State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1770

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Louis Larell Osborne,
Appellant.

Filed July 20, 2020
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-16627

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jordan W. Rude , Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm, arguing
that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence recovered during a
search incident to his arrest. Because probable cause justified the arrest, we affirm.
FACTS
Around 1:00 a.m. on June 30, 2018, Officer Joshua Krienert of the Minneapolis
St. Paul Airport Police observed a white Chevrolet Traverse in the parking lot of a medical
clinic near the airport. The clinic was closed, and a sign prohibits parking outside of
business hours. Officer Krienert checked the license plate and learned that the owner was
a car rental agency ; he saw no indication that the vehicle was stolen. He approached the
vehicle, noting that it was unoccupied and unlocked.
Officer Krienert reported the vehicle to his partner, Officer Bradley Wingate, who
was conducting an overtime patrol in an unmarked car due to reports of increased thefts
from car rental facilities at the airport. Officer Wingate indicated that he had seen the same
vehicle earlier, with two occupants.
Officer Wingate maintained surveillance of the vehicle from a distance while
Officer Krienert went to the rental agency for more information. He spoke with a manager,
who informed him that the vehicle was a short -term rental that was three weeks overdue.
The manager indicated he was reporting the vehicle as stolen.
Officer Wingate resumed surveillance of the stolen vehicle, joined by Officer Noel
Nelson. Both officers were in uniform. At approximately 3:15 a.m., Officer Nelson saw

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a man get dropped off by the clinic parking lot and start walking toward the vehicle. He
reported the development and approached in his unmarked car; Officer Wingate
approached in a marked squad car from nearby . As the man neared the vehicle, both
officers saw the vehicle’s interior and exterior lights flash and then remain on, as though
somebody had used a key fob to unlock it. Since nobody else was in the vicinity, they
suspected the man had unlocked the vehicle. Officer Nelson exited his car, identified
himself as a police officer, and shouted to the man to stop. The man immediately changed
course by approximately 60 degrees to walk away from the vehicle and increased his speed
to a “brisk walk.” Officer Nelson pursued the man, repeating the command to stop, but the
man did not comply. Officer Wingate drove toward the man in his marked squad car, also
shouting for him to stop , then exited his car, pointed his firearm at th e man, and ordered
him to the ground. At that point, he complied.
Officer Wingate handcuffed the man and helped him to his feet. While searching
him, the officer recovered the keys to the stolen vehicle and saw a gun drop from the man’s
groin area to the ground. The man was identified as appellant Louis Osborne.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged O sborne with unlawful possession of a
firearm and receiving stolen property. Osborne moved the district court to suppress the
gun evidence, arguing that the search that yielded the gun was not a lawful search incident
to arrest because police lacked probable cause to suspect him of a crime. After an
evidentiary hearing at which all three officers testified, the district court denied the motion.
The court concluded that the officers had a reasonable basis for suspecting Osborne of
receiving stolen property when they saw him approach the vehicle, and his act of fleeing

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in response to police commands elevated that sus picion to probable cause, justifying the
arrest and incident search. Osborne thereafter waived a jury trial and submitted the firearm
charge to the district court on stipulated evidence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3.1
The district court found him guilty. Osborne appeals.
D E C I S I O N
When reviewing a pretrial order denying a motion to suppress evidence, we review
the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo . State
v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn. 2011). Whether particular circumstances establish
probable cause is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Dickey, 827 N.W.2d
792, 796 (Minn. App. 2013).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect against “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV ; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10 . A person who
has been lawfully arrested may be subjected to a warrantless search incident to the arrest.
State v. Bradley , 908 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn. App. 2018) . “A warrantless arrest is
reasonable if supported by probable cause.” State v. Williams , 794 N.W.2d 867, 871
(Minn. 2011). Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts would lead a “person of
ordinary care and prudence” to “ entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a specific
individual has committed a crime.” Id. (quotation omitted). In determining probable cause,
courts conduct an objective analysis of all the facts of the case. Id.

1 The state agreed to dismiss the stolen-property charge.

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The district court concluded that all of the circumstances taken together established
probable cause to suspect the three facts necessary to arrest Osborne for receiving stolen
property: (1) the vehicle was stolen, (2) Osborne possessed the vehicle, and (3) Osborne
knew that the vehicle was stolen. See Minn. Sta t. § 609.53, subd. 1 (2016). Osborne
challenges the probable-cause determination only as to the third element.
He first argues that the record does not support the district court’s pivotal finding
that he changed his direction and pace after Officer Nelson exited his car and identified
himself as a police officer. We disagree. Officer Nelson testified: “ As I pulled into the
airport clinic lot I got out of my car and I yelled at the person walking toward the car that
I was police, to stop,” at which point Osborne changed his path and began to walk faster.
Officer Nelson also testified that Osborne ignored multiple commands to stop. This
testimony amply supports the district court’s finding.
Osborne next asserts that his evasive conduct does not support a n inference that he
knew the vehicle was stolen. This argument is similarly unavailing. While not
determinative, a n individual’s “n ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in
determining reasonable suspicion.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S. Ct. 673,
676 (2000) . Flight from police, as the “ consummate act of evasion ,” is “certainly
suggestive” of wrongdoing , id., and may indicate consciousness of guilt, State v.
McDaniel, 777 N.W.2d 739, 746 (Minn. 2010).
We consider Osborne’s evasive conduct in light of the surrounding circumstances .
He was dropped off at 3:15 a.m. by a vehicle that left immediately . He walked directly
toward a stolen vehicle parked in the otherwise vacant parking lot of a closed medical

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clinic. He used a key fo b to unlock the stolen vehicle. When a uniformed police officer
identified himself and commanded Osborne to stop, he did not do so. But he did not ignore
the officer. Instead, he substantially changed course and increased his pace in an attempt
to evade the officer. Osborne’s conduct as a whole established probable cause to believe
that he knew the vehicle was stolen. Accordingly, Osborne has not demonstrated that the
district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.
Affirmed.