Benjamin Joseph Hill, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 8).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1773

Benjamin Joseph Hill, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed June 15, 2020
Reversed and remanded
Klaphake, Judge *

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-11-438

Thomas Hagler, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KLAPHAKE, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s denial of app ellant Benjamin Joseph Hill’s
petition for an order declaring eligibility for compensation based on exoneration under
Minn. Stat. § 590.11 (2018 & Supp. 2019), appellant argues that the district court erred in
concluding that he was not exonerated because the postconviction court did not grant him
a new trial on grounds consistent with innocence. Because there is evidence of factual
innocence, the postconviction court granted appellant a new trial on grounds consistent
with innocence, and appellant therefore was exonerated. W e reverse and remand.
D E C I S I O N
The Minnesota Incarceration and Exoneration Remedies Act (MIERA) provides
procedures for compensating certain individuals who were incarcerated and later released
after a court reversed t heir conviction. See Minn. Stat. §§ 611.362-.368 (2018 & Supp.
2019). “An individual can file a claim for compensation under MIERA only if he or she
first petitions a court for and receives an order certifying that he or she is eligible for
compensation based on exoneration under Minn. Stat. § 590.11.” Buhl v. State , 922
N.W.2d 435, 438 (Minn. App. 2019); see Minn. Stat. § 590.11.; see also Back v. State, 902
N.W.2d 23, 26 (Minn. 2017) ( stating that the “threshold determination under the
exoneration-compensation statute is whether an individual has been ‘ exonerated’”).
Whether a petitioner meets the statutory definition of “exonerated” under section 590.11
presents a legal question subject to d e novo review. Buhl, 922 N.W.2d at 438.

3
Prior to 2019, Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1, provided that a person was
“exonerated” if (1) a court of this state “ordered a new trial on grounds consistent with
innocence and the prosecutor dismissed the charges” and (2) “the time for appeal of the
order resulting in exoneration has expired or the order has been affirmed and is final. ”
Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1 (1)(ii), (2) ( 2018). Although section 590.11 did not define
“on grounds consistent with innocence,” see Minn. Stat. § 590.11 (2018), this court
interpreted it to mean “agrees with innocence,” Buhl, 922 N.W.2d at 43 6.
In 2019, the legislature amended Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1. 2019 Minn. Laws
1st Spec. Sess. ch. 5, art. 2, § 13, at 965-66. The statute now provides, in relevant part, that
“exonerated” means that (1) a court “ordered a new trial on grounds consistent with
innocence and the prosecutor dismissed all felony charges against the petitioner arising
from the same behavioral incident,” (2) “ the time for appeal of the order resulting in
exoneration has expired or the order has been affirmed and is final,” and (3) “60 days have
passed since the judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated, and the prosecutor has
not filed any felony charges a gainst the petitioner from the same behavioral incident. ”
Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(b)(1)(ii), (2) -(3) (Supp. 2019). The statute also now defines
“[o]n grounds consistent with innocence” as either
(1) exonerated through a pardon or sentence
commutation, based on factual innocence; or
(2) exonerated because the judgment of convictio n
was vacated or reversed, or a new trial was ordered, and
there is any evidence of factual innocence , whether it was
available at the time of investigation or trial or is newly
discovered evidence.

Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(c)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2019) (emphasis added).

4
Appellant was convicted of two counts of prohibited person in possession of a
firearm in 2013 resulting from police finding a firearm at appellant’s parents’ residence
and a firearm at appellant’s business. In 2017, appellant petitioned for postconvictio n
relief, arguing that his “right to due process was violated when a corrupt law enforcement
officer planted [his] DNA on the firearms seized from his parents’ house and his business, ”
(2) that his counsel was ineffective, and (3) that the state failed to provide all police reports
and property room logs regarding the chain of custody for the fir earms. Following a
hearing, the postconviction court found that appellant had proven “by a preponderance of
the evidence that the DNA was planted in this case” and that the state failed to di sclose
chain-of-custody records . The postconviction court reversed his convictions, and ordered
a new trial. The state dismissed the charges, and in May 2019, appellant petitioned for an
order declaring his eligibility for compensation based on exoneration under Minn.
Stat. §590.11. The district court denied his request.
Appellant contends that the new statutory definition of “on grounds consistent with
innocence” should apply to his petition for an order declaring eligibility for compensatio n
based on exoneration. The state relies on the pre -2019 amendment version of Minn. Stat.
§ 590.11, subd. 1, and this court’s interpretation of “on grounds consistent with innocence”
in Buhl in its brief, but does not acknowledge the 2019 amendments. The district court
quoted the new statutory definition of “on grounds consistent with innocence” in Minn.
Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(c) , in its order denying appellant’s petition, but still relied on this
court’s interpretation of the phrase in Buhl.

5
In Freeman v. State , a recent published opinion of this court, we applied the new
definition of “on gr ounds consistent with innocence ” in Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1 (c),
to a petition filed in January 2019. ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2020 WL 1983227, at *1 -4
(Minn. App. Apr. 27, 2020). Like the petition in Freeman, appellant’s petition for an order
declaring eligibility for compensation based on exoneration was pending at the time of the
2019 amendments to Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1. We therefore follow Freeman and
apply the statutory definition of “on grounds consistent with innocence” in Minn. Stat.
§ 590.11, subd. 1(c). See State v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn. App. 2010) (stating
that this court is bound by the published o pinions of the court of appeals ), review denied
(Minn. Sept. 21, 2010).
Having decided that the statutory definition of “on grounds consistent with
innocence” in Mi nn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(c), applies here, we now use that definition to
determine whether the postconviction court “ordered a new trial on grounds consistent with
innocence.” See Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(b)(1)(ii).
As noted above, Min n. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(c)(2) , provides that “grounds
consistent with innocence” includes exoneration because “a new trial was ordered, and
there is any evidence of factual innocence, whether it was available at the time of
investigation or trial or is ne wly discovered evidence.” (Emphasis added.) “[T]he phrase
‘any evidence of factual innocence’ means any evidence that shows some fact establishing
the absence of the petitioner’s guilt.” Freeman, 2020 WL 1983227, at *2 . Witness
testimony, including ali bi witness testimony, may constitute “evidence of factual
innocence.” Id. at *4 & n.5.

6
Appellant was convicted of two counts of prohibited person in possession of a
firearm under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (Supp. 2009), which provides that a person
convicted of a crime of violence “shall not be entitled to possess a . . . [a] firearm.”
“Possession of a firearm may be proved through actual or constructive possession. ”
State v. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn. 2015). “Actual possession, also referred to
as physical possession, involves direct physical control.” State v. Barker, 888 N.W.2d 348,
353 (Minn. App. 2016) (quotation omitted). To establish constructive possession the state
must show either (1) the prohibited item was found “in a place under [the] defendant’s
exclusive control to which other people did not normally have access ,” or (2) if police
found the prohibited item “in a place to which others had access, there is a strong
probability (inferable from other evidence) that [the] defendant was at the time consciously
exercising dominion and control over it.” State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn.
1975).
At trial, appellant testified that he had never seen, touched, or possessed either
firearm. Appellant’s sister testified that she owned the firearm found at appellant’s parents’
home. Appellant’s cousin, who worked at appellant’s business, testified that he owned the
firearm found in the basement of appellant’s business, that he had stored it in a ventilatio n
duct there, and that he did not tell appellant that he brought a gun into the business. Because
the trial testimony of appellant, appellant’s sister, and appellant’s cousin, if credited,
indicates that appellant did not actually or constructively possess the tw o firearms, their
testimonies constitute “evidence of factual innocence” under Minn . Stat. § 590.11, subd.
1(c)(2). And because there is “evidence of factual innocence,” the postconviction court

7
ordered a new trial on grounds consistent with innocence. The district court therefore erred
by summarily denying appellant’s petition for an order declaring eligibility for
compensation based on exoneration. We reverse and remand to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with Minn. Stat. § 590.11 regarding appellant’s petition.
Reversed and remanded.