In re the Marriage of: Jennifer Perrill, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1792

In re the Marriage of: Jennifer Perrill, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Gregory High Perrill,
Respondent.

Filed December 7, 2020
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-17-734

Kay Nord Hunt, Marc A. Johannsen, Lommen Abdo, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Karim El -Ghazzawy, El -Ghazzawy Law Offices, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRYAN, Judge
In this marriage dissolution appeal, appellant asserts that the district court made the
following three errors: (1) the district court erred by finding that respondent’s efforts did
not contribute to the appreciation in value of one of respondent’s nonmarital business

2
interests; (2) the district court made unsupported factual findings concerning spousal
maintenance; and (3) the district court failed to invade respondent’s nonmarital property.
We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in making its challenged findings
regarding respondent’s efforts and regarding spousal maintenance. In addition, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to invade
respondent’s nonmarital property.
FACTS
Appellant Jennifer Perrill (wife) and respondent Gregory Perrill (husband) married
in May 2003. The parties have three children together. In early 2017, wife filed for a
divorce. The parties had a four -day trial in October 2018 on the issues of child custody,
marital property classification, and property division. Following t rial, the district court
issued its judgment and decree dissolving the marriage, determining marital and nonmarital
property, allocating assets, denying wife’s spousal maintenance request, and declining to
invade husband’s nonmarital assets. Wife filed a motion for amended findings . The
district court generally declined to amend its findings and conclusions, but it made various
amendments to correct clerical errors and revised some of its findings regarding the parties’
budgets. This appeal followed. We address the trial evidence and the findings related to
the appreciation of one of husband’s business interests, wife’s request for spousal
maintenance, and wife’s request to invade husband’s nonmarital property in light of wife’s
anticipated financial hardship.

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A. Appreciation in Value of Husband’s Interest in SecureConnect
Various witnesses testified at trial regarding husband’s interest in SecureConnect, a
company founded in 1994 by husband’s brother. Husband received an ownership interest
in the company at that time and acquired additional shares as nonmarital gifts through 2010.
In 2010, husband’s ownership interest was valued at $78,894. By the time that husband’s
brother sold the company in 201 3, however, these shares greatly increased in value and
were worth $2,481,639. The parties disputed whether husband’s efforts contributed to the
appreciation in value of husband’s interest in SecureConnect.
During the marriage, h usband was employed by another family-owned company
known as WAND Corporation . It is undisputed that husband’s employment at WAND
contributed to the development of WAND’s customer base and to that company’s growth.
In addition, multiple witnesses testified that both WAND and SecureConnect operated out
of the same building. Husband’s brother explained that both WAND and SecureConnect
used the same shipping and receiving facilities , and shared lunch and break rooms.
Throughout SecureConnect’s operations, WAND also provided “back office functions” to
SecureConnect, such as finance, accounting, human resources, and basic administration.
In the early years of SecureConnect, those following its founding in 1994, husband’s
brother confirmed that WAND’s customer list was used to generate client development
prospects for SecureConnect. After that initial period of time, however, husband’s brother
testified that market share at SecureConnect grew as a result of the efforts of “a very
extensive marketing and sales force,” distinct from WAND. Husband’s brother explained
that SecureConnect had “north of 15 people” separated into specific outreach groups, and

4
used a national account program to pursue sales. He also testified that, although WAND
and SecureConnect would pursue joint sales pitches from time to time, they would do so
with different sales teams. He explained, “[E]ach group would build and ultimately design
their own marketing collateral materials, and would present it as such. There wasn’t much
overlap there just because of the different—the difference of the products.”
When discussing husband’s role with SecureConnect, husband’s brother repeatedly
stated that husband was not involved in any SecureConnect business operations. In
addition, husband’s brother st ated that he did not rely on husband in making decisions at
SecureConnect. Instead, husband’s brother relied on the “vice president of sales role”
within SecureConnect. When asked if husband was responsible for the success of
SecureConnect, husband’s brother said no. According to husband’s brother, husband spent
“100 percent” of his workday on WAND business, did not spend time working at
SecureConnect, was not o n the organizational chart for SecureConnect, was not on the
payroll for SecureConnect, had no sales commissio n, did not sign contracts, and had no
legal authority over SecureConnect.
After trial, the district court found that the increase in value of husband’s interest in
SecureConnect from $78,894 to $2,481,639 did not result from husband’s active efforts.
Instead the district court found that although WAND and SecureConnect shared physical
space, husband was never employed by SecureConnect during the marriage, did not
manage the company, and did not contribute to its appreciation. In short, the district court
concluded that husband’s work at WAND did not sufficiently relate to SecureConnect’s
success or failure to constitute active efforts and require classification of the appreciation

5
as a marital asset. Wife moved for amended findings or new trial, restating her position at
trial that husband’s active efforts caused the increase in value of his SecureConnect shares.
The district court again disagreed, reiterated its earlier findings, and denied the request.
B. Wife’s Request for Spousal Maintenance
Wife requested $6,484 per month in permanent spousal maintenance. In addition
to trial evidence regarding the parties’ incomes, expenses, and postdissolution financial
circumstances, t he parties each submitted proposed findings with arguments related to
spousal maintenance.
Uncontested testimony at trial showed that both parties worked until the birth of
their first child in 2004. Wife then left her employment with Best Buy Co., Inc. and worked
at home supporting the family and taking care of the parties’ three children fulltime until
2014, when she returned to employment first as a contract worker, then as a salaried
employee. Husband worked until he took a one -year paid sabbatical in 2015. Husband
was out of work until 2018. The district court received Exhib it 111, a document listing
wife’s income both before and after she left the workforce. The table in this document and
wife’s testimony showed that she earned a consistent salary in the years prior to 2004 when
she left the workforce, that she reentered the workforce in 2014, and that she earned a six-
figure income by 2017:
Work Year Taxed Social Security Earnings
2017 $105,730
2016 $92,033
2015 $72,314
2014 $6,056
. . . .
2003 $49,829

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2002 $42,962
2001 $34,406
2000 $31,665

These amounts roughly correspond with the salaries listed in Exhibit 48, indicating that
wife’s salary has increased every year since she reentered the workforce. The district court
received into evidence copies of wife’s pay stubs, and w ife testified consistent with these
documents. In 2018, she earned a base salary of $103,000 and received a bonus of $24,569
for her 2017 performance.
Wife also submitted a monthly budget received into the record at Exhibit 51 and
totaling $14,424. In this exhibit, wife included a monthly grocery expense for herself
($300) and for the minor children ($600), as well as a monthly expense for restaurants for
herself ($50) and the minor children ($15 0). Wife testified that these amounts reflect her
actual expenses and the standard of living that the parties established during the marriage.
Exhibit 51 also includes printouts of online mortgage calculations showing monthly
mortgage expenses of $2,911 and $2,982 for down payments of $250,000 and $300,000
toward the purchase of a home worth $650,000 and $700,000.
Husband also submitted exhibits regarding his income and expenses. According to
his testimony and documentary evidence, such as his employment agreement, at the time
of trial, husband was self-employed as the CEO of a c ompany called Personal Computers

7
Cash Drawers, LLC , earning a gross annual salary of $120,000. 1 Husband submitted a
monthly budget at Exhibit 164, which totaled $8,693.
Based on these submissions, the district court found the following facts. At the time
of dissolution, wife was 42 years old and husband was 54 years old. Husband was self -
employed with gross annual income of $120,000. Wife was currently employed fulltime
in a management position at Best Buy with gross annual income of $103,000. Both parties
are eligible for bonuses, but the district court did not use their bonuses in its calculations.
In making its factual findings and conclusions of law regarding both child support and
spousal maintenance, the district court analyzed the partie s’ gross monthly income, not
their net monthly income. The district court did not include the child support payments
that wife was to receive in its calculation of her income when it analyzed her request for
spousal maintenance.
The district court found t hat wife’s Exhibit 51 established estimates for homes
ranging from $650,000 to $700,000 and that wife might choose to make a down payment
of $250,000 to $300,000. The district court also analyzed the parties’ proposed budgets.
The district court credited the testimony and written report of the financial planner that the
parties used in 2015. Based on this evidence, the district court found that wife’s proposed
budget overstated her reasonable expenses and did “not reflect the marital standard of
living.” For instance, after paying off the existing mortgage in 2016, the parties’ monthly

1 Before the district court, w ife requested that the district court impute annual income to
husband of $225,000. The district c ourt denied this request, and w ife does not challenge
the district court’s decision.

8
family budget totaled approximately $6,000 , well below wife’s proposed budget of
$14,424. In addition, the district court did not accept wife’s expense for real estate taxes,
which would not be owed while wife rented a residence and which would be included in
the line item for monthly mortgage payments after she has purchased a home. Similarly,
the district court rejected wife’s inclusion of an expense for home repairs , w hich wife
estimated at $9,756 per year. Given the type of home wife expected to purchase, the district
court concluded that wife was not likely to pay for such significant repair s. The district
court found that wife’s reasonable monthly expenses totaled $6,492 for herself and an
additional $1,500 for the children. The district court also reduced husband’s expenses,
finding that husband’s reasonable monthly expenses totaled $6,590 for himself plus $1,408
for the children. The district court did not include the amount of husband’s monthly child
support obligation in the list of monthly expenses.
The district court also examined wife’s ability to earn income. Although wife
forwent income during the parties’ marriage and left her position at Best Buy, the district
court found no evidence to indicate that wife’s earning capacity ha d been permanently
diminished as a result of staying home with the children. Instead, the district court found
that wife experienced a near-seamless return to employment at Best Buy and that wife does
not face any impairment to her earning capacity moving forward: “There was no credibl[e]
testimony that [w]ife’s time out of the workforce . . . in any way impairs her earning
capacity moving forward.” The district court also found t hat there was no evidence that
wife has any physical or emotional conditions that would affect her ability to work for the
next 25 years before retiring at the age of 67.

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Ultimately, the district court observed that “[w]ife presented no cash flow analysis
to support her claim for spousal maintenance,” and that “[w]ife did not introduce evidence
to support her request for maintenance .” Despite what the district court referred to as a
“dearth of evidence,” regarding the need for spousal maintenance , Minn. Stat. § 518.552,
subd. 1 (2018), the district court proceeded to analyze each of the factors enumerated in
section 518.552, subdivision 2 (2018).
The district court found that wife failed to establish that these factors supported her
request for spousal maintenance. Specifically, t he district court determined that wife did
not require an additional $6,484 each month in order to meet her needs given her ability to
independently earn income and given the assets awarded to her in the division of marital
property. The district court also concluded that wife would not need to acquire any
additional education or training to find appropriate employment, having returned to work
in 2015 and currently working fulltime in a management position.
The district court also provided a thorough description of the parties’ upper-middle
class marital standard of living. The district court determined that this standard of living
was in part subsidized by husband’s nonmarital contributions, such a s using the proceeds
from the sale of husband’s nonmarital asset to pay off the mortgage on the parties’ home ,
which the parties and the district court valued at $1,475,000. Similarly, the district court
noted that the parties’ family vacations were, in large part, paid for by husband’s family,
who have also set asid e funds for the children’s post secondary educations. The district
court characterized the parties’ spending as modest and observed that the children attend

10
public schools, leading to its conclusion that the parties cannot sus tain this standard of
living on their own postdissolution incomes.
Given wife’s previous and current employment, the district court concluded that her
experience was not outmoded and that her earning capacity had no t become permanently
diminished. In addition, the district court determined that wife’s physical and emotional
conditions did not weigh in favor of awarding spousal maintenance. Given husband’s
income, the district court also found that he did not have the ability to pay wife’s requested
amount of $6,484 in monthly spousal maintenance. Finally, since both parties contributed
to the value of the marital estate, the district court treated this factor as neutral.
In the final paragraph of its 13 -page analysis of wife’s spousal maintenance claim,
the district court noted that “[w]ife did not introduce evidence to support her request for
maintenance.” In the absence of other evidence, the district court conducted what it called
a “rudimentary calculation of net incomes” using a computer program commonly relied on
in dissolution litigation. The district court stated that the computer program determined
that “[u]sing the same gross monthly incomes as in the child support section,” if the district
court granted “[w]ife’s request for $6,484 in monthly, non-taxable spousal maintenance,”
the child support obligation would change. “Wife would owe [h]usband child support of
$516 per month.” In that scenario, “[w]ife’s net monthly income would be $12,551 (94.7%
of combined net income) and [h]usband’s net monthly income would be $709 (after receipt
of child support; 5.3% of combined net income).” The district court noted that these were
not factual findings based on the record. Instead, this reasoning was used to illustrate the
“effect of [w]ife’s request.”

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In her motion for amended findings or new trial, wife challenged the district court’s
spousal maintenance findings, re stating her position that the district court should impute
annual income to husband of $225,000. Wife also requested that the district c ourt adjust
the parties’ expenses, such as increasing the amount for rent or mortgage in wife’s budget
by $100, adding the monthly expense of $481 to reflect wife’s current car payment, and
reducing the amounts in husband’s food and grocery items to “the same level as [w]ife’s.”
Wife also requested that based on these amended findings, the district court should reverse
its denial of her spousal maintenance request and award her permanent spousal
maintenance of $4,000 per month. Wife also submitted a n affidavit with exhibits and a
memorandum of law in support of the requested changes. The district court amended the
original judgment and decree in some respects, but denied wife’s requests to impute income
to husband, to reduce his food expenditures so that they were identical to wife’s, and to
award her spousal maintenance.
C. Hardship-Based Allocation of Nonmarital Assets
Wife also asked the district court to invade husband’s nonmarital property and find
undue hardship because she is unable to provide “even a fraction of the marital standard of
living for her three sons post -divorce.” The district court de nied wife’s request because
wife has the ability “to earn approximately the same income as [h]usband.” In addition,
according to the balance sheet attached to the district court’s order at Exhibit 1, wife’s
property award included cash and securities valued at $22,678 ; her share of the marital
interest in the home valued at $162,250; her share of the marital interest in WAND valued
at $84,533 ; her vehicle valued at $9,500 ; and her share of the marital interest in the

12
retirement accounts valued at $96,465. The value of this award total ed $375,426. The
district court further explained that wife would receive a majority of the marital estate and
that fact, combined with her age, abilities, and significant income, precluded allocation of
husband’s nonmarital assets to wife.
Wife reiterated her request to invade husband’s nonmarital property in her motion
for amended findings or new trial. The district court again denied the request, noting that
wife has the ability to earn a high level of income, similar to husband. The district court
also rejected wife’s argument that the children will experience two very different,
disconnected world s unless the district court awarded wife a portion of husband’s
nonmarital property. The district court reiterated its findings that the parties spent modestly
during the marriage, and that a comparison of the marital standard of living to wife’s
postdissolution standard of living does not indicate wife has suffered an unfair hardship.
D E C I S I O N
I. Appreciation in Value of Husband’s Interest in SecureConnect
Wife argues that the district court erred when it found that husband’s efforts did not
contribute to the appreciation in value of his SecureConnect shares. Because our review
of the record does not leave us with the conviction that the district court made a mistake in
determining this fact, we affirm the district court.
Marital property is defined as “property, real or personal . . . acquired by the parties,
or either of them, to a dissolution . . . at any time during the existence of the marriage
relation between them, . . . but prior to the date of valuation.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd.
3b (2018). Property acquired by a spouse during a marriage is presumed to be marital

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property unless it meets an exception for nonmarital property. Id. Nonmarital property is
defined as “property real or personal, a cquired by either spouse . . . , which . . . (a) is
acquired as a gift, bequest, devise or inheritance made by a third party to one but not to the
other spouse; (b) is acquired before the marriage; [or] (c) is acquired in exchange for or is
the increase in value of” nonmarital property. Id.
Increases in the value of non marital property are divided i nto two types of
appreciation: active and passive. Gottsacker v. Gottsacker, 664 N.W.2d 848, 853 (Minn.
2003); Nardini v. Nardini , 414 N.W.2d 184, 193 (Minn. 1987). Active appreciation is
considered marital, whereas passive appreciation is nonmarital. Baker v. Baker , 753
N.W.2d 644, 650 (Minn. 2008). To determine whether the appreciation in the value of a
nonmarital investment is marital or nonmarital, we “look to whether the appreciation is the
result of active management.” Id. The party seeking to establish the nonmarital character
of appreciation during the marriage bears the burden to establish that the appreciation
resulted from passive efforts or gen eral market forces. Id. at 649 -50. We review
independently the issue of whether property is marital or nonmarital, “giving deference to
the district court’s findings of fact.” Id. at 649. If we are “left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made, we may find the [district] court’s decision to be
clearly erroneous, notwithstanding the existence of evidence to support such findings.”
Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted).
Wife argues that husband’s employment at WAND resulted in the success of
SecureConnect and caused the appreciation in the value of his shares. This present s a

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question of fact. Baker, 753 N.W.2d at 649.2 The district court found that husband’s work
at WAND, in or around SecureCon nect, was insufficient to tie him to SecureConnect’s
success or failure. The district court did not clearly err in making this finding. Although
the companies shared some business space, administrative functions, and facilities, the
evidence supports the finding that each company maintained independent marketing and
sales operations. In addition, the record includes evidence that husband spent 100% of his
workday on WAND business and that he was not employed by SecureConnect, was never
paid by SecureConnect , was not on SecureConnect’s organizational chart , had no legal
authority over SecureConnect, and did not participate in sales functions for SecureConnect.
On this record, w e conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that
husband’s work at WAND did not result in the appreciation in the value of SecureConnect
shares.
II. Denial of Wife’s Request for Spousal Maintenance
Wife next raises several challenges to the factual findings regarding her request for
spousal maintenance. We conclude that none of these arguments has merit . T he record
supports the district court’s factual findings regarding wife’s requested spousal
maintenance award.
Spousal maintenance is “an award made in a dissolution or legal separatio n
proceeding of payments from the future income or earnings of one spouse for the support

2 Wife does not argue that the district court misapplied the law to its findings regarding the
connection between husband’s efforts at WAND and the increase in the value of his
SecureConnect shares. Instead, wife argues that had the district court made alt ernative
factual findings, it would have classified the appreciation as a marital asset.

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and maintenance of the other.” Minn . Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3a (2018 ). A district court
may award spousal maintenance if it first finds that the spouse seeking main tenance does
not have sufficient property or resources to provide for his or her reasonable needs or is
unable to self-support, taking into consideration the marital standard of living and any other
relevant circumstances. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1(a )-(b) (2018); see also Curtis v.
Curtis, 887 N.W.2d 249, 251-52 (Minn. 2016). Next, the district court determines whether
to award the requested amount and duration of spousal maintenance. In doing so, t he
district court considers the following factors: the financial resources of the party seeking
maintenance; whether additional education or training is nec essary in order to find
appropriate employment; the marital standard of living; the duration of the marriage and
the period of time the party seeking maintenance has been absent from employment;
whether the earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance has become permanently
diminished; any loss of earnings and other employment opportunities by the party seeking
maintenance; the age and physical and emotional condition of th e party seeking
maintenance; the ability of the payor spouse to meet needs while paying maintenance; and
the contribution of each party to the acquisition of marital property and the furtherance of
the other party’s employment. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2018). The party seeking
maintenance has the burden to show the need for maintenance and to show that the statutory
factors weigh in favor of the request. Curtis, 887 N.W.2d at 252; Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569
N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997).
We review factual challenges regarding spousal maintenance for clear error. Minn.
R. Civ. P. 52.01 (stating that findings of fact “shall not be set aside unless clearly

16
erroneous”); Gessner v. Gessner, 487 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn. App. 1992) (“Fi ndings of
fact concerning spousal maintenance must be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.”).
“Findings of fact are clearly erroneous where an appellate court is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279,
284 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). We view the record in the light most favorable to
the district court’s findings. Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. App.
2000). “That the record might support findings other than those made by the [district] court
does not render the findings clearly erroneous . . . .” Robert v. Zygmunt, 652 N.W.2d 537,
544 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Dec. 30, 2002).
In this case, w ife argues that the district court made the follo wing errors in its
findings of fact :3 (1) the district court understated husband’s net income; ( 2) the district
court used husband’s child support obligation and wife’s child support income to deny
spousal maintenance ; (3) the district court understated wi fe’s anticipated mortgage
expense; (4) the district court found that husband’s family subsidized the marital standard
of living; and (5) the district court found that wife’s e arning capacity has not become
permanently diminished.4

3 Wife does not argue a misapplication of law. Instead, wife argues that had the district
court adopted wife’s proposed findings, the factors would have weighed in wi fe’s favor.
Such arguments present questions of fact.
4 Wife also challenges the food and grocery expense amounts, arguing they should be
identical. Wife argues that it is not reasonable to permit one spouse to list food and grocery
expenses that differ from the other spouse’s expenses. Wife cites to no legal authority,
however, requiring identical expenses or holding that unequal expenses are unreasonable.
Nor does wife argue that this is an issue of first impression. We need not address legal
arguments that are not adequately briefed. State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel
Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997); see also, e.g., Melina v. Chaplin , 327

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First, wife argues that the district court understated husband’s net income in denying
wife’s spousal maintenance claim. We are not persuaded.
As a preliminary matter, wife’s argument mischaracterize s the district court’s
decision. Paragraph XII, title d “Parties’ Income and Empl oyment,” includes t he district
court’s findings regarding the incomes of the parties. In this paragraph, the district court
determined the gross income for the parties and made no reference or finding regarding net
income. The district court determined that husband’s gross monthly income was $10,000.
Wife’s argument apparently stems from the district court’s comments in the final paragraph
of its 13-page analysis of wife’s spousal maintenance claim . The district court noted that
“[w]ife did not introduce evidence to support her request for maintenance.” In the absence
of this evidence, the district court referred to a “rudimentary calculation of net incomes”
that the district court conducted . The district court noted that these were not factual
findings based on the record. Instead, this reasoning was used to illustrate the “effect of
[w]ife’s request.” Contrary to wife’s argument, the reference to net incomes in the district
court’s illustration does not conflict with or undermine the definitive income findings that
the district court made in Paragraph XII.
In addition, the district court did not clearly err in making the income findings in
Paragraph XII. Wife’s pay stubs and testimony support the district court’s finding that her
gross annual income is $103,000. Similarly, husband’s testimony and husband’s

N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982) (declining to address issue not adequately briefed ). In the
absence of legal authority to support her position, we decline to adopt such a requirement
in this case.

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employment agreement support the district court’s finding that his gross annual income is
$120,000. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s findings,
we are not left with the conviction that the district court made a mistake in its income
findings. Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at 284; Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 472.
Second, wife argues that the district court improperly considered child support when
making its spousal maintenance findings. Again, we do not agree because wife’s argument
mischaracterizes the district court’s decision. Contrary to wife’s argument, the district
court did not include husband’s monthly child support obligation in his list of expenses and
did not include wife’s receipt of monthly child support payments as part of her income.
To the extent that wife again relies on the district court’s comments in the final
paragraph of its lengthy analysis, we conclude this reliance is misplaced. As noted above,
while the district court accounted for child support when it conducted a “rudimentary
calculation of net incomes,” it did so as an illustration of what could happen if the district
court granted wife’s spousal maintenance request and not as a factual finding based on the
record. In addition, the district court noted that “[c]onsidering [w]ife’s request for $6,484
in monthly, non-taxable spousal maintenance, the calculation shows that [w]ife would owe
[h]usband child support of $516 per month and that [w]ife’s net monthly income would be
$12,551.” According to the rudimentary calculation, husband’s net monthly income would
be $709, “after receipt of child support.” In this calculation, wife’s receipt of $6,484 in
spousal main tenance causes the change in child support. Therefore, the rudimentary
calculation performed by the district court did not consider child support before
determining spousal maintenance as wife argues.

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Third, wife argues that the district court erred in finding that her monthly mortgage
expense of $2,982 is reasonable. Specifically, wife argues that the district court determined
the reasonableness of her mortgage expense by assuming that with her property award,
wife could purchase a $700,000 home using a $300,000 down payment. Wife asserts that
she was not awarded property sufficient to fund the down payment on which she based her
mortgage expense. We are not persuaded that the district court erred. The exhibit that wife
submitted containing her printouts of online mortgage calculations show monthly expenses
of $2,911 and $2,982 for down payments of $250,000 and $300,000 toward the purchase
of a home worth $650,000 and $700,000. This exhibit, together with wife’s testi mony,
indicate that wife intended to purchase a home within this price range using a down
payment within this anticipated range. In addition, we observe that wife’s property award
totaled $375,426. Even a fter excluding the value of her vehicle and retire ment accounts,
wife would have $269,461 available for an anticipated down payment . This amount falls
within the contemplated range, and wife’s property award is not the only possible source
for wife’s anticipated future down payment. Given wife’s financial circumstances and the
value of her property award, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err when it
accepted wife’s stated monthly mortgage expense of $2,982 instead of some higher
amount. The district court did not understate wife’s mortgage expense.
Fourth, w ife argues that the district court erred in finding that husband’s family
subsidized the marital standard of living. The record supports the district court’s findings.
For instance, the trial testimony established that husband’s f amily paid for many of their
family vacations. In addition, the parties lived in a home that they remodeled for over ten

20
years prior to purchasing their current home. Wife testified that they were able to purchase
their current home in large part due to husband’s nonmarital interest in their previous home
and due to the SecureConnect sale proceeds, which, as discussed above, are nonmarital.
Apart from the home, the record supports that the parties’ lived on a budget of $6,000 per
month for the entire family. The affluent lifestyle emphasized by wife was relatively short
lived and primarily due to husband’s nonmarital assets. See Robert, 652 N.W.2d at 545
(affirming district court’ s den ial of request for spousal maintenance because the high
standard of living during the marriage was relatively short lived). The district court did
not clearly err in its findings regarding the marital standard of living.
Fifth, wife argues that the district court erred when it found that she stopped working
during the marriage “to be at home with the children.” The district court made this finding
as part of its analysis of the fourth statutory factor. See Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(d).
Wife contends that she stopped working to support husband’s career, not out of a desire to
spend more time with the children. For purposes of reviewing this factual finding, we need
not determine the precise reason or combination of r easons why wife left the workforce
because application of this factor does not hinge on the motives behind wife’s absence from
employment.5 Instead, the statute requires findings regarding the effect that the absence

5 Wife does not challenge the district court’s findings relating to the eighth statutory factor:
“the contribution of each party in the acquisition , preservation, depreciation, or
appreciation in the amount or value of the marital property, as well as the contribution of a
spouse as a homemaker or in furtherance of the other party’s employment or business.”
Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(h). The motives for leaving the workforce could be relevant
to application of this factor, if the parties disputed whether the decision to leave the
workforce was “in furtherance of the other party’s employment.” Here, the district court
concluded that this factor was neutral because both parties contributed to the accumulation

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may have had on wife’s earning capacity. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(d). In this case,
after her absence from the workforce, wife returned to employment in a management
position with her previous employer. The documentary and testimonial exhibits establish
that wife’s income since her return to the workforce greatly exceeds her income prior to
her absence. In t he four years prior to her absence, wife earned between $31,665 and
$49,829 annually. In contrast, after reentering the workforce, wife earned between $72,314
and $105,730 annually, and according to wife’s testimony and pay stubs, her annual gross
2018 salary was approximately $103,000, plus a bonus of $24,569 for her 2017
performance. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s
findings, we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court made a
mistake in finding that wife’s earning capacity has not become permanently diminished.
In sum, the record supports the challenged findings and we conclude that the district
court did not clearly err when it made its findings concerning spousal maintenance.
III. Undue Hardship
Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to invade
husband’s nonmarital assets to prevent wife from experiencing an undue financial

of the marital estate. Specifically, the district court found that “[w]ife left the workforce
to care for the parties’ children and household. She managed the children’s medical,
educational, and religious care when she stayed home with them.” The court also found
that wife became the “primary income -earner” after husband took a “one -year paid
sabbatical in 2015.” We need not review the findings or conclusions regarding th e eighth
statutory factor because wife’s challenge only relates to the fourth statutory factor: the
effect of wife’s absence from employment on her earning capacity.

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hardship. Because there is not a severe financial disparity between the parties, the district
court did not abuse its discretion.
A district court may award nonmarital property of one spouse to the other spouse,
but only if “the court finds that either spouse’s resources or property . . . are so inadequate
as to work an u nfair hardship.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 2 (20 18). I f a district court
apportions nonmarital property, it must make findings on “all relevant factors including the
length of the marriage, any prior marriage of a party, the age, health, station, occup ation,
amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, needs,
and opportunity for future acquisition of capital assets and income of each party.” Id; see
also Ward v. Ward, 453 N.W.2d 729, 733 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. June
6, 1990). While a district court generally enjoys broad discretion regarding the division of
property in marriage dissolutions, Hein v. Hein, 366 N.W.2d 646, 649 (Minn. App. 1985),
that discretion is narrower in the nonmarital-property-division context. Stageberg, v.
Stageberg, 695 N.W.2d 609, 618 (Minn. App. 2005), review denied (Minn. July 19, 2005).
“A very severe disparity between the parties is required to sustain a finding of unfair
hardship necessary to apportion nonmarital property.” Ward, 453 N.W.2d at 733. In fact,
it is “an unusual case where nonmarital property is distributed.” Dammann v. Dammann,
351 N.W.2d 651, 653 (Minn. App. 1984) (concluding that respondent suffered no hardship
because she was ten years younger than appellant, earned more money, was healthy, and
neither party owed substantial liabilities) ; see also Robert, 652 N.W.2d at 546 (affirming
denial of request to invade respondent’s nonmarital property because although
respondent’s financia l circumstances we re significantly better due to substantial

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nonmarital holdings, appellant was in good health, possessed marketable skills, and was
able to meet his reasonable expenses); Wolter v. Wolter, 395 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Minn. App.
1986) (reversing decision to invade appellant’s nonmarital property and concluding that
respondent did not suffer from economic hardship because she received $160,000 in
marital property and had net annual income of approximately $21,600); Hanson v. Hanson,
378 N.W.2d 28 , 30 (Minn. App. 1985) (affirming district court’s invasion of appellant’s
nonmarital property where appellant had a net worth of a pproximately $1 million, while
respondent could barely speak English, lacked employable skills, and had a net worth of
$5,000); Frederiksen v. Frederiksen, 368 N.W.2d 769, 775 (Minn. App. 1985) (affirming
district court’s invasion of appellant’s nonmarital property where appellant was a
successful farme r, while respondent suffered from serious emotional and physical
problems and had no marketable skills).
In this case, wife maintains that she is in such a disproportionate financial situation
that she will experience an unfair hardship , requiring reversal. We are not persuaded.
Unlike the requesting spouses in Hanson and Frederiksen, wife received a property award
valued at $375,426 ( a majority of the marital estate ), earns a six -figure income, and has
experienced few, if any, barriers to her employability . While there is some financial
disparity in the value of the parties’ nonma rital property, this is not a situation where one
spouse lacks marketable skills or where one spouse has an ability to earn significantly more
than the other . Instead, wife is more similar to the requesting parties in Robert, Wolter,
and Dammann. W e conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it

24
determined that wife did not demonstrate that her resources were “so inadequate as to work
an unfair hardship.”
Affirmed.