In the Matter of the Welfare of: T. B., Child.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1749

In the Matter of the Welfare of: T. B., Child.

Filed July 27, 2020
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-18-1365

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant T.B.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Fr eeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean Burdorf, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s decision to revoke his stay of adjudication
and adjudicate him delinquent for third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Because we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

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FACTS
This case arises out of a juvenile delinquency petition. The petition alleged that in
November 2017, appellant T.B. pushed his coworker into a bathroom , pulled down her
pants and underwear, and forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina without her conse nt.
Respondent State of Minnesota filed the petition in March 2018, charging appellant with
third-degree criminal sexual conduct. At the July 2018 plea hearing, appellant entered a
guilty plea and admitted to facts supporting a determination that he was guilty of the
charged offense . T he state agreed to a juvenile disposition . The district court stayed
adjudication for 180 days to allow appellant to seek sex-offense-specific treatment in an
outpatient program. Appellant began treatment in August 2018.
In September 2018, appellant assaulted a student at a restaurant by grabbing the
back of the student’s head and slamming it down on a table two or three times, causing a
concussion. Appellant was cited for fifth-degree assault for this incident.
In Octobe r 2018 , the parties appeared before the district court for a disposition
hearing on the criminal-sexual-conduct charge. At the hearing, the state urged the district
court to adjudicate appellant delinquent of the criminal-sexual-conduct charge based on the
seriousness of that offense, appellant’s behavior in the community after being placed on
probation, h is new fifth -degree-assault charge , and his lack of progress in treatment.
Appellant’s counsel requested a stay of adjudication. The district c ourt denied the state’s
request and stayed adjudication for 180 days, as permitted under the statute. The district
court indicated that it would set a return hearing date for approximately 90 days later to
review appellant’s progress and potentially continue the case for a longer period of time.

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The district court ordered appellant , as a condition of the stay , to complete outpatient
programming, including dialectical behavioral therapy (DBT) and aftercare. The district
court also ordered appellant to follow the rules of probation, abstain from alcohol or drugs,
remain law abiding, and attend school regularly. In March 2019, the district court held a
review hearing and extended the stay of adjudication for another 180 days.
In August 2019, appellant caused a disturbance at a restaurant in the Mall of
America and refused to leave. Mall security took appellant i nto custody and reported the
incident to the police department. The police department issued appellant a citation for
misdemeanor trespassing, refusing to depart. During the same time, appellant’s therapist
reported that appellant was not regularly attending treatment. The state moved to revoke
appellant’s stay of adjudication because he failed to complete treatment and failed to
remain law abiding.
The distr ict court held a three -day hearing on the state’s revocation motion in
September 2019. The distr ict court heard testimony from appellant’s juvenile probation
officer, two police officers, the lead therapist at the treatment program, and a high school
social worker. The probation officer testified that appellant had many unexcused absences
from treatment and would not be able to complete the treatment program within the
required time frame, even with the previously granted extension. The lead therapist
testified that appellant had several unexcused missed therapy sessions and would not be
able to complete the aftercare services on time.
Following the hearing , the district court revok ed the stay of adjudication and
adjudicated appellant delinquent of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. The district court

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determined that (1) there was clear and convincing evidence that appellant violated the
conditions of his stay of adjudication by failing to participate fully in sex -specific
treatment, DBT and aftercare, remain law abiding , and attend school regularly; (2) there
was clear and convincing ev idence that appellant’s violations were intentional and
inexcusable; and (3) there was clear and convincing evidence that appellant’s best interests
and public safety would be served by the disposition of adjudication. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
District courts have “broad discretion in determining whether to continue an
adjudication in a delinquency proceeding.” In re Welfare of J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d 241, 244
(Minn. App. 2002) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2002). A district
court abuses its discretion if its disposition is arbitrary or based on clearly erroneous factual
findings. In re Welfare of S.J.T., 736 N.W.2d 341, 346 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied
(Minn. Oct. 24, 2007). A factual finding is clearly erron eous if there is no reasonable
evidence to support it or if the reviewing court is “left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake occurred.” State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d. 836, 846-47 (Minn. 2011) (citation
omitted).
For each proven charge in a d elinquency petition, the district court shall either
“adjudicate the child delinquent pursuant to Minnesota Statutes, section 260B.198,
subdivision 1,” or “continue the case without adjudicating the child delinquent pursuant to
Minnesota Statutes, section 260B.198, subdivision (7).” Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05,
subd. 1. The district court may continue adjudication “[w]hen it is in the best interests of
the child” and “the child has admitted the allegations contained in the petition.” Minn.

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Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7 (2018). The district court may also consider the protection of the
public when determining whether to continue an adjudication. J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d at 246.
“[A]djudication after initially granting a continuance without adjudication is a pr obation
revocation proceeding” governed by Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.07. In re Welfare of
J.S.H.-G., 645 N.W.2d 500, 504 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2002).
The district court may revoke a stay of adjudication based on clear and convincing evidence
or the juvenile’s admission of a violation of the conditions of probation. Minn. R. Juv .
Delinq. P. 15.07, subd. 4(D).
Following a three -day probation-revocation hearing, the district court determined
that clear and convincing evidence supported revoking appellant’s stay of adjudication and
adjudicating him delinquent because he committed three violations of the conditions of his
stay. Specifically, appellant (1) failed to participate fully in sex-specific treatment, DBT,
and aftercare; (2) failed to remain law abiding because he assaulted a student in September
2018, and received a citation for misdemeanor trespass in August 2019; and (3) failed to
maintain regular attendance at school.
Appellant does not challenge these findings on appeal, which are amply supported
by the record. The record establishes that appellant did not complete treatment. The lead
therapist testified that appellant’s attendance at treatment was “[i]nconsistent,” and that he
had 18 unexcused missed therapy sessions. The lead therapist testified that appellant would
not be able to complete the full program or the aftercare services in the required timeframe.
The juvenile probation officer testifie d that appellant “struggled with attendance” at

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treatment and would not be able to complete the program and aftercare within the required
timeframe, even with the previously-granted extension.
The record also supports the district court’s determination tha t appellant failed to
remain law abiding. A police officer testified that in September 2018, she cited appellant
for fifth-degree assault for slamming another student’s head into a table at a restaurant.
The student suffered a concussion as a result of the assault. A second police officer testified
that in August 2019, appellant caused a disturbance in a restaurant at the Mall of America,
refused to leave, and received a misdemeanor trespassing citation.
Lastly, the record shows that appellant failed to maintain regular attendance at
school. Appellant’s mother unenrolled him from his first high school in September 2018.
He did not reenroll in another school until November 2018. Appellant remained at his
second high school from November 2018 to January 2019, when he unenrolled himself
from the school . Appellant was an adult at the time he unen rolled from this school.
Appellant did not reenroll in another high school until February 2019.
Appellant concedes that he “did not comply with all the required conditions ,” but
argues that several factors mitigate against revocation. At a revocation hearing, a juvenile
may present mitigating circumstances or other reasons why a probation violation “if
proved, should not result in revocation.” Minn. R. Juv . Delinq. P. 15.07, subd. 4(A).
Appellant argues that revocation was inappropriate because juveniles are “categorically
immature” and “less culpable” than adults. Appellant unpersuasively cites to Graham v.
Florida, which held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
a life sentence without the possibility of parole for juveniles who commit non homicide

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offenses. 560 U.S. 48, 74-75, 130 S. Ct. 2011 , 2030 (2010). But the Graham decision
does not prohibit a district court faced with clear and convincing evidence of a probation
violation from adjudicating a juvenile delinquent , as is the case here . And even if
mitigating factors were present and appellant was immature as a juvenile, “[i]mposing an
adjudication within the limits prescribed by the legislature is not an abuse of discretion.”
J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d at 245 (citation omitted).
Appellant also argues that the district court failed to “provide a reason specific to
the juvenile’s situation as to why adjudication an d registration [as a sex offender] was a
valid exercise of discretion.” We disagree. The district court made extensive findings of
fact that appellant failed to participate fully in a sex-specific outpatient treatment program,
and that this failure was “intentional and not excusable.” The district court also determined
that appellant failed to remain law abiding and attend school regularly. Based on these
findings, which are supported by the record, the district court determined that “[p]ublic
safety an d [appellant’s] best interests are served by adjudication and the resulta nt
registration requirement.” See J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d at 246 (recognizing that district court
may consider protection of the public).
Testimonial evidence in the record, coupled with appellant’s own admission s,
support the district court’s determination that appellant violated numerous conditions of
his stay of adjudication. Appellant’s failure to fully complete his treatment, remain law
abiding, and attend school regularly provides adequate grounds for revocation of his stay.
Given this record, we conclude that the district court’s decision to revoke appellant’s stay

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of adjudication and adjudicate him delinquent for third-degree criminal sexual conduct was
within its broad discretion. For these reasons, we affirm.
Affirmed.