St. Cloud Educational Rights Advocacy Council, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1762

St. Cloud Educational Rights Advocacy Council,
Appellant,

vs.

Tim Walz, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed November 9, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; motion granted in part
Frisch, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CV-19-1242

Gerald W. Von Korff, Rinke Noonan, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Martha J. Casserly, Alec Sloan, Assistant Attorneys
General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FRISCH, Judge
Appellant commenced this action against various government entities, alleging that
Minnesota’s education-funding framework violates the Education and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Minnesota Constitution by failing to afford an adequate education to certain

2
public school students within the St. Cloud Area School District. The district court
dismissed the amended complaint in its entirety and denied temporary injunctive relief,
concluding that the amended complaint raised a nonjusticiable political question and
otherwise failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; that certain parties were
immune from suit; and that appellant lacked standing, failed to join a necessary party, and
forfeited the issue of whether certain parties were improperly jo ined. We affirm the
dismissal of several parties from the action and the dismissal of the equal-protection claims.
We decline to reach the immunity issue. We reverse in part the district court’s dismissal
of the education -clause claim and the denial of the tempo rary-injunction motion. We
remand to the district court for reconsideration of the temporary-injunction motion and
further proceedings on the merits.
FACTS
In February 2019, appellant St. Cloud Educational Rights Advocacy Council
(SCERAC) commenced this action against several government entities, alleging generally
that Minnesota’s education -funding framework violate s the Education and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Minnesota Constitution by failing to afford sufficient funding to
provide an adequate education for students seeking to overcome educational disadvantages
within the St. Cloud Area School District (the school district). The respondents on appeal
are Governor Tim Walz, the State of Minnesota, the Minnesota Senate, the Minnesota
House of Representatives, the Minnesota Department of Education (MDE), and
Commissioner of Education Mary Ricker. We summarize SCERAC’s specific allegations
set forth in the amended complaint, accepting the allegations as true for the purpose of

3
reviewing the district court’s dismissal of the action. See Forslund v. State, 924 N.W.2d
25, 32 (Minn. App. 2019). We first contextualize SCERAC’s allegations with a brief
summary of the Education Clause and Minnesota’s education-funding framework.
The Education Clause
The Education Clause of the Minnesota Constitution requires the legislature to
“establish a general and uniform system of public schools” and to “make such provisions
by taxation or otherwise as will secure a thorough and efficient system of public schools
throughout the state.” Minn. Const. art. XIII, § 1. The Education Clause creates “a
fundamental right . . . to a general and uniform system of education which provides an
adequate education to all students in Minnesota.” Skeen v. State , 505 N.W .2d 299, 315
(Minn. 1993) (quotation omitted).
Minnesota’s Education-Funding Framework
Minnesota funds public schools through a mix of federal, state, and district-specific
resources. State appropriations include basic revenue and categorical revenues. Basic
revenue is calculated pursuant to a formula based on pupil units per school year, see Minn.
Stat. § 126C.10, subd. 2 (2018), while categorical revenues are directed toward specific
needs beyond those covered by basic revenue, see, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 126C.10, subds. 3-4
(2018). Aid is available for excess and unreimbursed education cos ts. See Minn. Stat.
§ 125A.79, subd. 5 (2018). Minnesota law further requires school boards to “provide by
levy of tax necessary funds for the conduct of schools, the payment of indebtedness, and
all proper expenses of the district.” Minn. Stat. § 123B.02, subd. 8 (2018).

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SCERAC’s Allegations
In the amended complaint, SCERAC alleged that, i n the 1990s, Minnesota
abandoned education standards emphasizing minimal levels of instruction and instead
adopted standards focusing on student proficiency. The transition increased the costs for
school districts that serve students with educational disadvantages. In 2003, Governor Tim
Pawlenty appointed a task force to determine whether Minnesota’s school -financing
arrangements equitably distributed funding. The state conducted a comprehensive study
in 2004. The task force found that minority student populations required additional staff
resources to close achievement gaps, that the proportion of limited-English-proficient
students had increased dramatically in the preceding decade, and that the rising number of
low-income students required additional educational services. The task force ultimately
recommended the implementation of a cost -based funding all ocation. No further action
was taken by the task force, and its recommendations were not implemented.
Today, according to SCERAC, the state’s legislative and executive branches have
still not determined the level of funding necessary to deliver a standa rds-compliant
education to students with educational disadvantages. Nor have those branches correlated
school funding to the cost of funding adequate education programs. SCERAC alleged that
the responsible government actors have “intentionally set funding levels knowing that they
are starkly insufficient to cover the cost of providing education that meets state standards.”
The school district spans 250 square miles and includes several cities and townships.
It has a large, growing population of “students with educational disadvantages,” which
SCERAC defines as “students seeking to overcome educational disadvantages in the

5
following groups”: (1) lower -income students , (2) English -language learners ,
(3) first-generation students, (4) students with dyslexia, and (5) students of color. Relative
to nearby districts, student demographics reflect high percentages of free -lunch-eligible
and English-language-learner students.
SCERAC alleged that b etween 2009 an d 2019, the school district’s
special-education deficit ballooned from $5 million to $12 million. In 2017, the school
district suffered an average annual budget shortfall of $5,867 per special-education student.
Various standardized testing metrics indicate achievement gaps between students with
educational disadvantages and students with educational advantages . For example, data
show that White children on average test higher than Black children in mathematics and
reading across various grade levels. Non -free-lunch-eligible students score on av erage
higher than free-lunch-eligible students.
SCERAC further alleged that the achievement gap threatens economic interests and
limits disadvantaged students’ access to post -secondary education. Performance
deficiencies can be corrected by the strategic implementation of structural changes, but the
school district cannot afford to implement the necessary changes under the current funding
scheme. While t he school district provides an education “at least comparable to other
districts for students with ed ucational disadvantages ,” that education does not meet
established state standards. The school district is disproportionately affected by the lack

6
of funding relative to districts with proportionately fewer students with educational
disadvantages.
SCERAC alleged that its members sustained damages. SCERAC claimed that the
funding system has deprived, is depriving, or will deprive children of their “opportunity to
attend their local public schools in an environment that is integrated racially, culturally,
and economically, in which all children . . . receive an education that meets state standards.”
SCERAC further claimed that the absence of adequate funding forced its members “to pay
for special dyslexia education privately , because their children were not screened and
identified”; frustrated and continues to frustrate school-board members’ “ability to meet
their constitutional and legal responsibilities”; and rendered educator members “unable to
implement the practices that fulfill their professional respo nsibilities,” damaging “their
reputation as professionals” and rendering their work more difficult. SCERAC alleged that
the declining quality of public education in the school district also damaged or will damage
members’ home values.
SCERAC alleged thre e violations of the Minnesota Constitution in the amended
complaint. Count I set forth a violation of the Education Clause based on the respondents’
failure to fund the costs of providing an adequate education to students with educational
disadvantages. Counts II and III set forth equal-protection violations based on the
respondents denying students with educational disadvantages their right to an adequate
education while ensuring that right was vindicated for advantaged students.

7
Motion for Temporary Injunction and Motion to Dismiss
SCERAC moved for a temporary injunction requiring the respondents to
(1) “provide the [school district] with full funding of the [school d]istrict’s
special[-]education expenditures . . . effective with the 2019 –2020 school year” and
(2) “develop an[d] implement a procedure to establish the cost of providing an education
that meets state standards to [school district] students —as well as other districts with
elevated percentages of students with high education needs, and to provide that plan to the
[district c]ourt .” The respondents moved to dismiss SCERAC’s amended complaint,
arguing that the governor and legislature were immune from suit ; SCERAC lacked
associational standing; the governor, house, senate , and state were imp roper parties;
SCERAC failed to join the school district as a necessary party; separation -of-powers
principles and the political-question doctrine barred SCERAC’s claims; and SCERAC
failed to state any claim upon which relief could be granted.
The district court granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss on numerous
alternative grounds. It concluded that SCERAC’s claims raised a nonjusticiable political
question implicating separation-of-powers principles and that legislative immunity barred
SCERAC’s claims against the governor and the legislature. The district court determined
that SCERAC lacked either individual or associational standing to sue. The district court
acknowledged the improper-parties argument without addressing its merits, observed that
SCERAC had failed to respond to the argument, and deemed the issue forfeited. The
district court also concluded that dismissal was proper because SCERAC had failed to join
the school district as a necessary party.

8
The district court then determined that the amended complaint failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. Under the Education Clause, the district court reasoned
that SCERAC did not allege that students actually receiv ed an inadequate edu cation but
instead alleged that the funding scheme merely impaired the school district’s ability to
achieve particular outcomes. The district court reasoned that the equal-protection claims
failed because (1) SCERAC did not allege that the school district received less funding per
pupil than other school districts, (2) SCERAC did not allege that the respondents intended
to discriminate against students with educational disadvantage s, and (3) it was unclear
whether “students with educational disadvantages” is a suspect class subject to
equal-protection claims. The district court also denied SCERAC’s motion for temporary
injunctive relief.
This appeal follows.1

1 SCERAC urges us to strike portio ns of the respondents’ brief and addendum not
presented to the district court or to consider supplemental affidavits on appeal. First, we
grant SCERAC’s request to strike the respondents’ specific argument that the school
district is a necessary party to defend against SCERAC’s allegation that students were
receiving an inadequate education. The respondents did not raise the theory below, and we
decline to consider it for the first time on appeal. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582
(Minn. 1988). W e reject the respondents’ argument that SCERAC first challenged the
adequacy of education on appeal , because SCERAC’s amended complaint contained
allegations that students were receiving an inadequate education. Second, w e grant
SCERAC’s request to strike information comparing the school district’s revenue to nearby
districts. The issue is not whether we may consider the data from public records, see State
v. Rewitzer, 617 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn. 2000), but is instead whether the data is properly
considered in reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, Forslund, 924 N.W.2d at 32. We
limit our review to SCERAC’s allegations. Third, we deny SCERAC’s request to strike
the respondents’ argument that the school district is a necessary party based on its abili ty
to seek approval for tax-levy funding. The respondents raised the argument in the district
court. Finally, we deny SCERAC’s request to supplement the record, because we limit our

9
D E C I S I O N
The district court dismissed SCERAC’s claims on multiple, independent grounds
and denied its request for a temporary injunction . We review the grant of a motion to
dismiss de novo, considering only the facts as alleged in the amended complaint, assuming
those facts to be true and drawing all reasonable inferences in SCERAC’s favor. See Cruz-
Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 2018); Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A. , 851 N.W.2d
598, 606 (Minn. 2014).
I. SCERAC forfeited its challenge to the dismissal of the state, governor, senate,
and house as improper parties.
The respondents moved to dismiss the state, governor, senate, and house as
improper parties, arguing that none of th ose parties could individually provide the relief
requested by SCERAC. The district court found that SCERAC failed to respond to the
respondents’ argument and th erefore deemed the issue forfeited.2 On appeal, t he
respondents repeat this substantive argument and assert that SCERAC’s forfeiture at the
district court is an independent basis to affirm the dismissal of these parties. We conclude
that SCERAC forfeited the issue on appeal by failing to challenge the district court’s

review to the allegations in the amended complaint and arguments raised by the parties or
considered by the district court.

2 The district court deemed the issue “waived.” But the supreme court has distinguished
waiver from forfeiture, explaining that “forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion
of a right,” whereas “waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right.” State v. Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d 275, 278 n.3 (Minn. 2015) (quoting United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1777 (1993) ). The district court indicated i t
“ha[d] not located” SCERAC’s responsive argument but made no finding that SCERAC
intended to waive the issue. Because the district court’s conclusion rested on SCERAC’s
failure to respond to the issue, we use the term “forfeiture” rather than “waiver.”

10
forfeiture determination. We therefore affirm the dismissal of the state, governor, senate,
and house.
Separate from any forfeiture before the district court , SCERAC forfeited this issue
on appeal. SCERAC failed to acknowledge or challenge in its principal appellate brief any
aspect of the district court’s order regarding dismissal based on the forfeiture of the
improper-parties argument. Nor did SCERAC address the issue in its reply brief,
notwithstanding the fact that the respondents again raised the underlying forfeiture issue in
their responsive brief and repeated their substantive argument. When asked during oral
argument to identify where or how SCERAC challenged the district court’s forfeiture
decision on appeal, counsel cited only to SCERAC’s arguments regarding immunity. But
whether the governor and legislature are immune from suit is an issue separate and distinct
from whether a party is individually incapable of affording comple te relief requested by
SCERAC and is therefore an improper party. We do not presume error on appeal, and as
the appealing party, SCERAC bears the burden of demonstrating error. See Loth v. Loth,
35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949). When a party fails to cha llenge a district court’s
decision in its appellate brief, the issue is forfeited and the district court’s decision stands.
Lener v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 263 N.W.2d 389, 390 (Minn. 1978).
Because SCERAC forfeited the issue on appeal, we affirm the dismissal of the state,
governor, senate, and house as parties to this action. And because we affirm the dismissal
of all parties claiming immunity from suit, we need not address the parties’ immunity
arguments. We also decline to reach the merits of the respondents’ improper -parties
argument. We express no opinion as to the effect of this dismissal , which is based solely

11
on forfeiture grounds , in any future proceeding. The dismissal of these parties is not
dispositive of the appeal because the respondents did not move to dismiss the MDE or the
commissioner of education as improper parties to this action. Accordingly, we address the
remaining issues on appeal as to the MDE and Commissioner Ricker.
II. The amended complaint set forth a justiciable, nonpolitical question.
The district court concluded that the entirety of the amended complaint raised a
nonjusticiable political question in violation of separation-of-powers principles, reasoning
that granting SCERAC’s requested relief would subsume powers granted by the
constitution to either the legislative or executive branches. See Minn. Const. arts. XIII, § 1
(Education Clause), X –XI (taxing and spending), IV ( establishing the legislature ). In
response, SCERAC argues that it asserted justiciable claims according to supreme court
precedent.
We review questions of constitutional interpretation and justiciability de novo.
Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 7. A justiciable controversy is one that is appropriate for a
court’s adjudication. Id. Justiciability is a prerequisite to a court’s exercise of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Schowalter v. State, 822 N.W.2d 292, 298 (Minn. 2012). The
Minnesota Constitution specifically precludes the judiciary from exercising “any of the
powers” delegated to the executive or legislative departments, except when specifically
allowed by the constitution. Minn. Const. art. III, § 1. This separation of powers “has
given rise to a number of prudential limits to the courts’ exercise of subject -matter
jurisdiction.” Citizens for Rule of Law v. Senate Comm. on Rules & Admin ., 770 N.W.2d
169, 173 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 2009). Separation-of-powers

12
principles preclude the judiciary from resolving political questions, which involve matters
“to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity” or which “ha[ve] been
specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government,
with discretionary power to act.” In re McConaughy, 119 N.W. 408, 417 (Minn. 1909).
In Cruz-Guzman, the supreme court held that claimed violations of the Education
Clause presented a justiciable controversy appropriate for judicial determination. 916
N.W.2d at 9. The Cruz-Guzman plaintiffs claimed that the state’s education pra ctices
resulted in racial and socioeconomic segregation and worse academic outcomes for
students enrolled in segregated schools. Id. at 5–6. The supreme court recognized that
matters of education policy generally fall within the legislature’s authority b ut that the
Education Clause is a constitutional “mandate to the [l]egislature.” Id. at 8–9 (quotation
omitted). Given that mandate, the supreme court reasoned that courts are “the appropriate
domain” to determine whether a constitutional violation exists. Id. at 9. It explained that
the judiciary is “not necessarily require[d]” to exercise the legislature’s powers to provide
a remedy, specifically when the claims “ask the judiciary to answer a yes or no question—
whether the [l]egislature has viola ted its constitutional duty to provide a general and
uniform system of public schools that is thorough and efficient.” Id. (quotation omitted).
And the court clarified that it did not read the complaint as requesting the judiciary to
devise “particular e ducational policies to remedy constitutional violations” in the
legislature’s place. Id.
SCERAC sought several forms of relief in the amended complaint. It asked the
district court to declare that Minnesota’s education-funding system, as applied to the school

13
district, violates the Education and Equal Protection Clauses. It sought a “preliminary and
permanent injunction” requiring the respondents to “fully fund St. Cloud’s special
education program for the 2019 -20 biennium in the 2019 legislative session .” SCERAC
sought an order requiring the school district to submit a plan to enhance and improve new
programs that meet the needs of educationally disadvantaged students and submit that plan
to the district court. Last, SCERAC sought a “preliminary and pe rmanent injunction
requiring the [respondents] to prepare and implement the framework to determine the full
cost of providing a public education to student[s]” in the school district and “to submit that
plan” to the district court “for potential utilizatio n in all subsequent budgets and
appropriations if the [district court] so orders.”3
The district court observed that this requested relief extended beyond the mere
answer of the yes-or-no question as to whether a constitutional violation occurred. The
district court concluded that the relief requested by SCERAC required the judicial exercise
of legislative and executive powers and therefore dismissed the entire action as presenting
a nonjusticiable political question.
While SCERAC acknowledges that it sought remedies compelling coordinate
branches of government to act differently, SCERAC emphasizes that this action also
presents a core question uniquely appropriate for judicial determination: whether the

3 SCERAC additionally asked the district court to “declare the limitations on . . . Quality
Compensation unconstitutional” and to order the state “to make Quality Compensation
available to all districts at management discretion and without requiring the consent of
labor unions.” The district court did not fully address this requested relief , and the parties
do not address this portion of the amended complaint on appeal. We limit our review to
the issues raised in the parties’ briefs.

14
respondents’ failure to adequately fund the educatio n of students with educational
disadvantages violates the Minnesota Constitution. In other words, putting aside that a
court may not be able to provide all requested remedies, SCERAC argues that its amended
complaint set forth at least one justiciable claim for relief: whether the acts or omissions
of the respondents give rise to a violation of the Minnesota Constitution.
The district court correctly concluded that the amended complaint requested at least
some relief that would require an impermissib le exercise of judicial authority . The
amended complaint, for example, requested that the district court require that the
respondents “fully fund” the St. Cloud special-education program for the current biennium;
compel coordinate branches of government t o prepare frameworks and plans for funding
school programs and present those plans to the district court for review and approval; order
the establishment of budgets for approved frameworks on a going forward basis; and
otherwise approve substantive education programs. These requests asked the district court
to establish, review , or approve “particular educational policies to remedy constitutional
violations” in violation of separation-of-powers principles.4 See id.
But the amended complaint also raised at least one justiciable, nonpolitical question:
whether a constitutional violation had occurred. SCERAC asked the district court to find
and declare that the education -funding framework violates the Education and Equal

4 SCERAC claims it is “doubtful” whether the judiciary’s power in this context is limited
to answer yes-or-no questions. But it offers no authority that would permit the judiciary to
order the legislative and executive branches to take steps to appropriate additional funding
to the school district. And we decline to comment on the availability of possible relief
beyond that already requested in this action.

15
Protection Clauses. This request fell within the proper domain of the judiciary and
presented a justiciable, nonpolitical question for the district court’s determination. The
type of question presented here is identical to that presented in Cruz-Guzman, where the
supreme court held that the judiciary was the “appropriate domain” to address the yes-or-no
question: “whether the [l]egislature ha[d] violated its constitutional duty.” Id. The district
court therefore erred in dismissing that portion of the amended complaint seeking
resolution of the question of whether a constitutional violation occurred.
Rather than recognize the justiciable, nonpolitical question posed by the amended
complaint, the district court and the respondents focused exclusively on the requests for
relief seeking ju dicial intrusion into matters delegated to coordinate branches of
government as justification for dismissal of the entire action . But justiciability merely
requires “the presence of a justiciable controversy,” Schowalter, 822 N.W.2d at 298
(emphasis added), rather than the absence of any nonjusticiable question. And while the
district court correctly noted that the parties in Cruz-Guzman did not seek the type of
expansive relief sought by SCERAC in this action, the supre me court explained that
“[p]roviding a remedy for Education Clause violations does not necessarily require the
judiciary to exercise the powers of the [l]egislature,” reconciling the judiciary’s power to
determine constitutional violations with the legisla ture’s power to set policy. Cruz-
Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 9 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, b ecause the amended complaint raised a justiciable controversy
appropriate for resolution in the district court, the district court erred by dismissing the

16
entire action as presenting a nonjusticiable political question in violation of
separation-of-powers principles.
III. The amended complaint contained adequate allegations that SCERAC has
associational standing to bring this action.
The district court conclude d that SCERAC lacked standing to sue because the
amended complaint did not contain allegations of concrete and actual injuries either to
SCERAC or its members. SCERAC argues that (1) the amended complaint contained
“compelling allegations” of direct injury to members with cognizable interests “in the
education of their own [children] and their community’s children in their own public
schools,” (2) the district court erroneously declined to consider affidavits, and (3) the
district court misapplied fed eral caselaw. The respondents urge us to affirm because
SCERAC failed to allege its members suffered an injury-in-fact, because any injury is not
fairly traceable to the respondents’ actions , and because SCERAC’s members lack any
“indicia of membership.”
We review questions of standing de novo, accepting the complainant’s allegations
as true and construing those allegations in favor of the complainant. Forslund, 924 N.W.2d
at 30, 32. Standing requires a party to have “a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy.”
Lorix v. Crompton Corp. , 736 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Minn. 2007). “A party may acquire
standing either by statute or as an aggrieved party who has suffered some injury -in-fact.”
Garcia-Mendoza v. 2003 Chevy Tahoe , 852 N.W.2d 659, 663 (Minn. 201 4). SCERAC
does not dispute that it lacks individual standing but instead claims associational standing
to sue.

17
Under the “well -established notion of associational standing,” Minnesota
recognizes the right of an organization to “sue to redress injuries to itself or injuries to its
members.” State by Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc. , 551 N.W.2d 490, 49 7–98 (Minn.
1996) (quotation marks omitted). An organization can assert associational standing “if its
members’ interests are directly at stake or if its members have suffered an injury -in-fact.”
Builders Ass’n of Minn. v. City of St. Paul , 819 N.W.2d 172, 177 (Minn. App. 2012). An
injury-in-fact is “a harm that is both concrete and actual or imminent.” Hanson v.
Woolston, 701 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. App. 2005) (quotation omitted) , review denied
(Minn. Oct. 18, 2005). The injury must be traceable to the defendants’ actions and
redressable by the court. Garcia-Mendoza, 852 N.W.2d at 663.
The amended complaint contained allegations that SCERAC is a nonprofit
corporation formed “to bring together residents[] and families served by the St. Cloud
District” (emphasis added) and that SCERAC’s membership include s “families whose
children have educational disadvantages.” SCERAC alleged that its members include
“families with children with educational challenges who deserve a more robust and fully
funded school system” including “families with c hildren who have dyslexia” who “have
gone for years without appropriate screening, diagnosis, and individualized instruction .”
These allegations support reasonable inference s that the “families served” by the school
district are the same “families whose children have educational disadvantages” and that
parents of children with educational disadvantages advocate for the specific relief of
additional funding for the school district to benefit their own children. A viable Education
Clause claim requires proof “that the legislature has failed or is failing to provide an

18
adequate education.” Forslund, 924 N.W.2d at 34 (emphasis added). These identified
members of SCERAC indisputably have a direct stake in the constitutional question posed
by this action : whether the legislature has failed or is failing to provide an adequate
education to disadvantaged, school-age children.5
The respondents contend that even if members of SCERAC have a direct stake in
the outcome of the action, SCERAC still lacks standing because injuries alleged on behalf
of parent members are not fairly traceable to the conduct of the respondents. But the
amended complaint contained allegations otherwise : that the respondents’ failure to
provide additional funds for the school district’s special -education costs results in
substandard education for students with educational disadvantages . W e accept those
allegations as true at this procedural juncture.6

5 For purposes of determining associational standing, we need not determine whether every
member of the organization has a sufficient stake in the outcome of the action. See Builders
Ass’n, 819 N.W.2d at 176 –77 (concluding that builders association had associational
standing where only “[s]ome of its members” suffered injury). Because we conclude that
SCERAC has assoc iational standing on behalf of parent members, we do not decide
whether other members’ purported injuries confer standing. And we note that our decision
is based solely on the allegations in the amended complaint, which we accept as true and
construe in the light most favorable to SCERAC at this procedural posture. Nothing in this
opinion should be construed to limit the ability of the parties or the district court to further
address the issue of standing as appropriate on remand.

6 The respondents rely upon a nonprecedential Florida Supreme Court case for the
proposition that “[b]road claims that a ‘lack of funding has resulted in disproportionate
outcomes for certain students’ fail to establish the necessary causal relationship ,” quoting
Citizens for Strong Schs., Inc. v. Fla. State Bd. of Educ., 262 So.3d 127, 142–43 (Fla. 2019).
But Citizens involved a different standard of proof, arising after a bench trial where the
parties were required to prove, as opposed to allege, a causal relationship. Id. at 143.

19
Finally, the respondents argue that SCERAC failed to allege sufficient indicia of
membership to demonstrate associational standing. In Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert.
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 344–45, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 2442 (1997), the Supreme Court
considered whether apple growers and dealers had sufficient “indicia of membership” to
confer associational standing on a state agency with no formal members, ack nowledging
that the agency was not a “traditional voluntary membership organization.” Although
Minnesota “derived” its associational-standing approach from Hunt’s general definition of
associational standing, Humphrey, 551 N.W.2d at 498, the supreme court has not adopted
a requirement regarding indicia of membership. We see no principled reason to apply such
a requirement to a traditional nonprofit corporation . And although the district court
summarized the respondents’ indicia-of-membership argument, it did not reach its decision
on that basis.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred by finding that the amended
complaint lacked sufficient allegations demonstrating SCERAC’s associational standing
to bring this action.
IV. The district court erred by dismissing the amended complaint for failure to
join the school district as a necessary party.
The district court concluded that because the school district was a necessary party
for SCERAC to achieve complete relief for its claims, its failure to join the school district
as a party merited dismissal of the action under Minn. R. Civ. P. 19.01 and the Minnesota
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA), Minn. Stat. §§ 555.01–.16 (2018).

20
We interpret statutes and procedural rules de novo. Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d
at 13. The UDJA affords courts the “power to declare rights, status, and other legal
relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” Minn. Stat. § 555.01. “When
declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest
which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of
persons not parties to the proceeding.” Minn. Stat. § 555.11. Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 19.01 meanwhile provides that a person “shall be joined as a party” if complete
relief cannot be afforded in that person’s absence or if the person claims an interest relating
to the subject of the action such that disposition would impair that person’s ability to protect
the interest or “leave any one already a party” at risk of incurring multiple or inconsistent
obligations.
We agree with the district court that the school district was a necessary party under
Rule 19.01. SCERAC requested that the district court order the school district to
(1) “dedicate the new funds towards improving markedly the education of other
educationally disadvantaged students” and (2) “submit a plan to enhance[ and] improve[]
new programs that meet the needs of those other educationally disadvantaged students.”
SCERAC’s request for relief sought more than a mere declaration of a constitutional
violation. See Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 14. Under Rule 19.01, the district court
therefore correctly reasoned that, in the absence of the school district, “complete relief
[could not] be accorded among those already parties.”7

7 This action is unlike Cruz-Guzman, where the relief requested did not require joinder of
the school districts and joinder was not necessary because “[e]ven if the school districts

21
For the same reason, the district court also concluded that the school district was a
necessary party under the UDJA. We note that the rule and statute differ. The rule
contemplates two circumstances in which a party must be joined: (1) when “complete relief
cannot be accorded” in the party’s absence and (2) when “the person claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action” and disposition would impair their interests or put an
existing party at risk. Minn. R. Civ. P. 19.01. The UDJA contemplates only the second
circumstance. See Minn. Stat. § 555.11 (“[A]ll persons shall be made parties who have or
claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall
prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding.”). But for purposes of this
appeal, we need not resolve whether the analysis by the district court regarding complete
relief applies to the UDJA because even if the school district was a necessary party under
both Rule 19.01 and the UDJA, dismissal for failure to join a necessary party was improper.
The respondents argue that dismissal is necessary because a declaratory action
cannot bind absent parties. They cite Unbank Co., LLP v. Merwin Drug Co. , a matter
where Unbank filed a declaratory-judgment action challenging the issuance of a currency-
exchange license to Merwin by the commissioner of commerce. 677 N.W.2d 105, 106
(Minn. App. 2004). Unbank did not sue the commissioner or join him as a party, opting
only to sue Merwin. Id. We concluded that Unbank’s failure to join the commissioner as
a necessary party was a fatal defect because the department of commerce “indisputably has

and charter schools might eventually be affected by action s potentially taken by the State
in response to this litigation, those possible effects are not enough to require that the school
districts and charter schools be joined as necessary parties.” 916 N.W.2d at 14.

22
an interest in its licensing decisions and the legal interpretation of its governing act.” Id.
at 107. We affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the declaratory action while clarifying
that the dismissal was without prejudice. Id. at 109–10.
But more recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of an action
with prejudice under Rule 19.01 based on the nonjoinder of a necessary party. See Schulz
v. Town of Duluth , 936 N.W.2d 334, 342 (Minn. 2019). In Schulz, the supreme court
explained that the “failure to join a necessary party is not a jurisdictional defect.” Id. at
339. Accepting that the appellants had indeed failed to join a necessary party, the Schulz
court concluded that Rule 19.01 required joinder of the necessary party rather than
dismissal of the action: “[O]nce a district court has jurisdiction over the matter, it must use
Rule 19.01 to join all parties that it finds to be necessary under the rule.”8 Id.
We are unconvinced that the UDJA required dismissal for two reasons. F irst,
Rule 19.01 applies to the UDJA, a fact that we expressly acknowledged in Unbank. 677
N.W.2d at 108 (“The rules of civil procedure supplement the provisions of Minn. Stat.
§ 555.11 . . . .”); see also State Auto. & Cas. Underwriters v. Lee , 257 N.W.2d 573, 575 –
76 (Minn. 1977) (applying Rule 19 to UDJA). Having concluded that th e school district
was a necessary party, the district court was required to “order that the [school district] be
made a party.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 19.01. Second, we see no principled reason why the

8 We are aware that the district court issu ed its order in September 2019, before the
supreme court released the opinion in Schulz in December 2019. Even so, we generally
apply the law as it exists at the time of our opinion. See Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles
Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs , 617 N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000). And even before the Schulz
opinion, Rule 19.01 included mandatory language.

23
absence of a necessary part y would warrant dismissal in on e case and joinder in another
when the rule and the UDJA similarly define necessary parties in terms of interests and
rights. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of the amended complaint for failure to join
a necessary party and remand for further proceedings in accordance with Rule 19 and this
opinion.
V. The amended complaint stated a claim for relief under the Education Clause.
The district court dismissed the cause of action arising under the Education Clause,
concluding that SCERAC failed to allege “that the financing system is actually resulting in
an inadequate education” and instead alleged that the funding framework “impairs
the . . . school district’s ability to achieve particular outcomes.” SCERAC contends that it
sufficiently alleged that the deficient funding system resulted in an inadequate education.
We review the sufficiency of allegations set forth in the amended complaint
de novo, accepting SCERAC’s allegations as true and drawing reasonable inferences in its
favor. See Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 606. The Education Clause extends the “fundamental
right . . . to a general and uniform system of education which provides an adequate
education to all students in Minnesota.” Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 315 (quotation omitted). A
viable Education Clause claim requires an allegation “that the legislature has failed or is
failing to provide an adequate education.” Forslund, 924 N.W.2d at 34.
SCERAC alleged, in part, that (1) “the state has failed to provide the [school] district
with adequate funding . . . to meet state standards for students with educational
disadvantages and, as a result, far too many of these students are not meeting state
standards” (emphasis added); (2) the state’s failure to correlate the cost of providing an

24
adequate education with funding measures “is a major contributing cause” of the state’s
“failure to provide students with an education that meets all state standards”; (3) “[t]o meet
the constitutional requirement . . . the [school district] must have substantially greater
funding . . . and it must use those additional funds to implement significant changes in the
delivery of instruction”; (4) “Minnesota’s system provides grossly inadequate funding and
management authority to meet the needs of students with educational disadvantages”; and
(5) “the state provides inadequate funding and an inadequate framework to deliver an
education for students seeking to overcome educ ational disadvantages and achieve an
education that meets state standards.” These allegations s tated a viable claim under the
Education Clause upon which relief could be granted.
The district court determined these allegations insufficient under Forslund, a case
in which the appellants alleged that portions of Minnesota’s continuing -contract and
teacher-tenure statutes violated their children’s rights under the Education and Equal
Protection Clauses. Id. at 29. The appellants in that case alleged that the statutes made it
difficult to dismiss ineffective teachers, that their children either had been or were at risk
of being taught by ineffective teachers, and that “the specter of ineffective teaching
burden[ed] their right to an adequate education.” Id. We presumed that the adequacy of
education could be influenced by a number of variables such as funding and substantive
education policies, clarifying,
When an Education Clause claim is based on one or more of
these variables, a plaintiff needs to prove facts to establish that
those variables are actually resulting in an inadequate
education. In other words, a plaintiff cannot sustain a claim
that the state is providing a constitutionally inadequate

25
education without proving that the state is in fact p roviding a
constitutionally inadequate education.

Id. at 34–35. We affirmed dismissal of the action because the allegations merely claimed
“that the challenged statutes ‘impinge[d] on’ or ‘burden[ed]’ their children’s right to an
adequate education ,” not that “the state has actually failed to provide an adequate
education.” Id.
But the allegations in the amended complaint here, by contrast, did assert that the
state actually failed to provide an adequate education and pinpoint the funding system itself
as the reason students do not receive an adequate education. A reasonable inference from
the amended complaint shows that SCERAC asserted that (1) the students are in fact
receiving an inadequate education , (2) the alleged underfundi ng is the cause of that
inadequacy, and (3) additional funding would correct the deficiency . The district court
either failed to accept portions of the allegations as true or failed to draw reasonable
inferences in SCERAC’s favor. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of
the cause of action arising under the Education Clause and remand for further proceedings.
VI. SCERAC forfeited its challenge to the dismissal of its equal-protection claims.
The district court dismissed the equal-protection claims for failure to state a claim
upon which relief c an be granted. Although SCERAC argues that the district court
misapplied caselaw, we do not reach the issue because SCERAC has forfeited its argument
on a required element of its equal-protection claim.
The Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o member of this state shall be
disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof,

26
unless by the law of the land.” Minn. Const. art. I, § 2. “The equal prote ction guarantee
in the Minnesota Constitution places limits on the circumstances under and extent to which
the [l]egislature can treat similarly situated people differently.” Fletcher Props., Inc. v.
City of Minneapolis , 947 N.W.2d 1, 20 (Minn. 2020). We recognize two types of
equal-protection claims: disparate -treatment claims and disparate -impact claims.
Odunlade v. City of Minneapolis, 823 N.W.2d 638, 647 (Minn. 2012).
The responden ts characterized SCERAC’s equal -protection claims as alleging
disparate impact, and the district court considered those claims as alleging a
disparate-impact theory. On appeal, SCERAC does not directly challenge that it alleged
disparate-impact equal-protection claims in this action. Disparate impact requires proof of
(1) disproportionate impact upon a suspect class and (2) discriminatory intent “on the basis
of any suspect class status.” Id. at 648. The district court concluded that SCERAC failed
to allege “the second element necessary for an Equal Protection Clause violation: i.e., that
the state actor intended to discriminate against the suspect class. As a result, [SCERAC]
has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”
On appeal, SCERAC does not challenge this determination and has therefore
forfeited the issue. See Lener, 263 N.W.2d at 390. We therefore affirm the ruling of the
district court. Because SCERAC forfeited this issue, we decline to address its merits or
the alternative reasons set forth by the district court for dismissal.

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VII. The district court abused its discretion in denying SCERAC’s motion for a
temporary injunction.
Finally, SCERAC challenges the denial of its motion for temporary injunction. We
review the decision to grant or deny a motion for a temporary injunction for an abuse of
discretion. In re Estate of Nelson , 936 N.W.2d 897, 910 (Minn. App. 2019). “[A]
temporary injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy to preserve the status quo
pending adjudication of a case on its merits.” Id. at 909. In Dahlberg Bros. v. Ford Motor
Co., the supreme court set forth the five factors a district court must weigh in considering
a request for temporary injunctive relief: (1) the nature of the parties’ preexisting
relationship, (2) the comparative harms of granting or denying the injunction pending final
adjudication on the merits , (3) the likelihood that one party will prevail on the merits ,
(4) public-policy interests , and (5) the administrative burden s of supervision and
enforcement. 137 N.W.2d 314, 321–22 (Minn. 1965).
Here, the district court analyzed only three of those five factors. The district court
considered the relationship of the parties, likelihood of success on the merits , and the
administrative burden of implementing injunctive relief . While the district court
summarized the parties’ arguments regardi ng comparative harms and public -policy
implications, the district court did not analyze or weigh these factors in its ultimate decision
to deny injunctive relief. A district court abuses its discretion when it fails to weigh the
necessary factors. See Nelson, 936 N.W.2d at 910 -11 (“Because the district court was
required to apply the Dahlberg factors but failed to do so, we reverse and rema nd for
consideration of the Dahlberg factors.”). We also note that our decision implicates the

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findings by the district court as to the likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, we
reverse the denial of motion for temporary injunction and remand to the district court for
further consideration.
CONCLUSION
We appreciate the seriousness of the allegations in the amended complaint, the
procedural complexity of this action, and the effect of this opinion. We are constrained by
the arguments the respective parties chose to advance, and we therefore limit our decision
only to those issues properly preserved and presented for our consideration. We express
no opinion as to the merits of forfeited issues or future proceedings.
We affirm the dismiss al of the state, governor, house, and senate as parties to this
action, as SCERAC forfeited the issue that these are improper parties to this action. We
affirm the dismissal of the equal-protection claims, as SCERAC forfeited any challenge of
the finding that SCERAC failed to allege the necessary discriminatory intent to sustain a
disparate-impact equal-protection claim. But for the reasons set forth herein, we conclude
that the district court otherwise erred in its wholesale dismissal of the amended comp laint
and in its denial of temporary injunctive relief, and we reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; motion granted in part.