In re the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Jesse James Adams.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1763

In re the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Jesse James Adams.

Filed April 27, 2020
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-PR-18-621

Jennifer L. Thon, Steven D. Winkler, Wa rren J. Maas, Jones Law Office, Mankato,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney , Lisa Jones, Assistant County Attorney,
Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges the initial and final orders indeterminately committing him as
mentally ill and dangerous to the Minnesota Security Hospital in Saint Peter. Appellant
does not challenge the district court’s dete rmination that he meets the criteria for
commitment as mentally ill and dangerous. Rather, appellant argues that the district court
erred in ordering him committed to a secure treatment facility instead of to a less restrictive
treatment program in the community. Appellant contends we must reverse for two reasons:

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(1) the district court erred in its interpreta tion of Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 1 (2018),
which provides that appellant has the burden to prove by clear a nd convincing evidence
that “a less restrictive treatment program is available,” and (2) the record does not support
the district court’s determination that Adams did not provide clear and convincing evidence
that a less restrictive treatment program wa s available. Because we conclude that the
district court did not err in its interpretation of the relevant statute, and that the record
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the district court’s decision, supports
its determinations, we affirm.
FACTS
In September 2016, the district court determined that appellant Jesse James Adams
was incompetent to proceed in two criminal matters. It co mmitted Adams as mentally ill
to the Anoka Metro Regional Treatment Cent er (Anoka Treatment Center). After Adams
regained competency, his criminal cases procee ded with bench trials on stipulated facts.
On November 13, 2018, the district court found Adams not guilty by reason of mental
illness on one count of first-degree criminal da mage to property and also determined that
he “bashed out the headlights and slashed the tires of a vehicle.” In the second criminal
case, the district court also found Adams not guilty by reason of mental illness on two
counts of second-degr ee assault, two counts of threats of violence, two counts of felony
domestic assault, and one count of domestic assault by strangulation. The district court also
determined that Adams threatened to kill and assaulted his mother and girlfriend by hitting,
choking, pushing, stomping, and using a metal pipe.

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Anoka County (the county ) petitioned to commit Adam s as mentally ill and
dangerous to the public. During a three-day evidentiary hearing, the district court received
testimony from two court-appointed examiner s, Dr. James Gilbertson and Dr. Anne
Pascucci, four witnesses from Anoka County and Anoka Treatment Center, and Adams.
The district court received 15 exhibits by stipulation of the parties, including prior Anoka
County civil-commitment orders, police reports, district court criminal files, and examiner
reports.
On March 18, 2019, the district court issued a 23-page order with 57 findings of fact
and 12 conclusions of law (March initial order). First, the district court determined that the
county had proved by clear a nd convincing evidence that Ad ams has “persistent lifelong
mental illness.” The district court accepted that Adams had stipulated to his mental
illness, but also relied on his diagnoses at the Anoka Trea tment Center—schizoaffective
disorder, unspecified, polysubstance-use diso rders, antisocial personality disorder, and
post-traumatic stress disorder—and the opinions of Drs. Gilbertson and Pascucci. More
specifically, the district court found that Adams’s mental illness “manifests in part with a
fixed delusion that he is an FB I agent that people want to kill. This persistent delusion
makes him a serious threat to others.” Inde ed, during Adams’s tes timony, he stated, as
summarized by the district court, “that he joined the FBI 15 years ago, that he is still with
the FBI, and that someone, perhaps [a local television journalist], wants to kill him due to
his affiliation with the FBI.”
Second, the district court determined th at the county had pr oved by clear and
convincing evidence that Adams presents a clear danger to the safety of others. The district

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court found that Adams “does not contest that he has engaged in overt acts attempting to
cause serious harm to another based on his conviction histor y” and relied on the factual
findings in the two criminal cas es discussed above. In brief, the district court found that
Adams had “inflicted serious harm on his moth er and girlfriend in 2016 while suffering
from his mental illnesses, and he has numerous other instances of assaulting others.” The
district court also found that the county had proved by clear and convincing evidence “that
there exists a substantial likelihood that Mr. Adams will engage in acts capable of inflicting
serious physical harm on another in the future.”
Third, the district court considered wh ether Adams had established by clear and
convincing evidence that a less restrictive treatment program is available. The district court
initially recognized that the expert testimony conflicted on the appr opriate placement for
Adams. Dr. Gilbertson recommended the Minnesota Security Hospital in St. Peter as “the
most appropriate placement” for Adams because he believes “the issue is public safety.”
The district court summarized Dr. Gilbertson’s testimony: “Only the doors at St. Peter are
actually locked,” and that “[a]t the 24/7 fa cilities, the doors are alarmed and workers are
present to [e]nsure that patie nts remain supervised in the facility, but the doors are not
actually locked.”
In contrast, Dr. Pascucci opined that “there are less restrictive alternative
placements” for Adams because a less secure setting will meet his treatment needs so long
as it is “a locked residentia l placement with 24-hour staffing.” Dr. Pascucci agreed that
“locked” in a community treatment progra m meant “alarmed doors, windows, beds and
24/7 monitoring/supervision, not a facility where the doors are actually locked at all times.”

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The district court found that “the only place where [Adams] has demonstrated a
prolonged period of psychiatric stability” is the Anoka Treatment Center, but “this facility
is no longer appropriate because it is an acute, i.e. short te rm, care facility.” Thus, the
district court found that “St. Peter is the only appropriate l ong term care facility that has
been identified as an alternative facility that meets the above stated needs.”
The district court’s March initial orde r committed Adams to the commissioner of
human services as a person who is mentally ill and dangerous to the public, directed
placement at a secure treatment facility, “whi ch by statutory definition is the Minnesota
Security Hospital at St. Peter,” and required that a follow-up treatment report be filed, as
well as set the case for a review hearing.
Adams remained at the Anoka Treatment Center pending his review hearing. In May
2019, Dr. Stephanie Bruss, an examiner for the Minnesota Security Hospital, submitted a
60-day evaluation report in which she stated that Adams continues to be a person who is
mentally ill and dangerous. At Adams’s reque st, the district court appointed a second
examiner, Dr. Tyler Dority, who submitted a re port also stating that Adams continues to
be a person who is mentally ill and dangerous.
At the July 2019 review hearing, the district court heard testimony from Drs. Bruss
and Dority, an Anoka Treatment Center soci al worker, and Adams. The district court
received 15 exhibits, including written reports by both examiners, Dr. Bruss’s risk
assessment completed in May 2019, and Anoka Treatment Center progress notes.
In September 2019, the district court issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
order (September final order). The district court found that clear and convincing evidence

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established that Adams continues to be mentally ill and dangerous and that he has “engaged
in an overt act causing or attempting to cause serious physical harm to another and is likely
to [do so] again in the future .” The district court also fo und that available community
treatment “would not appropriately address [Adams’s] mental illness and would not reduce
the . . . risk to the public.” On the other hand, the district court found that clear and
convincing evidence showed that the security hospital “can provide appropriate treatment,
structure, and supervision for” Adams and foun d “there is no lesser restrictive alternative
to indeterminate commitment to Minnesota Security Hospital available to” Adams. Finally,
the district court committed Adams “to the Mi nnesota Security Hospital as a person who
is mentally ill and dangerous to the public for an indeterminate period of time.”
Adams appeals.
D E C I S I O N
A district court may commit an individu al as mentally ill or mentally ill and
dangerous. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subds. 13, 17 (2018); Minn. Stat. § 253B.13, subd. 1
(2018); Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 3 (2018). An individual is mentally ill if they have an
“organic disorder of the brain or a substantial psychiatric disorder” that poses a substantial
likelihood of physical harm to self or others. Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13. An
individual is mentally ill and dangerous if he or she meets the elements of mentally ill and
“presents a clear danger to the safety of others” showed by “an overt act causing or
attempting to cause serious physical harm to another” and “there is a substantial likelihood
that the person will engage in acts capable of inflicting serious physical harm on another.”
Id., subd. 17.

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When the county petitions fo r commitment alleging that an individual is mentally
ill and dangerous, a district court conducts an initial hearing under Minn. Stat. § 253B.18,
subd. 1. If, based on evidence received at the hearing, the district court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and dangerous, the district court
“shall commit the person to a secure treatment facility or to a treatment facility willing to
accept the patient under commitment.” Minn. St at. § 253B.18, subd. 1(a). But if the
“patient establishes by clear and convincing evidence that a less restrictive treatment
program is available that is consistent with the patient’s treatment needs and the
requirements of public safety,” then the district court must place the patient in a less
restrictive treatment program (less-restrictive-alternative provision). Id.
If the district court commits a patient to a secure treatment facility, then the court
must conduct a review hearing “to make a fi nal determination as to whether the person
should remain committed as a person who is mentally ill and dangerous to the public.” Id.,
subd. 2(a) (2018). The treatment facility must provide the co urt with a treatment report
within 60 days after commitment. Id. If the district court finds, based on the review hearing,
that the patient continues to be mentally ill and dangerous, then the court “shall order
commitment of the proposed patient for an indeterminate period of time.” Id., subd. 3. After
indeterminate commitment, the district court may transfer, provisionally discharge, or
discharge the patient, as provided in section 253B.18. Id.
On appeal from an order of indetermin ate commitment, this court reviews the
district court’s findings of fact for clear error and “[t]he record is viewed in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s decision.” In re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995).

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“Where a district court is presented with co nflicting expert testimony as to the patient’s
treatment, the discretion accorded to the dist rict court takes on special significance, and
will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous.” In re Dirks, 530 N.W.2d 207, 211 (Minn.
App. 1995). “It is within the province of the trial court to resolve any conflicting evidence.”
In re Clemons , 494 N.W.2d 519, 520 (Minn. App. 19 93). Appellate courts defer to the
district court’s credibility determinations. Knops, 536 N.W.2d at 620. We review questions
of statutory interpretation de novo. Irwin v. Goodno , 686 N.W.2d 878, 880 (Minn. App.
2004).
I. The district court did not err in its interpretation of the less-restrictive-
alternative provision in Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 1(a).

Adams does not dispute the district court’s determination that he is mentally ill and
dangerous nor does he challenge any of the district court’s fa ctual findings related to this
determination. Rather, Adams ar gues that the district court erred when it interpreted the
less-restrictive-alternative pr ovision in subdivision 1(a) to require clear and convincing
evidence that an alternative treatment program be availabl e “at this time” and willing to
accept appellant. The county argues that the district court correctly interpreted and applied
the statute.
Both parties rely on the language of th e less-restrictive-alternative provision in
Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 1(a), which states:
If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
proposed patient is a person who is mentally ill and dangerous
to the public, it shall commit the person to a secure treatment
facility or to a treatment facility willing to accept the patient
under commitment. The court sh all commit the patient to a
secure treatment facility unless the patient establishes by clear

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and convincing evidence that a less restrictive treatment
program is available that is consistent with the patient’s
treatment needs and the requirements of public safety.

(Emphasis added.) Adams argues that the district court erroneously interpreted “available,”
even though Adams does not suggest a different definition of “available.” Adams appears
to argue that because he offered clear and co nvincing evidence of th e existence of a less
restrictive treatment program, he satisfied hi s burden under subdivision 1(a). The county
argues that subdivision 1(a) requires the patient to prove, first, that a less restrictive
alternative exists and is “willing to accept the patient under commitment,” as stated in the
sentence before the less-restrictive-alternativ e provision. Second, the county argues that
subdivision 1(a) requires “clear and convinci ng evidence that a less restrictive treatment
program is available that is consistent with the patient’s treatment needs and the
requirements of public safety.”
The goal of statutory interpretation is to “e ffectuate the intent of the legislature.”
State v. Koenig , 666 N.W.2d 366, 372 (Minn. 2003). We first determine “whether the
statute’s language on its face is clear and unambiguous.” State v. Carufel, 783 N.W.2d 539,
542 (Minn. 2010). In doing so, we give words and phrases “their plain and ordinary
meaning” and may consider dictionary definitions. Hince v. O’Keefe, 632 N.W.2d 577, 582
(Minn. 2001); Carufel, 783 N.W.2d at 542. We may also consider the disputed language
in the context of the statutory provision , as well as related statutory schemes. State v.
Struzyk, 869 N.W.2d 280, 287 (Minn. 2015) (“We read and cons true a statute as a whole
and interpret each section in light of th e surrounding sections to avoid conflicting
interpretations.”). If the statutory language is unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning.

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In re Commitment of Fugelseth , 907 N.W.2d 248, 254 (Min n. App. 2018) (quotation
omitted), review denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2018).
Because section 253B.18 does not define “available,” we refer to a dictionary
definition to help us understand its common meaning. Hince, 632 N.W.2d at 582; Carufel,
783 N.W.2d at 542. “Available” is defined as “present and ready for use.” The American
Heritage Dictionary 123 (5th ed. 2011). The parties suggest no other reasonable definition
of “available,” thus, we find the less-restric tive-alternative provision to be unambiguous.
And because subdivision 1(a) st ates, “is available,” we conc lude that the legislature
intended “available” to be proved in the pres ent tense. Thus, the plain meaning of the
less-restrictive-alternative pr ovision requires clear and co nvincing evidence that the
alternative program is “present and ready for use” at the time of commitment, rather than
at some point in the future.
We agree with the county that this interpretation of “available” fits with the rest of
the language in subdivision 1(a) and give s effect to the legislature’s intent. The
less-restrictive-alternative provision specifically states that the patient must offer clear and
convincing evidence that the alternative treatment program “is consistent with the patient’s
treatment needs and the requirements of public safety.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 1(a)
(emphasis added). Because the alternative treatment program must have qualities that meet
the patient’s needs and public-safety requirements, availability at the time of commitment
must be proved. Also, the sentence precedi ng the less-restrictive-alternative provision
states that a district court must commit a mentally ill and dangerous person to a secure
treatment facility “or to a treatment facility willing to accept the patient under

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commitment.” Id. (emphasis added). Because the trea tment facility must be “willing to
accept the patient under commitment,” the treatment facility must be available at the time
of commitment.
Adams makes three additional arguments that we will discuss in turn. First, Adams
argues that by requiring him to “prove an alternative placement during the pendency of the
MI&D commitment,” the district court made “an inappropriate and unnecessary addition
to the plain-language” of subdivision 1(a). We disagree because subdivision 1(a)’s
language specifically requires that a less restrictive treatment alternative “is available” and
“willing to accept” the patient. Thus, the district court did not add language to subdivision
1(a).
Second, Adams argues that “the legislature could not have intended to have the less
restrictive treatment program language read so narrowly.” Adams contends that requiring
him to prove the availability of a less restrictive placement alternative at the same time that
his mentally ill and dangerous petition is pending, is “abs urd and unreasonable” and
“impossible.” Adams is correct that “[c]ourts sh ould construe a statute to avoid absurd or
unjust consequences.” Hince, 632 N.W.2d at 582. But the district court’s interpretation
does not create an absurd result. Instead, its interpretation of the less-restrictive-alternative
provision gives meaning to the statutory re quirement that the treatment program “is
consistent with the patient’s treatment needs and the requirements of public safety.” Minn.
Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 1(a). A less restrictive alternative must be able to meet Adams’s
treatment needs, which includes the needs associated with being committed as mentally ill
and dangerous.

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The county argues that the less-restric tive-alternative provision for a patient
committed as mentally ill and dangerous “close ly parallels” a simila r provision in Minn.
Stat. § 253D.07, subd. 3 (2018), which gov erns commitments for sexually dangerous
persons (SDP) or persons with a sexual psychopathic personality (SPP). Subdivision three
states that upon a district court’s determinat ion that a person is either SDP or SPP, “the
court shall commit the person to a secure treatment facility unless the person establishes
by clear and convincing evidence that a less restrictive treatm ent program is available, is
willing to accept the respondent under commitmen t, and is consistent with the person’s
treatment needs and requirements of public sa fety.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.07, subd. 3. The
county argues this comparison shows that the “legislature intended” the mentally ill and
dangerous and “SDP/SPP commitments to be treated similarly” because both recognize the
“unique treatment and security needs” of a committed individual. We agree that the
analogy to the SDP/SPP statutes is persuasive and supports our view of the plain meaning
of subdivision 1(a).
Third, Adams argues that the mentally ill and dangerous pe tition prevented him
from locating a “willing placemen t,” record eviden ce shows that there were “viable
alternative placements” before the petition was filed, and that the county’s efforts to locate
an alternative placement stopped after the petition was filed. We are not persuaded. Adams
overlooks that the district court must commit the patient to a secure treatment facility or a
treatment facility “willing to accept the patient under commitment.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.18,
subd. 1(a). This language plainly requires that the treatment facility’s acceptance must be
for the patient “under commitmen t.” As for the county’s effort s to seek an alternative

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placement for Adams, it is true that placeme nt efforts stopped after the county filed
Adams’s petition. But record ev idence establishes that, before the petition was filed, the
county had applied to at least 20 and as many as 40 different treatment facilities on Adams’s
behalf. In fact, one treatment facility accepted Adams, but he declined because the Duluth
location was “too far away.”
We recognize, as did the district court, that Adams faced several barriers that may
have prevented his placement in a community treatment pr ogram. Adams has a criminal
history that includes convictions for assault and damage to property. Dr. Pascucci and Dr.
Gilbertson testified that Adams has fixed delusions, even when medically compliant, and
that his history of medication noncomplian ce is concerning. The district court also
acknowledged that Adams had a lack of opti ons “[d]ue to policy decisions made by the
State,” and observed that “only a limited number of corporate foster care facilities exist.”
While these barriers to commu nity placement are troublin g, they do not affect our
interpretation of the less-rest rictive-alternative provisi on in Minn. Stat. § 253B.18,
subd. 1(a).
We conclude that the district court did not err in its interpretation or application of
the less-restrictive-alternative provision when it determined that the provision required
Adams to prove, by clear and co nvincing evidence, that an alternative treatment program
must be willing to accept him under his co mmitment as mentally ill and dangerous,
available at the time of co mmitment, and provide a progra m that is “consistent with”
Adams’s “treatment needs and the requirements of public safety.” See Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.18, subd. 1(a).

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II. The record evidence supports the distri ct court’s determination that Adams
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a less restrictive
alternative is available.

Adams argues that he established by clear and convincing evidence that “a willing
less restrictive treatment program was available to him.” The county argues that the district
court’s finding that no alternative treatment program is “willing to take” Adams is
supported by record evidence.
We agree with the county’s view of the record evidence. First, we acknowledge that,
in its March initial order, some of the distri ct court’s language was less than clear. The
district court found that Anoka Treatment Center was “no longer an appropriate placement”
because it offers only short-term acute care that Adams no longer required. The district
court found that “St. Peter is an appropriate placement, but it is also the most restrictive
placement available.” In the next sentence, the district court found that “a corporate foster
care facility with 24/7 supervision and alarme d doors, at a minimum, with person[nel]
capable of making sure that Mr. Adams takes his medications is necessary for his protection
and the protection of the public, would be most appropriate.”
But Adams’s argument that the district c ourt’s findings are clearly erroneous or
somehow yield the conclusion that alternative treatment is available does not hold up when
we consider the rest of the paragraph. The district court also found that no evidence
established that corporate foster care “that meets these criteria [and] that is willing at this
point to take Mr. Adams exists.” The district court added, “I n fact, the evidence is to the
contrary”; “[a]t this point, as a matter of f act, St. Peter is the only viable long term
placement option available.”

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The district court’s determination relie d on testimony from several social workers
and other witnesses who tried to find an a lternative treatment program for Adams. For
example, an Anoka County soci al worker in the adult mental -health unit testified that he
had worked with Adams since September 201 6, had monitored Adams’s progress, and
assisted with discharge planni ng. He testified that he cons idered over 20 placements for
Adams, and agreed that location, Adams’s criminal history, and financial assistance were
barriers to finding a placement. The social worker testified th at a facility in Duluth was
willing to accept Adams, but Adams refused “because it was too far away.” When asked
why Adams could deny placemen t at the Duluth f acility, the social wo rker replied, “We
would want him on board as much as possible to make it a successful . . . program.”1
An Anoka County waiv er supervisor also testified that she tried to locate an
appropriate treatment facility for Adams. As summarized by the district court, the waiver
supervisor testified that “at least 40 plac ement sites were atte mpted for provisional
discharge of [Adams], which is more than normal” and that “[m]ultiple agencies declined
to accept [Adams] for various reasons.” She ag reed that no appropriate facility accepted
Adams.2

1 An Anoka Treatment Center social worker testified that she “work[ed] with Mr. Adams
to eliminate barriers to discharge” and helped in his placement effort s. As stated by the
district court, the social worker testified that “any placement must be a good fit” for Adams
because he “has threatened to leave any structured placement he would move to.”

2 For example, the waiver superv isor testified that James Inc. showed interest in Adams,
but the county rejected the placement because it was a senior assisted-living facility.

Adams offered testimony from a nonprofit program director, who stated that she
“researched placements and made placement re ferrals” for Adams. She testified, as

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It is true that one examiner recommende d that Adams be placed in a community
treatment program. But Dr. Pascucci’s opinion that Adams should be placed in an alarmed
treatment facility conflicted w ith testimony from Dr. Gilberts on. When expert testimony
conflicts, we defer to the district court’s as sessment of credibility and weight assigned to
the evidence. See Clemons, 494 N.W.2d at 520; see also In re Civil Commitment of Stone,
711 N.W.2d 831, 839 (Minn. App. 2006) (“The district court ac ts within its discretion in
determining the credibility of expert testim ony, and we defer to those assessments.”),
review denied (Minn. June 20, 2006).
Indeed, Dr. Pascucci’s testimony provided ample grounds for the district court to
question the weight given to her placement opinion. Dr. Pa scucci agreed that Adams still
has delusions even when medi cally compliant and that his “lack of insight [into his
delusions] remains a risk factor.” Dr. Pascucci also opined that Adam s was “at risk to be
dangerous to other people in the future.”3 And Dr. Pascucci agre ed on cross-examination
that the security hospital would provide the care that Adams needs.

summarized by the district court, that she was looking at “pla cements with 24/7
supervision” such as “corporate foster care and customized living.” She also testified that
her placement search stopped because of the me ntally ill and dangerous petition, and that
there are still “unexplored placement options available.” While this supports Adams’s
claim that an alternative treatment program may exist, it does not affect our analysis, which
considers whether record evidence supports the district court’ s findings and defers to the
district court to weigh the evidence. See In re Civil Commitment of Spicer , 853 N.W.2d
803, 807 (Minn. App. 2014); Clemons, 494 N.W.2d at 520.

3 Adams points out that Dr. Pascucci observed that Adams has had “behavioral control for
about a year” and has shown “an increased co operation with supervision and treatment.”
But the district court found, after hearing from both examiners at the review hearing, that
Adams’s “demonstration of some behavior self-control while at the restricted and artificial
environment at [Anoka Treatment Center] is not determinative on the issue of whether he

17
Additionally, Dr. Gilbertson was not alone in his opinion that Adams should be
committed to the Minnesota Secu rity Hospital. Adams’s brie f to this court omits any
discussion of the testimony by the two examin ers at the review hearing. Dr. Bruss’s
testimony, as found by the district court, “r ejected lesser restrictive alternatives to
committing [Adams] to the Minnesota Secu rity Hospital and opi ned the Minnesota
Security Hospital best aligns with [Adams’s] present trea tment and supervision needs.”
The district court also found that Dr. Dority opined that Adams “would not be cooperative
with less restrictive alternatives to commitment.”
Based on all of the evidence, the district court determined that Adams requires a
facility with locked, not alarmed, doors, and that the security hospital in St. Peter was the
only locked facility willing to accept Adams. We conclude that this determination is not
clearly erroneous. See Clemons, 494 N.W.2d at 519 (affirming commitment to a secured
hospital as mentally ill and dangerous and where appellant had a violent criminal history,
was non-compliant with medications, and had limited family support and insight); In re
Schauer, 450 N.W.2d 194, 197-98 (Minn. App. 1990) (affirming commitment to a secured
hospital as mentally ill and dangerous where appellant had exhibited violent conduct, had
been non-compliant with medication in a stressful environment, and was unlikely to report
a “deterioration” in his mental condition).
Adams also argues on appeal that the dist rict court erred in rejecting his “serial
commitment” option. Adams argued to the district court that it should commit Adams as

remains mentally ill and danger ous or would have appropriate self-control in a less
restrictive environment.”

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mentally ill, instead of menta lly ill and dangerous, as a less restrictive alternative that
would allow him to be placed in a commun ity treatment program. As described by the
district court, an order committing Adams as mentally ill would be for six months, could
be extended up to one year, and could be followed by subsequent petitions.
In the March initial order, the district c ourt rejected Adams’s serial-commitment
argument as flawed because Adams “has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that
a facility exists that would meet his needs and protect the safety of the community.” The
district court relied on evidence that Adams has a “history of medication non-compliance”
that “leads to violent outbursts,” and theref ore requires “24/7 supe rvision and alarmed
doors, at a minimum, with personnel capable of making sure that [he] takes his medications
and does not leave the facility unmonitored.” The district court also found that there is no
facility that “has been identified” and that “meets the above stated needs” except the
security hospital in St. Peter.
In the September final order, the district court also rejected Adams’s serial-
commitment argument, reasoning that it “is not sufficient to meet [Adams’s] long-term
treatment needs and would not address concerns of public safety.” The district court
summarized the evidence: Adams’s “history reflects his ne ed for the level of supervision
that is only available under a commitment as a mentally ill and dangerous person.”
We conclude that record evidence supports the district court’s determination that
Adams did not show by clear and convincing evid ence that a less restrictive alternative is
available, and thus we affirm.
Affirmed.