State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1741

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Natalie Rae Skaudis,
Appellant.

Filed October 19, 2020
Reversed and remanded
Segal, Chief Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69VI-CR-18-393

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney , Bonnie A. Norlande r, Assistant County
Attorney, Virginia, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appe llate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SEGAL, Chief Judge
Appellant challenges her conviction of driving while impaired (DWI), arguing that
the district court erred in de nying her motion to suppress the results of her blood-alcohol

2
test results on the grounds that the search warrant authorizing the blood draw was invalid.
Because the state failed to prove that there had been a judicial probable-cause
determination supporting the search warrant, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
On April 12, 2018, Deputy Ryan Smith of the St. Louis County Sheriff’s Office was
on patrol in Eveleth when he observed a vehicle that “was traveling more so on the shoulder
than in its lane of traffic.” Deputy Smith eventually pulled over the vehicle and the driver
identified herself as appellant Natalie Rae Sk audis. During the interaction, Skaudis was
very emotional, had difficulty staying focused, and indicated that she had post-traumatic
stress disorder and issues w ith law enforcement. Deputy Sm ith learned that Skaudis had
active warrants and, after initial resistance, Skaudis was placed under arrest.
Two additional officers, including Depu ty Brock Kick, arrived to provide
assistance. One of the officers observed a marijuana pipe in plain view in the vehicle and,
during a search of the vehicle, the officers discovered a pouch with two small baggies of a
substance that field-tested positive for methamphetamine.
Skaudis was asked to perform field sobriety tests. Based on the results of the tests,
Deputy Smith believed that Skaudis was under the influence of a controlled substance. An
electronic warrant application to obtain a blood sample from Skaudis was submitted by
Deputy Kick, and a blood sample was obtain ed approximately 20 minutes later. An
analysis of the blood sample by the Minnes ota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA)
revealed the presence of amphetamine and methamphetamine. After the blood sample was

3
obtained, Deputy Smith submitted the search warrant to the records division to be filed in
the electronic system.
Respondent State of Minnesota charge d Skaudis with fifth-degree controlled-
substance crime, obstructing the legal proce ss, and two counts of fourth-degree DWI.
Several months later, the sheriff’s office discovered that the search warrant on file did not
contain the page with the district court ju dge’s signature authorizing the warrant. The
record contained the probable-cau se statement, first page of the warrant and receipt and
inventory of the search, but did not contain the signature page. The sheriff’s office
contacted court administration and the BCA and learned that the copy on file with court
administration was also missing the signature page and that the BCA had destroyed its
copy of the warrant in accordance with its record-retention schedule. An investigator with
the sheriff’s office was able to locate a physical copy of the first page of the warrant, but
was unable to find the signature page.
The district court held a hearing to address the issue of the missing signature page.
The district court judge who presided over the hearing was the same judge who received
the electronic search warrant application. He indicated on the record that he could not
recall whether he had signed the search warrant. He stated that if he were called to testify
about the warrant he would not be able to conf irm or deny that he had signed it. At the
contested omnibus hearing, Skau dis argued that the results of the blood draw should be
suppressed because the absence of the signature page rendered the search warrant invalid.
Deputy Smith and Deputy Kick testified that they received a signed copy of the warrant in

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response to the application. Deputy Smith indicated that the loss of the signature page was
an honest mistake and that he did not know how it occurred.
The district court denied the motion to s uppress. The district court credited the
testimony from the two deputies and determined that their testimony established that the
search warrant application was signed by the district court judge before the blood sample
was obtained. On September 5, 2019, Skaudis waived her right to a jury trial and stipulated
to the prosecution’s case pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, to obtain review of
the denial of the suppression motion. The state agreed to dismiss the charge of obstructing
the legal process and one count of DWI, and the district court found Skaudis guilty of fifth-
degree controlled-substance crime and the rema ining count of DWI. The district court
stayed adjudication of the conviction of fift h-degree controlled-substance crime, stayed
execution of the sentence for th e DWI conviction and placed Sk audis on probation. This
appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we independently
review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whethe r the district court erred in
denying the motion. State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). Upon a motion to
suppress, the state bears the burden of estab lishing that the evidence was obtained in
accordance with the applicable constitutional provisions. State v. Edstrom , 916 N.W.2d
512, 517 (Minn. 2018). If the state fails to meet this burden, the evidence must be
suppressed. See State v. Jackson , 742 N.W.2d 163, 177-78 (Minn. 2007) (noting that
evidence obtained in viola tion of the Constitution must generally be suppressed).

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Additionally, evidence may be suppressed based on nonconstitutional, statutory violations
in the warrant process. State v. Jordan, 742 N.W.2d 149, 154 (Minn. 2007). Suppression
is required when “the violation of the statute was a serious one that subverted the purpose
of the statute.” Id. at 153. But mere technical violations do not require suppression. State
v. Goodwin, 686 N.W.2d 40, 44 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 2004).
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches
and seizures and provide that search warrants shall be issued only u pon probable cause.
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Probable cause is determined by the
reviewing judge based on the to tality of the circumstances. State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d
624, 633 (Minn. 1995). The statute governin g the issuance of search warrants provides
that, upon a determination of probable cause, “the judge must issue a signed search warrant,
naming the judge’s judicial office,” directi ng the place to be se arched. Minn. Stat.
§ 626.11(a) (2018).
Skaudis argues here that the district cour t erred in denying her motion to suppress
the results of the blood draw because the state was not able to produce a copy of a search
warrant signed by a judge. She contends that the state thereby failed to prove that the
warrant was issued following a probable-caus e determination by a ne utral and detached
magistrate. She argues that the warrant is th erefore defective, and that her conviction of

6
DWI based on the results of the blood draw conducted pursuant to the warrant must be
reversed.1
The state cites the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Andries, 297
N.W.2d 124 (Minn. 1980), in support of its ar gument that it satisfied its burden of proof.
In Andries, a deputy contacted the county attorney and informed him that there was
probable cause to believe marijuana would be found at a particular residence. 297 N.W.2d
at 125. The county attorney sought a telephone warrant because it was outside of business
hours and the nearest judg e lived 85 miles away. Id. The district court judge arranged a
conference call with the deputy and county attorney, during which the deputy read the
proposed warrant and supporting affidavit. Id. The district court judge then made the
substantive determination that probable cause existed and a warrant should be issued, and
directed the deputy to sign the warrant. Id. Both the deputy and judge recorded the
telephone call, and a complete transcript wa s submitted to the district court during the
hearing on the motion to suppress the evidence discovered as a result of the warrant. Id.
The supreme court concluded that, “[u]nder these circumstances,” the constitutional
and statutory warrant requirements were satisfied. Id. at 126. The supreme court observed
“that the requirement that the issuing judge si gn the warrant is a purely ministerial task”
that may be delegated “so long as the issu ing judge performs the substantive tasks of
determining probable cause and ordering the issuance of the warrant.” Id. at 125.

1 Skaudis did not appeal the finding of guilt with respect to the fifth-degree controlled-
substance crime, which was based on evidence discovered during a search of her vehicle
prior to the execution of the warrant.

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The facts in this case, however, diffe r in a significant respect. Unlike Andries, in
this case there is no recorded conversation or transcript indicating that a judge actually
performed “the substantive tasks of determin ing probable cause and or dering issuance of
the warrant.” Id. To the contrary, the district court judge stated on the record that he could
not recall whether he had reviewed the application and signed the warrant.
The state’s evidence that a valid search warrant was obt ained is based exclusively
on the testimony of the two deputies. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the deputies
testified that they saw the judge’s signature on the second page of the warrant before they
sought to obtain the blood test from Skaudis. The district court credited their testimony,
and we defer to the district court’s credibility determinations. State v. Miller, 659 N.W.2d
275, 279 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. July 15, 2003). But even with this
credited testimony, we are not sa tisfied that the state met its burden to establish that the
evidence was obtained in accord ance with constitutional requirements. The testimony of
the deputies is simply not comparable to the recorded call and transcript documenting the
judge’s probable-cause determination in Andries.
The crux of the protection established by the probable-cause requirement is that a
neutral judicial officer must determine that there is a sufficient basis to justify the issuance
of a warrant. See Johnson v. U.S., 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). To allow this requirement to
be satisfied, based only on the testimony of law enforcement, weakens the protections
guaranteed by the constitution. As in State v. Cook, 498 N.W.2d 17, 22 (Minn. 1993), we
“are not questioning the truthfulness of the officer’s recollections of what occurred[,]” but
we would set the constitutional ba r too low if we were to allo w the state to establish the

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existence of a judicial proba ble-cause determination in th is case based solely on the
testimony of the officers who requested the determination, without any confirming
evidence that a judicial probable-cause determination had actually occurred.
We, therefore, hold that the state failed to meet its burden to establish that the
challenged evidence was obtained in accordance with the c onstitutional requirement of a
judicial probable-cause determination. The district court therefore erred in denying the
motion to suppress the evidence discovered from the blood draw. 2 Because Skaudis’s
conviction for DWI is based on this evidence, we reverse that conviction and remand for
further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.

2 Because the state failed to establish that the evidence was obtaine d in accordance with
constitutional requirements, we do not consider the alleged statutory violation.