In re the Marriage of:

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1751

In re the Marriage of:

Ayano Eto Baylor, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Christopher Gary Baylor,
Appellant.

Filed May 18, 2020
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-18-3158

Elizabeth F. Sauer, Liselotte Schluender, Theresa Ashmead, Central Minnesota Legal
Services, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Christopher Gary Baylor, Springfield, Pennsylvania (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge;
and Slieter, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Christopher Gary Baylor appeals the district court’s order dissolving his
marriage with respondent Ayano Eto Baylor (Eto) and assigning Eto permanent sole legal
and physical custody of the par ties’ daughter, A.B.B. Baylor argues that (1) the district

2
court did not have personal jurisdiction over him, (2) the district court did not have subject-
matter jurisdiction, (3) Hennepin County was the wrong venu e for the parties’ litigation,
and (4) his procedural due-process rights were violated. We affirm.
FACTS
Baylor and Eto were married in Burnsville in February 2014. In August 2015, while
the parties were living in Florida, A.B.B. wa s born. The parties later moved to Tennessee
and then back to Minnesota in September 2017. In October 2017, the parties separated and
Baylor moved to Pennsylvania. Eto and A.B.B. remained in Minnesot a. Shortly after the
parties’ separation, Eto obtained an order fo r protection (OFP) against Baylor for her and
A.B.B. Baylor has made many unsuccessful attempts to challenge this order, including an
appeal in which this c ourt affirmed the OFP. See Baylor v. Baylor , No. A18-0077, 2018
WL 2187189 (Minn. App. May 14, 2018), review denied (Minn. July 17, 2018).
In May 2018, Eto petitioned for dissolution of marriage in Hennepin County. Baylor
filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Minneso ta did not have jurisdiction because (1) he
previously filed for an annulment of the marr iage in Pennsylvania, (2) Minnesota is an
inconvenient forum, and (3) Eto practiced unj ust conduct. The district court denied
Baylor’s motion. Baylor appealed the district court’s decision, but we dismissed the appeal
because it was from a nonappealable interlocutory order.
On April 3, 2019, Baylor filed a second motion to dismiss. Among other things,
Baylor argued—for the first time—that the district court did not have personal jurisdiction
over him because of invalid service of process. The district court denied Baylor’s motion,

3
concluding that Baylor forfeited his insufficient-service-of-process argument and the court
had jurisdiction.
The initial case management conference (ICMC) was on April 8, 2019, but Baylor
did not attend despite the district court’s attempt to contact him “several times by phone.”
The pretrial hearing followed on May 6. Baylor filed a notice to appear by telephone and
called in to the May 6 conference. Eto’s tran slator, however, informed the district court
that he was not able to tran slate for Eto properly, so the district court rescheduled for
May 24. Baylor did not file notice to appear by telephone or call in to the conference on
that date.
A bench trial was held on September 26, 2019. Eto and her attorney appeared at
trial, but Baylor did not appear in person or file notice to appear by telephone. Baylor tried
to call in after the trial started, but the dist rict court did not accept his call because he had
not filed a notice to appear by telephone. Both parties were allowed to file ten-page posttrial
summations, but only Eto submitted one. On October 24, 2019, the district court entered a
judgment that, among other things, dissolved the parties’ marriage and gave permanent
sole physical and legal custody of A.B.B. to Eto. Baylor appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Baylor is appealing as a pro se litigant. “While an appellant acting pro se is usually
accorded some leeway in attempting to comply with court rules, he is still not relieved of
the burden of, at least, adequately communi cating to the court what it is he wants
accomplished and by whom.” Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc., 400 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn.
1987). Baylor’s four arguments are analyzed in turn.

4
I. Baylor forfeited his personal-jurisdicti on challenge when he filed a rule 12
motion.

Baylor argues that the district court never had personal jurisdiction over him in this
matter because he had immunity against service of process while appearing for a mandatory
court proceeding, and that is when he was served.
A defense for lack of personal jurisdiction is forfeited if the defendant excludes it
from a rule 12 motion or fails to assert the defense in a motion or answer. Minn. R. Civ. P.
12.08(a). Rule 12.07 states, “If a party makes a motion under this rule but omits therefrom
any then available defense or objection which this rule permits to be raised by motion, that
party shall not thereafter make a motion base d on the defense or objection so omitted.”
Like lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient service of process is also a rule 12 objection.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02.
Baylor was personally served with Eto’s dissolution pe tition at the Family Justice
Center on May 30, 2018, where he had been ordered to appear in the domestic-abuse
matter. On August 14, 2018, Baylor filed a motion to dismiss Eto’s dissolution petition for
lack of jurisdiction, inconvenient forum, and improper venue. His jurisdictional argument
was based on subject-matter jurisdiction; he did not argue lack of personal jurisdiction or
insufficient service of process. Baylor first raised insufficient service of process of the
dissolution petition in his second motion to dismiss on April 3, 201 9—ten months after
being served. The district court denied Baylo r’s motion, concluding that the defense was
forfeited and that, even if it was timely rais ed, his argument for serv ice immunity failed.
We reach the same conclusion here. Baylor forfeited his right to challenge personal

5
jurisdiction or insufficient service of process when he failed to raise the issues in his first
motion to dismiss.
II. The district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the parties’ marriage
dissolution and child-custody matter.

Baylor argues that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this case.
Subject-matter jurisdiction “is a question of la w that [appellate courts] review de novo.”
Nelson v. Schlener, 859 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Minn. 2015). Baylor’s core argument is that the
district court lacks subject-ma tter jurisdiction because he is a Pennsylvania resident who
previously started an annulment action in Pennsylvania.
Minnesota courts have subject-matter ju risdiction over a marriage dissolution if
either spouse has resided in Minnesota fo r at least 180 days i mmediately preceding
commencement of the action. Minn. Stat. § 518.07 (2018). The parties do not dispute that
Eto had resided in Minnesota for longer th an 180 days before she filed the petition.
Minnesota courts also have jurisdiction over child-custody determinations if Minnesota is
“the home state of the child” when the proceeding commences. Minn. Stat.
§ 518D.201(a)(1) (2018). A.B.B. has lived in Minnesota with her mother since September
2017. Therefore, when Eto initiated this proceeding, Minnesota was A.B.B.’s current place
of residence and the only state that she had lived in longer than a year. Finally, Baylor
initiated two Pennsylvania and two Florida cas es that were dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. So, not only does Minnesota ha ve jurisdiction over the claims, but the two
other states in which Baylor tried to litigate this matter have affirmatively rejected the idea
that they have jurisdiction to address the parties’ disputes.

6
Baylor makes several arguments based on the premise that the parties’ marriage was
“invalid.” Baylor argues that it can only be viewed as a common-law marriage because the
parties’ marriage certificate was not signed by two witnesses. See Minn. Stat. § 517.10
(2018). Baylor is making this argument for the first time on appeal. Appellate courts do not
generally consider matters not argued to and considered by the district court. Thiele v. Stich,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Baylor’s argument is forfeited, and we treat the
marriage as valid.
Similarly, Baylor argues both that the di strict court did not have subject-matter
jurisdiction because Eto deceived the district court into asserting its jurisdiction over a
dissolution suit even though their marriage is “null and void,” and that “null and void” is a
permissive counterclaim. It appears that Baylor is arguing that their marriage was already
properly annulled and would not have been subject to dissolu tion if not for Eto’s alleged
deceit. But Baylor has not convincingly shown that this marriage is null and void. Further,
in one of the Pennsylvania actions initiated by Baylor, a Pennsylvania court denied
Baylor’s request for an annulment, finding that both parties got married for the purpose of
the relationship and remained together for four years. Baylor has not shown how Eto “lied”
to trick the district court or how the distri ct court improperly view ed this matter as a
marriage dissolution.
Finally, Baylor argues that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction
because Eto violated the doctrine of unclean hands. Baylor cites Brekke v. THM
Biomedical, Inc. for the premise that the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents a party
with unclean hands from “taking unconscionable advantage of [its] own wrong by asserting

7
[its] strict legal rights.” 683 N.W.2d 771, 777 (Minn. 2004) (quot ation omitted). Baylor
does not show how Brekke applies to his case. Brekke involves an employment contract,
and the court analyzed six required elements for equitable estoppel. See id. Importantly, to
prove equitable estoppel, the plaintiff must show he acted upon his reliance on a
representation or concealment and suffered a loss. Id. Baylor has not shown how the six
elements of equitable estoppel apply to this case. Appellate courts decline to reach issues
that are inadequately briefed. State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc.,
558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997); see also Carpenter, 400 N.W.2d at 729 (stating that
pro se litigants still have the burden of comm unicating their desired relief to the courts).
Baylor has not met his burden in showing that the district court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over the parties’ marriage dissolution or child-custody dispute.
III. Hennepin County was the proper venue because it is where Eto resides.
Baylor next argues that venue is improper in Hennepin County because it is an
inconvenient forum. He also argues that Eto resides in Ramsey County and not Hennepin
County.
For a dissolution proceeding, venue is proper in any jurisdiction where one spouse
resides. Minn. Stat. § 518.09 (2018). The preferred remedy for improper venue is a change
of venue. Rosnow v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 444 N.W.2d 591, 592 (Minn. App. 1989),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 13, 1989). “Since our di strict courts virtually constitute one
court of general jurisdiction coextensive with the boundaries of the state, the fact that a
civil action is brought or tried in th e wrong county is not jurisdictional.” Claseman v.
Feeney, 300 N.W. 818, 819 (Minn. 1941) (quo tation omitted). Baylor never moved for

8
change of venue but argued improper venue in his second motion to dismiss. “The standard
of review on a venue transfer challenge is whether the district court abused its discretion.”
State v. Fairbanks, 842 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Minn. 2014).
Baylor’s argument that Eto does not live in Hennepin County appears to be based
on her listed address and his belief that she mu st affirmatively prove her residency. Eto’s
listed address is a Safe at Home post offi ce box. The Safe at Home program provides
victims of domestic violence an address with out disclosing their residence. Minn. Stat.
§ 5B.01 (2018). Though Eto’s Safe at Home address is a P.O. Box in St. Paul, her
dissolution petition states that she resides in Hennepin County. The district court declined
to “usurp the purpose of the Safe at Home program by ordering [Eto] to provide her exact
address,” and Baylor has not shown that decisi on to be an abuse of discretion. Baylor’s
argument that Eto had to affirmat ively establish that venue was proper is misplaced. It is
Baylor’s burden on appeal to show both how the district court erred in denying his motion
to dismiss and that, as a result of that error, he suffered prejudice. See, e.g., Toughill v.
Toughill, 609 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Mi nn. App. 2000). Baylor di d not meet that burden.
Because venue was proper pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 518.09, the district court did not err in
denying Baylor’s motion to dismiss.
IV. The district court did not violate Baylor’s due-process rights.
Whether a party’s procedural-due-process rights were violated is a question of law
that appellate courts review de novo. Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes , 823 N.W.2d 627, 632
(Minn. 2012).

9
A. No opportunity to be heard
Baylor’s first argument is that his due-process rights were violated when he was not
given notice of the April 8, 2019 ICMC. But Eto correctly points out that the district court
sent an email to the parties on February 28, 2019, alerting the parties to the April 8 ICMC
both in the body of the email and through an attached notice. “Due process requires only
that notice be reasonably calculated to reach interested parties.” Goldsworthy v. State Dep’t
of Pub. Safety, 268 N.W.2d 46, 48 (Minn. 1978). Baylor previously responded to the email
chain—specifically in regards to the proposal of an April 8 conference—which shows that
the district court’s efforts to notify the parties were reasonably calculated to reach them.
Moreover, Baylor must show how he was prejudiced in order to prevail on appeal.
See Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr. Inc. , 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 1975). Baylor
brought a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction on August 15, 2018. He had
ample opportunity to be heard and he was heard on the jurisdictional arguments he claims
to have missed out on by missing the ICMC.
Baylor also argues that he did not receive proper notice for the rescheduled May 24,
2019 hearing about his second motion to dismiss. But, as Eto points out, Baylor states in
his brief that he learned of the rescheduled hearing when he received a May 15, 2019
district court order. Again, the district cour t provided proper notice, and Baylor has not
shown how he was prejudiced.
Finally, Baylor highlights several proceedings in which the district court attempted
to reach him by phone even though he did not file a notice to appear by telephone. This, he
argues, shows that there was a presumption th at he would appear by phone and that his

10
previous notice to appear by phone should cover the entire case, not just individual
hearings. Baylor does not provide any support for this argumen t. The district court must
approve a party’s motion to appear by teleph one before the party can call into a court
hearing. Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.09. Baylor has not met hi s burden of showing how his
due-process rights were violated.
B. “Abusing free and pure speech”
Baylor next argues that the district court violated his due process rights when it did
not let him call into trial after he did not submit a motion to appear by phone. But, as noted
in the previous section, Baylor has not shown how the district court’s refusal to let Baylor
appear by phone when he did not file a motion to appear violated his due-process rights.
Baylor also argues that the district cour t’s September 27, 2019 order allowing the
parties to file written posttrial summations is re ally just an “abusive sham” used to cover
up the injustice of Baylor not being allowed to argue in cour t. He further argues that the
district court’s 10-page limit for the closing ar guments was too narrow of a restriction in
light of Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.05, which allows 35 pages for a memorandum in support
of a motion. But Baylor does not show wh y the rule governing motion practice would
require the district court to allow longer written closing arguments. Baylor also mentions
that the page restriction violated his First Amendment right to free speech. Page limits on
court filings are common and not a violation of free speech. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The
Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession: Constraints on Lawyers’ First
Amendment Rights , 67 Fordham L. Rev. 569, 569 (1998) (“Rules of evidence and
procedure, bans on revealing grand jury testimony, page limits in briefs, and sanctions for

11
frivolous pleadings, to name a few, are exampl es of speech limitati ons that are widely
accepted as functional necessities in the administration of jus tice . . . .”). Baylor has not
shown how the page limit violated his freedom of speech, especially given his failure to
file a written closing argument at all.
C. “Abusing the option to vacate”
Under the heading “abusing the option to vacate,” Baylor first challenges the district
court’s denial of his “informal motion to va cate” the proceedings ba sed on Eto’s alleged
fraud and misrepresentations because the de nial was “abusively misleading.” In its
August 30, 2019 order, the district court stat ed that the “thrust of [Baylor’s] arguments
squarely attack[s] the weight and credibility of [Eto’s] anticipated testimony. Since [Eto]’s
credibility will be an important factor at trial, this factor is best assessed by the Court at
that trial, instead of prematurely retracting the services of the interpreter.” It appears that
the district court made a prudent decision to wait until the trial that was only a few weeks
away to make determinations implicating th e credibility of witnesses. Baylor does not
provide any relevant legal authority to support this argument.
Second, Baylor argues that the district court “abus[ed] the rules” when it denied his
motion to extend the length of trial and read his motion as an a ttempt to remove the
interpreter. But Baylor does not say which rule the district court abused. Further, this issue
is moot because Baylor did not attend the trial. See Dean v. City of Winona , 868 N.W.2d
1, 5 (Minn. 2015) (“An appeal should be dismissed as moot when a decision on the merits
is no longer necessary or an award of effective relief is no longer possible.”).

12
Finally, Baylor argues that the district court abused its disc retion when it did not
hold a hearing on his “motion to vacate” that followed his July 7, 2019 motion—filed with
this court—to strike Eto’s July 3, 2019 response to his petition for a writ of mandamus. It
is unclear what error Baylor alleges. To the extent he is arguing that he was entitled to
present oral testimony on his motion, Baylor does not address whether he made a motion
to present oral testimony as required by Minn. R. Gen. Pr ac. 303.03(d)(2). “[O]n appeal
error is never presumed. It must be made to appear affirmatively before there can be
reversal . . . [and] the burden of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it.”
Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 216 Minn. 489, 495, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (1944). Baylor has not
met his burden in showing how the district court erred.
D. “Abuse by continuance”
Baylor appears to argue that Eto and the district court colluded with each other to
continually request and grant continuances. He seems to base this argument on the assertion
that the court suggested a continuance before Eto requested one. Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 122
suggests that district courts can grant con tinuances when requests are made by motion or
when a judge thinks an emergency exists. Ba ylor has not met his burden in showing that
the district court committed a reversible error.
Baylor also argues that the district court “abruptly prevented [him] from completing
his defense and threatened to issue sanctions in order to chill his speech, denying access to
the court and the opportunity to be heard.” But there are no tr anscripts in the record, and
Baylor does not provide any other context or way to analyze this argument. “Although
some accommodations may be made for pro se litigants, this court has repeatedly

13
emphasized that pro se litigants are generally he ld to the same standards as attorneys and
must comply with court rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App.
2001). Baylor has failed to meet his burden on this issue.
Finally, Baylor argues that the district court physically destroyed his motion for
reconsideration, which he alleges went missing. Baylor blames the district court based on
the suspicious timing of when the district court addressed the missing document. But, as
mentioned before, a party need s to show prejudice to pr evail on due process claims.
Midway, 237 N.W.2d at 78. Here, Baylor believes the missing motion prevented him from
making his argument for improper service of process. Baylor claims that the missing
motion for reconsideration was filed in Oct ober 2018. This is still two months after
Baylor’s answer and first motion to dismiss. So, Baylor’s argument for improper service
of process would have still been forfeited even if the district court had received a copy of
his motion for reconsideration. Baylor cannot show prejudice.
In sum, Baylor has not shown how the district court violated his due-process rights.
Affirmed.