Eric D. Humphreys, et al., Respondents,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1775

Eric D. Humphreys, et al.,
Respondents,

Ann Humphreys Sellers,
Respondent,

vs.

Janet Humphreys Krasner,
Appellant.

Filed November 30, 2020
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69VI-CV-12-1010

Bryan M. Lindsay, Scott C. Neff, The Tr enti Law Firm, Virginia, Minnesota (for
respondents Eric D. Humphreys and Paul Humphreys)

Ann Humphreys Sellers, Reading, Pennsylvania, (pro se respondent)

Janet Humphreys Krasner, Ely, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M ., Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge;
and Connolly, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Janet Humphreys Krasner challe nges the district court’s allocation of
property-sale proceeds among her and her res pondent-siblings in this partition action
involving their family lake property. Krasne r argues that the district court abused its
discretion by directing reimburse ment of her two brothers’ attorney fees from the sale
proceeds, by refusing to fact or into the allocation of th e proceeds the value of her
improvements to the property, and by deducting $9,000 from her share of the proceeds and
allocating the sum to her siblings because Krasner harmed the value of the property before
sale. We affirm.
FACTS
The facts and procedural history of this case are recited at length in previous
opinions by this court. 1 In brief, Krasner and her sib lings Eric Humphreys, Paul
Humphreys, and Ann Humphrey s Sellers together owned a recreational cabin on Lake
Vermillion in St. Louis County. Krasner II, 2019 WL 2415252, at *1. In 2012, Eric, Paul,
and Ann commenced a partition action against Krasner. Id. Six years of litigation followed,
in the partition action and in related actions brought by Krasner. The crux of the litigation
turned on Krasner’s opposition both to the property’s sale to any nonfamily member and

1 See Humphreys v. Krasner , No. A18-1439, 2019 WL 2415 252 (Minn. App. June 10,
2019), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2019) (Krasner II); Krasner v. Hoffman, Nos. A17-
1773, A18-0170, 2018 WL 6442164 (Minn. App. Dec. 10, 2018); Humphreys v. Krasner,
No. A16-1643, 2017 WL 2628046 (Minn. App. June 19, 2017), review denied (Minn.
Sept. 19, 2017) (Krasner I).

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to the court-approved appraisal valu e, which she believed was too low. Id. In 2018, the
district court approved the sale of the property to two neighbors for $125,000—a sum that
was well below the 2013 court- approved initial asking price of $235,000 but was in line
with more current appraisals. Id. We affirmed that order on Krasner’s appeal. Id.
We now arrive at the subject of this appeal: the district court’s October 2019 order
distributing the proceeds of the partition sale among the siblings. In that order, the district
court determined that, after deduction of clos ing costs, there rema ined $122,262.64 in
proceeds from the sale. From these proceeds, the district court deducted other costs related
to the partition action and main tenance of the property and deducted $10,000 in referee
fees and real-estate commission on the sale of the property, $25,000 in attorney fees,
$4,492.59 in insurance costs for the property, and $2,485 in maintenance and repair costs.
The district court directed that the real-estat e agency and the referee be paid directly for
their expenses and that respondents be re imbursed for the remaining expenses in the
amount that each contributed.
After deduction of these co sts, $80,285.05 remained for distribution among the
siblings. Each sibling’s one-quarter share wo uld be $20,071.26. Bu t the district court
decided to deduct $9,000 from Krasner’s sh are and distribute that amount equally among
the other three siblings as compensation to the three siblings for the loss of the property’s
value caused by Krasner’s bad-faith efforts to prevent the sale of the property. Thus, in the
end, the district court ordered distribution of partition proceeds of $11,071.27 to Krasner
and $23,071.26 to each of the remaining three siblings.

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Krasner appeals.2
D E C I S I O N
As an initial matter, we identify what is and what is not before us on this appeal.
Krasner appeals an order distributing the partition sale proceeds. In her brief,
Krasner makes arguments challenging the property’s sale and events leading up to the sale.
But those arguments were either raised an d decided in Krasner’s previous appeals, see
generally Krasner II, 2019 WL 2415252; Hoffman, 2018 WL 6442164; Krasner I, 2017
WL 2628046, or could have been, but were not, raised by Krasner in those appeals and are
therefore not subject to review now. See Peterson v. BASF Corp. , 675 N.W.2d 57, 66-68
(Minn. 2004), vacated on other grounds , BASF Corp. v. Peterson , 554 U.S. 1012, 125
S. Ct. 1968 (2005) (concluding that the court need not review an issue that could have been
brought in a prior appeal, but was not, because “consideration of [the petitioner’s] [newly
raised] arguments . . . would undermine principles of fairness and judicial economy”). For
this reason, issues that are not before us include the selection of the referee, the fees to be
paid to the referee, certain maintenance and upkeep fees, th e approval of the sale of the
property, and the sale price of the property.
In addition, Krasner asserts arguments regarding the district court’s allocation order
that she did not make to the district court. Specifically, she asserts a claim for the return to
her of personal property from the cabin. We will not consider issues that were not raised to
and considered by the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988).

2 We note that Ann Humphreys Sellers did not file a brief in this appeal.

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In sum, we consider only Krasner’s chal lenges to the district court’s allocation
order, addressing only those issues that Krasner actually raised to the district court. Krasner
argues that the district court abused its di scretion or erred by (1 ) improperly deducting
attorney fees from the partition proceeds a nd reimbursing her brot hers for those fees,
(2) not taking into account the value of Krasner’s alleged improvements to the property in
allocating the proceeds, and (3) deducting $9,000 from Krasner’s share and distributing it
to the other siblings due to Krasner’s bad-fa ith actions that delayed the sale and reduced
the property’s value.
Partition proceedings are governed by statut e as well as by principles of equity.
Swogger v. Taylor, 68 N.W.2d 376, 380 (Minn. 1955); see Minn. Stat. § 558.01-.32 (2018).
We review a district court’s decision regardin g division of partition sale proceeds for an
abuse of its discretion. First Trust Co. of St. Paul v. Holt , 411 N.W.2d 564, 565 (Minn.
App. 1987). In doing so, we will not set aside a district court’s findings of fact unless they
are clearly erroneous. Anderson v. Anderson , 560 N.W.2d 729, 730 (Minn. App. 1997),
review dismissed (Minn. May 28, 1997). Findings of f act are clearly erroneous if we are
“left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” LaPoint v. Family
Orthodontics, P.A., 892 N.W.2d 506, 515 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
Under Minnesota’s partition statute, the di strict court determines the amount of
costs, charges, and disbursements that each party must pay or receive. Minn. Stat. § 558.10.
The district court distributes the proceeds according to the provisions of Minn. Stat.
§ 558.16. First, it pays a just proportion of the action’s “general costs.” Id. Second, it pays
the “costs of the reference.” Id. Third, it satisfies any liens in order of their priority. Id.

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Fourth, it distributes the remaining procee ds among the co-owners of the property
according to their respective shares. Id. In addition to this statut ory authority, the district
court has discretion to apply principles of equity in determining the amount it will allocate
to each party. Swogger, 68 N.W.2d at 383.
We turn to Krasner’s arguments.
Attorney Fees
Krasner contends that the district court erred by directing pa yment of $25,000 in
attorney fees out of the par tition proceeds. The district cour t determined that those fees
were reasonable, necessary, and of benefit to all of the parties in completing the partition
action.
Krasner does not identify any legal bar to the payment of attorney fees from partition
proceeds, and caselaw recognizes the appropri ateness of paying a ttorney fees from the
proceeds when the expe nditure results in a benefit to all interested parties. See Kuller v.
Kuller, 109 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Minn. 1961); Hanson v. Ingwaldson , 87 N.W. 915, 915
(Minn. 1901).
Nor does Krasner identify how the district court clearly erred by finding that the
$25,000 in attorney fees here were reasonable and necessary and benefited all interested
parties. We do not presume that the district court has erred; the pa rty asserting error has
the burden of showing it. Horodenski v. Lyndale Green Townhome Ass’n, 804 N.W.2d 366,
372 (Minn. App. 2011) (citing Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr., Inc., 237 N.W.2d 76,
78 (Minn. 1975)). Krasner has failed to meet that burden.

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In any event, the record provides no support for the argument. Although the district
court did not provide detail in its order about which fees were included in the
reimbursement, the district court had ample opportunity to review an itemized billing
statement provided by the brothers’ attorney a nd to identify those fees that furthered the
partition to the benefit of all of the parties. The record reflects that the district court did so
here, as it reduced the atto rney fees from the $71,904.92 re quested by the brothers to
$25,000. The district court did not err in apportioning attorney fees.
Krasner’s Claimed Improvements to the Property
Krasner also argues that the district c ourt abused its discretion by allocating the
proceeds among the four siblings without giving her financial credit for improvements she
claims to have made to the property. Kras ner supports her argument with a self-made,
partial list of improvements and her estimated value of each improvement. But the district
court found that Krasner actually decreased the property’s value, and that finding is
supported by the record. The re cord establishes that only Kr asner used the property and
that she left the property in disarray. Krasner has not shown that the district court clearly
erred by declining to consider her claimed improvements in its distribution.
Adjustment for Loss of Property Value
Finally, Krasner argues that the district court abused its discretion by deducting
$9,000 from her share and distributing it to he r siblings as compen sation for the loss of
value to the property resulting from Krasner’s bad-faith efforts to delay and prevent the
property’s sale. Krasner again asserts that she made several improvements to the property
and that she did not have exclusive control of it. But these arguments have no bearing on

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whether the district court abused its discreti on by reducing her share to compensate her
siblings for her bad-faith efforts to delay the sale of the property. And, in an earlier opinion
regarding this matter, we affirmed the district court’s finding that Krasner acted in bad faith
to delay and prevent the property’s sale. See Hoffman , 2018 WL 6442164, at *4. The
district court thus did not ab use its discretion by considerin g Krasner’s bad-faith efforts
when it determined her share.
We next consider whether the amount the district court deducted from Krasner’s
share is reasonable. The district court found that Krasner’s bad-faith efforts over six years
to prevent and delay the property’s sale amount ed to $9,000. This finding is not clearly
erroneous. To the contrary, Krasner’s stream of near-continuous legal actions against
persons involved in the property’s sale reduced the property’s market value, which dropped
from $235,000 to $125,000. See Krasner II, 2019 WL 2415252, at *1 (stating that Krasner
sued her brothers, the referee, and her br others’ attorney, among others). We therefore
conclude that the district court’s $9,000 deduction from Krasner’s share of the sale
proceeds to compensate her siblings is reasonable.
Affirmed.