State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1747

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Marguerita Elizabeth Abujobarah,
Appellant.

Filed July 27, 2020
Reversed
Slieter, Judge

Faribault County District Court
File No. 22-CR-18-841

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn Karjala, Faribault County Attorney, Mindy Quittem. Assistant County Attorney,
Blue Earth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Kalitowski,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
In this direct appeal of the district court’s order finding her guilty for the crimes of
fifth-degree controlled -substance and driving while impaired , appellant argues we must
reverse because the district court erred in concluding that the officer had a valid basis for
expanding the scope of the traffic stop. We agree and reverse.
FACTS
In December 2018, Faribault County sheriff deputy Briar Bonin responded to a
dispatch report of an erratic driver on Interstate 90 in Faribault County. Dispatch informed
Deputy Bonin that a green Jeep was speeding and was “all over the road.” Deputy Bonin
located the Jeep on Interstate 90 approximately five minutes later. He initially observed
the Jeep travelling at approximately 77 or 78 miles per hour in a 70 -mile-per-hour zone
and he followed it for three or four miles. During that time , he observed the vehicle
weaving within its lane. Based on the speeding , weaving, and driving complaint, Deputy
Bonin initiated a traffic stop.
Deputy Bonin identified appellant Marguerita Elizabeth Abujobarah as the driver.
While speaking with her through the passenger-side window of the car, Deputy Bonin
noticed a rolled-up paper towel near the gear shift on the center console. The deputy asked
appellant what was in the towel, and she said it was a tube. Deputy Bonin asked her if he
could see it, and she handed him the paper towel.
Deputy Bonin took the paper towel and unrolled it, and found a glass pipe inside
with white and brown residue , indicating to him that it was used to smoke

3
methamphetamine. The contents of the pipe later tested positive for methamphetamine.
Deputy Bonin then asked appellant to step out of the vehicle and he searched the vehicle
and conducted field sobriety tests.
Appellant was charged with f ifth-degree possession of a controlled substance , in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2018) and fourth-degree driving while
impaired, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.27, subd. 1 (2018).
The district court denied appellant’s motion to suppress evidence, finding that the
deputy had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to expand the scope of
the stop to question appellant about the contents of the paper towel. Following a stipulation
to proceed pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, the district court issued a judgment
finding appellant guilty of both charged offenses, stayed adjudication of conviction for the
fifth-degree controlled -substance crime and entered a conviction for driving while
impaired and imposed a sentence for both offenses. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that, by questioning her about the contents of the rolled -up paper
towel that ultimately lead to his seizure of the pipe, Deputy Bonin improperly expanded
the scope of the stop without reasonable suspicion to do so. We agree.
“When facts are not in dispute . . . [appellate courts] review a pretrial order on a
motion to suppress de novo and determine whether the police articulated an adequate basis
for the search or seizure at issue.” See State v. Williams , 794 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn.
2011) (quotation omitted). “[E]ach incremental intrusion during a stop must be strictly tied
to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the stop permissible.”

4
State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 364 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). “An intrusion
not closely related to the initial justification for the search or seizure is invalid under article
I, section 10 unless there is indep endent probable cause or reasonableness to justify that
particular intrusion.” Id. Evidence obtained as a result of a seizure without reasonable
suspicion must be suppressed. See State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn. 1999).
Reasonable suspicion must be “based on specific, articulable facts” that allow the
officer “to articulate at the omnibus hearing that he or she had a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d
388, 391 (Minn. 1995). This “reasonable suspicion standard is not high,” but requires
“more than an inchoate and unparticularized hunch of criminal activity. ” State v.
Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted) . An of ficer must
“articulate specific facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
objectively support the officer ’s suspicion.” State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476, 486 (Minn.
2016).
Deputy Bonin stopped appellant’s vehicle for weaving within its lane and speeding.
He testified that he observed a “rolled -up paper towel” in appellant’s vehicle, and that he
knew from his training and experience that paper towels were “sometimes” used to protect
glass pipes. During cross examination, appellant’s trial counsel asked Deputy Bonin if he
“had a guess” about what was in the paper towel at that time, and Deputy Bonin replied, “I
had a guess as well, yes .” Appellant’s counsel then asked Deputy Bonin, “Um, maybe
even a hunch?” and the deputy responded, “Due to its shape, yes.” Deputy Bonin also
agreed that many other items could reasonably have been inside of the paper towel such as

5
food for the dog that was in the vehicle at the time, the dog’s feces, or anything else that
could be wrapped in a paper towel of that size.
Deputy Bonin presented no facts supplementing his guess and hunch sufficient to
create objective support for his desire to search the rolled up paper towel. The district court
therefore erred in concluding that Deputy Bon in had a particularized and objective basis
for suspecting appellant of other criminal activity to warrant expansion of the stop beyond
that of speeding.
Reversed.