A20-0116

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1785
A20-0116

In the Matter of Xcel Energy's Petition for Approval of
Electric Vehicle Pilot Programs (A19-1785),

and

In the Matter of Xcel Energy's Petition for Approval of a
Residential EV Subscription Service Pilot Program (A20-0116).

Filed September 21, 2020
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Minnesota Public Utilities Commission
File Nos. E-200/M-18-643, E-200/M-19-186

Andrew P. Moratzka, Marc A. Al, Riley A. Conlin, Stoel Rives LLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for relator Xcel Large Industrials)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jeffrey K. Bo man, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Minnesota Public Utilities Commission)

T h o m a s H . B o y d , E r i c F . S w a n s o n , K y l e R. Kroll, Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for re spondent Northern States Power Company d/b/a Xcel
Energy)

Joy R. Anderson, Evan Mulholland, Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for amici curiae Minn esota Center for Environmental Advocacy,
Union of Concerned Scientists, Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Fresh
Energy)

David F. Herr, Erica A. Holzer, Maslon LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for amicus curiae
Edison Electric Institute)

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Considered and decided by Worke, Pr esiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In these consolidated certiorari appeal s, relator Xcel Large Industrials (XLI)
challenges decisions by res pondent Minnesota Public Utility Commission (MPUC)
approving three electric-vehicl e (EV) charging pilot programs proposed by respondent
Northern States Power Company, d/b/a Xcel Energy (Xcel). XLI argues that the MPUC
exceeded its authority when it approved the pilot program s because Minnesota law does
not authorize the MPUC to regulate publ ic-utility investments “b ehind the customer
meter.” In the alternat ive, XLI argues that the MPUC act ed arbitrarily and capriciously
when it granted three componen ts of Xcel’s cost-recovery requests. Because the MPUC
acted within its statutory authority and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, we affirm.
FACTS
Xcel, a utility company headquartered in Minneapolis, proposed the three pilot
programs at issue to the MPUC as part of its ongoing development of EV initiatives. The
pilot programs are designed to advance electr ification of the transportation sector in
Minnesota by testing and study ing how public utilities can he lp overcome barriers to EV
adoption.
XLI is a consortium of entities, including USG Interiors Inc., a gypsum-products
manufacturer, and two oil refineries, Flint H ills Resources Pine Bend LLC and Marathon
Petroleum Corporation. These entities are a ll large industrial customers of Xcel. XLI

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opposed the pilots throughout the MPUC evaluation process, arguing, among other things,
that the proposals would require ratepayers to subsidize EV-charging investments that
should instead be made by private businesses.
To understand the specific pilot programs at issue, it is useful to first review several
recent EV-related actions by the Minnesota Legislature and the MPUC.
Background
In 2014, the Minnesota Legislature en acted a statute directing public utilities 1
selling electricity at retail to file a tariff with the MPUC “that allows a customer to purchase
electricity solely for the purpose of recharging an el ectric vehicle.” Minn. Stat.
§ 216B.1614, subd. 2 (2018); 2014 Minn. Laws ch. 254, § 10, at 880. The tariff must allow
residential customers to purchase electricity to charge EVs at a discounted rate during off-
peak energy usag e hours, when electricity is relatively less expensive for the utility to
generate. See id. The tariff must also include “a mechanism to allow the [utility’s] recovery
of costs reasonably necessary to comply” with the tariff requirements, including costs for
educating customers “about the financial, energy conservation, and environmental benefits
of electric vehicles.” Minn. Stat. § 216B.1614, subd. 2(c)(2). The statute authorizes the
MPUC to approve, modify, or reject utility-p roposed tariffs. Minn. Stat. § 216B.1614,
subd. 2(c).
Following the enactment of the EV-charging tariff stat ute, the MPUC evaluated
multiple matters involving EVs. In 2015, the MPUC granted Xcel’s petition for approval

1 The term “public utility” is defined by statute and include s investor-owned utilities but
not municipal or cooperative-association utilities. See Minn. Stat. § 216B.02, subd. 4
(2018).

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of a residential EV-charging tariff permitting residential customers to charge EVs at home
using time-of-day rates.2 Later, after customers reported th at the significant upfront costs
for charging equipment and for wiring a second electrical meter—necessary to track time-
of-day use—deterred their participation in the program, Xcel proposed and the MPUC
approved the Residen tial Service Pilot. 3 Xcel designed the Reside ntial Service Pilot to
facilitate at-home EV chargi ng by providing a ch arger to pilot participants, which
participants can pay for over time, and by equipping the charger to transmit metering data
to Xcel over a wireless network, thereby eliminating the need for a second meter.
In 2017, the MPUC initiated a general in quiry into EV charging and infrastructure
in Minnesota, with the purpose of gathering information to better understand:
1. The possible impacts of EVs on the electric system, utilities,
and utility customers, including the potential electric system
benefits;
2. The degree to which utilitie s and utility regulatory policy
can impact the extent and pace of EV penetration in Minnesota;
and
3. Possible EV tariff options to facilitate wide availability of
EV charging infrastructure.4

The inquiry garnered wide-ranging stakeholder participation, including through a public
workshop, and many comments. As a result, the MPUC found that facilitating electricity-
powered transportation in Minnesota is in the pu blic interest but that there are significant

2 In re Xcel Energy’s Petition for Ap proval of a Resi dential Electric Vehicle Charging
Tariff, MPUC Docket No. E-002/M-15-111 (June 22, 2015).

3 In re Xcel Energy’s Petition for Approval of a Residential Electric-Vehicle Service Pilot
Program, MPUC Docket No. E-002/M-17-817 (May 9, 2018).

4 In re Commission Inquiry into Electric Vehicle Charging and Infrastructure , MPUC
Docket No. E-999/CI-17-879 (Feb. 1, 2019).

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impediments, including a lack of charging infrastructure, hindering transportation-
electrification efforts.
To address the impediments, the MPUC directed Minnesota’s investor-owned
public utilities to “take steps to encourage the cost-effectiv e adoption and integration of
EVs.” It also instructed th e investor-owned u tilities to submit various filings, including
transportation electrification plans, by specified dates. It is against this backdrop that Xcel
petitioned for approval of the three pilot programs at issue.
The three EV charging pilot programs
The first of the two conso lidated appeals, A19-1785, regards Xcel’s October 2018
petition requesting that the MPUC approve tw o new EV pilot programs: the Fleet EV
Service Pilot (fleet pilot) and the Public Charging Pilot. The second of the two consolidated
appeals, A20-0116, regards Xcel’s February 2019 petition requesting approval of another
residential pilot called the Residential EV S ubscription Service Pilot (second residential
pilot). Xcel proposed all of these initiatives as pilots in order to test key assumptions about
its programs on a small scale before making them broadly available.
(1) The fleet pilot
The fleet pilot proposes that Xcel “insta ll, own, and maintain EV infrastructure for
fleet operators in order to reduce these customers’ upfront costs for EV adoption.” Xcel’s
petition estimates that the fleet pilot will facilitate installation of over 700 charging ports,
serving charging needs for light-duty vehicles and buses. It states that fleet customers
expected to participate in th e pilot include Metro Transit, the Minnesota Department of
Administration, and the City of Minneapolis.

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The “make-ready” infrastructure that Xcel proposes to own under this pilot consists
of both (1) service-connection infrastructure on the utility’s traditional side of the meter
and (2) EV-supply infrastructure—specifically, new panels, conduit, and wiring up to the
charger—on the customer’s traditional side of the meter. Pilot participants have the choice
to either purchase EV chargers from Xcel or supply their own.
The rate structure for the fleet pilot, lik e that of Xcel’s other EV-charging pilots,
promotes off-peak charging of EVs. Xcel asse rts that increased off-peak charging places
downward pressure on all ratepayers’ electrical rates.
In order to recover costs related to the fl eet pilot, Xcel requested that it be permitted
to record its capital investments in infrastruct ure as utility plant assets, “for which cost
recovery [will] begin via inclusion of these investments in rate base in [its] next rate case”;
to waive service policy provisions governing c ontributions in aid of construction (CIAC)
that would otherwise require pilot participants to bear a portion of the costs for service
connection installation; and to defer some pilot operational and depreciation expenses to
be recovered in its next rate case.
(2) The public ch arging pilot
The public charging pilot ai ms to facilitate public acce ss to EV charging through
“community hubs” and fast-charging stations along high-traffic corridors. Participation in
the public charging pilot is available to operators “who inve st in deploying fast-charging
stations along corridors in [Xcel’s] service territory.” 5 The Cities of St. Paul and

5 Xcel’s petition notes that the program will “specifically target[] applicants seeking funds
from Minnesota’s Diesel Replacement Program funded by the Volkswagen Environmental

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Minneapolis plan to partner with Xcel to install the community mobility hubs, and
HOURCAR plans to be an “anchor tenant.” Two key purposes of public charging are to
support longer-distance EV driving by reduci ng “range anxiety”—the fear that an EV
battery will deplete and there will be no nearby charging station—and to provide charging
solutions for those unable to charge EVs at home.
Like the fleet pilot, the pu blic charging pilot involves Xcel’s investment in make-
ready infrastructure. But, unlike the fleet pilo t, the public charging pilot does not entail
Xcel owning or maintaining a ny EV chargers. “Instead, th e charging equipment will be
installed, owned, and maintained by site hosts and third-party charging developers.”
Participants in the public charging pilot also pay tim e-of-use rates for on-peak
versus off-peak charging, in addition to monthly minimum charges based on EV charging
connections. Xcel’s October 2018 petition reque sted the same cost-recovery mechanisms
for the public charging pilot as for the fleet pilot.
(3) The second res idential pilot
The second residential pilot builds upon Xcel’s first residential pilot and is intended
to address another customer barrier to EV adoption: difficulty projecting EV-charging costs
under the time-of-use rate structure. To addr ess this barrier, the se cond residential pilot
offers participants a flat monthly subscripti on fee for “off-peak” elect ricity usage, with
separate pricing for on-peak charging in ex cess of a specified energy allotment. Xcel
installs and maintains the charging equipment and the customer can either prepay the cost

Mitigation Settlement (VW Settlement) and administered by the Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency (MPCA).”

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of the provision and installation of the charging equipment or pay it in monthly installments
as part of a “bundled” service charge.
Because the cost of the charging equipm ent installed by Xcel for this pilot is
recovered from the participants, Xcel did not request the sa me cost-recovery mechanisms
described above that it did for the fleet and public charging pilots.
All three of the pilots in volve Xcel owning and managing some level of
infrastructure and equipment th at is located on customer p remises beyond the point at
which electricity has passed from the grid and through the custom er’s meter—in other
words, “behind the meter.” Th e specific infrastructure and eq uipment “behind the meter”
consists of panels, conduit and wiring, and EV-charging equi pment. As an example, the
following figure from the record illustrates the EV charging infrastructure components for
the fleet pilot, which is the pilot where Xcel’s invo lvement is mo st extensive:

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The MPUC’s decisions
On July 17, 2019, the MPUC approved the fleet pilot and the public charging pilot,
with several modifications based on stakeholder input. It fo und that both pilots “advance
the legislative goal of transportation electr ification in a manner that reasonably limits
potential rate impacts, while pr esenting an opportun ity for ratepayers and the public to
benefit.” It granted Xcel’s requests to waive CIAC provisions, treat capital investments in
make-ready infrastructure as cost items in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
distribution accounts, and defer some pilot ope rational and depreciation expenses to be
recovered in its next rate case. XLI petitione d for reconsideration, and the MPUC denied
the petition on October 7, 2019. On the same day, the MPUC also approved the petition
for the second residential ch arging pilot. The MPUC de termined that there was a
“compelling public interest in a short-term, limited program to explore one possible cost-
effective means to promote electric vehicles.” XLI petitioned for rec onsideration of this
order as well, and MPUC denied the petition.
These appeals follow.
D E C I S I O N
Our review of the MPUC’s decisions is governed by the Minnesota Administrative
Procedure Act (MAPA). Minn. Stat. § 216B.5 2, subd. 1 (2018). Under MAPA, we may
reverse, remand, or modify an agency decision only if the agency’s actions were:
(a) in violation of constitutional provisions; or
(b) in excess of the statutory au thority or jurisdiction of the
agency; or
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) affected by other error of law; or

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(e) unsupported by substantial ev idence in view of the entire
record as submitted; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious.

Minn. Stat. § 14.69 (2018). XLI’s first cha llenge to the MPUC’s decisions regards
subpart (b), whether the MPUC act ed in excess of its authority or jurisdiction. Its second
regards subpart (f), whether the MPUC’s approval of components of Xcel’s cost-recovery
request was arbitrary or capricious. We address each issue in turn.
I. The MPUC did not exceed its statutory authority by regulating public-utility
investments “behind the customer meter.”

Whether the MPUC “has acted within its statutory authority is a question of law that
[appellate courts] review de novo.” In re Otter Tail Power Co. , 942 N.W.2d 175, 179
(Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted). 6 “The MPUC, as a creature of statute, only has the
authority given it by the legislature.” Minnegasco v. Minn . Pub. Utils. Comm’n , 549
N.W.2d 904, 907 (Minn. 1996) (quotation omitted). The MPUC’s regulatory authority can
be either express or implied from powers expressly granted by the legislature. Otter Tail

6 Respondents argue that, b ecause XLI’s argument regardin g the scope of the MPUC’s
authority turns on the statutory definition of “service,” and be cause that analysis depends
on the interpretation of technical words or phra ses within the agency’s area of expertise,
the MPUC’s decision as to its authority is entitled to deference. See In re N. States Power
Co., 775 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Minn. App. 2009). But the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected
a similar argument in In re Hubbard, explaining that when an appellate court is “confronted
with the threshold question of whether the legislature has granted an agency the authority
to take the action at issue,” the “suggestion of deference is . . . misplaced.” 778 N.W.2d
313, 318 n.4 (Minn. 2010). Moreover, “[a]ppellate courts retain the authority to review de
novo errors of law which arise when an ag ency decision is based upon the meaning of
words in a statute.” In re Claim for Benefits by Meuleners , 725 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Minn.
App. 2006) (quotation omitted). Because XL I challenges the MPUC’s authority, and
because the arguments largely turn on the interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 216B.02, subd. 6
(2018), we apply de novo review.

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Power Co. , 942 N.W.2d at 179. “Express authority exists only where a statute
unambiguously grants the MPUC such authority.” Id. “[E]xpress statutory authority need
not be given a cramped reading.” Peoples Nat. Gas Co. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 369
N.W.2d 530, 534 (Minn. 1985). As to implied authority, though, “any enlargement of
express powers by implication must be fairly drawn and fairly ev ident from the agency
objectives and powers expressly given by the legislature.” Id. XLI argues that the MPUC
had neither express nor implied authority to regulate Xcel’s behind-the-meter activity in
the EV pilot programs. We begin with the question of express authority.
Minnesota law vests the MPUC with “the powers, rights, functions, and jurisdiction
to regulate in accordance with the provisions of Laws 19 74, chapter 429 every public
utility.” Minn. Stat. § 216B.08 (2018). The MP UC “may ascertain and fix just and
reasonable standards, classifications, rules, or practices to be observed and followed by any
or all public utilities with resp ect to the service to be furn ished.” Minn. Stat. § 216B.09,
subd. 1 (2018). “Service,” in turn, is statutorily defined as “natural, manufactured, or mixed
gas and electricity; the installation, removal, or repair of equipment or facilities for
delivering or measuring such gas and electricity.” Minn. Stat. § 216B.02, subd. 6 (2018).
XLI’s primary argument turns on the abov e definition of “service.” XLI contends
that the definition of “service” in section 216B .02, subdivision 6, constrains the scope of
the equipment and facilities that a public utility may own and operate. Correspondingly, it
argues, the MPUC has no authority to regulate equipment and facilities operated by a public

12
utility that fall outside the definition of “service.” 7 XLI contends that any panels, conduit
and wiring, and EV chargers “behind the meter” to be owned and managed by Xcel in the
pilots fall outside of the “service” definition. XLI argues that these items cannot constitute
equipment or facilities for delivering or meas uring electricity because the delivery and
measurement of electricity contemplated by the statute is “complete at the customer meter.”
The MPUC disagreed with XLI and determ ined that the language of Minn. Stat.
§ 216B.02, subd. 6, expressly allows it to regulate the conduit, wiring, and chargers at issue
in the pilots because these items fall squarely within “equipment or facilities for delivering
or measuring . . . electricity.” The MPUC dete rmined that neither the statutory definition
of “service” nor any other stat ute imposes a regulatory limitati on related to the customer
meter.
To interpret a statute, courts must firs t “determine whether the statute’s language,
on its face, is ambiguous.” State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn. 2017). Only
if the statute is ambiguous will courts proc eed to apply the canons of construction for
resolving ambiguity. Id. We accordingly begin with wh ether Minn. Stat. § 216B.02,
subd. 6, is ambiguous.

7 XLI clarifies in its reply brie f—in response to Xcel’s asse rtion that there is no dispute
that public utilities can own and offer the equipment at issue and that the only dispute is
whether the MPUC can regulate it—that it inde ed disputes Xcel’s ownership of the EV-
charging infrastructure. (XLI explains: “[T]he fact that XLI is arguing that the [MPUC]
exceeded its authority in authorizing Xcel’s ownership of infrastructure that falls outside
the definition of service is no different th an arguing Xcel cannot own and offer such
equipment or facilities—the arguments are opposite sides of the same coin.”) XLI submits
that, instead of owning the EV-charging infras tructure itself, “Xcel’ s alternative is to
operate the programs through an unregulated affiliate.” In any event, we resolve both issues
here by deciding whether “service” may include owning and maintaining the EV-charging
infrastructure.

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A. Plain meaning of Minn. Stat. § 216B.02, subd. 6

The language of a statute is ambiguous “o nly if it is susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation.” 500, LLC v. City of Minneapolis, 837 N.W.2d 287, 290 (Minn.
2013). Again, the statute defines “service” to include electricity a nd “the installation,
removal, or repair of equipment or facilities for deliverin g or measuring . . . electricity.”
Minn. Stat. § 216B.02, subd. 6.
All parties contend that Minn. Stat. § 216B.02, subd. 6, is unambiguous. XLI
contends that the statute is unambiguous because “delivering” and “measuring” of
electricity are necessar ily completed at the customer me ter. Xcel and the MPUC, on the
other hand, contend that “equipment or facilities for delivering or measuring . . . electricity”
unambiguously encompasses the EV-charging infrastructure. Conduits, wiring, and EV
chargers all deliver electricity to the electric vehicle for ultimate consumption. In addition,
the MPUC notes that many modern EV charge rs are capable of measuring the amount of
electricity used to charge a vehicle.
The dispute primarily turns on the definitions of “delivering” and “measuring.” As
for “delivering,” XLI contends that delivering electricity only means delivering electricity
to the customer at the meter , while Xcel and the MPUC inte rpret “delivering” to also
include delivering electricity to an EV at th e charging station. Similarly, XLI believes
measuring necessarily occurs at the meter, wh ile respondents assert that measuring may
occur beyond it.

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Absent a technical definition or special meaning, words in a statute are to be
construed “according to their common and approved usage.” 8 Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (2018).
“Plain meaning embodies ordinary use of th e language in the context of the whole-act
structure, applying the usual conventions of grammar and syntax.” First Nat. Bank of the
N. v. Auto. Fin. Corp. , 661 N.W.2d 668, 670 (Minn. App. 2003). When the words of a
statute are plain in their application to a pa rticular case, the cour t applies that plain
meaning. ILHC of Eagan, LLC v. County of Dakota, 693 N.W.2d 412, 419 (Minn. 2005);
see Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (“When the words of a law in their application to an existing
situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded
under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.”)
The American Heritage Dictionary most applicably defines “deliver” as “To bring
or transport to the proper place or recipient; distribute.” The American Heritage Dictionary
of the English Language 480 (5th ed. 2018). It defines “measure” as “To ascertain the
dimensions, quantity, or capacity of,” or “To allot or dist ribute as if by measuring” Id. at
1089. The administrative record reflects that the conduits, wiring, and chargers all transport
electricity to the EV for ultimate consumption. The MPUC also found that many modern
EV chargers are capable of measuring electric ity. The record supports this finding in that

8 Xcel contends that the MPUC set forth a technical definition in this case when it decided
that the EV charging infrastructure qualifies as “equipment or facilities for delivering or
measuring electricity.” Xcel argues that, because XLI offered no contrary technical
definition here, this court should accept the MPUC’s “definition.” But the MPUC’s order
does not set out any established definition of “deliver” or “measure.” It merely applies the
“service” definition to the fa cts of this case and determ ines that the EV-charging
infrastructure qualifies. Accordingly, in the absence of technical definitions from any of
the parties, we apply the common and ordinary definitions of the words in the statute.

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Xcel’s chargers for the residential pilot pr ograms are specifically designed to measure
electricity in order to eliminate the need for a second meter.
We note that, as Xcel acknowledges, its involvement with delivering and measuring
electricity typically ends at the customer meter. However, the fact that public utilities
traditionally deliver electricity to that point does not mean that they may only deliver
electricity to that point; nothing in the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 216B.02, subd. 6,
restricts delivery to the meter. If a statute omits words, courts may not read them into “an
unambiguous statute under the guise of statutory interpretation.” 328 Barry Ave., LLC v.
Nolan Props. Grp., LLC, 871 N.W.2d 745, 750 (Minn. 2015).
Xcel and the MPUC urge that analyzing “service” by applying the “whole-statute”
canon further demonstrates that the legisl ature did not intend to limit a public utility’s
involvement based on the location of the me ter. The “whole-statute canon” is a “pre-
ambiguity canon.” State v. Scovel, 916 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Minn. 2018). Under this canon,
the court must read the statute “as a whole and interpret each section in light of the
surrounding sections in an effort to avoid conflicting interpretations.” Id. (quotations and
citation omitted). Statutor y “words and sentences are to be understood in light of their
context and are not to be viewed in isolation.” Schwanke v. Minn. Dep’t of Admin. , 851
N.W.2d 591, 597 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). Xcel points to five surrounding
statutory sections that it argues show that th e legislature did not in tend “delivering and
measuring” to carry a definition limited by the customer meter.
The first is Minn. Stat. § 216B.022 (201 8), which provides that the MPUC and
public utilities may not limit the availability of submetering to building occupants. If the

16
legislature meant to prohibit the MPUC an d utilities from all act ion behind customer
meters, it argues, there would be no need for this specific behind-the-meter limitation.
The second is Minn. Stat. § 216B.1614, su bd. 2, which, as previously described,
requires that public utilities offer a tariff for purchasing electricity “solely for the purpose
of recharging an electric vehicle” and instru cts that the MPUC regulate the tariffs. The
statute directs that tariffs must incorporate the cost of “metering or submetering within the
rate charged to the customer.” Minn. Stat. § 216B.1614, subd. 2(c)(4). Xcel argues that this
directive shows that, specifically in the EV context, the MPUC’s authority over public
utility “service” includes equipment (submeters) installed on the customer’s side of the
meter.
Third, Xcel points to Minn. Stat. § 21 6B.241, subd. 3 (2018), which discusses
energy conservation improvements. Subdivisi on 3 states that “an energy conservation
improvement made to or installed in a buildin g in accordance with this section, except
systems owned by the utility and designed to turn off, limit, or vary the delivery of energy,
are the exclusive property of the owner of th e building . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 216B.241,
subd. 3. Xcel argues that this statute simila rly shows that the legislature contemplated
utility investment on the customer side of th e meter, and it provides one example that
utilities have been using for over thirty years called a “Savers Switch.”
Fourth, Xcel points to Minn. Stat. § 21 6A.05, subd. 2(2) (2018), which gives the
MPUC authority to “review and ascertain the reasonableness of tariffs of rates, fares, and
charges, or any part or classification thereo f.” “Rate,” in the cont ext of public utilities,
“means every compensation, charge, fare, toll, tariff, rental, and classification, or any of

17
them, demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any public utility for any service . . . .”
Minn. Stat. § 216B.02, subd. 5 (2018) (emphasis added). Xcel argues that the inclusion of
“rental” in the statute shows that the legislature expected that Xcel would own equipment
and facilities to rent out to customers, such as the EV chargers here.9
These statutes surrounding the statutory se ction at issue do not directly allow utility
ownership of the EV-charging in frastructure. But we agree w ith Xcel that, applying the
whole-statute canon, they do lend support to the common-usage interpretation of the statute
that the “service” that a public utility may provide is not st atutorily limited based on the
location of the meter.
To be ambiguous, a statute must be “s usceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation.” 500, LLC, 837 N.W.2d at 290. XLI asks the court to find that a reasonable
interpretation of “the installation, removal, or repair of equipment or facilities for
delivering or measuring . . . gas and electricity” in Minn. Stat. § 216B.02, subd. 6, excludes
equipment or facilities behind th e customer meter, but that assertion is not supported by
the common meaning of the words in the statute or by the statutory scheme. We accordingly
hold that Minn. Stat. § 216B.02, subd. 6, is unambiguous in that it does not impose a
limitation on the MPUC’s regulatory authority based on the location of the customer meter.

9 Xcel also points to Minn. St at. § 325F.185 (2018), which requires that all “[e]lectric
vehicle infrastructure installed in this state must . . . be capable of providing bidirectional
charging, once electrical utilities achieve a cost-effective capability to draw electricity from
electric vehicles connected to the utility grid.” Xcel argues that a public utility drawing
electricity from an electric vehicle is “optimally achieved” through the utility’s ownership
and control over the EV-charging infrastructure, further demonstrating that the meter is not
a hard boundary for utility ownership.

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B. Prior decisions

XLI argues that the MPUC’s decision here departs from three prior decisions—two
by the MPUC and one by this court—that, XL I claims, imposed a meter-based limitation
on the MPUC’s jurisdiction. XLI argues that the MPUC recognized the meter as the “point
of delivery” in In re Complaint by La ke Country Power Against Minn. Power Alleging
Violation of Its Exclusive Serv. Area by Providing Serv. To Canadian Nat. Ry. Co.
Facilities Near Hoyt Lakes, MPUC Docket No. E-015, 106/SA-17-893, at 5 (Mar. 5, 2019)
(Lake Country Power), and also interpreted “service” in general as ending at the meter in
In re Application of the Minn. Gas Co. for Au th. to Change its Schedule of Rates for Gas
Util. Serv. in Minn., MPUC Docket No. G-008/GR-80-630 (Nov. 25, 1981) (Minnegasco)
and in In re Implementation of Util. Energy Conservation Improvement Programs , 368
N.W.2d 308 (Minn. App. 1985) (In re CIP). We examine each case in turn.
In Lake Country Power , the MPUC examin ed whether Minnesota Power was
providing service outside its service area and into Lake Country’s exclusive area. Lake
Country Power, MPUC Docket No. E-015, 106/SA-17-893, at 1. A railroad that passed
through both utilities’ service areas had purchased electricity from Minnesota Power and
constructed “signal bungalows” at intervals along the track. Id. at 3. It had then endeavored
to use its own private distribution line to power bungalows located in Lake Country’s
territory. Id. The MPUC rejected Lake Country’ s claim that Minnesota Power was
providing service outside its area, explaining:
Because a utility has no cont rol over where a customer
ultimately uses electricity once delivered under its statutory
and tariff obligations, the point of delivery (i.e., the meter) is
the appropriate focus in cases of service-area straddling.

19
Absent gerrymandering, prior ag reement to the contrary, or
some overriding public-interest consideration, as long as a
utility delivers power within the utility’s own service territory,
a customer may transfer that same power over its own private
distribution network into anothe r utility’s service area for its
own use.

Id. at 5.
XLI contends that, in this decision, th e MPUC established the meter as the sole
“point of delivery.” But Lake Country Power did not involve a pub lic utility’s actions
beyond the customer meter; it involved a cust omer’s transfer of electricity beyond that
point and into anothe r utility’s service area. The MPUC determined that delivery of
electricity to the meter was the “appropriate focus in cases of service-area straddling.” Id.
(emphasis added). It did not decide whether public utilitie s can take actions beyond the
meter generally.
XLI also relies heavily on the Minnegasco matter to urge a meter-based limitation.
In Minnegasco, the MPUC evaluated whether a utility could permissibly include costs of
a “customer appliance service program,” in which the utility perfor med maintenance on
gas-consuming customer appliances, in its rate base and opera ting expenses. MPUC
Docket No. G-008/GR-80-630, at 1. The MPUC determined that maintenance on customer
appliances fell outside the scope of the defin ition of “service” in Minn. Stat. § 216B.02,
subd. 6. Id. at 6. It explained, “The servicing of customer appliances which consume gas
is clearly outside the scope of delivery or measurement at the customer’s meter. The
‘adequate, efficient, and r easonable service’ requirement of [Minn. Stat.] § 216B.04
established standards for the utility’s system, not for the customer’s property.” Id. at 7.

20
In the same decision, though, the MPUC permitted the utility to provide “leak
investigations in customer-owned piping, equipment and appliances,” as it determined that
this “safety-related portion of the program” was a utility service. Id. at 2, 7. The Minnesota
Supreme Court agreed that responding to ga s leaks in customer lines, equipment, or
appliances was part of utility services and held that the “c osts necessarily incurred when
responding to gas leaks . . . are to be included in the rate as if incurred directly by the gas
utility in furnishing utility service.” Minnegasco, 549 N.W.2d at 910.
As Xcel and the MPUC point out, neith er the supreme court’s nor the MPUC’s
Minnegasco decision definitively interpreted “service” as constrained by the meter; in fact,
both permitted utility action inspecting customer-owned piping, equipment, and appliances
behind the meter. See id.; MPUC Docket No. G-008/GR-80-63 0, at 2, 7. As respondents
also observe, the case at hand involves elec tricity—not gas—and invo lves infrastructure
that delivers and measures electricity (the conduit, wiring, and chargers)—not the ultimate
power-consuming items (appliances). The EV-c harging infrastructure here serves the
specific purpose of delivering electricity. We thus reject XLI’s argument that the
Minnegasco case compels a meter-based limitation on the MPUC’s regulatory authority.
In the third case that XLI relies on, In re CIP , this court addressed, among other
issues, whether the MPUC was required to hold a contested-case hearing before approving
a utility’s conservation impr ovement program. 368 N.W.2d at 312-13. The MPUC’s
authority to evaluate a utility’s conservation improvement program came from Minn. Stat.
§ 216B.214 (1984), and the legislature imposed informal proceedings rather than formal
contested-case proceedings in that statute . In re CIP , 368 N.W.2d at 312. But the large

21
industrial customer requesting a contested-case hearing argued that Minn. Stat. § 216B.09
(1984) required one because that section re quired the MPUC to hold a contested-case
hearing before ascertaining and fixi ng standards for public utilities “ with respect to the
service to be furnished.” Id. at 312-13. We rejected that argument. We concluded that the
“service” referred to in section 216B.09 was defined in Minn. Stat. § 216B.02, subd. 6, and
that an “energy conservation improvement” was not “service” under section 216B.02,
subdivision 6. Instead, an “energy cons ervation improvement” was separately and
explicitly defined in Minn. Stat. § 216B.2 41, subd. 1(b) (1984), as the purchase or
installation “of any device, method or material that increases the effi ciency in the use of
electricity or natural gas,” id. at 313, and no contested-cas e hearing was required for an
energy conservation improvement program.
XLI argues that, like the energy conservation improvements in In re CIP , the
infrastructure behind the meter owned by Xcel in the EV pilots does “not qualify under
Minn. Stat. § 216B.02, subd. 6, as ‘delivering or measuring electricity.’” But we did not
analyze in that case whether particular equipment and facilities “deliver[ed] or measur[ed]
electricity.” Rather, we determined that “energy conservation improvements” do not fall
within the statutory definition of “service” because they have their own statutory definition
and were accordingly governed by different st atutory subsections th at did not require a
contested-case hearing. In re CIP does not advance XLI’s argument for a meter-based
limitation.

22
C. XLI’s arguments regarding ab surdity and monopoly expansion

XLI also argues that interpreting Minn. St at. § 216B.02, subd. 6, to include the EV-
charging infrastructure would create an absu rd result and would expand public utilities’
monopoly powers onto customer premises.
As to absurdity, XLI conte nds that “extending” the definition of service beyond the
meter would lead to an absurd result in which utilities could own and rate-base all the
wiring in customers’ homes or businesses, al ong with all types of electronic charging
devices.
When interpreting a statute, courts assume that the legislature did not intend an
absurd or unreasonable result. Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (2018). “This rule of construction
applies when the words of the statute are ambiguous.” Schatz v. Interfaith Care Ctr., 811
N.W.2d 643, 651 (Minn. 2012). “It is not available to override the plain language of a clear
and unambiguous statute, except in an exceedingly rare case in which the plain meaning of
the statute ‘utterly confounds’ the clear legislative purpose of the statute.” Id.
Because Minn. Stat. § 216B.02, subd. 6, is unambiguous, we examine whether its
plain meaning “utterly confounds” the legislative purpose. See id. As the MPUC argues,
XLI’s concern about utilities profiting from al l wiring, extension cords, smartphone
chargers, and outlets seems to ignore the regulatory role of the MPUC. The MPUC points
out that “any future request by a utility to ow n and seek a return on capital investments,
regardless of whether those investments are lo cated in front of or behind the customer’s
meter, will be scrutinized by the MPUC to ensure the investments are reasonable, prudent,
used and useful in providing servi ce, and in the public interest.” See Minn. Stat.

23
§§ 216B.03, .16, subd. 6 (2018) (requiring just and reasonable public-utility rates and
describing the factors considered by MPUC in assessing whether rates are just and
reasonable). Especially in light of the MPUC ’s review of all rate-basing requests, the
absence of a meter-based lim itation for “service” does not meet the high threshold for
absurdity.
XLI also contends that “the result of the [MPUC’s] orders is an unreasonable
expansion of electric utilities’ service-territory monopolies.” It argues that allowing utility
investment beyond the meter intrudes into “non-monopoly space” and gives public utilities
the exclusive right to provid e EV-charging infrastructure to the exclusion of private
companies. For support, XLI cites Minn. Stat. §§ 216B.38, subd. 4a, and 216B.40 (2018).
Minnesota Statutes sections 216B.37 to 216B.43 govern the division of the state
into geographic service areas within which specific electric utilities may operate. Section
216B.38, subdivision 4a, defines “electric se rvice” as “electric se rvice furnished to a
customer at retail for ultimate consumption.” Section 216B.40 provides that “each electric
utility shall have the exclusive right to provide electric service at retail to each and every
present and future customer in its assigned service area and no electric utility shall render
or extend electric service at retail within the assigned service area of another electric utility”
unless an exception applies. Minn. Stat. § 216B.40.
XLI argues that the definition of “e lectric service” in section 216B.38,
subdivision 4a, which applies only to sections 216B.37 to 216B.44, necessarily includes
the definition of “service” in section 216B.02, subdivision 6, which applies to the entire
chapter. Thus, it argues, if the EV-charging infrastructure Xcel offers here is “service,”

24
section 216B.40 gives Xcel the exclusive right to offer that infrastructure within its service
area.
The MPUC argues that “electric service” in section 216B.38, subdivision 4a, and
“service” in section 216B.02, subdivision 6, are separately and distinctly defined and
should not be conflated. Xcel agrees and also contends that, even assuming that “electric
service” in section 216B.38, subdivision 4a, encompasses the service definition in section
216B.02, subdivision 6, no statute precl udes non-utilities from offering the EV-charging
infrastructure. The restriction in section 21 6B.40 only discusses u tility’s exclusive rights
as to other utilities. At most, the statute states that public utilities may not enter each other’s
exclusive service areas to provide the service at issue here.
We need not decide the meaning of “e lectric service” in section 216B.38,
subdivision 4a, or resolve the question of whether or how secti on 216B.40 would apply
here, because Xcel does not seek to exclude any competitors from providing the same EV-
charging infrastructure that it will provide under the pilots. Xcel seeks to make EV-
charging infrastructure more accessible, and EV adoption thus more affordable, to a limited
number of pilot participants in order to test assumptions about EV usage on a small scale.
We discern no violation of monopoly-regulation principles that would compel us to ignore
the plain language of section 216B.02, subd ivision 6, to limit the MPUC’s regulatory
authority here.
In sum, the MPUC has the express author ity to regulate the pilot programs at issue
because Xcel’s installation and maintenance of the conduits, wiring, and chargers in the
EV-charging pilot programs fa lls within the definition of “service” in Minn. Stat.

25
§ 216B.02, subd. 6. Because we conclude that MPUC has express statutory authority, we
need not address the question of implied authority.
II. The MPUC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it granted three
components of Xcel’s cost-recovery request.

XLI also argues, in the altern ative, that if the MPUC did have jurisdiction to regulate
the EV-charging pilot programs, the MPUC’s approval of three components of Xcel’s cost-
recovery request was arbitrary and capricious . An appellate court may find an agency’s
order arbitrary or capricious if the agency:
(a) relied on factors not intended by the legislature; (b) entirely
failed to consider an importa nt aspect of the problem;
(c) offered an explanation that runs counter to the evidence; or
(d) the decision is so implausible that it could not be explained
as a difference in view or the result of the agency’s expertise.

Citizens Advocating Responsible Dev. v. Kandiyohi Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 713 N.W.2d 817,
832 (Minn. 2006). “[I]f there is room for two opinions on a matter, the [MPUC]’s decision
is not arbitrary and capricious, even though the court may believe that an erroneous
conclusion was reached.” N. States Power Co., 775 N.W.2d at 658 (quotation omitted). If
the agency “departs from its prior norms and decisions, the agency must set forth a reasoned
analysis for the departure that is not arbitrary and capricious.” In re Review of 2005 Annual
Automatic Adjustment of Charges for All Elec. & Gas Utils., 768 N.W.2d 112, 120 (Minn.
2009).10

10 Xcel asserts that, because the MPUC was ac ting in a legislative capacity, and because
XLI does not challenge the MPUC’s “authority or fact finding,” XLI’s challenge must fail
because it has not proven that the MPUC’s decision was “ill egal by clear and convincing
evidence.” But XLI’s challenge specifically asserts a departure from previous agency
norms, and the supreme court has specified that when an agency so departs, it must “set
forth a reasoned analysis for the departure that is not arbitrary and capricious.” In re Review

26
XLI argues that the MPUC deviated from its prior decisions without providing an
explanation by ignoring cost-causation prin ciples in granting Xcel’s accounting-
classification request and waiv ing applicable CIAC provisi ons, and by approving Xcel’s
deferred-accounting request.
A. Accounting-classifica tion and CIAC waiver

XLI asserts that cost-causation is a “bed rock regulatory principle.” Cost-causation
refers to the principle that, in order to be just and reasonable, utility rates should take into
consideration the costs that sp ecific classes of customers cause the public utility to incur.
To demonstrate that cost-causa tion is an established norm, XL I refers to the “regulatory
compact” and to Minn. R. 7825.4300 (2019).
The “regulatory compact” refers to the arrangement that allows utilities to hold
monopolies within delineated se rvice areas but obligates them to provide service to all
customers in those areas at rate s that are just and reasonable. See Minn. Stat. § 216B.03.
As part of obtaining MPUC approval of significant rate changes, utilities must submit
studies that include details about the co st of service by class of customers. See Minn. R.
7825.4300.
XLI argues that the MPUC departed from cost-causation principles both by granting
Xcel’s accounting-classification requests a nd by approving a CIAC waiver. As to the
accounting-classification requests, Xcel proposed to classify its investments in make-ready

of 2005 Annual Automatic Adjustment, 768 N.W.2d at 120. XLI clarifies in its reply brief
that its challenge is “a process challenge under In re Review of 2005 Annual Automatic
Adjustment.” We are thus properly tasked with evaluating whether XLI has shown that the
MPUC departed from a norm, and, if so, whether the MPUC gave reasons for doing so that
were not arbitrary or capricious. See id.

27
infrastructure for the first two pilots as “u tility distribution plant” in its Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission distribution accounts. This accounting classification allows Xcel
to seek to include the investment amounts in ba se rates in its next general rate case. After
reviewing the comments from all interested parties, the MPUC approved this request with
modifications. It explained:
One key purpose of the pilots is to investigate the extent to
which socializing the costs of this EV-related infrastructure
will encourage EV adoption, and to measure the benefit that
increased EV adoption provides to ratepayers. This purpose
would be unattainable if Xcel were not allowed to classify
these infrastructure investments as utility distribution plant.
Therefore, Xcel’s proposal to install, maintain, and own
infrastructure is an essential and necessary part of these pilots.
As a result, it is therefore reasonable under these
circumstance[s] to authorize Xcel to classify its make-ready
infrastructure as requested. More specifically, these proposed
infrastructure investments in th e context of these pilots will
help the Commission and stakeholders evaluate the extent to
which these investments will benefit the public.

Contrary to XLI’s arguments, the above- quoted language suggests that the MPUC
indeed considered cost-causation principles—in doing so, it simply reached a decision that
XLI disagrees with. The MPUC’s reasoning r ecognizes that the pi lot programs are just
that—pilots—and are designed to test an up- and-coming area of electricity provision to
EVs. With this recognition, it distinguishes th e request in the pilot proposals to classify
investments as utility distribution plant fro m past requests. And notably, XLI has not
pointed to any prior MPUC decisions or casel aw that the pilot de cisions depart from.
Because there is “room for two opinions” on the matter, any departure regarding the
accounting classification was no t arbitrary or capricious. See N. States Power Co. , 775
N.W.2d at 658.

28
Similarly, the MPUC gave a reasoned explanation for approving the requested
CIAC waivers. A CIAC, as explained in a public comment on Xcel’s petition by the
Minnesota Department of Commerce, Divisi on of Energy Resources, is “a monetary
contribution by a customer to reduce the capital costs of connecting to or expanding service
from the system, to ensure that ratepayers pay for the costs to connect to the system, net of
the revenues they will provide.” Calculatio n of a CIAC involves taking the expected
revenue generated by a new customer and comparing it to the costs of adding that customer.
The MPUC explained that it would allow waiver of this typical charge to the customer for
pilot participants for several reasons:
The limited terms of the p ilots and their reasonable
budgets ultimately limit the impact to ratepayers. In the event
pilot budgets are reached prior to the end of the three-year term,
Xcel will not accept additional participants; the Company has
committed to staying within th e budgets proposed. Further,
Xcel has made a persuasive argument that the customer’s
CIAC contribution cannot be ac curately calculated without
knowledge of EV charging and revenues.
The Commission recognizes that the existing CIAC
policies were developed to prot ect ratepayers from excessive
and unreasonable costs. But to foster growth of EVs for the
purpose of transportation electr ification requires a forward-
thinking approach. Utilities are at the forefront of this effort.
Although the pilots could ultimately lead to an understanding
that advancing EVs requires no refinement of the traditional
cost-causation approach, such an outcome is merely one
possibility and is an issue the pilots are intended to study.
Facilitating expansio n of EVs necessarily requires the
installation of equipment not typically installed. This is a new
arena, and as Xcel aptly poin ted out, it warrants a limited
departure from ordinary practices.

The MPUC provided compelling reasons for its depa rture from the standard CIAC
approach. These reasons are consistent with the overall approval of the pilot programs,

29
which are designed to investigate the impact of EV adoption when upfront costs to
customers are mitigated. It is reasonable th at, to further this investigation, CIAC
provisions—which assign costs to the cust omer—be waived. The MPUC’s decision was
not arbitrary or capricious.
B. Deferred accounting

Deferred accounting, as the MPUC explained in its order, is “a regulatory tool used
primarily to hold utilities harmless when they incur out-of-test-year expenses that, because
they are unforeseen, unusual, and large enough to have a significant impact on the utility’s
financial condition, should be eligible for possible rate rec overy in the next rate case.”
Deferred accounting “has also been permitte d when utilities have incurred sizeable
expenses to meet important public policy mandates.” Minn. R. 7825.0300, subp. 4 (2019),
instructs that the MPUC may grant a public utility’s petition for “approval of an exception
to a provision of the system of accounts” if “good cause” is shown.
Xcel petitioned for an exception to the st andard accounting treatment of operations
and maintenance expenses and de preciation expenses related to its capital investments in
the pilots. It represented that it would request recovery of the costs in its next general rate
case, and in the meantime would track the costs in an EV tracker account established in a
separate docket.
After reviewing stakeholder input, the MPUC found that good cause existed to grant
Xcel’s deferred-accounting request. It reasoned that the “investments for which deferred
accounting is sought in this cas e are clearly intended to serve important public policy
objectives” because both the legislature and th e MPUC had “indicated that transportation

30
electrification is an important public policy goal.” The legislature expressed this goal with
the enactment of Minn. Stat. § 216B.1614, and the MPUC further prodded utilities to bring
forth proposals that would encourage EV us e following its general inquiry into EV
charging and infrastructure in Minnesota.
The MPUC also reasoned that the pilots at issue are “targeted to produce maximum
public and ratepayer benefit, wh ile having a limited ra te impact.” It went on to note that
allowing some costs to qualify for deferred accounting did not guaran tee the recovery of
those costs in the next general rate case; rather, the MPUC will later consider whether they
were reasonable and prudent and thus recoverable. It also elected to limit the timeframe
during which the costs may qualify for deferred accounting up to January 1, 2020.
XLI argues that the MPUC granted the de ferred-accounting request arbitrarily and
capriciously because its decision does not co mport with a “four-part test” previously
applied by the MPUC and because no public policy “mandate” supports the expenses
incurred.
As to the “four-part test” argument, XLI references the MPUC’s decision in In re
Petition by the Minn. Energy Res. Corp. for Approval of Farm Tap Customer-Owned Fuel
Line Replacement Plan, Tariff Am endments, & Deferred Accounting , MPUC Docket
No. G-011/M-17-409 (Nov. 30, 2017) ( MERC Petition ). There, the MPUC granted a
deferred-accounting request both because it found that the proposal at issue served “an
important policy goal,” and b ecause it found that the costs sought to be deferred were:
“(1) Related to utility operations for which ratepayers have incurred costs or received
benefits; (2) Significant in amount; (3) Un foreseen, unusual, or extraordinary; and

31
(4) Subject to review for reasonableness and prudence.” MERC Petition, MPUC Docket
No. G-011/M-17-409, at 9-10. The MPUC did not, however, suggest that these four criteria
must always be met before a deferred-accounting request may be granted. Moreover, in the
present case, the MPUC explicitly stated in its order that it was not granting Xcel’s request
for deferred accounting based on a demonstration that the “costs are unforeseen, unusual,
and significant in size,” but instead based on the policy-goal justification and the specific
facts of the case. We accordingly evaluate whether the justification actually relied upon by
the MPUC evidences arbitrary or capricious decision-making.
XLI acknowledges that the MPUC has hist orically found “goo d cause” to grant
deferred-accounting requests when utilities incur sizeable expe nses to meet important
public-policy mandates. XLI argues, though, th at (1) Xcel’s expenses are not “sizeable”
and (2) no public-policy mandate, but merely a public-policy objective, supports the pilot
programs.
XLI argues that the expenses will not be si zeable because the cost of the fleet and
public-charging pilots will account for only one -quarter of one percent of Xcel’s total
revenue. The MPUC responds that no precedent suggests th at comparison to overall
revenue is the proper measure of “sizeable,” as “[n]o expense, not even the construction of
a large generation facility, coul d possibly meet this standard .” Because XLI points to no
precedent supporting its view of “sizeable,” we defer to the agency’s discretion that the
expenses at issue qualify as such. See St. Otto’s Home v. Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 437
N.W.2d 35, 40 (Minn. 1989) (“When the agency’s construction of its own regulation is at

32
issue, . . . considerable deference is given to the agency interpretation, especially when the
relevant language is unclear or susceptible to different interpretations.”).
As to a public-policy mandate versus objec tive, XLI similarly has not shown that
the agency’s decision was arbitrary or caprici ous. In fact, in one of the decisions cited by
XLI, the MPUC referred to the proposal at issue as serving “an important policy goal”
rather than “mandate.” MERC Petition , Docket No. G-011/M-17-409 at 9 (emphasis
added). And, most importantly, the overarching question for granting deferred accounting
is whether there is “good cause” to do so; the distinction XLI relies on is of little
consequence in light of this flexible standard. We accordingly hold that XLI has not shown
that the MPUC acted arbitrarily or capricious ly in granting, with modifications, Xcel’s
request for deferred accounting.
Affirmed.