In re the Marriage of: Tammy Kay Holleman, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1766

In re the Marriage of: Tammy Kay Holleman, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Carlo Raphael Holleman,
Appellant.

Filed March 22, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Larkin, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19AV-FA-17-2354

James S. Carlson, Burnsville, Minnesota (for respondent)

Kathleen P. O’Connor, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
In this marital -dissolution case, a ppellant-husband challenges the district court’s
denial of his motion to reopen the spousal-maintenance provisions of a default judgment

2
and decree of dissolution based on an alleged fraud upon the court. He also challenges the
district court’s order finding him in contempt for failure to pay spousal maintenance as
required by the default judgment . We conclude that respondent -wife committed a fraud
upon the court by failing to fully disclose her business interests and associated income
when requesting spousal maintenance. We therefore reverse the district court ’s denial of
appellant’s motion to reopen the judgment, reverse the provisions of the default judgment
regarding spousal maintenance, and remand for a new trial on the issue of spousal
maintenance. Because the contempt order was based on appellant’s failure to pay spousal
maintenance as set forth in the default judgment and we reverse th at portion of the
judgment, we also reverse the contempt order.
FACTS
Appellant Carlo Raphael Holleman (husband) and respondent Tammy Kay
Holleman (wife) were married in 1998. On March 30, 2017, wife petitioned for dissolution
of marriage. She requested spousal maintenance of at least $4,000 per month. In support
of that request, wife stated that her “income and property are not sufficient to meet [her]
reasonable needs” and that husband’s “income and property are sufficient to meet [his]
reasonable needs.” Wife asserted that she was employed a s a real -estate agent, that her
monthly gross income “varie [d],” and that “her income for 2016 was approximately
$32,000.” She a lso indicated that she “does not know [husband’s] exact gross monthly
income but believes it to be in excess of $16,000.”
Husband did not respond to wife’s petition for dissolution. Wife eventually
requested a default hearing. The district court held the default hearing on October 23,

3
2017. Wife appeared in person with counsel; husband did not appear. That same day, the
district court found husband in default, entered a default judgment, and issued a decree and
dissolution of marriage. In its findings of fact, the district court adopted wife’s allegations
from her petition almost verbatim. The district court found that wife’s “income and
property are not sufficient to meet [her] reasonable needs,” that husband’s “income and
property are sufficient to meet [his] reasonable needs and contribute to the reasonable needs
of [wife],” that wife’s “gross income for 2016 was approximately $32,000,” and that wife
“does not know [husband’s] exact gross monthly income but has good reason to believe[]
it to be in excess of $16,000.” The district court ordered husband to pay permanent spousal
maintenance of $4,000 per month to wife, consistent with wife’s request.
On October 31, 2018, wife moved the district court to find husband in contempt of
court for nonpayment of spousal maintenance. She alleged that husband had not made any
of the spousal -maintenance payments ordered by the district court . In support of her
motion, wife submitted an affidavit and various documents detailing her an d husband’s
finances. The district court scheduled a contempt hearing for January 23, 2019.
On January 9, 2019, husband moved to reopen the October 2017 default judgment
and to terminate or modify his spousal-maintenance obligation. He alleged a “fraud upon
the court” as the basis for relief. He noted that, in her petition for dissolution, wife
represented to the court that her gross income from 2016 was $32,000, which came from
her employment as a real -estate agent. Husband asserted that wife failed to disclose that
she had a cleaning business, which provided wife with another source of income. Husband
submitted documents in an attempt to demonstrate his inability to pay spousal maintenance

4
as required under the default judgment and asked the district court to deny wife’s contempt
motion.
The contempt hearing was held on January 23, 2019. At the beginning of the
hearing, the district court took note of husband’s motion to reopen the October 2017 default
judgment, but the court stated that it was no t prepared to address the motion at that time.
The district court issued an order finding husband in contempt of court. It found that
husband “is able to pay $4,000.00 per month in spousal maintenance, but chooses not to
do so.” The district court ordered husband to serve 45 days in jail, but the court stayed the
jail time for three years, on the condition that husband make the monthly spousal -
maintenance payments on time and make payments to cure the arrearages.
Husband moved for amended findings or a new trial. He requested that the district
court determine his monthly gross income available for spousal maintenance and find that
he is unable to pay $4,000 per month. Alternatively, husband requested a new trial, in part
because the district court declined to decide his motion to reopen the October 2017 default
judgment.
On August 28, 2019, the district court issued an order denying husband’s motion.
It determined that husband had failed to establish wife’s alleged fraud upon the court ,
reasoning that the evidence supported wife’s assertion that her 2016 gross income was
$32,000. The district court also determined that there was no legal or factual basis to amend
its contempt order or to hold a new hearing.
Husband appealed to this court. In an order accepting jurisdiction over husband’s
appeal, this court determined:

5
Although the August 28, 2019 order does not expressly deny
[husband’s] January 9, 2019 motion to reopen the default
judgment and decree based on fraud upon the court, the order
in effect ruled on the motion, because the court concluded that
[husband] had not established fraud or misrepresentation by
[wife]. To the extent that the August 28, 2019 order denied
[husband’s] motion to reopen the default judgment on the
ground of fraud u pon the court, it is a final and appealable
order.
This court also determined that it is appropriate to review the district court’s contempt
orders in the interests of judicial economy. Because wife did not file a brief, this court
ordered the appeal to proceed under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03 (providing that if a
respondent fails to file a brief, the case shall be determined on the merits).
DECISION
I.
Husband challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to reopen the October
2017 default judgment and decree of dissolution. “A decree of dissolution of marriage or
of legal separation is final when entered, subject to the right of appeal.” Minn . Stat.
§ 518.145, subd. 1 (2020). But a court may relieve a party of a marital dissolution judgment
and decree under certain circumstances, including a “fraud upon the court.” Id., subd. 2
(2020).
Although a motion to reopen a judgment for ordinary fraud must be brought within
one year of the judgment, no such limit applies to motions to reopen for a fraud upon the
court. See id. (providing that the subdivision does not limit the court’s power to set aside
a judgment for a fraud upon the court); see also Doering v. Doering, 629 N.W.2d 124, 130
(Minn. App. 2001) (holding that ordinary fraud is the proper standard for motions brought

6
within one year of the judgment ), review denied (Minn. Sept. 11, 2001) ; cf. Maranda v.
Maranda, 449 N.W.2d 158, 16 5 (Minn. 1989) (providing that a fraud on the court
“eliminates the time restriction for bringing a motion to vacate a judgment”).
In a marital-dissolution case, a fraud on the court is generally described as “an
intentional course of material misrepresentation or non -disclosure, having the result of
misleading the court and opposing counsel and making the prope rty settlement grossly
unfair.” Maranda, 449 N.W.2d at 165. “[T]he difference between fraud and fraud on the
court is primarily a difference of degree rather than kind.” Id. The standard for
demonstrating a fraud on the court is more strenuous than the standard for demonstrating
ordinary fraud. Doering, 629 N.W.2d at 129.
We review the district court’s decision whether to reopen a judgment based on a
fraud on the court for an abuse of discretion. Thompson v. Thompson , 739 N.W.2d 424,
428 (Minn. App . 2007). A district court does not abuse its discretion when there is
evidence to support its decision. Id. “The moving party bears the burden of establishing a
basis to reopen the judgment and decree.” Id.
Husband alleges that wife committed a frau d on the court because she failed to
disclose a primary source of her income—her cleaning business—when requesting spousal
maintenance. According to husband, this nondisclosure was material because it impacted
the district court’s decision to award permanent spousal maintenance of $4,000 per month
to wife.
The record supports husband’s contention. In her petition for dissolution, wife
represented that she was employed as a real-estate agent and that her gross income for 2016

7
was approximately $32,000. The district court adopted those findings in its October 2017
default judgment. Wife’s subsequent filings with the district court during the contempt
proceedings indicated that at the time of the dissolution proceedings, wife was self-
employed as a real-estate agent but that she also received income from her own cleaning
business. Moreover, those documents reveal that wife’s gross income from 2016 was not
$32,000. Instead, wife’s form 1040 for 2016 lists her gross income as $18,469, which was
entirely from business income. According to wife’s Schedule C forms, the net profit from
wife’s real-estate business was $3,726, and the net profit from her cleaning business was
$14,743, resulting in a gross income of $18,469.1
In rejecting husband’s assertion that wife committed a fraud on the court by failing
to disclose the existence of her cleaning business, the district court reasoned that wife “did
have a cleaning business, but her profit and loss statements from 2016 and 2017, as well
as her tax returns support the finding she earned $32,000 total ,” referring to the district
court’s finding in the default judgment that wife’s “gross income for 2016 was
approximately $32,000.” Because wife’s form 1040 for 2016 shows that her gross income
for that year was $18,469, the district court’s reasoning is flawed.
In sum, wife did not fully disclose all relevant facts regarding her income when she
petitioned for dissolution and requested spousal maintenance. Her actual gross income
from 2016 differed significantly from the amount she listed in her petition for dissolution,

1 The net profits listed on the Schedule C forms are added together and entered on the form
1040 as “business income” in the gross-income section.

8
and she failed to disclose her cleaning business, which was the principal source of that
income.
Even though wife’s gross income from 2016 was actually less than $32,000 as found
in the dissolution judgment , her failure to disclose the existence of her cleaning business
was not harmless. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring courts to ignore harmless error). The
district court must consider all relevant factors when determining an award of spousal
maintenance. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2020). Those factors include “the financial
resources of the party seeking maintenance” and that party’s “ability to meet needs
independently”; “the time necessary to acquire sufficient edu cation or training to enable
the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment”; “the standard of living
established during the marriage”; “the duration of the marriage”; “the loss of earnings,
seniority, retirement benefits, and other employmen t opportunities forgone by the spouse
seeking spousal maintenance”; “the age, and the physical and emotional condition of the
spouse seeking maintenance”; “the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought
to meet needs while meeting those of the s pouse seeking maintenance”; and “the
contribution of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation, or appreciation in
the amount or value of the marital property.” Id., subd. 2(a)-(h).
The fact that wife was self-employed and had an additional cleaning business that
generated the majority of her income was relevant to several of th ose statutory factors,
most notably, wife’s financial resources and her ability to meet her needs independently.
Thus, w ife’s misrepresentation affected proper consideration of the statutory spousal -
maintenance factors and prevented an informed decision regarding spousal maintenance.

9
In addition to wife’s misrepresentation of her 2016 gross income, husband identifies
several other concerns regarding the district court’s October 2017 default judgment and
argues that those concerns support reopening the default judgment based on wife’s fraud
on the court. Specifically, husband argues that the district court adopted the allegations in
wife’s petition in their entirety, entered the default judgment on the same day as the default
hearing, did not review the dissolution decree before entering the default judgment, and
did not adequately consider the spousal-maintenance factors set forth in Minn. Stat.
§ 518.552, subd. 2.
Husband cites to Manore v. Manore, 408 N.W.2d 883 (Minn. App. 1987), in support
of his arguments. In Manore, the wife petitioned for dissolution of marriage and obtained
a default judgment. 408 N.W.2d at 884-85. The district court adopted the wife’s proposed
findings and conclusions in their entirety and issued the decree of dissolution on the same
day as the default hearing. Id. at 885. The judgment included an award of spousal
maintenance to the wife. Id. The husband later moved to vacate the default judgment
based on fraud on the court, but the district court denied the motion. Id. at 885-86.
This court reversed, concluding that vacation of the judgment was necessary. Id. at
886. We noted that th e district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law did not
demonstrate the in-depth inquiry of the spousal-maintenance factors required under Minn.
Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2. Id. at 887. Also, the wife had failed to provide evidence of her
specific financial needs and resources, and that failure “was compounded by the [district]
court’s blanket acceptance of that lack of record and [by] the [district] court’s unmodified

10
adoption of [wife’s] proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Id. at 887-88. We
summarized:
When the [district] court was presented with vague and
inadequate proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, it
had a duty to make appropriate inquiries to insure compliance
with statutory requirements and to modify the prop osed
findings and conclusions to reflect consideration of the
statutory factors. The fact that a dissolution is secured through
a default ju dgment does not permit the [district] court to
abdicate its responsibilities under the law. The result here is a
judgment that serves neither the interests of the parties nor the
interests of justice.
Id. at 888.
Our reasoning from Manore applies here. First, the district court adopted wife’s
allegations in her petition in their entirety , and the district court’s findings recite wife’s
allegations nearly verbatim. Second, the district court entered the default judgment and
issued the decree of dissolution on the same day as th e default hearing. Third, and most
importantly, the record does no t indicate that the district court correctly considered the
relevant statutory factors as required under Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2.
For example, in its findings of fact in the default judgment, the district court noted
that wife’s “income and property are not sufficient to meet [her] reasonable needs” and that
husband’s “income and property are sufficient to meet [his] reasonable needs and
contribute to the reasonable need s of [wife].” Those findings were taken nearly verbatim
from wife’s petition and were stated in a conclusory manner, without supportive , specific
findings regarding each party’s reasonable needs. In its conclusions of law, the district
court determined that its spousal -maintenance award was supported by “[t]he parties’

11
relative ear ning capacities,” “[t]he parties’ lifestyles,” husband’s “ability to support
himself,” and “[t]he property settlement as set forth herein.”
We have concluded that the parties’ relative earning capacity was not correctly
determined by the court, as a res ult of wife’s failure to disclose her cleaning business and
associated income. Although the district court said its spousal-maintenance award was
supported by the parties’ lifestyles, it did not make any findings regarding the parties’
lifestyles or the standard of living established during the marriage. And the proper
consideration is not simply whether husband has the ability to support himself, but whether
he has the ability to meet his needs “while m eeting those of the spouse seeking
maintenance.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(g).
Moreover, the district court’s reliance on the property “settlement” set forth in the
default judgment is compromised by w ife’s failure to disclos e her cleaning business and
the associated income stream.2 The property distribution awards husband “[a]ll right, title
and interest in and to the business, Holleman Hauling.” But the property distribution does
not include wife’s cleaning business, which was effectively awarde d to wife as a result of
her nondisclosure. Thus, wife’s nondisclosure impacted the district court’s property
distribution, which in turn was a basis for its spousal-maintenance award.
Furthermore, the district court did not mention other relevant factors, such as wife’s
ability to meet her needs independently, the duration of the marriage , and wife’s age and
physical and emotional condition. See id., subd. 2 (a), (d), (f). Lastly, in explaining the

2 We note that there is no indication in the record that the district court’s property
distribution in the default judgment was based on a “settlement” between the parties.

12
district court’s award of permanent spousal maintenanc e of $4,000 per month to wife, the
default judgment states, “this agreement and stipulation is fair and equitable” and that “full
disclosure of each party’s financial circumstances has occurred.” The record belies that
explanation. The record does not in dicate that the spousal-maintenance award was based
on an agreement or stipulation of the parties , and husband has established that the award
was not based on full disclosure of wife’s financial circumstances.
On this record, we are concerned that the district court did not make appropriate
inquiries to develop a record adequate to address wife’s requested spousal maintenance or
to enable complete consideration of the required statutory factors. Instead, as was the case
in Manore, the district cour t seems to have engaged in a “blanket acceptance” of an
inadequately developed record and an “unmodified adoption” of wife’s proposed findings
and conclusions of law.
In Thompson, this court rejected a husband’s attempt to reopen a default judgment
based on an alleged fraud upon the court because the husband had failed to respond to the
wife’s discovery requests with information to “supplement wife’s admittedly limited
knowledge of the parties’ marital property,” the wife had provided the district court wi th
financial information “based on the best information that she had,” and the husband “did
not provide any evidence to rebut wife’s need for spousal maintenance.” 739 N.W.2d at
429.
But in this case, wife did not supply the district court with the best financial
information that she had . In fact, the record indicates that wife did not submit any
documents or testimony in support of her request for spousal maintenance at the default

13
hearing. Although wife eventually provided the district court her tax returns for 2016 and
2017, that submission occurred in November 2018, after she moved to find husband in
contempt. This record does not suggest that wife was incapable of providing the district
court with the necessary information about her cleaning business when she requested
spousal maintenance at the default hearing.
We note that “[i]n dissolution cases, the court sits as a third party, repr esenting all
of the citizens of the State of Minnesota to see that a fair property distribution is made.”
Maranda, 449 N.W.2d at 165. Parties to a dissolution matter have an obligation to ensure
that a district court’s decisions in the matter are fully informed.
Because the confidential relationship between the parties
creates an affirmative duty to disclose, nondisclosure is
sufficient to establish a breach of that duty, without evidence
of intent. Further, because the duty to make a full and fair
disclosure is an affirmative duty, there is no requirement that
the moving party show that he requested the information that
was not disclosed; the duty to disclose exists in the absence of
such a request.

Doering, 629 N.W.2d at 131. In this case, it is apparent that wife did not honor her
affirmative obligation to provide the district court with relevant full information at the time
of the dissolution proceeding.
In sum, we conclude that husband has estab lished a fraud upon the court. Wife’s
failure to disclose the existence of her cleaning business and the resulting income stream
misled the district court, impacted nearly all aspects of the spousal -maintenance
determination, and made the resulting permanent-spousal-maintenance award of $4 ,000
per month grossly unfair. And w ife’s fraudulent nondisclosure was exacerbated by the

14
district court’s blanket acceptance of wife’s allegations in her petition , the court’s failure
to make inquiries to develop an ade quate factual record, and the court’s failure to fully
consider the statutory factors for spousal maintenance. Thus, the district court abused its
discretion by denying husband’s motion to reopen the October 2017 default judgment.
We therefore reverse the spousal-maintenance provisions of the October 2017
default judgment and remand the case to the district court for a new trial on the issue of
spousal maintenance. See Minn. Stat. § 518.145 , subd. 2 (providing that “ the court may
relieve a party from a judgment and decree . . . and may order a new trial”). On remand ,
the district court shall permit the parties to develop a record that allows consideration of
all relevant statutory spousal -maintenance factors. See Manore, 408 N.W.2d at 888
(vacating the portion of the default judgment regarding maintenance and remanding for
reconsideration on an expanded record).
We recognize that husband contributed to this situation by failing to participate in
the dissolution action , which resulted in the default ju dgment, and that husband
exacerbated the situation by failing to move to reopen the default judgment until more than
one year later, after wife moved for a contempt finding. On remand, the district court is
not prevented from considering the imposition of costs or fees based on husband’s actions
or inactions. See Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2020) (indicating that a district court may
award fees, costs, and disbursements against a party who “unreasonably contributes to the
length or expense of the proceeding”).

15
II.
Husband also challenges the district court’s order finding him in contempt of court
for failure to pay spousal maintenance according to the terms of the default decree . “The
district court’s decision to invoke its contempt powers is subject to reversal for abuse of
discretion.” In re Welfare of Children of J.B., 782 N.W.2d 535, 538 (Minn. 2010).
The purpose of a civil contempt proceeding is to “secure compliance wi th an order
presumed to be reasonable,” and not to punish past misconduct. Hopp v. Hopp , 156
N.W.2d 212, 216 (Minn. 1968). Because we vacate the portion of the October 2017 default
judgment requiring husband to pay spousal maintenance , we cannot say that the spousal-
maintenance order was reasonable. Enforcement of that order therefore does not serve the
purpose of a civil contempt proceeding. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s
contempt order.
Reversed and remanded.