In re the Marriage of: Samantha Magdalena Hansen, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1779

In re the Marriage of:
Samantha Magdalena Hansen, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Richard Bradley Hansen,
Appellant.

Filed June 29, 2020
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-19-2971

Scott M. Rodman, Michael G. Cain, Arnold, Rodman & Kretchmer, PA, Bloomington,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Randall A. Smith, Lake Harriet Law Office, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Reyes, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant f ather, a Canadia n citizen, challenges the district cou rt’s exercise of
jurisdiction over a child-custody dispute with respondent mother, a United States citizen
who resides in Minnesota . Because the district court did not (1) err by concluding that it

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has subject-matter jurisdiction due to the significant connections child and mother have
with Minnesota or (2) abuse its discretion by rejecting father’s argument that Minnesota is
an inconvenient forum, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2014, a ppellant Richard Bradley Hansen and respondent Samantha Magdalena
Hansen married in Minnesota. Their child was born in January 2017 and has dual
citizenship in the United States and Canada. Father was convicted of a federal drug-
distribution crime in January 2018, and the family moved to W innipeg, Manitoba in
Canada the following month .1 Mother was able to maintain her Minnesota employment
for the first six months. But by November, her employer would no longer permit her to
work remotely. Mother decided to end the marriage, and she returned to Minnesota with
the child on N ovember 10. Since that time, t he child has spent alternating two -week
periods with each parent.
On May 2, 2019, mother petitioned to dissolve the marriage in Minnesota; father
petitioned to dissolve the marriage in Canada later that month. At a n initial case -
management conference before the district court, counsel disputed which court has
jurisdiction to determine custody of the child. Upon the parties’ motions and affidavits,
the district court determined that neither Minnesota nor Canada has home-state jurisdiction
under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, codified in Minnesota

1 Father advised the district court that he cannot return to Minnesota “for fear that [he] will
be arrested for violating the terms of [his] probation.”

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as Minn. Stat. §§ 518D.01 -.37 (2018) (the act) . But t he court concluded that it has
significant-connection jurisdiction and is not an inconvenient forum. Father appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court has jurisdiction because the child and mothe r have
significant connections with Minnesota.

The act governs which court has jurisdiction to resolve custody issues when a child’s
parents live in different states. 2 It provides four bases under which a court may exercise
jurisdiction over an initial child -custody determination, two of which are at issue here.
Under the act,
a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child
custody determination only if:
(1) this state is the home state of the child on the date of
the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of
the child within six months before the commencement of the
proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent
or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state;
(2) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction
under clause (1), or a court of the home state of the child has
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is
the more appropriate forum . . . , and:
(i) the child and the child’s parents, or t he child and at
least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a
significant connection with this state other than mere physical
presence; and
(ii) substantial evidence is available in this state
concerning the child’s care, protection, training, an d personal
relationships[.]

Minn. Stat. § 518D.201(a)(1), (2).

2 The act applies to international custody disputes . Abu-Dalbouh v. Abu -Dalbouh, 547
N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. App. 1996). Minnesota courts “shall treat a foreign country as if
it were a state of the Unites States” for purposes of the act. Minn. Stat. § 518D.105(a).

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“Home state” is defined as “the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person
acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the
commencement of a child cus tody proceeding. ” Minn. Stat. § 518D.102(h). And “[a]
period of temporary absence of [the parents or child] is part of the [six-month] period.” Id.
Home-state jurisdiction has priority over the other statutory bases. See Kasdan v. Berney,
587 N.W.2d 3 19, 324 (Minn. App. 1999) (recognizing that the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act “gives home state of [the] child fundamental priority in
determining jurisdiction over child custody”).
We review subject-matter jurisdiction under the act de novo. Cook v. Arimitsu, 907
N.W.2d 233, 238 (Minn. App. 2018) , review denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2018). “Findings of
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous[.]” Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; see Minn. R. Civ. P. 43.05 (permitting a district
court to hear a motion “on affidavits presented by the respective parties”). We will not
disturb a district court’s factual findings if reasonable evidence supports them , Rogers v.
Moore, 603 N.W.2d 650, 656 (Minn. 1999), and reverse only if the findings are “manifestly
contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a
whole,” Ekman v. Miller, 812 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted).
A. Home-State Jurisdiction
It is undisputed that on the day mother commenced this action, the child was living
in Minnesota two weeks per month and in Canada two weeks per month. That arrangement
had been in place for approximately six months. Accordingly, the district court concluded

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that the child had not lived in or been absent from Minnesota or Canada for purposes of
exercising home-state jurisdiction under Minn. Stat. § 518D.201(a)(1).
Father contends that Canada is the child’s home state because the child lived there
during the six months before mother commenced this action. Minn. Stat. § 518D.201(a)(1).
He characterizes the time the child spent in Minnesota as temporary absences from Canada
that are included in calculating the six-month period under Minn. Stat. § 518D.102(h). We
disagree.
In Cook, this court considered the meaning of a “temporary absence” under the act.
907 N.W.2d at 23 9. The parties married and had four children in Minnesota. Id. at 235.
In preparation for a July 2014 trip to Japan, the parties agreed in writing that mother would
return to Minnesota with the children by a specific date in August. Id. Mother did not
comply with the agreement. Id. Father commenced a marriage dissolution action in April
2015, arguing Minnesota was still the children’s home state because their absence during
the preceding six months was temporary. Id. In affirming the district court’s determination
that Minnesota was the children’s home state, we focused on the factual record, specifically
the parties’ intentions concerning the children’s absence from Minnesota. Because the
parties expressly agreed that the children would be in Japan for only one month, we
concluded their absence from Minnesota w as temporary, and included in the six -month
period used to define “home state” under Minn. Stat. § 518.D.102(h). Id. at 239.
Father asserts that, as in Cook, the child’s absence from Canada was only temporary
because the parties agreed and intended that mother would “ obtain Canadian citizenship,

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and return to Canada to work and live as a family again.” We reject this argument for two
reasons.
First, the record does not support father’s contention that mother’s absence —and
thus, the child’s intermittent absence—from Canada was temporary. The parents in Cook
expressly agreed in writing that mother would bring their children back to M innesota
within a specific time period. No such agreement exists here, and mother offered evidence
that her departure from Canada was intended to be permanent. She avers in her affidavit
that she left Canada not only for work-related reasons but also because she had decided to
end the marriage. And she avers that when she left Canada, father was well aware that she
wanted a divorce. Consistent with mother’s affidavit , the district court found that the
parties separated after mother left Canada. To the extent that father’s factual assertions
differ from mother’s assertions, we do not “reconcile conflicting evidence,” as that role is
“exclusively the province of the factfinder.” Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99
(Minn. App. 2009 ) (quotation omitted). And we defer to the district court’ s factual
findings, even when based on documentary evidence. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (stating
that “[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous”); In re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995) (same);
see also Straus v. Straus , 94 N.W.2d 679, 680 (Minn. 1959) (noting that appellate courts
defer to a district court’s resolution of factual questions presented by conflicting affidavits);
Hestekin v. Hestekin , 587 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Minn. App. 1998) (citing this aspect of
Straus).

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Second, we discern no error by the district court in concluding that the child was
not “absent” from Canada because she spent substantial time there after mother returned to
Minnesota. The district court found that the child lived continuously in Canada from
February 10, 2018, through November 10, 2018, and after the parties separated the child
spent alternating two-week intervals in Canada and Minnesota. Father does not challenge
these findings. The undisputed fact that the child has spent two weeks out of every month
with her father in Canada since mother returned to Minnesota defeats the argument that she
has been absent from Canada. See Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2018) (requiring words to be
interpreted “acc ording to their common and approved usage”); Staab v. Diocese of
St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 2012) (stating that “[w]e give words and phrases in
a statute their plain and ordinary meaning s”). The act does not define “absent.” When a
statute does not define a word, an appellate court often “look[s] to dictionary definitions.”
Gilbertson v. Williams Dingmann, LLC , 894 N.W.2d 148, 152 (Minn. 2017) (quotation
omitted). The dictionary definition of “absent” is “[n]ot present; missing.” The American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 6 (5th ed. 2011). Because the child was not
temporarily absent from Canada within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 518D.201(a)(1), the
district court did not err by concluding that Canada does not have home-state jurisdiction.
On this record, we observe no error in the district court’s conclusion that neither
Canada nor Minnesota is the child’s home state for purposes of subject-matter jurisdiction.
B. Significant-Connections Jurisdiction
Father next asserts that the district court erred in concluding it has jurisdiction under
Minn. Stat. § 518D.201(a)(2) because the child and mother have significant connections

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with Minnesota. He relies on an Illinois case for the proposition that the exercise of
jurisdiction under this basis requires “maximum rather than minimum” contacts, which do
not exist here. In re Frost , 681 N. E.2d 1030, 1036 (Ill. App. 1997) (stating that
“[m]aximum rather than minimum contacts with [a state] are required in order for
jurisdiction to exist”). We are not persuaded.
Significant-connections jurisdiction exists if no state has home-state jurisdiction and
“the child and the child’s parents . . . have a significant connection with this state other
than mere physical presence,” and “substantial evidence is available in this state concerning
the child’s care, protection, training , and personal relationships.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518D.201(a)(2). In making this determination, “courts consider the nature and quality of
the child’s contacts with the State.” In Interest of T.B. , 497 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tex. App.
2016).
In defining this jurisdictional basis, the act contrasts a “significant connection” with
“mere physical presence.”3 The record reveals mother and child are more than physically
present in Minnesota. The district court made numerous findings about the significant

3 We are not persuaded by father’s reliance on Frost, in which an Illinois appellate court
interpreted “temporary absence” as included in the home-state jurisdiction provision of the
act in the context of a parent who moved with a child to another state. 681 N.E.2d at 1034-
36. Without analyzing the significant-connections jurisdiction provision of the act, the
appellate court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing as to whether the court had
home-state or significant-connections jurisdiction. Id. at 1036-37. The appellate court’s
statement that “[m ]aximum rather than minimum contacts with Illinois are required in
order for” significant -connection jurisdiction to exist is dicta and does not instruct our
analysis in this case. Id. at 1036 ; see Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, LLC , 884 N.W.2d
601, 611 (Minn. 2016) (stating that “dictum” is a statement “unnecessary to the decision”
of a case).

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contacts mother and the child ha ve with Minnesota and found that substan tial relevant
evidence regarding the child is available in this state. The record supports these findings.
Since her birth in January 2017, the child has spent all but nine months of her life in
Minnesota. The child has contact with members of mother’s extended family in Minnesota,
attends preschool here, receives medical care here, and “has established friendships and a
sense of community.” Mother lived in Minnesota when she met father in 2010. With the
exception of her nine -month stint in Canada, she has lived in Minnesota ever since. She
has worked for a Minnesota employer for many years, returning from Canada, in part, to
retain that employment. While in Canada, mother continued to work for that Minnesota
employer.4 And the record amply establishes that substantial evidence related to the
“child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships” is available here, as noted
above, and includes records of the child’s birth and ongoing medical care, school records,
and documentation related to mother’s health, employment, and ability to care for the child.
The record persuades us that the district court did not err by concluding that Minnesota has
significant-connections jurisdiction under Minn. Stat. § 518D.201(a)(2).
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by r ejecting father’s argument
that Minnesota is an inconvenient forum to determine child custody.

Even when a district court has subject-matter jurisdiction, it “ may decline ” to
exercise it if the court “determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances
and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.” Minn. Stat. § 518D.207(a).

4 While not part of the district court’s findings of fact, the record shows that mother
continued to receive mail in Minnesota during the time she lived in Canada.

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We review this determination for abuse of discretion. See Levinson v. Levinson ,
389 N.W.2d 761, 762 (Minn. App. 1986) (reviewing district court ’s inconvenient-forum
ruling in a child-custody matter for abuse of discretion).
To determine whether Minnesota is an inconvenient forum, the district court must
consider a number of factors including:
(1) whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely
to continue in the future and which state could best protect the
parties and the child;
(2) the length of time the child has resided outside this
state;
(3) the distance between the court in this state and the
court in the state that would assume jurisdiction;
(4) the relative financial circumstances of the parties;
(5) any agreement of the parties as to which state should
assume jurisdiction;
(6) the nature and location of the evidence required to
resolve the pending litigation, including the testimony of the
child;
(7) the ability of the court of each state to decide the
issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the
evidence; and
(8) the familiarity of the court of each state with the
facts and issues in the pending litigation.

Minn. Stat. § 518D.207(b).
The district court made findings as to each of these factors, determining that the
forum choice is not affected by domestic violence involving the parties, the distance
between the two states, the parties’ incomes, the nature and location of evidence, or an
agreement between the parties . But the court determined that Minnesota is a more
favorable forum due to the length o f time the ch ild has resided outside of Canada, the

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courts’ ability to expeditiously decide child custody , and the courts’ familiarity with the
facts and issues of this case.
Father contends that he will be disadvantaged if Minnesota exercises jurisdiction
because he cannot enter the United States without facing arrest. But, as the district court
noted, each party is unlikely to appear in person at proceedings in the other’s state due to
the significant distance separating them, father’s attorneys have “ably represented him” to
date, and the act specifically facilitates out -of-state party participation . Minn. Stat.
§§ 518D.110-.112. On this record, we discern no abuse of discretion by the dist rict court
in rejecting father’s inconvenient-forum argument.
Affirmed.