he used his vehicle to strike
another vehicle, appellant made numerous statem ents regarding that incident. Appellant
stated that he crashed his car on purpose, and that he was trying to crash into people and
kill them . Appellant also explained that when he chose the car he wanted to hit, he
accelerated into the car with the intention of making the car roll over or explode, and killing
people.

8
conclusion is supported by evidence in the record . As discussed previously, the record
supports the district court’s finding that appellant, on a prior occasion, engaged in an overt
and dangerous act when he attempted to cause serious physical harm to another by driving
his car into an occupied vehicle at a high rate of speed. Furthermore, the district court’s
finding that there is a substantial risk that appellant will engage in acts capable of inflicting
serious physical harm on another is supported by the record. Dr. Lovett testified that she
believes appellant presents a clear danger to the safety of others and th at there is a
substantial likelihood that he is capable of inflicting serious physical harm on others. Her
opinion was based on a violence risk assessment. She explained that the “greatest or the
strongest predictor of future violence is the presence of past violent behavior.” Dr. Lovett
used the HCR -20 V3 to assess appellant’s risk of future violence. 5 Based on the
assessment, Dr. Lovett concluded that appellant poses a risk of harm to himself or others
given his “history of threatening and aggressive behavior over time,” his “homicidal
threats,” and the increase in “frequency and severity” of these threats and behaviors
beginning in 2016 and 2017 and while under a court hold for the instant proceedings.
The record also indicates that appellant has repe atedly threatened to kill his case
managers, wielded a hammer and knife on the light rail, and threatened police officers and
others in public with a hammer. These events all demonstrate appellant’s dangerousness.
See Lufsky, 388 N.W.2d at 766 (affirming the district court’s commitment of Lufsky as

5 The Historical Clinical Risk Management 20, version three (HCR -20 V3) is a violence
risk assessment used by mental health professionals to measure risk factors associated with
future violent behavior.

9
mentally ill and dangerous based on his “past outburst s and threats to kill his parents, the
assault at Country Meadows, threats to burn and strangle elderly residents, and invitations
to ‘shoot it out’ with police”). Furthermore, Dr. Lovett noted that “even when [appellant]
is relatively stable from a psychiatric standpoint . . . he views violence as an acceptable
behavior” and that when “ [he] is not psychiatrically stable . . . he believes that he is in
danger, and he believes that he is entitled to and, in fact, must defend himself against
others” even though he is not actually physically in danger. Dr. Lovett also expressed
concerns about appellant’s tendency to “decompensate very quickly” and the difficult y of
predicting when appellant may act in a violent manner. She further explained her concerns
about appellant’s “utter lack of insight” into his mental illness. The district court’s finding
that there is a substantial likelihood that appellant will engage in acts capable of inflicting
serious harm on another is not clearly erroneous.
Finally, appellant argues that the county erroneously relied on the presumption that
appellant’s mental illness will not be treated or supervised by case management, to suggest
that when treated and supervised he doesn’t pose a risk to others. As an initial matter,
appellant cites to no legal authority to support his contention that the county or the court
must consider the effect of ongoing supervision or treatment in dete rmining whether a
person is mentally ill and dangerous. Moreover, even if the district court was required t o
consider it, the record indicates that appellant poses a risk to the safety of others even when
being treated and supervised. The record shows that the incident on July 10, 2018, in which
appellant drove his vehicle into another occupied vehicle on the highway, occurred while
he was civilly committed, court -ordered to take neuroleptic medication, and receiving

10
intensive community services. Dr. Lovett testified that even though appellant is in secured
facilities and receiving psychiatric care, he has not improved and continues to experience
symptoms of psychosis. She testif ied that despite receiving the top level of care, she still
believes there i s a substantial likelihood that appellant will engage in acts capable of
causing serious physical harm to others. Contrary to appellant’s contention that the county
erroneously relied on the presumption that appellant’s mental illness will not be treated or
supervised, the record shows that appellant still poses a risk to the safety of others even
while being treated and supervised.
Affirmed.